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ABSTRACT
REVISIONIST ZIONISM IN AMERICA: THE CAMPAIGN TO WIN PUBLIC
SUPPORT 1939-1948
by
Joanna Maura Saidel
University of New Hampshire, December, 1994
Shortly before the outbreak of World War II, followers of the
Zionist Revisionists went to the United States at the urging of their
leader, Vladim ir Jabotinsky. They established two groups which
initially attempted to gain public support for the creation of a Jewish
Army.
The New Zionist Organization of America, headed by Benzion
Netanyahu, followed the Revisionist political party. Its campaign
exposed the anti-Jewish position of the British in Palestine. It was
effective in placing the Palestine problem on the world (rather than
regional) agenda of the State Department
The Irgun Delegation to the United States, headed by Hillel
Kook (Peter Bergson), acted independently, in defiance of the
Revisionist political party. While assisting in some rescue work for
the underground Irgun Z’vai Leumi, the American delegation did
work which was prim arily political and educational.
Though independent of one another, the efforts of both groups
vi
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heightened public awareness of the extermination o f European
Jewry. They created a nationwide advertisement campaign which
pressured the United States government through growing public
support They fought for a Jewish Army and later for statehood. They
were the pioneers of the Jewish lobby in America.
The Irgun Delegation provided intelligence to the United States
in World War II and aided in the rescue of American airmen. They
also helped to forestall the pro-Arab policy of Franklin Roosevelt His
allegiance and promises to Ibn Saud resulted from wartime national
security concerns which necessitated Saudi oil concessions and
guarantees for an American air base at Dharan.
The Irgun Delegation to the United States and the New Zionist
Organization of America have generally been overlooked, or
incorrectly described, in American Jewish historiography. Personal
interviews, F.B.I. files, and government documents confirms that
they were two distinct, independent organizations having different
philosophies and goals. They remained neutral toward one another
until Hillel Kook called for a democratic (rather than Jewish) state in
Palestine. This resulted in charges that the Irgun Delegation was
anti-Zionist and in an open attack by the NZO. The antagonism which
existed between the two groups was never totally resolved.

vii
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1
INTRODUCTION

This dissertation traces the development of the Revisionist
Zionist movement in America from 1939 to 1948. It begins With a
survey of the history of Zionism, its meaning, origins, leaders, and
development Biblical, political, geopolitical, and socialist Zionism are
discussed in this section, which provides background material for the
second chapter, “Revisionist Zionism Comes to America.”
Leaders o f the Revisionist movement decided, in 1939, that it
would be beneficial to their cause to campaign in America. It was
believed that only there could enough influence be exerted to force
the British to change their position on Palestine. Revisionists thought
that, as British power waned, America would become the world
leader and could, thereby, help the Zionist cause.
The two most im portant groups w ithin the Revisionist
movement to undertake this mission

were the New Zionist

Organization of America, an affiliate of the Revisionist political party,
and the Irgun Delegation to the United States, which was sent by the
Revisionist m ilitary arm, the Irgun Z’vai Leumi, in Palestine. While
the former organization was political, philosophical and activist, the
latter was also activist but had no attachment to the political party,
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operating rather as a practical m ilitary organization, for the most
part independently under various names. These included The
Committee for a Jewish Army, The Hebrew Committee for National
Liberation, and The American Friends for a Free Palestine. The leader
of the New Zionist Organization was Benzion Netanyahu. The Irgun
Delegation to the United States was headed by Hillel Kook, who was
known in the United States as Peter Bergson.
Both groups came from the Jabotinsky school of thought which
envisioned a Jewish national home in Palestine on both sides of the
Jordan, with mass Jewish immigration and settlement. Jabotinsky
was the head of the Revisionist party and also the head of the Irgun,
although these were two independent organizations. While both
groups came from the body of Revisionist Zionism neither believed
that the Irgun Delegation to the United States was Revisionist in a
political sense.
Jabotinsky visited America several times before 1939 but,
despite his ever growing popularity in Eastern Europe, he failed to
get support. American Jewry was firm ly under the control of Chaim
Weizmann, president of the World Zionist Organization, and American
Zionist leaders like Rabbi Steven Wise.
The first major campaign undertaken by both the New Zionist
Organization and the Irgun Delegation was the drive to gain public
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support for the creation of a Jewish Army. Both groups utilized
similar methods to gain this support. Particularly, they applied the
innovative practice of running full page political advertisements in
newspapers throughout the country. They also held mass rallies, and
applied intense efforts to gain the support of public officials,
congressmen, and members o f the Roosevelt and Truman
administrations. These were some of the first major Jewish lobbying
efforts in the United States.
Chapter three, “The Campaign for a Jewish Army,” discusses
the methods and tactics employed by the groups. It also emphasizes
the reasons why such an army would be important to America and
its Allies, as well as the reasons why Britain opposed such a force.
The Zionists believed that the defense of Palestine and the
“World Island” was crucial to the Allied success o f the war. The
creation of a Jewish Army would have immediate benefits for the
Allies and long term benefits for the Zionists. Palestine was at the
center of the “World Island,” that is, at the crossroads to Asia, Africa,
and Europe. It was the focal point of a major drive by the Axis
powers. Not only could they win the war by taking this area (they
were already in the Caucasus’, the Baltic, the Pacific, Europe and
North Africa) but by obtaining this area would capture the Suez
Canal and gain access to Middle East oil fields. By establishing a force
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of 200,000 dedicated Jewish opponents to H itler who were fam iliar
with the terrain, the British could afford to withdraw reinforcements,
bring them home or station them elsewhere; and, by being in place
(i.e. not needing to be transported to their destination) a Jewish army
could play a vital part in the war effort
There were also long term benefits for the Zionists which the
British were well aware o f and which ultim ately prohibited the
creation of the force. The Jews of Palestine would become a strong,
armed fighting force able to defend themselves and to force the
British out of Palestine at the end of the war. The Jewish Army
would, in effect, become the Army of Israel. Although the Jewish
Army effort did not succeed, despite years of campaigning, it did
result in the creation of the Jewish Brigade.
Chapter four focuses on the American political response to the
Bermuda Conference on Refugees and to the ad campaign publicized
by the Irgun Delegation in reaction to this Conference. The Irgun
Delegation called the conference a mockery and a sham. Their
response to the it, though accurate, caused their organization and
reputation to suffer greatly because of the inept timing o f their
dynamic ad campaign. Had they been a bit more patient and careful
it could have been extremely successful. As it turned out they
released a shocking fu ll page ad before the official report on the
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Conference was issued. Because the names of many important
officials and congressmen were attached to this ad without their
consent, those persons were greatly angered and decried the Irgun
Delegation publicly and on the Senate floor. The group lost many
sponsors, including Harry Truman, because of this error in planning.
The fifth chapter details the fight fo r a Jewish State. This
section begins with the Hoskins Affair. Mr. Hoskins, aide to President
Roosevelt, pressed for a joint Anglo-American declaration which
would, in effect, stifle the Palestine question during the war and
make a decision on Palestine depend upon Arab agreement. He
advised that unless this was done there would be civil war which
would endanger Allied war efforts. Only by a united Zionist lobbying
effort was the Hoskins proposal overcome.
The ad campaign, letters to the President, rallies, and marches
(such as the march of 400 Orthodox rabbis on Washington in October
1943)

of the Irgun Delegation brought pressure to bear on the

adm inistration. Simultaneously, the New Zionist Organization
continued to expose British aspirations in Palestine, to criticize that
government’s policy and to push for a nationwide boycott of British
goods. At the same time it made important inroads into the U.S.
government by its persistent well planned campaign.
Other Irgun Delegation efforts included the plan by Dr. Alex
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Raphaeli to establish an o ff shore radio station to broadcast news
about the Holocaust to Europe. This is an interesting story which
shows some of the problems faced by the Irgun in their contacts with
the U.S. government. Other problems with the government are also
discussed, particularly the efforts of Cordell Hull to have the F.B.I.
investigate H illel Kook and his group. The F.B.I. did conduct an
investigation of the Hebrew Committee for National Liberation and
looked into the status o f Kook, his organizations, and their right to
solicit funds in America. The findings of these queries are found in
this chapter.1
This section also concentrates on the Irgun’s activities in
Palestine, particularly the murder of Lord Moyne and the bombing of
the King David Hotel, both of which had international repercussions.
It was by the relentless, determined but unpopular action of the
Irgun and Lechi that the British were forced to abandon the Mandate
and turn the Palestine problem over to the United Nations. The Irgun
Delegation to the United States was responsible for participating in
some of these missions and for funding certain operations such as the
purchase of the ship, Altalena , which was loaded with arms by the
Irgun and brought to Palestine, only to face a grim end.
The negative effects of these actions are also stated, including
charges by Abba Eban that the actions of the underground resulted
1 Chapter eight also contains material on the F.B.I. findings.
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in the postponement o f statehood (i.e. of a partition plan scheduled
for December 1944). It is unlikely that his scenario would have
materialized.
The chapter moots the position taken by the United States
government regarding the formation of the Jewish state, articulates
the pros and cons o f supporting the plan, discusses a plan for
cantonization and the rejection of the Morrison-Grady Plan, and
examines the role which the Revisionist Zionists in America played in
shaping the final destiny of the Jewish state
Chapter six, “Rescue and Partition,” describes some o f the
practical work o f the Irgun Delegation and the accomplishments it
made in financing and purchasing rescue vessels. Menachem Begin
became angry at the Irgun Delegation for this diversion of funds. He
thought they should have been used at the front rather than for the
purchase of a few vessels. The relations between the American and
Palestinian branches o f the Irgun deteriorated.
In January 1947 British Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin, stated
his position on Palestine in a cabinet paper which he sent to Prime
Minister Attlee. It said, “Without the Middle East and its oil

[I see]

no hope of being able to achieve the standard of living at which we
were aiming in Great Britain.”2

His plan was to have Palestine

2 Years of Wrath. Davs o f Glory. Yitshak Ben Ami, New York: Shengold
Publishers, Inc., 1983, p. 398.
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replace Egypt as the headquarters for the Im perial Forces in the
region. Thereby, the communications, oil supplies and the strategic
geopositioning of the British would be maintained and protected.
However, on February 18th the Palestine question was turned
over to the United Nations. There is speculation on the reasons why
Britain let the Mandate go to the U.N. These are presented in this
chapter. The debate over partition continued within the government
and in Jewish circles until the U.N. vote on Palestine in November
1947.
The position o f the U.S. State Department official, Loy
Henderson, and his connection with Benzion Netanyahu are also
discussed. Although Henderson was considered to be an opponent of
Zionism, this chapter portrays a different picture of his position and
of the changing views within the Department itself. While the State
Department had been firm ly opposed to Jewish statehood, Benzion
Netanyahu’s influence on Henderson may have paved the way to
changes in State Department policy, particularly as the U.S. - Soviet
conflict heated up.
Hillel Kook (Peter Bergson) continued to press for immediate
action from the government to support a Jewish state (rather than
partition) in Palestine. President Truman

become increasingly

irritated by the pressure which the Jews put upon him. “According
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to the diaries of Henry Wallace, at a period o f particular pressure he
exclaimed at a cabinet meeting in mid-1946, “If Jesus Christ couldn’t
satisfy them here on earth, how the hell am I supposed to?” He
added later, “I have no use for them and I don’t care what happens
to them.”3
Following the decision to partition Palestine, Hillel Kook (Peter
Bergson) continued to petition President Truman to arm the Jews so
that American forces would not have to be sent to Palestine to quell
the fighting.
Chapter 7, “Begin’s Visit to the United States,” demonstrates
the problem the U.S. government had in deciding whether to allow an
alleged terrorist onto American soil. This political and diplomatic
problem was also influenced by the public debate on the subject.
Despite recommendations that Begin be banned from the United
States, there was support for the visit. Mr. Begin was the head of
the strongest opposition party in Israel. His party was also rightist
and anti-communist. It was possible that the party would become
the controlling power in Israel in which case, if the United States did
not grant him the visa, they would be excluding the future Prime
Minister of Israel.
This is followed by a chapter about the extent and range of the
3 Spiegel. The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America’s Middle East
Policy, from Truman tq Reagan, p. 20.
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workings and contacts of the Irgun Delegation to the United States,
and its connections with Reuben Hecht in Europe. The archives of Dr.
Reuben Hecht are important to the study of Revisionist Zionism in
America because they clearly show the place which the Irgun
Delegation to America held in the overall scheme of Jewish efforts to
save victims of the Holocaust Hecht’s papers
point to a major lacuna in the historiography of attempts
made to rescue Jews from the Holocaust. The scholarly
literature on the subject has been dominated by a tendency
to emphasize the rescue efforts undertaken by the
“establishment” Jewish and Zionist groups, such as the Jewish
Agency, the Institute for Illegal Im m igration, and the
American Joint Distribution Committee, and not those of their
rivals, the “dissident” organizations.4
Here the Irgun’s association with the American Consul General
in Switzerland, Samuel Edison Woods, is established. He and Hecht
collaborated to rescue Allied airmen and to coordinate efforts to
rescue Jews. The primary advantage of this relationship for the Irgun
Delegation in America was that it provided a direct contact between
the underground and the White House, rather than through the
official intelligence center in Bern headed by the Zionist opponent,
Allen Dulles.
Hecht evaluated the work of the Irgun Delegation to America in
a very positive light. When Hecht was asked, during a war trial in
4Introduction, Archives o f the Holocaust . Hecht Archive-Universitv of
Haifa, p .ix .
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1954, what he believed contributed to bring the most pressure on
the United States to help the Jews he credited Hillel Kook’s group,
saying, “I think that the great pressure was carried out by the large
advertising campaign in the press and the mass meetings of the
“Hebrew Committee.” 5
This chapter also demonstrates the continuing difficulties in
trying to get help from the American government to bomb the
railways and crem atoria at Auschwitz. Hecht testified that
Eisenhower and McClelland refused

to take such action on the

grounds that they were not flighting a Jewish war and that they did
not want the Germans to think that the Americans perceived it as
such.
Samuel Edison Woods helped to stop the British blockade of
arms and immigration ships to Palestine. These contacts were also
successful in getting intelligence concerning the planned Nazi
invasion of England.

Hecht and Woods helped to bring American

pilots and captains o f the A ir Force, who were interned in
Switzerland, to freedom and to prepare suggestions for psychological
warfare against the Germans. Woods nominated Reuben Hecht for the
American Medal of Freedom.
From evidence in this chapter it is possible to conceive that the
long delayed charges against Hillel Kook (Peter Bergson) in the
8 Hecht Archive, p. 176.
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United States (i.e. regarding his alien status) and the casual attitude
toward him taken by the F.B.I. (their reluctance to investigate his
activities and status) were, in reality, because he was seen as an
asset to the American war effort.
Kook’s fund raising work in America was essential to the rescue
work of Reuben Hecht and W illiam Perl. The Irgun Delegation
partially funded the S.S. Sakarya, the S.S. Pencho, and other rescue
missions. Kook and Hecht worked hand in hand.
The position of Reuben Hecht proved to be convenient for the
Irgun Delegation in America in other ways. The Hebrew Committee
for National Liberation needed, for their political work, money in
France and other

places.

Reuben Hecht was essential to the

movement of these funds. Hillel Kook arranged for him to be Consul
in order to be able to bring gold from Switzerland to Paris, and to
have a free travel possibility.
When asked, in 1982, what the major contribution of the Irgun
and people like Hillel Kook made, and what deserved historical
emphasis, Hecht replied, “I think that the battle of the Irgun, not I
think, Churchill said it, that the Irgun was one of the reasons that the
British left Palestine.”6 Hecht also stated his belief in the importance
and effectiveness of the propaganda of the Hebrew Committee in
America.
8Hecht Archive, p. 467.'
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Chapter nine of this study calls into question the motives for
President Roosevelt’s lack of efforts to help the Jewish victims of the
Holocaust. It may be that Roosevelt was more interested in obtaining
and retaining the loyalty of Ibn Saud, oil concessions and the rights
to the Dharan air base than he was in assisting the abandoned Jews.
His interests in Saudi Arabia were based on

national security

concerns. Oil was instrumental in fueling the war and the air base
was a necessary stopover and fueling point for American war efforts
in the Pacific. He may, therefore, have considered these to be
overriding concerns. Ibn Saud was adamantly opposed to a Jewish
state in Palestine. Agreements for oil and Dharan may have been
contingent on Roosevelt’s isolation from the Jewish problem.
The simultaneous development of a dual U.S.-Israeli, U.S.-Saudi
defense policy was directly affected by Revisionist Zionist efforts in
America. Had these efforts failed and had the Revisionists not
pressed the Jewish issue by drawing major public attention to it the
United States may have adopted a purely pro-Arab policy,
guaranteeing access to oil and to strategic m ilitary positions without
the complications of support for the Jewish State. The public outcry
however, which resulted in part from the activities of the Revisionist
Zionists and the Irgun Delegation in America, called attention early
on (1939-1942) to the plight o f the European Jews, later (1942-
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1945) to the moral responsibility of the U.S. government to help save
them, and, finally (1945-1948) urged the U.S. government to support
and defend a Jewish State in the Near East. The defense of Israel by
the U.S. government not only sustained the creation of a democracy
in the region but in later years helped to balance the growing power
of the Arab nations, to repulse Soviet aggression, and to maintain U.S.
hegemony in the region.
The United States dual policy of support for both Jerusalem /
Tel Aviv

and Mecca / Riyad would become the fulcrum of an

ongoing balancing act to maintain peace in the region.
Chapter ten examines problems of terminology. Particularly, it
faces the problem of who was a Revisionist and who was not. It
presents the views of those involved and argues that, despite
negation on both sides, the Irgun delegation were Revisionists,
having come from the Revisionist Zionist school of thought. This does
not, however, deny that they had no affiliation to the Revisionist
political party, that they operated independently, and that they were
essentially a m ilitary, not a political, organization. Each group sees
itself as being the bearer of truth and as the most effective voice on
the American scene, sometimes begrudgingly attributing credit to
the other for unquestionable successes. They openly call each other
liars and deceivers. The members of these two groups and those
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interviewed from Labor and Lechi are all powerful characters,
intelligent, with strong opinions. They have dedicated their lives to
their beliefs and are not afraid to express their views. While each
holds his own viewpoint to be the truth it seems that there is some
truth to all of their views. Each, with one exception, seems to be
correct in their view. Their combined work, though criticized by
each other, was effective on a broad scale, in ultimately bringing
forth the creation of the State. They succeeded in applying enough
public pressure, by drawing attention to the plight of the Jews, to
demand worldwide support for the Jewish State.
The antagonism which existed between the two groups was
never totally resolved. American Revisionists alleged that the Irgun
Delegation deviated from the leadership of Jabotinsky, ( i.e. their
decision to act independently in America, to act as a military rather
than political entity, and to establish a democratic, rather than a
Jewish State in Palestine.) The decision to support a democratic state
was the determining factor in Benzion Netanyahu's decision to launch
an attack on the Irgun Delegation. The democratic state idea
belonged to Hillel Kook and was not supported by all members of the
Irgun delegation. Dr. Alex Raphaeli and Yitshak Ben Ami opposed the
idea. Because of Kook’s position as leader of the delegation the idea
was presented publicly as that of the whole group. This proved to be
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a very contentious point
The final chapter of this dissertation discusses the effects of the
Irgun Delegation to the United States and the New Zionist
Organization of America on U.S. public opinion and on American
foreign policy. It argues that their work stirred and challenged the
American public, forcing additional pressure on the government to
help the Jews o f Europe and later to support a Jewish state in
Palestine. It also argues that the work of the Irgun Delegation may
have been effective in forestalling an outright pro-Arab policy, while
the work of the New Zionist Organization (NZO) exposed the British
intentions in Palestine.
The activist role of both groups forced mainstream Zionists,
who had isolated themselves, to reexamine their position and
eventually drove them out of their silence, forcing them to adopt
some of the policies of the NZO and Irgun delegation. Emboldened by
the successes of these groups in America, it has been contended that
Wise and Silver pressed President Truman and David Niles to resist
the State Department and to stand solidly for the creation of a Jewish
State. Wise and Silver did not acknowledge the work of Kook and the
Irgun until the late 1940’s. One may be certain however that the
rabbis used to their advantage every opportunity which resulted
from the work of this group.
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The Irgun Delegation and the New Zionist Organization may
have been the main forces to originate and stimulate a powerful
Jewish lobby in America. They positively affected the creation of the
only democracy in the Near East. Had the Zionists been more passive
it is possible that a Jewish State in Palestine would not have resulted.
Palestine would have remained in British hands or become an Arab
entity.
In the final analysis the disunity within the Zionist ranks in
America was actually beneficial to some degree. Their independence
from each other gave them the liberty to take actions which they
would otherwise have been unable to have excuses for. The violence
could be condemned while the effects of that violence could give
credibility to the idea of a de facto government in place in Palestine.
Certainly violence tarnished the relationship between Jewish leaders
and U.S. Government officials. This was temporary, however.
While most American Jews were afraid to risk the security
which they felt in the United States by exhibiting loyalty to an
ancient homeland, the Irgun Delegation and the New Zionist
Organization did not harbor this fear. Their leaders were not
American citizens. They could afford to take chances. Only when it
was clear that a Jewish State would become a reality did the
mainstream feel safe enough to openly endorse the groups' activities.
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By then the War of Independence was being fought and support of
American Jews was essential to press the government to aid the
newborn State of Israel. Statehood gave added legitimacy to the
Irgun. American leaders were suddenly faced with the possibility of
an

Irgun led government. Although this did not m aterialize

immediately, the Revisionist

factor has continued to play an

important role in Israeli politics to the present day (i.e. the present
Likud party). The Irgun was one o f the only so-called terrorist
groups that brought about a democracy rather than a leftist
totalitarian regime. For this the world can be thankful.
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CHAPTER 1

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT

What is Zionism? How did it originate? Who were its leaders?
What did it accomplish? The term Zionism comes from the root word
Zion. Although the origin of the word is uncertain there is no doubt
that Zion refers to a h ill and fortress in Jerusalem. First used as the
name of the Jebusite fortress on the southeast of Jerusalem, below
the Ophel and the Temple Mount, Zion came to be known as the “City
of David.”

Sometimes Zion referred to the Temple Mount alone.

During the time o f the Macabees the Mount

was called the

“Mountain of Zion.” By the time of Josephus however, Zion included
the upper city and the upper agora. The slight deviations in the exact
definition of Zion were eclipsed by the generally accepted definition
which has survived for centuries. This definition, which developed
very early in Jewish history, made Zion synonymous with Jerusalem.
It has, since the destruction of the First Temple, had a special
meaning which reflected the yearning of the Jewish people for a
homeland.
Some of the earliest references to the longing for Zion are cited
in the Bible. “By the rivers of Babylon, there we sat down, yea, we
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wept, when we remembered Zion,” writes the psalmist.1
The Bible guaranteed the “Promised Land” to the children of
Israel. This land was to extend from the River o f Egypt to the
Euphrates River.2 However, as time passed, the transgressions of
Israel caused God to sever them from their land and to disperse
them to the ends of the earth.3
Zionism was bom from the desire for, and the Biblical promise
of, return to the land of Israel. Jerusalem was biblically designated as
the eternal capital of Israel.4
The wanderings and persecutions of the Jewish people served
to reinforce their desire for a homeland. s Only recently did this
longing for Zion acquire the name, Zionism, which became an official
political movement.
Some of the earliest precursors of the modern Zionist
movement were found in Europe. Napoleon Bonaparte proposed a
Jewish State in Palestine, ?lbeit for his own political reasons. He
wanted the Jews to side with him against the Turks. The reward for
this service was to be a Jewish State.6
’ Psalms 137:1.
2 Genesis 15:18.
3Ezekiel 37:21.
4 Zechariah 8:2-8.
5See Appendix A for list of expulsions
8 Napoleon Bonaparte from his Headquarters in Jerusalem, April 20, 1799,
from The Rise of Israel: A Documentary Record from the Nineteenth Century to
1948. Hereafter referred to as R.O.I.. vol. 1, document 1.
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In nineteenth century Great Britain, there were also calls for a
Jewish national homeland in Palestine by high ranking officials.7 This
plan, in contrast to that of the French, envisioned cooperation with
the Turks in the form of a Jewish protectorate of the Sultanate.8 The
Ottoman government, however, failed to accept this proposal9 Feeling
that the request had been misunderstood another proposal was sent
with the approval of Qjueen Victoria.10
This also failing, appeals were made by British officials for
European assistance in the establishment of a homeland in Palestine
for the Jews.11 Jews throughout Europe were called upon by the
Board of Deputies of British Jews to implement this proposal.12 This
paved the way for the emergence of Zionism in Europe.
Due to Palestine’s strategic location at the crossroads of Asia
and Africa, and its proximity to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal,
British support for the Jews became more geopolitical than
humanitarian in nature.13

Various schemes for Jewish settlement

under British supervision emerged. One was that the world owed the
7 F.O. 78/368 - No. 2, British Foreign Office, R.O.I. vol. 1, document 9.
8F.O. 78/390 - No. 134, British Foreign Office, R.O.I.. v o l.l, Document 11.
0 Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston -Enclosure No. 24, F.O. 195/185
- No. 19, British Foreign Office. R.O.I.. document 13.
10F.O. 78/427 -.No. 33, British Foreign Office, R.O.I.. vol. 1, document 15.
11 Letters from Col. Charles H. Churchill to Moses Montefiore, June 14, 1841
and August 15,1842. R.O.I.. vol. 1, documents 17 & 18.
12R.O.I.. document 19
13 Colonel Churchill, Mount Lebanon, a Ten Years Residence, from 18421852. London. 1853 (vol. i., pp. v-x), R.O.I., vol. 1, document 2.
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Jews retribution for the atrocities committed against their people.14
Another advanced the idea that domination of Palestine would
provide the shortest and safest lines of communication with British
colonies in the Far East.15 A third proposed the development of the
agriculture and natural resources of the region. While such schemes
appeared throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
the pogroms of Eastern Europe and Russia added to the urgency of
these appeals.
This period marked the dawning, in Europe, of Zionism as a
political movement. The movement rapidly gained momentum and,
by the twentieth century,

spread to America. The European

precursors of modem Zionism were instrumental in planting the idea,
in the minds of the oppressed Jews of Eastern Europe, that a Jewish
state in Palestine was realistic and feasible.

They ignited an

emotional spark which exploded with intensity.
Among the most influential of these leaders were two Germans,
Moses Hess,16 known as the father of Zionist Socialism, and Max
Bodenheimer,17 founder of the Zionist organization in Germany. They,
14See Colonel George Gawler’s comments from a pamphlet entitled
Tranauilisration o f Syria and the East. London. 1845, pp.30-31. R.O.I.. vol. 1,
document 22.
15An address by Colonel George Gawler, January 25, 1853, Syria, and its near
prospects.. . p. 49, R.O.I.. vol. 1, document 23.
18Hess’ philosophy is expounded in Rome and Jerusalem (Paris 1860),
translated by M. Waxman, New York, 1918.
17See The Memoirs of Max T. Bodepheimer: Prelude to Israel. New York,
London, 1963.
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among others, laid the foundation for modern Zionism.
The term Zionism was coined by Nathan Bimbaum in the April
1, 1890 edition of his journal Selbstem anzination.

Birnbaum

described Zionism in political and nationalistic terms as the
“establishment of an organization of national - political Zionist party
in juxtaposition to the practically oriented party that exists now.” He
sought to replace the pure philanthropic approach which prevailed
with a more vibrant nationalist movement. This definition of Zionism
was generally accepted by the time of Theodore Herzl near the turn
of the century.
By the early twentieth century (at the Eighth Zionist Congress
in 1907) Chaim Weizmann coined the term “synthetic” Zionism,
putting an end to the prolonged struggle between the two concepts
within the Zionist movement (i.e. “political” and “practical” Zionism).
Weizmann’s term defined Zionism as a symbiotic movement in which
both approaches were necessary to insure success.
The religious, concept of Zionism differed from the practical and
political approaches. This ingredient was both a stimulus and an
obstacle to the movement. Zionism leaned heavily on Messianic hopes
from which it derived much of its ideological and emotional appeal.
While

some religious leaders urged Jews to return to Zion in

fulfillm ent of Biblical prophecy others believed that man could not
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bring about a Jewish messianic state but that only God could
establish the true Israel. The Hibbat Zion (“Love of Zion”) movement,
for example, which flourished in Jewish communities of Eastern
Europe in the 19th century, contended that human endeavors to
bring about a Messianic age would fail. Even today, a segment of the
Israeli populace does not recognize the State of Israel.
Another problem that troubled and divided Zionists in the
struggle between “practical” and “political” Zionists was the idea that
Jewish nationalism could not be tolerated. However, the persecution,
defam ation, and the bloody pogroms in Eastern Europe
overshadowed this concern. When, for example, in 1881, Czar
Alexander II was assassinated, a wave of pogroms swept Russia and
resulted in the belief among Jews that there was no future for Jews
in Russia under the existing government. Some Jews turned to
revolution, many to mass emigration, most became Zionists.
Jews such as Leon Pinsker believed that anti-Semitism was not
lim ited to Russia but was an international phenomena. He called it
Judophobia in an essay entitled Autoemancipation. Pinsker wrote
that the nations of the earth feared the Jews because they were like
a ghost which walked the earth without a habitation.18 He called
Judeophobia an incurable, psychic aberration, a condition having the
18Pinsker, Leon, Auto-Emancipation: An Appeal to his People bv a Russian
Tew. 1882. English translation by D. S. Blondheim in B. Netanyhu (ed.), Road to
Freedom. New York, 1944, p. 18.
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sole remedy of self - emancipation (i.e. by the creation of a national
homeland).
Pinsker’s views were reiterated in the late 1800’s by a
Viennese correspondent in Paris, Theodor Herzl. Unaware of
Pinsker’s Autoemancipation. Herzl wrote Per Tudenstaat in which he
expressed views nearly identical with those of the Russian, Pinsker.
Herzl’s nationalist spirit was awakened as he covered the famous
Dreyfus Affair in Paris. His growing awareness of anti-Semitism led
him to take a bold political stand. He organized the first Zionist world
congresses, established a Zionist newspaper, Die Welt, and ran the
growing movement almost single - handedly. The official program of
the movement was a plan to secure for the Jewish people a publicly
recognized, legally secured home in Palestine, to encourage the
settlement of Palestine by Jewish agricultural workers, laborers and
those pursuing other trades. The plan also called for the unification
and organization of all Jewry into local and wider groups in
accordance with the laws of their respective countries, and the
strengthening of Jewish self-awareness and national consciousness. It
also planned for initial steps to obtain the consent of the various
governments necessary for the fulfillm ent of the aims of Zionism.19
Herzl, who lived only forty four years, came to be known as the

'“Laqueur, A History of Zionism, p. 106.
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father of political Zionism. During his short life he founded the World
Zionist Organization and began the work that resulted in

the

establishment o f a Jewish State in Palestine.
By World War I Zionism had become a mass movement and a
major political force. It has been argued, contrary to the belief that
Zionism developed as a reaction to the inability of Jews to assimilate
into the gentile world, that, conversely, it was a reaction to the fear
of assimilation of Jewry within Gentile society whereby Jews could
retain their unique existence through the creation of a political
state.20
This nationalist sentiment was stimulated by the growth of
racist nationalism within Christendom which objected to
Jewish assimilation. Another important element destined to
play a leading role in the Zionist movement was the religious
sentiment o f Orthodox Jewish groups which now saw in
Jewish nationalism the only bulwark for the preservation of
the Jewish fa ith .21
The first Jewish Supreme Court Justice, Louis D. Brandeis,
became an ardent Zionist. He wrote, “Our task is to bring into
Palestine, as rapidly as we can, as many persons as we can.”22
Brandeis made Zionism credible by clearly declaring its compatibility
with Americanism. Brandeis conceived of Zionism as essentially a
20Stevens, Richard P., American Zionism and U.S. Foreign Policy 1942-1947.
p. xv .
21Ib id.
22 L. D. Brandeis. Brandeis on Zionism. Statement made on July 14,1920, to
members of the American Delegation at the London Conference.
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democratic movement
The path of the Zionist in America, during this year of
trial, has been relatively clear solely because the Zionist
ideals, the highest Jewish ideals, are essentially the
American ideals. Democracy is also a Zionist concept. Social
justice is also a Zionist aim. Full and complete liberty is an
essential of triumphant Zionism as it is the Jewish ideal of
the twentieth century. As Americans, and as Jews battling
for American ideals, we may look forward to the support
of a great majority of the Jews of the United States.23
Brandeis did not envision the accomplishment of this goal in
the same way as other Zionists did. Some o f those, including Joseph
Trumpeldor, Vladim ir Jabotinsky, David Ben-Gurion and Izhak BenZvi, were of a more m ilitant nature. During World War 1, they
wanted to organize Jewish fighting units to assist the Allies. Their
efforts resulted in the establishment of the Jewish Legion - the Zion
Mule Corps, which fought at Gallipoli in 1915 and, in 1917, the
Jewish battalions.
Between the first and second World Wars there was infighting
within Zionist ranks. The spectrum of Zionism stretched from the far
left Marxist, pro-communist, Ha-Shomer ha-Za’ir, to the Orthodox
extremists of Agudat Yisrael which found Zionism to be too secular.
The greatest problem during most o f those years was the question of
Jewish immigration, which was always strictly limited by the British
23Brandeis, Remarks delivered by Louis D. Brandeis before the Convention
of the Federation of American Zionists held in Boston and Chelsea in June,
1915.
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in reaction to Arab opposition and violent outbursts. The World
Zionist Organization controlled the distribution of entry permits
for new immigrants, up to the number permitted in any one year by
the British. How these permits were divided became a cause for a
fiery struggle, both among the various Zionist factions which
accepted the discipline of the world body and especially with the
Zionist Revisionists, who regarded themselves as discriminated
against
Who were the Revisionists and what did they do? Their full
name was the Union of Zionists-Revisionists. They were later called
the New Zionist Organization. Founded by Vladim ir Jabotinsky the
Revisionists maintained the maximalist Zionist political position. They
were the strongest opposition group to the conciliatory policies of the
mainstream Zionist movement led by Chaim Weizmann during the
1920’s and 1930’s. Weizmann’s group accepted the British Mandate
over Palestine and did not offer serious objection to their attempts to
lim it Jewish immigration. To the contrary Jabotinsky believed that
this policy would result in the creation of an Arab state since, under
such circumstances, the Arab population would increase
disproportionately to that of the lesser populous Jews. Jabotinsky’s
plan to revise the Zionist policy came therefore to be known as
Revisionism. His program called for active resistance to the British
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line.
Jabotinsky was a dynamic individual who seems to have highly
affected everyone whom he came in contact with. For example,
Former Prime Minister Yitshak Shamir, who was a leader of the most
extreme underground movement, Lechi, was greatly inspired by his
mentor.
And you cannot make, have, any distinction between
Jabotinsky and the movement. The Revisionist movement
is, we can say, is a creation of Jabotinsky. He was the
founder of this movement, the inspirator (sic), and the
ideologue, from the beginning and it continues to be after
his disappearance. And you cannot make any distinction
because it was his movement. . . his movement. He was
not only the leader, he was the, I wouid say, the
incarnation o f this movement. It ’s the Jabotinsky
movement!24
The central tenets of the Revisionist plan for Palestine included the
establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine on both sides o f the
Jordan, mass Jewish im m igration and settlement, intensive
agricultural cultivation of small plots, and mandatory arbitration of
labor disputes, including the outlawing of strikes and lockouts during
the initial period of statehood.2S
To combat Jabotinsky’s growing popularity, Chaim Weizmann
made a deal with the leftist Labor party in Palestine. In exchange for

24Interview with Yitshak Shamir by Joanna Saidel, Knessett, Jerusalem,
Israel, June 2, 1993.
25Encyclopedia Tudaiea. vol. 14, p. 129.
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their support in the World Zionist Congress he agreed to give them
most of the funds from the World Zionist Organization as well as the
majority of immigration certificates allocated by the British for entry
into Palestine. This measure would allow the Labor party to increase
their numbers and power in Palestine by assuring that the majority
of new immigrants would support their party. This agreement
enabled Weizmann to maintain his control of the World Zionist
Organization.
Animosity between Weizmann’s supporters and those of
Jabotinsky escalated and peaked in the famous Arlosoroff murder
trial in which Revisionists were charged by the Laborites with the
murder of the Socialist Zionist, Chaim Arlosoroff, who advocated a
policy of peace and reconciliation with the Arab population in
Palestine.26
Failure to reach an understanding w ith Arab leaders led
Arsoloroff to reconsider his previous contentions and to amend his
solution to the Palestine problem.
After 1929, while still maintaining the need for a political
agreement with the Arabs, he asserted that the Arab
national movement was dominated by the forces of social
reaction and political tyrannyand blamed it for not having
produced leaders like Sun Yat-sen or Gandhi. Arlosoroff
favored cooperation on the municipal level, economic
collaboration, the dispatch of Jewish students to A1 Azhar
and other Arab universities, and Zionist support for
28W alter Laqueur, A History of Zionism. New York: Schocken Books, 1989, p.
242.
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Egyptian and Iraqi independence. But he was pessimistic
with regard to the chances o f an understanding with the
Palestinian Arabs, for the simple reason that the Arabs
were still convinced that they could defeat Zionism with
violence.27
This pessimism led to ArlosorofPs adoption o f partition or
cantonization as the only viable solution to the problem short of a
Jewish seizure of power.
Arlosoroff became the head of the political department of the
Jewish Agency. While walking along the Tel Aviv coast on June 16,
1933 he was shot. Revisionist leaders and others in Israel claim that
he was murdered by two Arabs. This was supported by the legal
confession of one Arab.— Revisionists contend that the blame was
transferred to their party by Labor and the British in an attempt to
discredit and vilify the Revisionist Party and to liquidate them
politically, as public opinion would certainly mount against them,
especially since Labor controlled the press. Because of this,
Revisionists believed that no accurate reports of the tria l were
forthcoming. They decided to start their own daily newspaper. The
editor of this paper was Benzion Netanyahu, whose father, Rabbi
Nathan Mileikowsky, had been involved in helping to organize the
public defense of the accused. He was instrumental in influencing

27Ibid, p. 258.
“ Telephone conversation with Benzion Netanyahu, January 1995, from
New York.
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Rabbi Kook to come out openly in defense of the accused. The
circumstances of the murder were never formally resolved.29
Following this incident, a b itter propaganda campaign
developed on both sides to discredit each other. The Rabbi, Hillel
Kook (whose nephew later came to the United States as the leader of
a delegation sent by the underground Irgun), sought reconciliation
between the two groups by bringing Jabotinsky and Ben Gurion
together in an attem pt to reach an agreement and to focus their
attention on a campaign against the British rather than against each
other. An agreement was reached which had to be ratified by both
parties. The Revisionists voted in favor of ratification. The Labor
party however voted against it. Unable to made peace with Labor,
Jabotinsky decided that the only alternative was to leave the World
Zionist Organization.
In 1935 the Revisionists seceded from the W orld Zionist
Organization and formed a new party called the New Zionist
Organization (NZO). Vladim ir Jabotinsky was elected president. The
aim of the NZO was the same as the earlier Revisionist plan with an
added emphasis on the “redemption of the Jewish people and its
land, the revival of its state and language, and the implanting of the
sacred treasures of Jewish tradition in Jewish life” through the
creation of a Jewish m ajority on both sides of the Jordan and
29Conversation with Benzion Netanyahu, October 1993, Jerusalem.
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liquidation of the Diaspora (i.e. emigration of all Jews to Palestine).
Shortly after Jabotinsky formed the New Zionist Organization
new Arab riots broke out in Palestine. The Jews had to decide how to
react to them. The leftists continued to rely on the British for their
protection, but w ithin the Revisionist movement a revolutionary
section formed which demanded active resistance to the Arabs and
to the British.30 These activists formed two groups, the Irgun Z’vai
Leumi (National M ilitary Organization), and the group formed by
Avraham Stern, which was known within the British camp as the
“Stern Gang,” and which came to be called Lechi (acronym for
Fighters for the Freedom of Israel).
According to Benzion Netanyahu, who was later to become the
head of the political department of the New Zionist Organization in
America, the British issuance of the 1939 White Paper marked the
climax of the anti-Zionist British drive which aimed at the formal
liquidation of Zionism.31 Under the terms of the White Paper only
75,000 Jews would be allowed to enter Palestine (with a small
additional number, annually), the Jews would be allowed to buy only
a few more pieces of land, and that would be the end of it.32 This
decision caused the revolutionary Revisionists to decide to attack the
30Conversation with Benzion Netanyahu, October 29, 1993, Jerusalem, Israel.
31Telephone conversation with Benzion Netanyahu, January 23, 1995, from
New York.
“ Conversation with Benzion Netanyahu, October 29, 1993, Jerusalem,
Israel.
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British rather than the Arabs.
By the late 1930’s the New Zionist Organization became
alarmed at the situation in Europe and created a ten - year plan to
absorb a m illion and a half Jews in Palestine through clandestine
shipments of Jews prim arily from Eastern Europe.33 There was
impressive support for Jabotinsky there, “not just among the simple
unsophisticated people willing to give their blessing to anyone
promising them salvation; it was especially marked among the young
generation and the intelligentsia. For, as the world situation
deteriorated, there was growing impatience among all sections of the
Jewish communities.”34
Though at odds with the British government Jabotinsky urged
the Revisionists to abstain from their struggle against the British
during World War II

so that efforts could be concentrated on

defeating the Nazis and on the formation of a Jewish Army to fight
with the Allies. While most Revisionists accepted this idea the
minority group, headed by Abraham Stem, rejected it. In September,
1938, his m ilitant stand was endorsed in Warsaw at the world
conference of Betar (an activist Zionist youth movement). Betar’s
leader, Menachem Begin, called for increased militancy.
We are standing on the threshold of the third phase of
Zionism,” Begin declared. “After ‘Practical Zionism’ and
33 The Ten Year Plan for Palpstinp. Tnn rin n 1938.
34Laqueur, A History of Zionism, p. 369.
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‘Political Zionism’ the time has come for ‘M ilitary Zionism.’
Eventually, m ilitary and political concepts w ill merge, b u t. .
. if we create our m ilitary strength, the salvation of the
diaspora w ill come. The world is indifferent . . . its
conscience ignores what is happening to our people. The
League of Nations is impotent. We cannot continue on this
road. We want to fight! To win or die!35
This rejection of a wartime truce with the British led to a split
in the Irgun, in 1940, when the group led by Avraham Stern seceded
from the Irgun following the death of Jabotinsky. The name of
Stem’s group was changed in 1942, following the murder of Stern,
to Lohamei Herut Israel (i.e. Lechi).
While the Irgun suspended its aggression against the British
until Menachem Begin took command in 1944, Stem continued his
armed struggle during the war. He pursued the ideological principles
which Jabotinsky had formulated. Those principles were articulated
in Lechi’s outline for national revival.36
Those joining the Stem group are generally considered to have
been a m inority. That contention has been challenged by a member
of the Irgun, Hillel Kook ( Peter Bergson).
When the Irgun split in 1940 and Avraham Stern formed
the Stern group of Lechi - (Lohamei Herut Yisrael - Israel
Freedom
Fighters) people think he took a m inority of the
people and that the Irgun got the majority. What really
happened was that between two and five percent - nobody
compiled statistics - went with Stern; between ten and
3SYitshak Ben Ami, Years of Wrath. Davs of Glorv. p. 193.
38See Appendix I for full text of Jabotinsky’s National Revival Principles.
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fifteen percent went with Raziel37 in varying degrees of
activity; and the rest went home just didn’t do anything. Of
the members o f the command of the Irgun who were with
me . . . nearly everybody except Raziel went with Stern.
They lasted between a month or two then they went home.
They ceased being active because Stern’s beliefs were too
extreme for some and Raziel’s were too mild for the others.
In a practical sense people did not feel like joining.38
During this period of decision within the Zionist ranks Hillel
Kook chose to remain with the Irgun.
The Irgun agreed in 1939 to cease preparations for conflict
with the British and instead to collaborate with the British,
to work with the British, except for Jabotinsky’s followers.
And I’m not mocking it. I was one of those who agreed and I
still believe it was correct up till a certain time. Jabotinsky’s
proclamationwas to the Jewish people to join, first of all and
above all in the war against Nazi Germany; to join with the
allies in the war, as a belligerent in the w ar.39
Hillel Kook was to become the leader of the Irgun Delegation to
the United States. His group, which was comprised of only a handful
of individuals, came to America from Palestine to try to influence
public opinion to favor the creation of a Jewish army, to help save
the Jewish victims o f the Holocaust, and to establish a Hebrew
democratic state in Palestine. The role of this group in America
during the 1940’s is highly controversial. Their opponents have

"Raziel lead the Irgun before Menachem Begin.
“ Interview of Hillel Kook by M. Kaufman, October 27, 1981, Hebrew
University of Jerusalem, Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Oral History
Division, Tape Nos. 194, A, B, C. Interview page 8.
“ Ibid, p. 7.
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stated that their work accomplished nothing while supporters say
that “this was the most significant Zionist voice that was present on
the American scene at these times.”40

40Interview with Yitshak Shamir by Joanna Saidel, Knessett. Jerusalem,
Israel, June 2,1993.
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CHAPTER 2

REVISIONIST ZIONISM COMES TO AMERICA

The year, 1939, marked the entrance of both the New Zionist
Organization and the Irgun Delegation to the United States onto the
political scene in America. They came to gain public support for the
fight for the creation of a Jewish Army in Palestine. It was believed
that only the U.S. could exert the necessary pressure on Britain to
make this plan a reality. Early attempts of the two organizations to
merge proved a failure due to differences in philosophical and
political ideals, as well as personality conflicts among the leadership
of the two groups. Lack of support from the Roosevelt administration
as well as opposition from mainstream Jewish organizations and their
leaders (particularly the ardent Roosevelt follower, Rabbi Steven
Wise) also hampered the efforts of the N. Z. O. and the Irgun
Delegation in America.
By May of 1939 the fear of war was in the air. The leader of
the New Zionist Organization of America, Benzion Netanyahu, left
Palestine, where he had been editing a daily newspaper called The
Io rd an, and went to London to meet with Jabotinsky and his
executive. Mr. Netanyahu presented his views, suggesting a major
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campaign in the United States to gain public support there. Because
of the poor reception which Jabotinsky had received earlier in
America, the founder of the Revisionist party was reluctant to accept
Netanyahu’s ideas, but was so impressed by Netanyahu’s literary
work and optimistic confidence that he agreed to go along with
Benzion. Both knew the enormous value of gaining American public
support.1
When Jabotinsky asked how Netanyahu proposed to finance
the expenses of the delegation, he said that he did not know but that
he would devise a plan by the following day. This he did. The next
day Netanyahu gave Jabotinsky the names of ten wealthy individuals
whom he had met in Israel and Egypt. Though not Revisionists,
Netanyahu knew that they were not enemies o f Revisionism. He
asked Jabotinsky to write individual letters to each of these people.
Netanyahu then planned to deliver the letters personally and ask
each for a donation o f one hundred British pounds. He told
Jabotinsky that if these ten requests were successful he would then
go to another ten, and another. Jabotinsky wrote the letters,
Netanyahu delivered them and presented the purpose and case of
the delegation. There was not one individual who refused to give him

’ Personal conversations with Benzion Netanyahu, October 29, 1993, in
Jerusalem, and telephone conversation January 23, 1995 from New York.
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the money.2
It was agreed that Jabotinsky would not go immediately to
America but that Netanyahu and a delegation chosen by him would
precede their leader and prepare the groundwork. Netanyahu
returned to Palestine to prepare for the mission.
In the meantime, on September 1, 1939, Germany invaded
Poland and World War II began. The following day Jabotinsky
declared Germany the number one enemy of the Jewish people and
proposed the formation of a Jewish Army which would mobilize Jews
worldwide, “not just a few units or battalions of Jewish soldiers, but
the nucleus of a true national army which would fight along side the
allies.”3 This body would number between one quarter and one half
million men according to Jabotinsky’s calculations. In December of
1939 a different proposal for the formation o f a single Jewish
Division of the British forces was put forth by Dr. Weizmann. Neither
plan received much support in Britain. While little headway was
made in London, it was decided to campaign in America for a Jewish
Army.
Jabotinsky cabled Netanyahu and asked him to come to
America.

Netanyahu agreed but had problems leaving Palestine.

The British there wanted to know why he was going to America.
2Ibid.
3Yitshak Ben Ami, Years o f Wrath. Davs o f Glorv. p. 237.
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Netanyahu procured a visa with the help of Dr. Magnes, the head of
Hebrew University, who was opposed to him politically, but who
nevertheless gave his assistance. Netanyahu told him that the trip to
America was to complete his doctoral dissertation, which was in fact
his secondary motive. He did not tell Magnes about his political
interests in the United States. After an examination by the police,
Netanyahu, who was on a British list of suspicious persons, was
finally allowed to go.4
Netanyahu arrived at Ellis Island at the beginning of April
where he was met by the Zionist leader, Emanuel Neumann. He
immediately met with Jabotinsky and formulated plans for their
campaign.
The new approach which they chose to follow was
masterminded by M r. Netanyahu who vehemently believed their
efforts should focus on exposing the Jewish struggle against the
British and their intentions in Palestine. While he wanted the British
to win the war, he was against their policy in Palestine. The
campaign was to be totally anti - British. Although some of the
delegation agreed with Netanyahu’s reasoning they felt that the
timing was impractical because of the war. They thought such a
campaign would be premature and that it would encumber their
‘ Personal interview with Benzion Netanyahu, October 29, 1993, Jerusalem.
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work. Netanyahu was deeply dissatisfied.5 Jabotinsky considered
both views carefully and finally agreed to begin the campaign.6
In 1940, Jabotinsky addressed small gatherings, lecturing on
Russian literature and other topics which, although he was an expert
in these fields, had little to do with the Jewish struggle. Disappointed
by the poor attendance he received in the States (he was used to a
full to overflowing house when he spoke in Europe) Jabotinsky
became disillusioned. Meanwhile Netanyahu continued to press
Jabotinsky and his delegation to campaign for a Jewish army. Finally
Jabotinsky agreed. Again the problem o f financing the project arose.
Having no money available, an innovative advertisement campaign
was conceived and embarked upon, on credit, and succeeded in fully
funding the operations of the organization.
The focus of the Jabotinsky - Netanyahu campaign was initially
to gain support for a Jewish Army. The overall plan however was to
combat the British with a nationwide campaign which would expose
their anti - Zionist policy and would turn public opinion against them.
They arranged for speakers to address mass meetings. One of their
main supporters was the famous Colonel John Henry Patterson who
commanded the Jewish Legion during the first world war. Jabotinsky
5Ibid.
“Telephone conversation with Benzion Netanyahu, January 23, 1995, from
New York.
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spoke at some of these meetings. One of the most effective was a
mass rally at the Manhattan Center on June 19, 1940. This success,
which had a big press following, seemed to bring Jabotinsky back to
life. Their campaign gained momentum across the country during the
late spring. It slowed down briefly during the hot summer months
and was scheduled to resume at the end of summer.
The Irgun Delegation to the United States also began its
activities during this period. Though an offshoot of the Revisionist
movement this group was not part of the Revisionist party. The
delegation was composed of Hillel Kook (known as Peter Bergson in
America), Dr. Alex Raphaeli, Yitshak Ben Ami, Shmuel Merlin, and
Aryeh Ben-Eliezer.
You cannot say that this was a Revisionist movement. It was
a very special movement, I would say, that was created by
Hillel Kook and his friends . There have been others, they
have been sent to the United States by the Irgun. And the
Irgun was, we can say, a certain affiliation of the
Revisionist movement. They have been sent to America,
Hillel Kook and his friends as delegates of shlihim, that you
call in Hebrew, it means envoys, by the Irgun. And in this
framework of the Irgun, H illel Kook and his friends have
founded the group that was very active . . . in the public
world, in the media.7
They too met with Jabotinsky and made plans to work with
him to gain support in America. Although both the New Zionist
7 Telephone interview with Yitshak Shamir from Tel Aviv, by Joanna
Saidel, June 2,1993.
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Organization and the Irgun delegation had the same leader,
Jabotinsky, they were not united in their work. Each had a different
focus and a different philosophy.
In August, 1940, Jabotinsky died in New York. This event
affected both groups. Seven days later Benzion Netanyahu, because
of the division o f opinion with regard to the campaign for a Jewish
Army, disagreement on matters of policy, and other matters, and
seeing the growing pessimism which developed among the remaining
delegation, resigned.8
Shortly thereafter, Hillel Kook (Bergson) met with Netanyahu to
see if they might merge in a common effort. Mr. Netanyahu was
asked to join the executive of the Committee for a Jewish Army.9 He
agreed to assist the delegation in every conceivable form provided
they concentrate on the campaign for a Jewish Army which they
hesitated to undertake, but agreed to when Van Passen joined and
became the President of the Committee. Netanyahu then joined the
Committee for a Jewish Army (not the Irgun Delegation).10 This
unification was short - lived, however. Netanyahu stayed with Kook
for only six months. He was disappointed that the delegation refused
to focus their attack prim arily on the British in the manner which he
8Telephone conversation w ith Benzion Netanyahu, January 23, 1995, from
New York.
8Ibid.
10Ibid.
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had envisioned.11
There was a conflict o f interests, philosophies and
personalities, particularly between Hillel Kook and Mr. Netanyahu. A
member o f the Irgun Delegation, Dr. Alex Raphaeli, understood this
personality conflict
He (Benzion Netanyahu) was very much admired by me in
any case. And with Benzion we worked, he even worked in
our office for a little while. But he was a Revisionist and
(this was) his mentality, He’s a veiy gifted man, a professor,
but we didn’t feel that he has m ilitary spirit, m ilitary
reaction in a situation where you need immediate action and
where you have sometimes the courage to take a weapon
and, etcetera, etcetera.12
When asked if there was much antagonism between the two men Dr.
Raphaeli replied,
Very much. Listen. Listen. There are many, many jealousies.
Compared with us he was a bit older. He was a professor. We
were just youngsters relatively. . . I was at that time (a)
Doctor. . . But most o f the other colleagues were a bit
younger than I and didn’t have any education. He considered
himself im portant. Suddenly he comes in a group which
really behaved . . . in a m ilitary w ay.. . and he couldn’t live
with that. Number two, he considered himself intellectually,
maybe, that’s right, much more important than Hillel or any
of the other colleagues... So I would say, the Revis(ionists)..
. and I speak about people who are my friends.. .w ere.. . a
relatively.. . small, very unimportant group . . . they did
not do much, they were not successful. This was not the field
of action suddenly to come and speak on television and on
11Personal interview with Benzion Netanyahu, October 29, 1993, Jerusalem.
12Telephone interview with Dr. Alex Raphaeli from Jerusalem by Joanna
Saidel, June 15,1993.
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the radio or appear at a university facing, as we had,
British ministers and discuss with them. They couldn’t do
that. So suddenly comes an unknown group of Israelis who,
young, who don’t even appear under their real names, who
have their m ilitary names, were entirely different. And
suddenly get that attention and people speak (with you) and
you’re invited (to important affairs) and you’re busy and
you’re going to go around, and you’re just saying what you
feel. Naturally the people who worked here maybe wanted
the same thing, don’t feel comfortable. So there are
psychological things which one can not discard.13
Yitshak Ben Ami also admits that there were problems between the
New Zionist Organization and the Irgun Delegation, stating that
despite their coordination of overt and covert activities there was
constant infighting due to personality clashes, and debates over
political and ideological questions.14 He believed that one of the main
points of contention was the N.Z.O.’s platform (1938 Prague
Convention) which called for the transfer of one million Jews to
Palestine over the course of ten years. “We Irgun men knew that we
did not have ten years to spare,” writes Ben Ami.ls
M r. Netanyahu decided to leave the Irgun Delegation. He
continued with his own campaign which proved to be highly
effective in penetrating Congress and the administration.
These Zionists, (i.e. the Revisionist and the Irgun delegation),

13ibid.
14Ben Ami, p. 199.
15Ibid, p. 228.
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had two primary reasons for focusing on America in their quest for
support. First, it was believed that if American opposition to the
British White Paper of 1939 (which proposed turning all of Palestine
over to the Arabs and nullification of the Balfour Declaration) could
be developed then pressure could be exerted upon Britain to rescind
it. During the initial stages of the war this was especially important
as, at that stage, the United States was only a potential ally and the
British were eager to maintain cordial relations with America. The
second reason for increased Zionist interest in America was to
supplant Great Britain with the U. S. as the main component of
gentile support. It was correctly believed that the British Empire was
on the decline and that America would fill the vacuum as British
power diminished. Zionists felt that it was essential to have a good
rapport with American leadership in case that power shift occurred.16
H illel Kook (Bergson) had come to America

for this

undertaking with only with a handful of Palestinian Jews.
These Palestinians were not associated with the New Zionist
Movement o f America, which was the Revisionist Zionist
body in the United States. Most of them, in fact, were
secretly members of the Irgun (Irgun Zvai Leumi), a Jewish
armed underground in Palestine. W hile these men
constituted a tiny, American-based wing of the Irgun, they
did not conduct underground activities in the United States.
During the war they were almost completely isolated from
18Alan R. Taylor. Prehide to Israel: An Analysis of Zionist Diplomacy 18971947. Darton. Longman & Todd, London, 1959 p.74-75.
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the Irgun in Palestine.17
While some, who have known the Irgun Delegation, say that this
small group of individuals accomplished little, others contend that
they had remarkable results.
They made a great work in America asking for the American
support for the Israeli independence, for the creation of
Israeli State in the land of Israel, for, they fought for the
right of the Jewish people from all over the world to (come
to) the land o f Israel. . . they (the Irgun delegation) played a
great role in the years of the second World W ar. . . this was
the most significant Zionist voice that was present on the
American scene at these times.18
Hillel Kook was descended from a notable rabbinical line. In the
United States he adopted the name Peter Bergson in order to keep
his political activities from reflecting on the name of his uncle, the
former chief rabbi of Palestine, Abraham Isaac Kook,19 who believed
that the return of Jews to the land of Israel “marked the beginning
of divine redemption and that the Balfour Declaration of 1917 had
ushered in a new era in the renewal of the Jewish people.”20 He also
believed, however, that the Zionist movements of his day (18651935) were too secular and needed spiritual infusion. This idea was

17Wyman, David. Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust.
1941-1945. New York: Pantheon Books, 1984, p. 85.
18 Telephone interview with Yitshak Shamir from Tel Aviv by Joanna Saidel,
June 2,1993.
18Wyman, p. 85.
20Encyclopedia Tudaica. vol. 10, p. 1183.
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markedly in contrast with Hillel Kook’s philosophy which was not
religious.
A 1944

F.B.I. summary of H illel Kook (Peter Bergson)

portrayed him as follows.
Bergson is described as being single and thirty-four years of
age. He is related to have been bom in Lithuania, the son of
Rabbi Dov Kook. It is related that he studied typography, at
the Hebrew University, although he claims to be a journalist.
He is said to be a British citizen. In 1929 he allegedly
became involved in riots between Jews and Arabs in
Palestine, and at that time was also alleged to have been
engaged in an organization to advance the Jews against the
Arabs in Palestine. He subsequently is reported to have
become a ffilia te d w ith a group advocating “Free
Immigration to Palestine.” With regard to this group, it has
been alleged that its real purpose was to smuggle into
Palestine people outside of the immigration quota. In the
year 1936 Bergson reportedly left Palestine for London
where headquarters for his group were established. Later
the remark, “We have been responsible for 40,000 Jewish
refugees having entered Palestine illegally from Europe
during the past seven years” was attributed to Bergson. It is
alleged that Bergson is not looked upon with favor by the
British Government.21
The m ainstream Zionists detested the Irgun and the
Bergsonites, and were not fond of the New Zionist Organization, for a
number of reasons. It was generally believed that the Irgun was too
m ilitant and that they bordered on being fascist; that their violent
activities were detrim ental to the Zionist cause and could “damage
21Summary F.B.I. file on Peter Bergson, December IS , 1944 - from file #100309132-1; 100-257656-4.
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the moral stature of Zionism.”

Jabotinsky’s break with the World

Zionist discipline was both feared and resented.22 The New Zionist
Organization was considered too anti-British, too aggressive, and a
breaker of discipline. After two and a half years of campaigning
however, the Zionist Organization found itself forced to adopt the
ideas of the Revisionists whose outspoken behavior had changed the
mood of public opinion in America.
Bergson’s group operated first as the American Friends for a
Jewish Palestine. Their in itial goal was to raise funds to relocate
European refugees in Palestine and to buy arms for the Irgun.
However, by 1940, the war had expanded, communications between
American and Palestinian groups were cut off. The focus then shifted
to the idea of a Jewish Army .23
When the war broke out Jabotinsky decided to go to
America to conduct a public campaign for the creation of a
Jewish Army to join the war against Germany, and generally
also in a sense to make propaganda for America to come a
little closer, because there were many American volunteers
in the Jewish Legion in World War I and he wanted to
repeat the same thing on a bigger scale. Instead of the legion
this time however, he spoke o f a Jewish army representing
the Jewish nation in the war.24
To accomplish their goals the Revisionist Zionists and the Irgun
22 Ibid
23 Ibid.
24Interview of Hillel Kook by M. Kaufman, Oct. 27, 1981, Hebrew University
of Jerusalem, Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Oral History Division, Tape. Nos.
194, A, B, C. Interview page 11.
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Delegation attempted to win the support of the American public,
Congress, and the Administration. They also sought the support of
journalists, clergymen, public servants, and persons of standing and
importance. The Zionist propaganda campaign was an ultim ate
success. As a result of it thirty-three state legislatures, the Congress
of Industrial Organizations and the American Federation of Labor
passed resolutions favoring Zionism. Later, both houses of Congress
introduced similar resolutions, and in the 1944 election campaign the
two major political parties adopted pro Zionist planks.25
In 1939 the two strongest Jewish groups in America were the
American Jewish Committee and the Jewish Labor Committee. These
groups were traditionally, sometimes fiercely, anti-Zionist. Zionists
decided to attempt to make inroads into the American Jewish
community. Some of their members and supporters included Haim
Lubinsky, who was the ranking Irgun officer of the mission to the
U.S., Robert Brisco, a member of the Irish Parliament, and John
Patterson, former commander of the Zion Mule Corps and of the
Jewish Legion during the first World War.
In 1939, the Kook (Bergson) group, Patterson, and Chaim
Lubinsky, had founded “The American Friends for a Jewish Palestine”
to raise funds to support the “illegal immigration” to Palestine. They
25Ibid, p. 76.
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began with an effort to establish contacts. W ith the help of Rabbi
Louis I. Newman, the Irgun delegation held meetings in several
synagogues and private homes, espousing free immigration to
Palestine for the Jews of Europe. Listening to Briscoe, Patterson, and
Lubinsky, some individuals were moved to action. They contacted
their rabbis and other leaders, asking about Kook’s group. “Who are
these people? they asked. Who is Jabotinsky? What is the Irgun?
And the answer (of mainstream Jewish organizations) was always
the same: “Don’t touch them.’’ 26
An extremely important contact was established with the help
of Benzion Netanyahu. He suggested that Pierre Van Passen meet
with the Kook group.27 Netanyahu influenced him in this direction in
the early days, before the rift developed between the two
organizations.
Many mainstream Zionist leaders greatly admired Benzion
Netanyahu’s father, whose name was Rabbi Nathan Mileikowsky (he
later changed it to Netanyahu). He was a very influential man and a
great authoritative Yiddish speaker who was, for five years, one of
the leading spokesman in America for Zionism. When Benzion came
to America many leading American Zionist leaders wanted to meet
MBen Ami, p. 215.
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with Mileikowsky’s son, despite the fact that he had become a
Revisionist. This opened doors for Netanyahu, who would years later
become Professor of Judaic Studies at Cornell University. At one
social gathering in the home of a man named Weisgal (who later
founded the Weizmann Institute) Netanyahu met Joe Brainin, the son
of the famous Hebrew author Reuben Brainin. Brainin turned out to
be the agent of the celebrated Dutch author, Pierre Van Paassen.
Netanyahu suggested that Brainin arrange a meeting between Van
Paassen and Hillel Kook. This meeting was fixed and Van Paassen’s
affiliation with the Irgun Delegation proved to become one o f the
main assets of the Irgun campaign.
It was ironic that Brainin was rumored to be a Communist
agent who was supporting the Zionist cause in order to encourage
the Jews to campaign

and fight against H itler and the Nazis.28

Netanyahu was unaware of these allegations at the time.29
Van Passen was one of the most effective speakers for the
Irgun Delegation. He spoke not only in favor of a Jewish Army but,
under Netanyahu’s influence, against the British policy and against
Weizmann’s Zionist policy which was characterized by compromise

28 Conversation with Benzion Netanyahu, November 1, 1993, Jerusalem.

- Ibid.
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and submission.30
The New Zionist Organization’s campaign for a Jewish Army
and against British policy extended to an active campaign to secure
political opinion in America. This was a very difficult task in those
days. While the President of the United States had made favorable
pronouncements toward the Jews, his policy, in fact, was anti-Zionist.
While Jabotinsky was still alive he had asked an influential
supporter, Robert Briscoe (who later became mayor of Dublin,
Ireland), to try to interest President Roosevelt in an emergency plan
which proposed the removal o f 2,000,000 Jews from central and
eastern Europe. Briscoe was unable to obtain a hearing in the White
House. It was believed within Zionist circles that “the key for helping
the Jews of Europe lay in the hands of Franklin D. Roosevelt because
the Allies would follow any forthright action the United States
initiated.” 31
Franklin Roosevelt had endeared the Jewish population to
himself for a number of reasons. These included his advocacy of old
age pensions, the New Deal, and the appointm ent o f an
unprecedented number of Jews to high positions within his
administration. The latter action caused Roosevelt to be labeled with
30 For his entire speech see, “Israel, You Are Being Betrayed!” Zionews.
October 1, 1942, p. 14 -1 7 .
31 Ben Ami, p. 281.

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

55
the pejorative term, “Jew Deal,” by anti-Semetic elements.32
In fact, Roosevelt did not prove to be faithful to his Jewish
following. He gave in to British requests not to discuss Palestine at
the Evian and the Bermuda conferences. He feared alienating either
the British or the Arab leaders. Although he issued a number of proZionist statements, particularly before the elections o f 1944,
Roosevelt promised Arab leaders that they would be consulted
before any decision was reached concerning Palestine. The New
Zionist Organization vigorously attacked the administration, turning
to the Republican party for support.
Concerning rescue efforts to save Jewish victims of the
Holocaust, Roosevelt has been severely criticized. The author, David
Wyman, accused the President of abandoning the Jews. Wyman
believes that there were a number of options available to Roosevelt
which may have assisted the victims. Wyman made a twelve point
list of things that Roosevelt might have done to help them.33
These policies and suggestions, however, were never enacted
for a number of reasons. The Roosevelt administration refused to
acknowledge the severity of the situation which the Jews faced. “One
reason for this was to avoid responsibility for taking special steps to
save them. Such steps, if successful, would have confronted the
32 Encyclopedia ludaica. vol. 14, p. 257.
33See Appendix K for list of Wyman’s twelve points.
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Allies with the difficult problem of finding places to put the rescued
Jews.” 34
While the Roosevelt administration procrastinated, the New
Zionist Organization and the Irgun Delegation continued their
campaign to win American support. In December of 1942 the Irgun
Delegation issued a “Proclamation of the Moral Rights of Stateless
and Palestinian Jews” which stated that the Irgun would no longer
passively witness the calculated extermination of the Jewish people
by the Nazis.3S
This “Proclamation” was placed in a two page ad in The New
York Times in December 1942. It was supposedly signed by more
than 3,000 prominent Americans, and European exiles, including
Herbert Hoover, and Senator Hariy S. Truman. This advertisement
took the Zionist campaign out of a strictly Jewish milieu and made
the cause universal. The statement was also form ulated “to
counteract the inhibitions of Jewish leaders like Stephen S. Wise”
who, Ben Ami writes, “was writing his “Dear Boss” notes to his idol,
President Roosevelt” while, “ironically, we, the Zionist “extremists,”
were the ones now calling for broad humanitarian rescue above all.
Helping the Jews to survive was all that mattered now.” 36
34Wyman, p. 337.
35Ben Ami, p. 282.
38Ibid, p. 283.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

57
Stephen Wise began his Zionist career in the late 1890’s. In
1897 he was a founder o f the New York Federation of Zionist
Societies. In the following year he was instrum ental in the
foundation of the national Federation of American Zionists, serving as
honorary secretary of that organization until 1904. From 1898 Wise
served as American secretary of the world Zionist movement. He
collaborated with Theodor Herzl, creating the Provisional Executive
Committee for General Zionist Affairs in 1914 and later administering
it.37

Rabbi Wise assisted in framing the text o f the Balfour

Declaration of 1917, spoke in favor o f Zionism at the 1918-19
Versailles Peace Conference, was vice-president o f the Zionist
Organization of America from 1918 to 1920 and its president from
1936 to 1938. Wise worked closely with David Ben-Gurion, Chaim
Weizmann, and Abba Hillel Silver. Often he disagreed with them but
sought unity in the movem ent38 As editor of Opinion. Rabbi Wise
wrote about the reasons for his dedication to Zionism.39
From 1921 until 1925 Wise was the vice president of the
American Jewish Congress.

A fter 1925 he served as honorary

president until his death. He believed that the American Jewish
Congress was called into being for two purposes.
37 E n c v rlo n e d ia ftid aicq. v o l. 1 6 , p . 5 6 6 .

“ Ibid
“ Wise, Stephen S., As I See It. Jewish Opinion Publishing Corporation,
Marstin Press, Inc., New York, 1944.
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. . . To bring about the establishment of the Jewish National
Home in fulfillm ent of the ancient and unrenounced ideal of
our fathers. This means a Jewish m ajority on both sides of
the Jordan . . . in conform ity with the vision and the
program of Theodor Herzl. The second purpose was and is to
safeguard rights of Jews in all lands in which they dw ell.40
Dr. Wise recognized and warned both Jews and non-Jews that
these rights were seriously threatened by Nazism. He was one of the
first to make such predictions in the 1930’s and to organize for the
defense of Hitler’s victims. He established the World Jewish Congress
in 1936 and administered it until 1949 when he died. It has been
claimed that he was responsible for making President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, the U.S. State Department, and the general public aware of
the circumstances which the Jews faced.41

This general belief is

contestable in the light of the little known accomplishments of the
Irgun Delegation and the New Zionist Organization which were the
real motivating forces for the change in government policy and
public opinion.
Wise contended that diplomacy should be the first route to
liberation but did not discount “deeds of despair” when all else
failed.42 However, he opposed the actions of the Revisionists and
Irgun Delegation. According to the founder of The American Friends
40 Ibid, “W orld Jewish Conference,” p. 21.
41Encyclopedia ludaica. vol. 16, p. 567.
42Wise, S. , As I See It, Address to the American Jewish Conference, “ The
Jewish Fate and Faith,” 1943, p. 76.
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for a Jewish Palestine, co-organizer for the Committee for a Jewish
Army, and the Emergency Committee to save the Jewish people of
Europe, Rabbi Wise was the chief opponent of Ze’ev Jabotinsky in
America.
In New York, Stephen Wise, the most politically prominent
rabbi in the United States, called Jabotinsky a “traitor” for
preaching “evacuation” from the ghettos of Europe. Davar,
the Socialist-Zionist daily in Palestine, said that by working
with the Polish government on annual emigration quotas,
Jabotinsky was “joining hands w ith the Endeks, the
pogromizers of the Jews of Poland.43
When Jabotinsky died in 1940 Stephen Wise said,
He was not only one of the most eloquent men of his tim e..
.but he was one of the bravest. . . His limitation was that he
could not bear to be a Grand Vizier, second in command.
Feeling born to lead, and indeed, possessed of an undeniable
flair for leadership, he was ill at ease in enduring a mere
Lieutenancy. He was ill favored, too, in his following, which
was pitiably unequal to its Commander.. .44
Members of the Kook group contend that a delegation headed
by Rabbi Stephen Wise formally requested the British Ambassador
not to make any gestures of sympathy to Jabotinsky’s campaign and
issued instructions to the Jews of the United States not to contribute
funds to the Irgun Delegation. When they ran an ad in major U.S.
newspapers appealing for funds to “purchase” the Jews which

“ Ben Ami, p. 211.
“Wise, p. 228
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Rumania was selling for fifty dollars a piece the State Department
and the Jewish establishment denied that such an offer existed.
Stephen Wise called the appeal “a hoax on the part of the Hecht
group

By the fall of 1943, when the United States Government and

Stephen Wise finally admitted that such an offer had even existed, it
no longer did.” 45
David Wyman wrote about this issue. According to him
the Rumanian government had offered to help relocate 70,000 Jews
from Transnistria to any place chosen by the Allies in exchange for
approximately $130 per refugee. When the administration was
approached with the matter it was referred to the State Department.
They stated that the story was without foundation. Wyman charges
that the State Department’s investigation was “superficial.” He
believes that
the Rumanian proposal might not have been workable. Quite
likely it would have involved an element of bribery in
addition to the actual costs of removing the imperiled Jews.
But it most certainly was not a story “without foundation. .w46
It is believed by some political analysts that the plight of the Jews
was used by the Revisionists and by the Irgun to promote public
sympathy for a Jewish state. For example, political analyst Alan R.
Taylor writes that Zionists, while emphasizing the need for asylum
45Ben Ami. p. 288
48Wyman, p. 84 - 85.
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for the displaced Jews of Europe to draw support to their cause,
employed the general sympathy of all people of good w ill in
selling the idea of Jewish statehood. To the Zionists, asylum
was not the real issue - rather it was the current need of
Jews for asylum that they employed to ju s tify the
establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.47
Certainly the noiTendous events which occurred in Nazi Europe
provided a legitim ate reason to bargain for a Jewish State in
Palestine. However, it is wrong to assume that Zionist aims were
focussed on exploiting the circumstances of their Jewish brethren to
ensure statehood. This is simply not the case. Zionists were the most
dynamic segment of the Jewish population. They were deeply
concerned with the plight of Jewish refugees. The fact that the use of
that plight served to capitalize on the statehood question should in
no way diminish the attention and concern that Zionists had for
victims of the Holocaust. Zionists, it should be remembered, were the
most active elements worldwide to initiate or to campaign for rescue
attempts for concentration camp victims. David Wyman adequately
described the various attempts by Zionist groups to affect the war.
Revisionist branches of Zionism were at the forefront in the list of
risk-takers. The m ajority of rescue attempts were initiated by
Revisionist groups or with Revisionist support. (In this context the

’ Alan Taylor, p. 77.
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term Revisionist applies to both the Revisionist party and to the
Irgun and Lechi.) These attempts include at least sixty two rescue
missions

attem pted

between

1937

and

1944,

involving

approximately 33,598 individuals.48 Such rescue attempts were
typical of the dedication of Revisionists to the rescue of Holocaust
victims. Sim ilarly, they were intensely dedicated to the idea of
creating a Jewish Army.
The early efforts of the New Zionist Organization and the Irgun
Delegation were successful in setting up the mechanisms for the
promotion of organized efforts to rally a nationwide campaign to gain
American public support. Financial needs were successfully planned
for. These plans became fully operative. Plans to publicize the
campaign were enacted through the use of rallies and mass meetings.
An effective nationwide ad campaign was initiated. Although
resistance confronted them from the w ithin the Roosevelt
adm inistration and from mainstream Jewish organizations the
operations of the two organizations were successfully set in motion.
The campaign for a Jewish Army became the primary initial focus of
these efforts.

".The chart in Appendix J illustrates this point.
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CHAPTER 3

THE BATTLE FOR A JEWISH ARMY

The campaign for a Jewish Army appealed to Americans
because it was believed that such a force would benefit the War
effort Zionists contented that the defense of Palestine and the “World
Island” was crucial to the Allied success in the War because of the
extremely important geopositioning of this area at the crossroads of
Asia, Africa and Europe. The Zionists based their case for a Jewish
fighting force in Palestine on these premises while harboring an
underlying goal of establishing a strong armed fighting force which
would be able to evict the British from Palestine at the end of the
war.
In 1941, following the initial efforts by Ze’ev Jabotinsky and
Benzion Netanyahu to campaign in America for the creation of a
Jewish Army, the Committee for a Jewish Army was formed. This
group was headed by Irgun representative,

H illel Kook (Peter

Bergson). The president of the Carnegie Institute, Dr. Samuel Harden
Church, and Colonel John Henry Patterson were

the honorary

chairmen and Pierre van Paassen was National Chairman of the
committee. The name o f the organization was amended to the
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Committee for a Jewish Army of Stateless and Palestinian Jews
shortly after Pearl Harbor was attacked. “This dissident group”
which was later called the Hebrew Committee for National Liberation,
“agitated in the U.S., mainly through newspaper advertisements, by
expounding and supporting the ideas and acts of the Irgun Zeva’i
Le’ummi (I.Z.L) in Palestine.. .The style and tactics of the “Bergson
Group” were the subject of sharp controversies in Zionist circles,
particularly among Revisionists and their sympathizers.”1
Irgun agents had contacted both Zionist and non-Zionist Jewish
leaders even before the formation of the Committee in America,
asking for their support. They refused and actively attempted to
hinder its work.

They believed that the Irgun emissaries had

exaggerated the Nazi threat to Jewish survival and that they were
too militant. Mainstream Jews feared that such militancy would stir
up anti-Semitism in America.
These views were largely a reflection of the official position
of the U.S. Government. The indifference of the allied
governments and of the Jewish community’s silent
acceptance of the position o f the allies on the fate of the
Jews under the Nazis became known as “the abandonment
of the Jews.2
The Committee for a Jewish Army proceeded with its plan despite
1Encyclopedia Judaica. voL 16, p. 1144.
2 Hiahu Lankin, To Win the Promised land: Story of a Freedom Fighter.
Shengold Publishers, Inc., New York, 1992.
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Jewish and non-Jewish resistance.
Jews who considered themselves assimilated, patriotic
Americans were outraged and uneasy. When members of the Kook
group visited conservative synagogues they were faced w ith
traditional pacifist Zionist reactions. People questioned the necessity
of a Jewish Army and of a Jewish State. They were not yet aware of
the extent of the Holocaust and felt threatened by the push for a
Hebrew nationalistic movement. They considered themselves fully
assimilated American Jews (i.e. Americans who practiced Judaism)
and felt that the movement might threaten their security in the
United States.
Orthodox congregations were more sympathetic, but were in
no hurry to assist the Kook group. They felt that redemption would
come in its own time and that it did not require the hand of man
intervening in heavenly matters. While they resisted the national
liberation movement they often supported and collaborated with the
group in rescue and relief missions.
On January 5,1942, the Irgun Delegation published its first full
page advertisement in The New York Times which was headlined
“Jews Fight for the Right to Fight”3
Our first public statement, stunned Jews and non-Jews alike,
made Washington uneasy, outraged the British and irritated
3This slogan had been coined prior to this time by Benzion Netanyahu in
an article which he wrote.
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the Zionist establishment.4
It bore the signatures of a variety of notables including Louis
Bromfield, Ben Hecht, Melvyn Douglas, Lion Feuchtwanger, Bruno and
Waldo Frank, Frances Gunther, Max Lerner, Reinhold Niebuhr,
Abraham L. Sachar, Paul T illich and Lowell Thomas. Many
congressmen also signed. The ad was repeated in other papers across
the nation.
We continued using this technique o f full - page ads until we
ended our activities in the United States. It was without
precedent among Jews to campaign on such a large scale of
public agitation.5
The motives behind the Zionist proposal for a Jewish Army
were, self-defense for the Jewish community in Palestine, “which
was threatened by the possibility of Axis invasion, British
evacuation, and Arab insurrection; and second, the desire for national
revenge against Adolf Hitler, who had declared war on Jews the
world over.”6
Those favoring a Jewish Army had political motivations as well.
They hoped that a strong m ilitary showing during the war might lead
to statehood after the war. This was the prim ary reason why the
British continually opposed a Jewish Army.
4Ben Ami, p. 250.
6Ibid.
8Michael J. Cohen, The Rise of Israel: The Jewish M ilitary Effort. 1939 1944. vol. 29, Introduction.
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Chaim Weizmann, president of the World Zionist Organization,
first offered Jewish m ilitary aid in the war effort to Prime Minister
Neville Chamberlain on August 29, 1939.

The British Cabinet

bickered over the proposal throughout much of the war.
From New York, in May, 1940, Jabotinsky cabled Winston
Churchill, offering m ilitary assistance from a Jewish Army.
I offer to raise Jewish Army for all Allied fronts . . .
provided MacDonald policy stopped, leaving Palestine
destiny officially unprejudiced till peace conference.7
While Churchill favored utilizing Jewish troops in Palestine to
relieve British troops and allow them to return to Britain, he was
unable to convince his government that such a trade o ff was
worthwhile. Their

response was to advise him to decline

Jabotinsky’s offer “in view of the insuperable objections to which any
such scheme would be open.”8
The reason for opposing the creation of a Jewish Army was
even more exactly expressed by Colonial Secretary Lloyd in
correspondence to Churchill in a suggestion as to how the Prime
Minister should respond to American Zionist Leaders.
. . . I need hardly emphasize the objections to this Zionist
plan for arming the Jews of Palestine.. . I am convinced that
7Western Union Cablegram from Jabotinsky to Churchill, M ay 12,1940,
Foreign Office 371/24566, The Rise of Israel: The Jewish M ilitary Effort 19391944. Doc., 10.
e “Secret” letter from Colonial Secretary George Lloyd - after consultation
with Halifax and Eden - to Prime Minister Churc h ill, May 22,. 1940, Colonial
Office, London, R.O.I.. vol. 29, Doc. 11).
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the step should not be taken. The political and m ilitary
consequences would be so grave that any advantages would
count as nothing in the scale.9
Colonel Secretary Lloyd emphasized the trouble that such a policy
would cause to British - Arab relations.
.. .This apart from the dire consequences that would ensue
in Palestine, would make shipwreck of our relations with
Egypt and the neighboring Arab countries, which lie athwart
of a vital line in our communications, thus greatly
aggravating our m ilitary problem in the event of an enemy
offensive. .10
Secretary Lloyd urged Churchill to tell the American Zionist leaders
that he could not endorse the formation of a Jewish m ilitary force in
Palestine.
Although George Lloyd had the agreement of Lords Halifax and
Eden he could not persuade Winston Churchill, who continued to
support the creation of a Jewish Army.

In response, Churchill

stressed the very large numbers of troops needed in Palestine (6
battalions of Infantry, 9 regiments of Yeomanry, 8 battalions of
Australian Infantry, totaling more than 20,000 men). Churchill
contended that this was a heavy price to pay for Britain’s anti-Jewish
policy. If the war were to go heavily into Egypt the troops would
have to be withdrawn leaving the Jewish Colonists in a precarious

8 Colonial Secretary Lloyd to Prime Minister Churchill, June 27, 1940. R.O.I..
Doc. 16.
10Ibid.
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position. By arming them, Churchill believed, British forces could be
released to serve where needed.
. . . I think it is little less than a scandal that at a time when
we are fighting for our lives, these veiy large forces should
be immobilized in support of a policy which only commends
itself to a section of the Conservative Party.11
Churchill also disagreed with Lloyd’s assumption that Arab feelings
in the Near East and India would be prejudiced, especially since the
British relationship with Turkey had vastly improved and because of
a settlement Churchill made with the Arabs on the basis of the
Zionist policy which “commanded the full assent of Lawrence.”12
Disillusioned and frustrated by the obstructions in Britain,
Jewish leader, Chaim Weizmann planned to go to the United States to
rally support for a Jewish Army. He went with two objectives in
mind. These were to accelerate the process of recruitm ent and
training of such a force and to use what influence he had within the
Jewish community to help speed up production. He also believed
that hundreds of Jewish commercial airline pilots could be recruited
to fight for Britain.13 David Ben Gurion agreed with Weizmann, “We

11Churchill to Lloyd, June 28, 1940, Prime Minister’s Office, London, 3/3 4 8 ,
R.O.I.,
Doc. 17.
1! Ibid.
13 Chaim Weizmann to Field Marshall Chetwode, of the War Office, July 6,
1940, R.OJ., vol. 29, Doc. 18.
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must bring our supporters in America into action.”14
This was not the full extent of Weizmann’s objectives however.
In a secret meeting on August 29, 1940, Dr. Weizmann told the
Zionist Executive that he had, the prior day, made his true intentions
known to Lord Halifax.
Weizmann told Halifax that he would be proceeding to the
United States in order to unite the Jews there on a single platform to
ensure a solution to the Jewish problem at the war’s end. Weizmann
believed that the Jews would have difficulty in finding a place to
emigrate to at that time. “Therefore it was essential to establish a
Jewish State in Palestine, w ithin reasonable limits; that was his
solution.”15
Plans for a Jewish Division of the British Army were weighed
and disputed throughout 1941. No action was taken.
The position o f the United States government regarding the
creation of a Jewish Army changed during the following two years
from

aloofness and opposition to a position of support in the

Congress. This support extended even to sections o f the State
Department and the administration itself. It was highly affected by

u Memorandum by David Ben Gurion, July 31, 1940, chairman of the

Jewish Agency Executive, Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem 24/14.632,
R.O.L, voL 29, Doc 22.
16“Secret” -minutes o f Zionist Executive meeting in London, August 29,
1940, War Office, London, R.O.I., voL 29. Doc. 25.
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the zealous efforts of the Revisionist Zionists in America and the
Irgun Delegation. They continued their effective ad campaign and
lobbied for support where ever possible.
From the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Coinage,
Weights, and Measures, Andrew L Somers wrote to Senator Harry S.
Truman requesting his support for the Jews and asking him to
support “a Resolution asking the President to direct the Secretary of
State to prevail upon the British Government to authorize such an
Army” 16 (i.e. a Jewish Army in Palestine).
Truman responded to the call for a Jewish Army in Palestine
with little enthusiasm. It is questionable whether he understood the
complete plan at that tim e as, in his response, he pressed for
American Jews to remain in the U.S. Army. These Jews were not the
focus of a Jewish Army but rather stateless and Palestinian Jews.
America was merely a staging area to rally support for the
movement. However Truman’s reply did not reflect this thinking. He
wrote,
. . . so far as the United States is concerned I think the best
thing for the Jews to do is to go right into our Army as they
did in the last war and make the same sort of good soldiers
as they did before. It is an honorable undertaking to
organize an Army for Palestine but I think American citizens
ought to serve in the American Army.17
18Senatorial Files, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Truman Library, January 26,
1942.
17Papers of H an y S. Truman, January 28, 1942, Senatorial Files, Truman
Library.
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The campaign for a Jewish Army lasted nearly three years and
reached the highest levels in the United States government. There it
was not always received well. In April of 1942 Samuel Edelman, a
Jewish public relations man from Philadelphia wrote to Secretary of
State, Cordell Hull. Edelman emphasized his belief that the demand
for the creation of a Jewish Army “does not even have the support
of the Zionist organization and certainly not of the educated classes of
Jews in America. Nevertheless, this movement is gaining support
from the

masses,

and

it is a flareback against the British

government” 18
Yitshak Ben Ami was cited as the leader of the movement .
Edelman requested that proceedings be initiated against Ben Ami as
“an undesirable alien.” This caused investigative correspondence to
begin between Ben Ami and the Department of State to determine
whether the campaign for a Jewish Army was being conducted on
behalf of a foreign principal. Despite these allegations Jewish Army
leaders continued their attempts to make inroads at high levels and
to stir up public awareness.
In February, 1942, a shock method was employed in the
advertisement entitled “FOR SALE to Hum anity 70,000 JewsGuaranteed Human Beings at $50 a Piece.” This New York
18Ben Ami, p. 323.
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Times ad stemmed from the offer by the Roumanian government to
the “Four Freedoms” to deliver 70,000 Jews to Palestine for a price.
The ad, which was antagonistic and sarcastic toward the so-called
Four Freedoms, included a note from the famous writer, Ben Hecht.
To the Four Freedoms
Care United Nations Leaders.
My Dear Noble State of Mind:
I know you are very busy, too busy
perhaps to read this story on the left
hand side of this page.
For that reason I am writing an ad. Ads
are easier and quicker to read than
stories.
Your admirer,
Ben Hecht
Beneath this note, which was on official Committee for a Jewish
Army stationery, was more sarcasm.

Attention Four Freedoms ! ! !
NO SPIES WERE FOUND AMONG THE 300,000 JEWS WHO CAME TO
PALESTINE SINCE HITLER ASSUMED POWER IN GERMANY.
THERE WILL BE NO SPIES SMUGGLED IN AMONG THESE JEWS. (IF
THERE ARE YOU CAN SHOOT THEM.)

Attention Humanity ! ! !
PALESTINE’S ARABS WILL NOT BE ANNOYED BY THE ARRIVAL
OF 70,000 JEWS. THE ONLY ARABS WHO WILL BE ANNOYED ARE
THE ARAB LEADERS WHO ARE IN BERLIN AND THEIR SPIES IN
PALESTINE.

Attention America ! ! !
THE GREAT ROUMANIAN BARGAIN IS FOR THIS MONTH ONLY!
IT IS AN UNPRECEDENTED OFFER !
SEVENTY THOUSAND SOULS AT $50 A PIECE !

The Doors o f Roumania Are Open !

Act Now ! 19

19The New York Times. Feb. 16,1943, p. 11.
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The ad then described the plight of the European Jews and urged
immediate help to save them. It said, in part, that the principal
demand of the Committee was that the United Nations immediately
“appoint an intergovernmental committee to formulate ways and
means of stopping the wholesale slaughter of human beings ..
Ben Hecht, who wrote this and many other ads for the
Committee, and who wrote the script for a famous pageant which
they held at Madison Square Garden called “We Shall Never Die,”
proved to be a tremendous asset to the Committee for a Jewish
Army.
Hecht’s mind was as sharp as his tongue. He said that he
“wrote with a whip as much as with a pencil,” but the whip
seemed more to me like a scalpel; sometimes it drew
another’s blood, sometimes his own.20
Sunday, May 3,1942 marked a milestone on that road to the
creation of the Jewish Army. Detailed plans were expounded at a
national conference and testimonial dinner for Pierre Van Paassen
which rallied 800 supporters.21
At this meeting, which was held at the Waldorf-Astoria, plans
were made to

accelerate and expand the movement for the

formation of a Jewish Army “to defend the lifelines of the United
“Ben Ami, p. 284.
21 From the newsletter called MEMO from the N ational Headquarters of the
Committee for a Jewish Army. 535 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y., May 15, 1942
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Nations in the Middle East.” 22 At this meeting Dr. Emil Lengyel,
Committee member, author and authority on Middle East affairs gave
a speech entitled “The Jewish Army, and the M iddle East.” It
reinforced the idea that the Middle East was one of the most
important strongholds of the Allied defense.
In this speech Dr. Lengyel emphasized the importance of the
strategic location of Palestine in the “World Island,” a term by which
the Germans had referred to Europe, Asia and Africa. Lengyel
contented that if Palestine were to fall to the Nazis the entire World
Island would be swept along with it, thereby determining the fate of
the rest of the world. He believed that no one was better equipped to
defend Palestine than the Jews residing there who knew the terrain
and believed in what they were fighting for.23
Other members of the Irgun delegation also spoke at the
Conference. They stressed the value of a Middle East force, giving
facts and figures of m ilitaiy strength of various elements there and
analyzed their value in the world struggle.24
In the ensuing discussion a number of speakers raised the
question of the relationship of the Committee to the Zionist
Organization. They urged cooperation and understanding despite the
continuing independent activities of the Revisionists and the Irgun
“ Ib id
23Ibid. MEMO, p. 3 ,4 , 6
24Ibid, p. 7
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Delegation.
The Conference received considerable attention in the press
both in America and abroad.25 Most notably the articles covered the
comments o f two American Senators, James M. Mead, a Democrat
from New York, and James E. Murray, a Democrat from Montana.
These speeches were entered in The Congressional Record. Both
Senators urged the immediate organization of a Jewish Army in
Palestine to oppose the Axis thrust toward the Middle East and the
Suez Canal26 Mead warned that Suez was “virtually the last bastion
we command between Malta and Australia.”27

Senator Murray

stressed the importance of oil fields in Iran and Iraq which were
vital to the war effort.
Irgun delegation members who spoke believed that a Jewish
Army would differ greatly from the non-committal (and later proAxis) attitude taken by the Arabs in the war. The speakers compared
this attitude to the whole-hearted support given by the Jewish
population of the Middle East, and particularly o f Palestine, to the
defense of the Middle East.
Alfred A. Strelsin, chairman of the executive board of the
Committee for a Jewish Army, speaking at the same dinner, outlined
26See the New York M irror. May 3, 1942, The Rochester Times. May 3, 1942,
The Buffalo N.Y.News. May 4 ,1 9 4 2 .
29For the complete text of the speeches of Senators Mead and Murray see
Appendices B and C.
27 The Washington. D.C. Post. May, 3,1942.
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the plan for the creation of the Jewish Army.28 He said that the
testimonial dinner marked the closing of the formative stage of the
campaign. The second stage would be devoted to making the Jewish
Army idea a reality through the use of the press, radio, and rallies.
We hope to impress Great Britain with the American public
desire to give concrete expression to Churchill’s recent
statement that this is not a war for territorial controls, nor
subordination of people, but for the freedom o f the world,
the dignity of man, and equality of all races, colors, and
creeds.. . 29
Hillel Kook also addressed the group at the W aldorf Astoria.30
He reiterated many of the essential points made by the other
speakers but, in doing so, emphasized the Palestinian side of the
argument. That is, that Jews not only wanted to fight the Nazis but
were being treated as “protected people,” unable to defend
themselves and their families. He also stressed the rebirth of their
fighting spirit.
We will fight because out there has grown a generation that
has again learned something that Jews have long forgotten,
and that is to kill. For generations we have learned to die a
multitude of deaths, the fighting Jews of Palestine have
learned to kill a ruthless enem y... give us the tools, and we

26For the complete text of Alfred Strelsin’s speech in the Congressional
Record see Appendix D.
28 Congressional Record. Comments of Alfred A. Strelsin, from The Tewish
Arm Extension of Remark of Hon. James A. Shanley of Connecticut In the
House of Representatives Tuesday, May 12,1942.
30For the complete text of Hillel Kook’s speech in the Congressional Record
see Appendix E.
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will do our job.31
The testimonial dinner for Pierre Van Paassen and convention
for the creation of a Jewish Army brought the work to a decisive
stage. The Convention authorized the Executive Board 1) to create a
nation-wide net of affiliates all over the United States, 2) to establish
offices in London, Buenos Aires, and Montreal , and 3) to make a
survey of the Jewish manpower available for the Jewish A rm y.32
Messages of encouragement were received from around the
world. Eleanor Roosevelt, Frank Knox (Secretary of the Navy), as well
as a number of British M.P.’s sent supporting messages.33
The pressure generated by the Irgun Delegation and the New
Zionist Organization forced the appearance of a resolution on the
Senate floor regarding the formation of a Jewish army.
Resolved by the House of Representatives (The Senate
concurring),that the President of the United States is hereby
requested to direct the Secretary of State to petition the
Government of Britain to take such action as may be
necessary to permit the organization of all-Jewish m ilitary
units in Palestine.34
The efforts of these activist Zionists to draw attention to the
31Congressional Record. Comments o f H illel Kook from Extension of
Remarks o f Hon. Andrew L Somers of New York In the House of
Representatives, Thursday, May 7, 1942.
32 MEMO from the National Headquarters of the Committee for a Jewish
Armv. May 15,1942, p. 9.
33For their comments see MEMO from the National Headcmartprs fnr the
Committee for a Jewish Armv. Vol. 1. No 13, May, 1942.
34Zionews. May 1, 1942, vol. 5, no. 8, p. 1.
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plight of European Jews were effective in giving additional credence
to the activities of the Jewish agency and other mainstream Jewish
organizations. The perception that the Revisionists and the Irgun
delegation were radicals actually benefited the mainstream Jewish
activities in some ways. While somewhat suspicious of the linkage
between the Revisionists and mainstream Zionists, the President and
Government officials were, perhaps, more willing to listen to and talk
with men like Wise, Silver, Weizmann, and Ben Gurion whom they
considered to be more moderate. Whether planned or not, the
presence of “radical” groups in the arena of struggle of any national
liberation group gives to the “more rational” members of that
struggle a seemingly tolerable voice. This has proven true, for
example, in the current struggle of the Palestinian Arabs for a
homeland. In the 1960’s and 1970’s the Palestine Liberation
Organization was perceived as the most extreme faction of the
Palestinian population. Its leader, Yasser Arafat, was then the most
obvious o f the radicals. He received some credibility

after

addressing the United Nations. As time passed and other extremist
groups such as Hamas and Hizbollah, appeared on the scene. The P.
L. O. began to appear less radical and slowly gained credibility. It
used this change in perception to its advantage by making
statements that sounded more diplomatic and acceptable to the
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world at large.
It is evident from the example of the P.L.O. and from the
example of the Zionist Revisionists, that there is a necessity for
extremism in any national liberation movement. Acts of violence are
often used by these groups to draw world attention to their causes.
The cycle of events in a national liberation movement therefore often
begins with the efforts of a few extreme activists who may represent
a dissatisfied constituency who yearn for something that they dare
not attem pt to achieve. It is often the most idealistic of that
population, the freedom fighters or terrorists, who sacrifice their
blood to move the rest into action. Conditions affect that movement.
Usually, the greater the oppression the quicker and more intense the
action. Legitimacy and diplomacy often follow in a cycle which begins
with terrorism and shock tactics. These may eventually lead to
national liberation.
So it was with the Irgun and Lechi in Palestine. The Revisionist
and Irgun representatives in America employed more subtle shock
tactics by use of the written and spoken word, rather than by the
gun.
Following the convention and testimonial dinner for Pierre
Van Paassen at the W aldorf Astoria, these two groups renewed
their efforts to gain the support of American leaders such as Senator
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Truman. He was approached by Dr. A. Hadani, a representative of the
Committee for a Jewish Army (in reality Dr. Alex Raphaeli, member
of the Irgun).

Van Paassen requested that Truman “grant an

interview to Dr. A. Hadani,. . . a brilliant scholar and authority on
Middle Eastern affairs,” in a letter dated May 19, 1942 which was
also sent to acquaint Truman with the new Committee headquarters
in Washington at 2317-15th Street, N. W .35
Truman reluctantly agreed to Van Paassen’s request for the
meeting.
I w ill be glad to talk with Dr. A. Hadani some time at his
convenience, but I am not very strong for a Jewish Army. I
am enclosing you a copy of a letter which I wrote to
Congressman Somers on the same subject some time in
January. Sincerely, Harry S. Truman, U.S.S.36
This comment indicates that Truman was still presuming that
the Jewish Army would include many American Jews. A meeting
with Dr. Hadani may have reeducated Senator Truman for, by the
following week, Truman had suddenly changed his mind.
An F.B.I. file entitled “Background Information Concerning
Members of the Hebrew Committee of National Liberation and Other
Individuals Associated with the Committee” says
. . . another member of the original Palestinian delegation
(i.e. the “Bergson group”) was Dr. Alexander Rafaeli, alias
35 Letter from Pierre Van Passen to H arry Trum an, May 19, 1942, Senatorial
File, Papers o f H arry S. Trum an, Trum an Library.
36 Undated Copy, Senatorial Files, Papers o f H arry S. Truman.
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Alexander B. Hadani. . . Dr. Alexander Rafaeli, who uses the
pen name Hadani, is an economist, an expert on Near East
affairs. He was editor of the Economic Post in Tel Aviv. Since
1938 he visited more than forty countries in Europe, Asia,
and Africa, conferring on Jewish problems.. .”37
Two memoirs of the Irgun also mention the name, Alexander
Rafaeli. (Though neither mentions the alias, Dr. Hadani.) Yitshaq Ben
Ami stated that Rafaeli’s job in the United States was to take “charge
of mobilizing local activists to manage our spreading network of
organizations.”38

Ben Ami also stated that, in 1948, “Rafaeli would

concentrate on his specialty of aircraft acquisition.”39

This is

corroborated by the captain of the Altalena, Eliahu Lankin, who, in
his memoirs, wrote that Rafaeli was one of the six original “Irgun
emissaries”40 sent, in 1939, to the United States to set up The
American Friends of Jewish Palestine.41
(Yaakov) Meridor conceived the idea of organizing a flying
squadron to accompany and protect the Altalena on her
way to Eretz Israel and later to become part of the future
Israeli air force. We succeeded in mobilizing a dozen
volunteer pilots who had served in the various Allied forces
during World War II and were competent and experienced.
Among them were fighter pilots, heavy and medium bomber
pilots, and reconnaissance pilots. We began to buy planes.
Our experts, Yehiel Ratushnik, Alexander Rafaeli and Meir
37 F.B.I. Confidential File, “Background Inform ation Concerning Members
of the HCNL” taken from The Answer, June 15,1944.
38Ben Ami, p. 299.
39Ib id, p. 400.
40The sixth member being Eri Jabotinsky, son of V ladim ir Jabotinsky.
41Eliahu Lankin, To W in die Promised land ; Story of a Freedom Fighter, p.
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Zilberstein, were sent to various destinations, and the
airplanes began to arrive only after the A lta le n a ’s
departure. They were eventually turned over to the
representatives of Israeli government.42
Besides procuring airplanes fo r the Irgun, Rafaeli was a
spokesman for the group. It was in this capacity that he approached
Harry Truman, and gained support in the United States for the
Irgun.
Alex Rafaeli pointed out the friendship and understanding
we had found among Chinese, Indians, Koreans, Yugoslavs,
Czechs and other exiles in the United States, and said that we
needed to attend international gatherings to present the
cause of Hebrew independence in a m ilitant style, without
the self-deprecating restraint of traditional Zionism. When
the war was over, and the nations of the free world met to
decide the future, we had to make sure that the reborn
Hebrew nation was represented forcefully and w ith
dignity.43
About himself Dr. Raphaeli said:
I was a publisher for Economic Newspaper in Israel. I
volunteered in 1937 for a full time job with the Irgun. I did,
from ' 37 to '39 , underground work in Europe organizing the
Jews for . . . underground immigration. I was purchasing
arms. I was carrying (on) political negotiations with other
national minorities like Maronites in Lebanon, like Kurds,
etcetera, etcetera. Then I was in charge of Irgun’s western
office in Paris. . .Then I was trying to get into England.
England pushed me outside. I returned for a month or two
to Israel, again Eastern Europe, and then the commander of
the Irgun decided to send me with the other friends whom
you know, Kook, Merlin, Ben Ami, Ben Eliezer to the United
States. In the United States I was on the last boat from Italy,
42Ibid, p. 273.
43Ben Ami, p. 296.
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Rex. After that Italy declared war on the Allies and I was
taken to the press conference of Jabotinsky in the hotel at
Times Square. . . And there I couldn’t be introduced under
my real name and I wasn’t used to the name o f Hadani.
Since then the work in America til ' 44 or ' 45 was done
under the name Hadani.44
Dr. Raphaeli was one of the main publicity men for the Irgun
Delegation to the United States. He was sent to Hollywood to gain the
support of stars.
I was asked to go to Hollywood via (the) West Coast. Lots of
lectures, in Texas, Oklahoma. No one ever heard about such
strange things like Irgun. And then I started a more
continuous work, established our office in Chicago, and then
I was in Hollywood where I worked with quite a number of
people - among them Ben Hecht and Georgie Gessel and Billy
W ilder and Garfield, etcetera. I think most of them are
published in a number of books. I was in Hollywood doing
public relations and m obilizing public opinion o f the
community there which is not American community, not
specifically Jewish, there were many British there, etcetera,
establishing the American Friends of the Jewish Palestine.
And then, from that work, I was sent to Washington and
Philadelphia. I had a radio station in Philadelphia - WPHIL once a week on Near Eastern subjects. And I worked in
Washington. Hillel Kook got, at that time, sick and I had, for
a while, to take over completely. At this occasion Truman
was just one of quite a number of matters. Truman at that
time was chairman of the, of the W ar. . . not the War Supply
Board but Senate’s Committee of War Production Board something like that, I don’t remember the exact name. And
what happened was that General Rommel, the Nazi
General, was at that time already coming close to the
Egyptian borders and we were afraid he w ill move into
Palestine. Montgomery wasn’t strong enough to stop him.
44Telephone interview w ith D r. Alex Raphaeli from Jerusalem by Joanna
Saidel, June 15,1993.
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Rommel captured the whole coast up to Egypt and we
expected them in Palestine. There was (a) plan of us
withdrawing into the mountains and we needed weapons.
And I was charged with a job.45
Dr. Raphaeli said that while President Roosevelt did nothing to help
the Jews, his Secretary of the Treasuiy, Henry Morgenthau, was very
helpful, as was the Secretary of the Interior, Ickes.
Morgenthau took an unequivocal stand against the State
D epartm ent’s policy to conceal from the public all
inform ation regarding the murder of the Jews, which had
been available since September 1942. Together with some of
his colleagues at the Treasury, he tried to convince Roosevelt
to publish this inform ation and assist Jews who had
managed to escape the Nazis. He supported our demand that
the American government publicly state that the Nazis and
their cohorts would be tried as war criminals at the end of
the war. . . He never joined our board officially, but was
always willing to help.46
Apparently, on May 27, 1942, the Irgun Delegation (perhaps
also because of behind the scenes pressure which the New Zionist
Organization had effectively exerted within the adm inistration)
succeeded in “enlightening” Senator Truman. It may have been the
conversation with Dr. Raphaeli, followed by one with Hillel Kook
(Peter Bergson) which finally convinced Truman to join the effort.
This is evident from correspondence of that day in which Bergson
wrote:

48

Ib id .
D r. Alexe Raphaeli, Dream and Action, p. 105-106.
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Following our conversation of this morning in which you
expressed your sympathy and approval of our plan and
consented to become a member of the Committee for a
Jewish Army, I am writing to express our deep appreciation
for your kindness and assure you that the Jewish people will
never forget that you were among the leading personalities
in this country to take a positive and friendly stand towards
their most vital problem in the most critical moment of their
history.. .47
Truman’s response to this letter was " . . . I really think you give me
too much credit. I w ill be glad to do what I can.”48
On June 22,1942 one, Baruch E. Rabinowitz, submitted a short
memorandum to President Truman highlighting the main points of a
plan to create a Jewish Army in the Near East. Rommel’s
breakthrough in Libya necessitated a Jewish Army in the region,
argued Rabinowitz. The benefit of such an army was that shipping
transport forces would not be necessary since 100,000 men could be
immediately mobilized in Palestine, plus an additional 100,000
stateless Jews from elsewhere. While many Arabs had joined the
Axis ranks, Jews could be counted on to remain firm ly within the
Allied camp. Reiterating some of the points addressed at the Waldorf
Astoria meeting the prior month he wrote, “Palestine is the gateway
to the Persian Gulf, the back-door to Russia. It is also where Hitler

47 Letter from
Trum an, Trum an
48 Letter from
Trum an, Trum an

Bergson to Trum an, May 27, 1942, Senatorial Files, Hgrry S.
lib ra ry .
Truman to Bergson, June 1, 1942, Senatorial Files, H arry S.
Library.
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and Hirohito hope to join hands and thus have complete access to the
oil and minerals of the heart of the World Island, which is the Middle
East” 49
Rabinowitz remarked that the crisis of lack of manpower had
already destroyed Singapore, Malaya, Burma, Crete, Hong Kong and
other areas, and would sim ilarly threaten the Middle East. The
Jewish Army would solve this problem; “100,000 men on the spot
are worth 3,000,000 men yet to be drafted and transported,” he
wrote.50 These available men would fight fiercely and “provide the
unbreakable morale that is the absolute condition of victory . . . If
the Jews of the Middle East are slaughtered unarmed, it w ill be the
greatest blow to Allied morale in this war because the aims of the
Atlantic Charter w ill then be suspect wherever free men still
breathe.” S1 Rabinowitz closed by proposing the immediate formation
of a Jewish Army to be placed under Supreme Allied Command and
by expressing a moral point of view written by Lord Davies in a
letter to the Manchester Guardian.
Davies stressed that a determined stand needed to be taken
either for or against the Jews. The attitude taken would reflect the
sincerity of British war aims. Abandonment of the Jews would be
49"Highlights on the Jewish Arm y Plan,” attached to a le tte r from Baruch
E. Rabinowitz to Senator H arry S. Trum an, June 22, 1942, Papers o f H arry S.
Trum an, Senatorial Files, H arry S. Trum an Library.
" Ib id .
61 Ibid.
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construed as the abandonment of ethical principles, since Hitler had
chosen them for his personal target. By this action the Jews had
become central to a choice between good and evil. Desertion of the
Jews would im ply the betrayal of British war aims and the
repudiation of British principles. The Jews and Palestine needed to be
defended.
Assumptions by supporters of the Committee for a Jewish
Army concerning H itler’s plans to attain the World Island with the
assistance of Arab collaborators proved to be true. “Haj Amin al
Husaini, the most influential leader of Palestine Arabs, lived in
Germany during the Second World War. He met Hitler, Ribbentrop
and other Nazi leaders on various occasions and attempted to
coordinate Nazi and Arab policies in the Middle East.”52

It was

claimed that al Husaini had connections with Adolf Eichmann.
Hannah Arendt, who covered the Eichmann tria l in Jerusalem,
believed however that this charge was incorrect. She nevertheless
confirmed the union of Husseini with the Nazis.
The Grand M ufti’s connections with the Nazis during the war
were no secret; he had hoped they would help him in the
implementation of some “final solution” in the Near East.. .
That Arab nationalists have been in sympathy with Nazism
is notorious, their reasons are obvious . . . they never were
in hiding. . . The M ufti had been in close contact with the
German Foreign Office and with Himmler, but this was
“ W alter Laqueur and Barry Rubin. The Israel-Arab Reader. New York,
1984, p.79.
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nothing new .53
The outbreak of the war had caused the Germans to reevaluate
their position on the Arabs because of the importance of Middle East
oil and supply routes.
The Axis began giving generous subsidies to the M ufti in
Baghdad, and the Germans modified their racial theory of
the Arabs, who were upgraded from a prim itive people
belonging to the lower races (though above Jews, gypsies,
and blacks) to those possessing Nordic influences. The
M ufti’s fair hair and blue eyes convinced H itler that the
Arab leader “has more than one Aryan among his ancestors
and one who may be descended from the best Roman
stock”54
On November 30, 1941 the Grand M ufti of Jerusalem had
actually met with H itler in Berlin. In a record of the conversation
between them, which was held in the presence o f the Reich Foreign
Minister and Minister Grobba, the Grand M ufti affirmed that
“the Arabs were Germany’s natural friends because they
had the same enemies as had Germany, namely the English,
the Jews, and the Communists. They were therefore
prepared to cooperate with Germany with all their hearts
and stood ready to participate in the war, not only
negatively by the commission of acts o f sabotage and the
instigation of revolutions, but also positively by the
formation of an Arab Legion.”55

53Hannah A rendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, p. 13.
64Philip M attar, Ih e_M u fti o fJerusalem ; Al-Haii Amin al-Husavoi and the
Palestinian National Movem ent, p. 100.
55 Laqueur and Rubin, p. 80.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

90
The Grand M ufti expressed his desire to enter into an agreement
with Hitler. He promised the M ufti that once the gateway to the
Middle East was opened by way of the Caucasus that the M ufti could
make a public declaration telling the Arab population of Axis
support Hitler assured the M ufti of the following, “enjoining him to
lock it in the uttermost depths of his heart:”
1. H itler would continue his efforts to destroy “the JudeoCommunist empire in Europe.”
2. German armies would reach the southern exit of the
Caucasus.
3. When this happened “Germany’s objective would then be
solely the destruction of the Jewish element residing in the
Arab sphere under the protection o f British power. In that
hour the Mufti would be the most authoritative spokesman
for the Arab world. It would then be his task to set o ff the
Arab operations which he had secretly prepared.” S6
Meanwhile, Hitler continued to butcher the Jews. As the fact of
the extermination of the Jews became known to the world, a rising
sense of moral outrage grew.
In New York, forty thousand people attended a pageant, called
“We Shall Never Die,” in Madison Square Garden

to watch a

theatrical presentation of the extermination on the Jews. This
performance, which took place on March 9, 1943, was conceived by
Ben Hecht and the Irgun Delegation in America, and directed by Moss

50 Ib id , p. 83, Prof. Laqueur took this inform ation from D ocum ents on
Germ an Foreign P o licy 1918-1945, Series D, Vol. Xm, London, 1964, pp. 881 f l .
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Hart. It was staged before a backdrop of two huge tablets three
stories high bearing the Ten Commandments. In the production
there was a roll call of the greatest Jewish figures throughout time
emerging from the tablets individually, each carrying a candle which
symbolized the Jewish contribution to humanity. The pageant ended
with these words,
The corpse of a people lies on the steps of civilization. And
no voice is heard to cry halt to the slaughter, no government
speaks to bid that the murder of millions end. Those of us
here tonight have a voice. Let us raise it. Perhaps the dead
w ill hear it and find hope. Perhaps the four freedoms w ill
hear it and find their tongue.57
The presentation was repeated in Washington, at Constitution Hall,
where it was attended by seven members of the Supreme Court, two
Cabinet members, hundreds of Congressmen and high ranking
government officials. Eleanor Roosevelt was in the the audience. She
wrote movingly about the event in her weekly syndicated column.
Others were also writing about Bergson’s production in less
favorable tones. The F.B.I. received mail from an individual who
wrote a number of “personal and confidential” letters to J. Edgar
Hoover concerning Peter Bergson’s (H illel Kook) activity in the
Theatre Authority of New York. The w riter believed that the Theatre
Authority should be investigated for doing business with a non
57Ben Ami, p. 286.
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citizen of the United States, Peter Bergson, and allowing him to collect
funds thereby. The w riter stated,
The question is? Why didn’t Alan Corelli (of the Theatre
Authority) write your department about Mr. Bergson and
make some inquiry regarding Bergson’s status in this
country or what right had Mr. Bergson in this country?... (to
organize) the ‘Gigantic Pageant “We W ill Never Die” at the
Madison Square Garden and gather in Thousands of Dollars
from the Pageant when Alan Corelli knew right well that
Bergson was not a citizen of the United States. To my mind
the Theatre Authority is an organization of “Parasites.” that
have no right to e x is t. .S8
The use of this underlined term, so often employed by Hitler to
describe the Jews, may suggest that the source of this letter was an
anti-Semite, writing for that purpose rather than the purpose stated
(i.e. to investigate the theatre company and the alien status of
Bergson).
The same w riter (apparent from handwriting) wrote to Hoover
regarding a play called “The Gate” put on by the Theatre Company
which was supposed to benefit the children of India. The w riter asks,
“W ill India’s children get the money Paid for the benefit?” and then
implies that it might go to “European and other suspects” who were
making “in roads on the American Pocketbook .”59
An F.B.I. investigation into the activities of Peter Bergson and
“ Letter to J. Edgar Hoover, from F.B.I. file on Peter Bergson.
60F.B.I. file on Peter Bergson.
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his group was undertaken. The Committee for a Jewish Army
continued to attem pt to put pressure on the United States
government and to influence American public opinion.
While the New Zionist Organization and the Irgun Delegation
worked in an all out effort to gain acceptance for the creation of a
Jewish Army in Palestine they were not successful Despite American
support for the idea, the British, completely aware of the underlying
motives for such a force, feared the consequences and were
determined to oppose the creation of such an Army. The work o f the
Irgun and the N.Z.O. did, however, result in the creation of the Jewish
Brigade and continued to be the major agent of public exposure to
the plight the Jews of Europe, to the anti-Jewish policy of the British
in Palestine, and o f the ineffectiveness o f the United States
government in assisting the Jews.
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CHAPTER 4

BERMUDA

The ineffectiveness of the United States government in dealing
with the “Jewish problem” in Europe was clearly visible in America’s
response to the Bermuda Conference on Refugees in 1943. The Irgun
Delegation made this response the focus of an ad campaign which
characterized the Conference as a sham and a mockery. Though this
analysis was substantially correct, its appearance in the nationwide
press was prem ature. The

inappropriate

tim ing

of the

advertisements proved to be extremely costly for the organization
prim arily due to the attachment of a list of names of congressmen,
without their expressed consent, prior to the release of the official
report of the Conference. The Irgun Delegation was angrily decried in
public and on the Senate floor. The group lost many supporters
including Senator Truman because of their error in planning.
On April 19, 1943 the Irgun Delegation to the United States
shifted their attention from the creation of a Jewish Army to the
Bermuda Conference on the Refugee Problem which lasted until the
end of the month. This Anglo-American Conference sponsored by
Roosevelt and Churchill was the result of pressure from Jews, and
from the general public in the U.S. and in Britain. Their demands for
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action could no longer be stifled, particularly after the issuance of the
United Nations Declaration on Jewish Massacres in December, 1942.
This declaration stated that the governments of Belgium,
Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and Yugoslavia, and the French National Committee had been drawn
to numerous reports from Europe that the German authorities were
carrying into effect Hitler’s intention to exterminate the Jewish
people in Europe.
From all the occupied countries Jews are being transported,
in conditions of appalling horror and brutality, to Eastern
Europe. In Poland, which has been made the principal Nazi
slaughterhouse, the ghettos established by the German
invaders are being systematically emptied of all Jews except
for a few highly skilled workers required for war industries.
None of those taken away are ever heard of again. The able
bodied are slowly worked to death in labor camps. The
infirm are left to die of exposure and starvation or are
deliberately massacred in mass executions. The number of
victims in these bloody cruelties is reckoned in many
hundreds of thousands of entirely innocent men, women and
children.1
By the declaration the above mentioned governments and the French
National Committee condemned, in the strongest possible terms, the
“bestial policy of cold-blooded extermination.” They warned that
1M onty N. Penkower, The Tews were Expendable: Free World Diplomacy and
the Holocaust, p. 91.
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those responsible for the crimes would not escape retribution and
expressed their determ ination to press on until this enemy was
vanquished.
While Jews submitted various rescue plans, the members of
the Bermuda Conference, headed by the president of Princeton
University, Willis Dodds, anxiously avoided referring to the Jews as
the Nazis’ major victims. The Conference attained little except to
revive the Evian Committee (Intergovernm ental Committee of
Refugees) and to decide to extend the British mandate over Palestine
to deal with problems that would occur after the war ended. British
plans to open up wartime refugee camps in North Africa did not
materialize. The decisions of the Bermuda Conference came too late
to save Jews from the Nazi Holocaust.2
The revival of the Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees
would secure visas for refugees wherever it could. However, this
body did not facilitate Jewish immigration into Palestine since it
regarded its activities as purely humanitarian and wished to avoid
being drawn into political controversies.3
The Conference proved to be a sham. Despite public demand for
action, the British and American governments “hid behind
questionable immigration figures . . . Ships were found to bring
2Encyclopedia Judaica, vol. 4, p. 669.
3Richard Stevens, American Zionism and U.S. Foreign Policy 1942-1947. p.
70.
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400,000 German prisoners of war to internment in the United States
outside current visa regulations, but not for Jews facing death . . .
Indeed, the word “Jews” could not be found in the final communique’
from the conference.”4
The failure of the Conference to assist the Jews of Europe
brought Zionists who had been inactive to their feet. Rallies and
protests increased. Restrictive immigration policies gave credence to
the Zionist contention that only a Jewish state would relieve the
suffering of European Jews.
This was especially true after the Bermuda Conference of
1943 demonstrated that Washington was not prepared to
modify existing American immigration laws. Not until 1947
was a belated, and ultim ately futile, effort made to relax
American immigration policy with a view to aiding growing
numbers of Europeans of all faiths, displaced from their
homes by the w ar.s
Although the United Nations Declaration on Jewish Massacres
had stirred public sympathy it had failed to call the Allied powers
into action. It was the only international document of its nature
produced during the war period.
“Deeds commensurate with the gravity of the hour,” called
for in a last cable from the doomed fighters of the Warsaw
ghetto uprising while the conference’s delegates basked in
the Bermuda sun, had not followed. The pleas and reasoned
proposals of a concerned public could not move London and
4Penkower, p. 119.
6Dan Tschirgi, The Politics o f Indecision: Origins and Im plications of
American Involvem ent w ith the Palestine Problem, p. 129.
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Washington to meaningful action. Chaim Weizmann’s bitter
observation, included in a memorandum to the conference
which the Jewish Agency could not deliver in person, that
“the world is divided into countries in which the Jew cannot
live and countries which they must not enter” had proved
only too true during the Holocaust6
Dr. Yehuda Bauer, Professor of Holocaust Studies and former
head of the Institute of Contemporary Jewry at Hebrew University in
Jerusalem analyzed the reaction of mainstream American Jews to
the Holocaust. He believes that while Jewish organizations in America
were well informed about the failure of the Bermuda Conference,
“they did not respond with plans of their own. In addition to the
formidable psychological hindrances to action hinted at already,
there were certain objective circumstances that m ilitated against
“radical” demonstrations, hunger strikes, and the like.” Such actions,
Bauer contends,

would have hurt President Roosevelt and his

administration, which, Bauer states, “for all its shortcomings, had
stood between the Jews and American antisem itism . Any
demonstrations against the government would be perceived as a
demonstration against the war. Jews in 1943 simply could not
demonstrate against Roosevelt” 7
Bauer states however that if groups like the American Jewish
Joint Distribution Committee, which was the chief representative of
* Penkower, p. 121.
7Yehuda Bauer, American Jewry and the Holocaust, p. 195.
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mainstream Jews in Europe during the War, had backed the activist
Zionists in America, rescue actions would probably have been much
more successful.
Some action was attempted, and might have been more
successful if more representative groups had joined: the
mission in the United States of the extremist underground
Revisionist Irgun organized an Emergency Rescue Committee
which roped in senators and congressmen and demanded
action, such as sending funds to Nazi-controlled territory and
creating a special governmental agency to deal with rescue
plans. But their activity, aimed at maximum publicity and
lobbying, went far beyond what the JDC (Joint Distribution
Committee) considered its proper line of approach.8
This presumed “proper line of approach” did not deter the
Irgun Delegation who were outraged by the Bermuda Conference.
They again used shock tactics to bring attention to the Conference. On
May 4, 1943 they placed another ad in The New York Times . The
caption atop it read, To 5,000,000 Jews in the Nazi Death-Trap
Bermuda Was a “Cruel Mockery”9 . It was subtitled “When Will
The United Nations Establish An Agency To Deal With The Problem of
H itler’s Extermination of a Whole People?” The ad criticized the
Bermuda Conference, calling it a “mockery and a cruel jest.” It drew
public attention to the problem but alienated many important
individuals because it was published before the final reports of the

8 Ib id .
9 For fu ll text of this ad see Appendix L.
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Conference were published. Although the accusations of the Irgun
Delegation proved to be true, many officials resented having their
names attached to the ad without consent and prior to the disclosure
of the official findings. The overriding result of the ad however was,
to some extent, positive. It helped increase pressure resulting in the
formation of the War Refugee Board.
This powerful advertisement did not go unnoticed. A legal
adviser of the Visa Division named Mr. Alexander pointed out the
article to an F.B.I. agent who noted it in his file on Hillel Kook (Peter
Bergson). The F.B.I. file on the Bermuda Conference ad said
The entire article which followed the headline was cast in a
tone of vituperation. . . Along the margin of this ad,
separated in a black-lined box, was a large number of names
of people prominent in public life, including Sidney Heilman,
Donald Nelson, Herbert Hoover and thirty-three United
States Senators. The implication was offered that these
persons endorsed the statements appearing in the ad.10
This list,

which was composed of many m ilitary officers,

senators, ambassadors, governors, and distinguished American
leader, included their names

under the subtitle “The Voice of

America.”11
Senator Edwin Johnson immediately complained to Mr. Bergson
because he felt it was unfair to condemn the Conference before an
10F.B.I. Memorandum to M r. Ladd from S. S. Alden - Re: Committee fo r a
Jewish Arm y o f Stateless and Palestinian Jews, May 12, 1943.
11See Appendix G fo r entire list o f names included in this ad.
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official report was issued regarding Bermuda. He also believed that
one of the U.S. representatives to the Conference “who had no
background in refugee matters,”12 Senator Scott W. Lucas, had been
maligned by the ad.
. . . My colleagues and I have great respect for Senator Lucas
and we do not deem it fair to him to prejudge or condemn
the work of the committee until it has had sufficient
opportunity to make a report. None of the work of the
Conference has been disclosed to me in confidence or
otherwise, and in all fairness I must therefore withhold my
judgment until such time as I know what actually took place
in the Conference.. .13
Johnson also objected to the use of his name, which appeared
as National Chairman of the organization, and to the publication of
other names, saying, “While there is nothing to indicate that this
group of distinguished citizens endorses the specific advertisement,
the inference might be made that they do.”
The Congressional Record for May 6, 1943 set forth a protest
by Senator Lucas in which he defended the conference at Bermuda.
He also read Senator Johnson's letter to Peter Bergson into the
Record. During that session of Congress four other senators
disclaimed knowledge of the ad. These included
Oklahoma, A. B. Chandler of Kentucky,

E. H. Koore of

Alexander W iley of

12Penkower, p. 108.
13Letter from Senator Edwin C. Johnson to Peter Bergson, May 6, 1943;
Senatorial File, Papers o f H arry S. Trum an.
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Wisconsin, and Harry S. Truman of Missouri.
Senator Truman was outraged. He withdrew his support for the
Committee for a Jewish Army. In a letter to Peter Bergson Truman
stated his case.
Dear Mr. Bergson,
Senator Lucas yesterday called my attention to an
advertisement in the New York Times to which was signed
the names of some dozen or so Senators and to which the
name of Senator Edwin C. Johnson was signed as Chairman.
Senator Johnson informs me this advertisement was never
submitted to him for approval, and I have the same
information from a number of other Senators.
I am withdrawing my name from your Committee, and you
are not authorized under any circumstances to make use of
it for any purpose in the future.
This does not mean my sympathies are not with the down
trodden Jews of Europe, but when you take it on yourself
without consultation to attack members of the Senate and
House of Representatives who are working in your interest I
cannot approve of that procedure.
Sincerely yours,
Harry S. Truman, U.S.S.14
On May 10, 1943 Senator Maybank of South Carolina pointed
out that his name had also been used without his approval and “that
the man responsible was one Peter Bergson, a citizen of Palestine,
who, with four or five other Palestinian citizens, is presently in the
14Papers o f H arry S. Trum an, Senatorial File, dated May 7, 1943, H arry S.
Trum an Library, Independence, Missouri.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

103
United States preparing full page ads of the same general tenor.”15
In the Congressional Record for this date Senators Lucas and
Chandler expressed their resentment that “an individual not an
American citizen should, without authority, use the names of other
Senators to condemn a colleague in the United States Senate.”16
Mr. Lucas made the following comments in the Congressional
Record.
The time may come for a showdown with respect to the
alien groups, regardless of who they may be, who are here
under temporary sufferance at the hands of a benevolent
government which accords them better treatment than they
can get at any other place under God’s shining sun, and
while they are here they take advantage of the courtesy and
kindness extended to them.17
Bergson sent letters of apology to both Senator Lucas and
Senator Truman on May 13, 1943 for what Bergson considered a
misinterpretation of intent by the senators. But the damage had been
done. Truman’s reply to the apology was curt " . .. I still feel that you
abused your privilege when you subjected the members of the
United States Senate to the embarrassment of your advertisement
which was not authorized by any member of that committee.”18

15 F.B.I. Memorandum to M r. Ladd from S. S. Alden - Re: Committee fo r a
Jewish Arm y o f Stateless and Palestinian Jews, May 12, 1943.
18Ib id
17Congressional Record, M ay 10,1943.
1* Letter to Peter Bergson from H an y Truman, May 24, 1943 ; Senatorial File,
Papers o f H arry S. Trum an.
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Irgun delegation member, Yitshak Ben Ami, commented on the
reaction to advertisement in his memoirs.
As we hoped we would, we touched a nerve, and a storm
of protest against us broke loose, whipped up by Senator
Scott Lucas, who had just returned from the conference. The
debate which then broke out on the Senate floor revolved
mostly around Senator Lucas’ hurt feelings. Lucas declared
before the Senate that no one could accuse him of not caring
for the Jews of Europe, since “some of my best friends are
members of the Jewish faith.” In May, 1943, this was
considered a forthright and courageous statement. Without
knowing the facts or understanding the historic issues,
Lucas’ colleagues rose up on the floor and several, including
Harry S. Truman, announced their withdrawal from the
Committee for a Jewish Army. How could our ad have dared
to state “It was almost improper to mention the word Jew?”
Lucas called this a “diabolical untruth,” and wanted to know
how we knew what had been said or not said at the
Conference. (We did have friends who had attended.)
While Eichmann’s Germany herded thousands into the
shuttle trains to the extermination camps, while David
Wdowinski and his comrades were retreating from bunker
to bunker in the Warsaw ghetto, the members of the United
States Senate were patting each other on the back in a show
of support for each other’s fine efforts.19
While the Senate continued to debate the issue, Kook (Bergson)
wrote to Senator Edwin C. Johnson, “President Roosevelt called this a
war... for the survival of human liberties; for the survival of human
freedom; for the survival of world civilization and the dignity of the
human race... Let not the day of victory come and find seven million

,BBen Ami, p. 290.
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Jewish corpses in Europe.”20 During 1943 Truman had been urged by
more moderate elements o f the Zionist movement to support a
Jewish State in Palestine. On January 28, Rabbi Stephen Wise sent
him a copy of a volume called “Why a Jewish State” written by Rabbi
Leon Feuer of Toledo.21 On February 4,1943 Truman replied, “I shall
read it with much interest.” 22 Truman’s amicable relationship with
Wise prompted further correspondence in the wake of the Senator’s
resignation from the Committee for a Jewish Army. On May 20,1943
Rabbi Wise, representing the American Emergency Committee for
Zionist Affairs, wrote to Truman about Peter Bergson and the Irgun
Delegation in America.
The activities o f M r. Bergson have been a source of
considerable embarrassment to the organized Zionist
movement in this country, whose leadership has viewed
with concern the manner in which he and his associates
have been conducting their campaign.23
Senator Truman’s June 1,1943 reply to this letter is both interesting
and revealing. In it he openly criticizes Bergson and states why.
Dear Rabbi Wise,
I appreciate your letter of the twentieth very much, and it
is fellows like Mr. Bergson who go o ff half cocked in matters
20Ib id, p. 290-291.
21 Letter from Steven Wise to Senator Trum an, Jan. 28, 1943, Truman
Senatorial Files, Trum an Library.
22Reply from Trum an to Wise, Feb. 4, 1943, Senatorial Files, Papers o f H arry
S. Trum an, Trum an Library.
23Letter from Rabbi Steven Wise to Senator H arry Trum an, May 20, 1943,
Trum an Library.
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that affect strategy of the whole world that causes all the
trouble. No one feels more sympathetic toward the Jews
than the members of the United States Senate who signed
that Committee petition, but when an ad such as Bergson
put in the New York Tomes can be used to stir up trouble
where our troops are fighting it is certainly outside my
policy to be mixed up in such an organization.
That ad was used by all the Arabs in North Africa in an
endeavor to create dissension among them and to stab our
fellows in the back.
We want to help the Jews and we are going to help them but
we cannot do it at the expense of our m ilitary maneuvers.
Sincerely yours,
Harry S. Truman, U.S.S.24
The failure of the Irgun Delegation to properly time the release
of its advertisement attack on the Bermuda Conference was
regrettable. The plan could have been highly successful had proper
endorsement been attained. It is probable that such support could
have been mustered. Over - zealousness and a desire to make the
public aware of the hypocrisy of the event seemingly overshadowed
the systematic approach of affirm ation and consent which should
have been followed. This failure, however, did not stop the Irgun
Delegation from continuing with its mission.
Other im portant events were simultaneously taking place.
Despite the animosity between the Irgun Delegation, the Senate, and

24Letter from H arry Trum an to Steven Wise, June 1, 1943, Truman Library.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

107
the mainstream Jews in America,

in 1943, over the Bermuda

Conference, there was cooperation elsewhere.
The establishment Zionists, important anti-Zionist figures,
and a group of young Palestinians in the United States led
by Peter Bergson managed to torpedo a joint U.S.-British
declaration that would have disavowed commitment to a
Jewish state in Palestine, and denied freedom of expression
to a minority (i.e. the Revisionists) in the United States.25
The affair began in January with the appointment of Lt. Col. Harold
B. Hoskins, “an Arabist in the Office of Strategic Services,” to the
position of Near East envoy to Franklin Roosevelt.26

25 “The Hoskins A ffair,” by Louis Rapoport, The Terusalem Post. November
23,1984, p. 5.
20Ibid.
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CHAPTER 5
THE FIGHT FOR A JEWISH STATE
The Hoskins Affair threatened to stifle the Palestine question
during the war and to make a decision on Palestine dependent upon
Arab agreement. This incident, which was averted by the united
effort of a broad spectrum of Jews, was only one incident in the large
number that constituted the fight for a Jewish State by supporters in
both America and Palestine. While the methods were controversial,
the results of those efforts was increased pressure and publicity for
the creation of a Jewish State.
Harold B. Hoskins, the son of missionaries from the United
States, was bom in Beirut and educated at American University, and,
in the United States, at Princeton. His first job in the Roosevelt
administration was to establish friendly contacts (i.e. to create an
intelligence network) in the Arab world.1 In a report which he
wrote, he pressed for a joint Anglo-American declaration which
would, in effect, stifle the Palestine question during the war and
making a decision on Palestine depend upon Arab agreement.2

He

advised that unless this was done there would be civil war there
1 “The Hoskins A ffair,” by Louis Rapoport, The Jerusalem Post. November
23,1984, p. 5.
2Summary of lieutenant Colonel Harold B. Hoskins’ Report on the Near
East, Foreign Relations of the United States. (Palestine section) 1943, volume
IV, p. 784.
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which would endanger Allied war efforts.3
He also

cited the controversy between mainstream and

Revisionist Zionists (particularly the campaign of Rabbi Wise against
the Irgun Delegation) as contributing to “domestic disunity.” Hoskins’
appraisal stated that 10 additional divisions would be needed in
Palestine unless Zionist agitation, especially the campaign for a
Jewish Army, was silenced immediately.4 British reports and State
Department assessments confirmed Hoskins’ assumptions. There
Wallace Murray headed the Near East desk and “was considered the
most intransigent foe of Zionism in the government.” 5 General
Patrick Hurley (Army Intelligence) made similar recommendations.
Had Roosevelt and Churchill jointly disavowed any commitment to a
Jewish homeland in Palestine it would have been a terrible blow to
Zionism.
However, Churchill’s strong support for an allied Jewish force
overcame the major forces of opposition.
W ithout the Prime M inister’s support, evident at every
crucial stage since September, 1939, the Jewish Brigade
would never have gotten by the careerists in London and
the Middle East. The U.S. War and State departments also
rejected the idea, and a report in m id -1943 from
Roosevelt’s personal emissary to the Middle East (Hoskins),
3Hoskins to Under Secretary Sumner Welles, from Cairo, January 23, 1943,
Foceign_Relations of the United States. Palestine Section, 1943, volume IV, p.
748.
4 “The Hoskins A ffair,” by Louis Rapoport, The Jerusalem Post. November
23,1984, p. 5.
6 Ibid.
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which did much to shape government opinion, omitted any
mention of the Yishuv’s war record... Churchill justified the
Jewish Brigade on m ilitary grounds, on the basis of his firm
views supporting a large Jewish state in Palestine .. .6
By the end of July 1943, Roosevelt used a Jewish aide, Judge
Samuel Rosenman, to convince Jewish leaders to accept the Hoskins
report. Rabbi Stephen Wise and Chaim Weizmann were two of the
Jewish leaders to whom appeals were made to stop the activities
supporting the formation of a Jewish Army. “Wise pointed out, quite
justly, that he had no control over the Jewish Army people, but that
he would see what could be done.” Similarly there was a request
made of Chaim Weizmann in Great Britain “to stop the Jewish Army
campaign, and the Zionist leader’s reply to Lord Halifax (was) that
the Bergson group would not listen to him. The Zionist establishment
tried, nevertheless, to frustrate the movement for a Jewish Army.”7
In 1984 Hillel Kook (Peter Bergson) said that Rabbi Wise, after
talking with Rosenman, had telephoned and asked Bergson to attend
a meeting in New York of about 10 Zionist leaders. At the meeting,
Wise stated that Roosevelt told him personally that unless the Jewish
Army Committee’s ads were stopped, he would alter the tax
exemption status of sill Zionist organizations in the United States.8
* Penkower, p. 26.
7 “The Hoskins A ffair,” by Louis Rapoport, The lerusalem Post. November
23,1984, p. 6.
"Ibid.
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Controversy continued over both Kook’s (Bergson’s) activities
and the Hoskins report.

Kook’s friend, Senator Edwin Johnson

(national chairman fo r the Committee for a Jewish Army and
chairman o f the Senate M ilitary Affairs Committee) demanded an
inquiry into the Hoskins affair. After Johnson was finally able to
obtained the Hoskins report, he told Kook that “the recommendations
in it were based purely on opinion, that there was no substantiation
for his assessments of a possible Arab revolt”9
I. F. Stone, Washington correspondent, editor of The Nation.
and PM newspaper, called Hoskins “politically a Syrian nationalist
who had given alarmist accounts to Franklin Roosevelt.” 10 By July
1943 the War Department stated that Lt. Col. Hoskins’ activities
were unauthorized. In the Treasury Department Secretary Henry
Morgenthau was dismayed by Hoskins’ activities. Morgen thau
defended the rights of the Irgun delegation.
A cross spectrum of Jewry united, for it was feared that if
Hoskins’ efforts succeeded there would be an increase in antiSemitism nationwide. “The president realized that he was facing, for
the first time, united Jewish and Zionist opposition representing the
entire spectrum: the clamorous Bergson group in the same company
as Baruch, Frankfurter, Wise, Morgenthau and Roseman. All would
MblcF
10The Nation. March 18.1944.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

112
be in one open revolt if the joint declaration were forced through.”11
Despite efforts to halt Hoskins in this matter, he remained friendly
with F.D.R., who sent him on other missions to the Middle East to talk
with Ibn Saud.12
The Hoskins affair showed the strength of the Jewish lobby.
No similar effort was made-except by the Bergson group-to
lobby intensely for the rescue of Jews from Nazi satellite
states. It was a question of priorities: the Beigsonites, after
November 1942, put rescue first, Palestine second. The
mainstream Zionists openly admitted - even at the height of
the Holocaust- that Palestine should be “first and foremost”
on the agenda, as Zionist leader Dr. Israel Goldstein said in a
statem ent at the establishm ent’s Am erican Jewish
Conference in June 1943. Rescue was a poor second.13
Following the Hoskins Affair,

Colonel Hoskins became less

conspicuous. He left the secret service and returned to the State
Department, becoming director of the Foreign Service Institute from
1955-1961. Later, he became a Middle East consultant to Standard
Oil of New Jersey. His 1977 New York Times obituary never
mentioned the Hoskins Report, which nearly became Allied policy.14
It was only because of the united Jewish lobbying effort that this
was prevented.
It was believed that the underlying motive of the Irgun
11The Jerusalem Post. November 23,1984, p. 6.
11Ibid.
13Ibid.
,‘l Ibid.
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Delegation and the Revisionist Zionists in America was to arm the
Jewish population in Palestine in preparation for a revolt against the
British. This belief was especially held by the British themselves and
was the principle cause for the demise of the Jewish Army plan. The
British War Office produced a seventeen page report on the subject
in December of 1942, which stated that “the Committee for a Jewish
A rm y. . . is closely connected with the [aim of] creation of a Jewish
State in Palestine..

The British, however, were not too concerned

about American support for such an Army. The report commented
that Lord Halifax believed that officials in the State Department were
aware of the real objectives of the Jewish agitation, but due to
benevolence, and a desire, in an election year, to avoid the risk of
offending voters or being called anti-Semites, did not publicly
confront the matter. 15
In Washington the British approached this m atter more
diplomatically. Members of their embassy requested the Prime
Minister to tell the Irgun Delegation that the arming of the Jews in
Palestine was being actively implemented w ith the help of the
Jewish Agency. Nonetheless, after three years only 12,000 of the
130,000 men and women registered in Palestine for service had been
admitted to various British units in the Middle East.16
16Report from the British War Office, Dec. 10,1942, quoted by Ben Ami, p.
332.
ie Ben Ami, p. 333.
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In June of 1943 Irgun delegation member, Yitshak Ben Ami’s,
army furlough was ending. He believed that his work in the Irgun
Delegation in the United States had been beneficial
Even though we had met opposition every step of the way
from our fellow Jews in the establishment, if nothing else,
we had at least served as a stimulus, pointing to new
approaches, and shaming Jews and non-Jews alike to look
up, to take notice, and sometimes to act. Whether or not we
succeeded, we had done our best17
While hopes for an Army of Stateless and Palestinian Jews
were dashed, the effort was not a failure. In England Chaim
Weizmann, though not a Revisionist, had also been pushing for
independent units

of stateless and Palestinian Jews within the

British forces to serve with the Allied armies.
Although this effort was criticized by more extreme elements
who wished to see an independent Jewish fighting force, W eizm ann
believed that such a force, even under British control, would help to
form

the nucleus of a Jewish army which could contend with Arab

opposition when Jewish statehood was proclaimed. He also hoped
that the creation of such a unit would have political ramifications.
Jewish units representing the Jewish people, fighting under a Jewish
flag, would draw further attention to the goal and recognition of
Jewish statehood. It would also affect non-Zionist Jews by creating
the impression that Jews were fighting in the war as members of the
17Ibid, p. 334.
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Jewish nation, not as subjects of other nations, which was the real
situation.18
Continuing Revisionist and Irgun agitation for a Jewish Army
in the United States impacted on the situation in Great Britain. In
September, 1944, the combined efforts in America and in Great
Britain succeeded. The British War Office created the Jewish Brigade
which fought in Italy under the flag of present day Israel. In this
respect these Zionist activists achieved some of their goals. “The
veterans of the Jewish Brigade became, exactly as the [Mandate]
Administration had foreseen, the nucleus o f the future Israeli Army
and the decisive factor in the Arab defeat, which, as things were,
amounted to a defeat of British policy.”19
Weizmann had secured the assurance of Churchill that Great
Britain would recognize statehood. If the Conservatives had remained
in power, the British probably would have recognized Zionist claims
to statehood, at least a restricted part of Palestine. However, it was
Zionist operations in America during the war that initiated the final
showdown before Israel’s b irth .20
The Irgun delegation fervently turned their sights toward the
statehood question. While Senator Truman had resigned from the
18Alan R. Taylor, Prelude to Israel: An analysis of Zionist Diplomacy 18971947. p. 67.
1t Taylor, p. 69, (quoting A rthur Koestler, Promise and Fulfillment.
Palestine. 1917-1949. Macmillan, New York, 1949).
20Taylor, p. 70.
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Committee for a Jewish Army he had not deserted the idea of a
Jewish State. Undated and untitled

correspondence, possibly in

response to a May 2, 1944 request from the American Zionist
Emergency Council fo r a statement o f support for a Jewish
Homeland,21 contained a statement which suggested and urged
Truman to say, in part, that, as a member of the Sub-Committee of
the Resolutions Committee of the Democratic National Convention, he
would give his earnest support to the plank in the platform which
favored the opening o f Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration
and colonization, resulting in the establishment there of a free and
democratic Jewish commonwealth at the earliest possible moment.22
Truman, though sympathetic, was hesitant to issue the
statement. He wrote in other correspondence, “My sympathy is with
the Jewish people and I am of the opinion that a Resolution such as
this should be very circumspectly handled until we know just exactly
where we are going and why. With the difficulties looming up
between Russia and Poland, and the Baltic States and Russia, and
with Great Britain and Russia, it is absolutely necessary to us in
financing the war. I don’t want to throw any bricks to upset the
applecart, although when the right time comes I am willing to help
make the fight for a Jewish Homeland in Palestine.”23
21Letter from Rabbi Leon I. Feuer to Truman, May 2, 1944, Truman Library.
22 Senatorial File, Harry S. Truman
23Undated Senatorial file, Papers of Harry S. Truman.
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Messages of support such as this one were continually being
sought by Jewish Agencies, Revisionist and otherwise, to give
additional credence to the movement for a Jewish State. On
September 15, 1944 the Zionist Organization of America requested
such a statement for its forty-seventh Annual Convention. In the
request to Harry Truman the responsibility of America to keep past
promises to the Jews was recalled and emphasized.
The Senator was reminded that, after World War I, 52 nations,
including the United States, had guaranteed a Jewish Homeland in
Palestine, and that it was the obligation of the United Nations to
declare Palestine open to unrestricted Jewish immigration so that it
could become a Jewish Commonwealth, in which all the inhabitants
would be guaranteed full equality and cultural autonomy.
The establishment of Palestine as a Jewish Commonwealth is
in harmony with the policies of our Government as set forth
in the Joint Resolution of Congress in 1922, reiterated by
every president from Woodrow Wilson to President
Roosevelt, and reconfirmed in the Palestine planks in the
platforms of the two major Party Conventions this year.. . 24
Meanwhile other things had been happening within the Irgun
Delegation in America. In 1943 the Gillette-Rogers resolution calling
for a Presidential Commission to Save the Jewish People of Europe

24Letter of Israel Goldstein, President of the ZOA, to Truman,September 15,
1944, Senatorial Files, Truman Papers.
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had been introduced to Congress. The Senate Foreign Relations
Committee approved it by a unanimous vote. This led, in January
1944, to the creation of the War Refugee Board, which eventually
proved to be the only United States Government entity to help save
substantial numbers of Jews from extermination, although the total
of those saved was actually very small compared to the number
that could have been saved had the Board been created earlier.
Nevertheless, it was a success for the Irgun Delegation to the United
States, which had been directly responsible for promoting the plan as
a result of ads in The New York Times and throughout the country on
August 30, 1943. These ads were captioned,

“WE ALL STAND

BEFORE THE BAR OF HUMANITY, HISTORY AND GOD! WE
WILL

ALL

BE JUDGED

IF

WE

DO

NOT

CREATE

THE

MACHINERY TO SAVE THE JEWISH PEOPLE OF EUROPE.” The
response from President Roosevelt had been that the rescue of the
Jewish people o f Europe was under constant examination by the
State Department.
Outraged by Roosevelt’s failure to effect any rescue efforts,
400 Orthodox rabbis had marched on Washington in October, 1943,
demanding a special governmental agency be established to rescue
Jews from the Holocaust. While Roosevelt’s policy had been “rescue
through victory,” critics pointed out that by the end of the war there
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might be no Jews left to rescue. They marched from Capitol H ill to
the White House hoping for an audience with the President. This was
not forthcoming. They were told by the Presidential secretary that he
could not meet them “because of the pressure of other business.” This
was not true. The President had few meetings that day but had
refrained on the recommendation of Dr. Steven Wise, president of the
American Congress and Judge Samuel Rosenman, of the American
Jewish Committee. Before the rabbis arrived President Roosevelt
“slipped out a rear White House exit to attend a ceremony marking
the induction of 40 Yugoslavs into the American army. Then he left
for a long weekend in the country.”25 Roosevelt was severely
criticized in the press for his treatment of the rabbis.
This march had been planned by H illel Kook. During the
summer of 1943 he had sponsored an Emergency Conference to Save
the Jewish People in Europe. This conference had rallied forces from
many walks of life to unite and to put additional pressure on the
administration.
President Roosevelt had been uncooperative with the Irgun
Delegation in another im portant pursuit. Dr. Alex Raphael! had
attempted to establish an off shore radio station to publish news
about the Holocaust to the Jews of Europe. Though fully funded, and

25“The Day the Rabbis Marched,” by Dr. Rafael MedofF, Jewish Journal of
Greater Los Angeles. October 22-28,1993, p. 17.
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supported by the head of the Office o f War Information (O.W .I.),
Elmer Davis, Raphaeli’s plan was thwarted by the President.
Dr. Alex Raphaeli, after a few in itial meetings, was able to
convince Elmer Davis that it was the duty o f the Irgun Delegation,
and of the American people, to establish, outside territorial waters of
the United States, a radio station which would broadcast to Europe in
Yiddish, Russian, and Polish, via London.
I had to provide the budget for it, which was a very big
budget, and I got the money and obligation from a very
famous m an.. . This was Samuel Zammuray, the King of the
White Fleet... This was a poor Georgia boy who came to New
Orleans at age of eight; started dealing with bananas and,
after forty, fifty years controlled all the banana fields of
Central America. And controlled the White Fleet - all the
boats bringing bananas from Central America, to America,
to Europe, all over the w orld. . . we became very friend ly. . .
and for us he undertook the obligation for three million
dollars to finance this radio station. So I was absolutely
covered and I had this radio station and then Elmer Davis
comes and says, Alexe - but the President has to confirm it. I
cannot go ahead. Pm for it. I passed it in all committees of
O.S.S. and British objected. I told them this has nothing to do
with Britain it’s outside the territory, (in) international
waters. And he (Roosevelt) vetoed it. And we couldn’t do it.26
Dr. Raphaeli turned to Eleanor Roosevelt for help. She had
previously helped him but could not in this situation.
And I went to see his wife who was very helpful.. . Eleanor.
.. who was very helpful when our boats when our boats got
stuck in (the) Danube. She was very helpful contrary to the
29Telephone interview from Jerusalem with Dr. Alexe Raphaeli by Joanna
Saidel, June 15,1993.
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President. But when it came to this she said, Excuse me
please, this is a political matter. .. I can not get involved.27
The question remains, Why did Roosevelt refuse permission for
this station? Perhaps it had to do with an internal battle that was
taking place regarding control of propaganda and psychological
warfare. On June 13, 1942 the President consolidated the Foreign
Information Service, the Office of Government Reports, the Office of
Facts and Figures, and the Division of Information of the Office of
Emergency Management into a single agency. This agency was the
Office of War Information (O.W.I.) which was given the duty of
conducting foreign and domestic informational programs through
radio, the press, movies and related sources. Elmer Davis was chosen
by the President to head the O.W.I.; Dwight Eisenhower’s brother,
Milton, became the associate director.
On June 13, 1942 the President also created the Office of
Strategic Services, placing it under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A quarrel
arose about who had jurisdiction over clandestine broadcasting. It
was argued that the O.W.I. should have control over informational
broadcasting but that the O.S.S. should control psychological
broadcasting. The O.W .I controlled most of the available broadcasting
transmitters in America.
On December 23, 1942, the Joint Chiefs gave the O.S.S.
27Ibid.
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responsibility for “propaganda and warfare phases of psychological
warfare.” On January 3,1943, William Donovan, O.S.S. head, created
the Morale Operations branch o f the O.S.S. which would use
propaganda to incite and spread dissension in enemy countries.
Elmer Davis was angered by Donovan’s attempt to take control
of U.S. government propaganda. On January 5, Davis met with the
President to object to plan. F.D.R. assured Davis that the O.W.I. would
retain control of government propaganda and that he would discuss
it further with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J.C.S.). The controversy
expanded into the public arena. Donovan gained the backing of the
Joint Chiefs who advised the President of their decision. “Before
receiving the statement of the Joint Chiefs, F.D.R. had sided
completely with Davis and planned to remove O.S.S. from under the
J.C.S. and place it under the War Department. The J.C.S. statement,
however, changed his mind.”28 The result of this decision was that
the O.W.I. would control propaganda while the Joint Chiefs would
control psychological warfare.
On October 27, the Joint Chiefs gave the O.S.S. control of all
forms of morale subversion, including “false rumors, ‘freedom
stations,’ false leaflets and false documents. . . for the purpose of
creating confusion, division and undermining the morale of the
“ Lawrence C. Soley, Radio Warfare: OSS a n d C IA Subversive P ranaganria p.
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enemy.”29
Further problems developed in this arena. “O.W.I. was always
plagued with internal disagreements and conflicts, over which Elmer
Davis was able to exercise some control,” however when, in
September 1943, additional power was given to the Overseas
Editorial Board in New York, it was at the expense of Elmer Davis.
Members of this Board submitted proposals that “in effect, stripped
Davis of authority over foreign propaganda.”30 Another dispute
followed which Davis won resulting in the firing of the heads of the
Overseas Editorial Board.
It is possible that, because of this struggle for power and the
complexities evolving as a result of these problems, the request by
Raphaeli for his radio station was somehow hindered during the
commotion which took place during 1942 and 1943, the years in
which he attempted to get the broadcasting base. There may have
been other reasons as well. It is not clear.
During this time, Dr. Raphaeli was inducted into the U.S. Army.
He was selected to be an agent for the Counter Intelligence Corps. He
was responsible for the arrest and interrogation of the powerful
German industrialist, munitions manufacturer, and S.S, official, Alfred
Krupp. This interrogation led to the arrest of Erich Mueller, who had
“ Ibid.
30Ibid, p. 101.
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designed the infamous German guns, known as Kanonnen Mueller,
and of Houdremont, “another builder of German cannons which, at
that time, were the best in the world. The Americans were very
anxious to get Houdremont, and he was actually delivered to us with
Krupp’s help, after found hiding in a forest around Essen.”31
In March, 1944, the Hebrew Committee of National Liberation
(HCNL) was founded. Its chairman was Hillel Kook (Peter Bergson).
Again the members of the Irgun delegation found themselves at odds
with the Zionist establishment in America. “Paralleling the
declaration of revolt by the Irgun in Palestine, it (the Irgun
Delegation in America) served notice on the Zionist establishment, on
the British, and on the State Department that once the war was over,
Hebrew freedom and Statehood could not be stopped.”32
Preparations for this move began in 1943 when victory over
the Germans began to look possible and the Irgun delegation’s
campaign to save European Jewry was in full swing. In November,
ads were placed in newspapers throughout the United States
featuring a piece by Ben Hecht called “My Uncle Abraham Reports.”
Uncle Abraham was a ghost chosen by the millions of murdered Jews
to represent all their ghosts at worldwide conferences “to make the
world a better place to live.” Uncle Abraham would take notes while
31Dr. Raphaeli, Dream and Action, p. 128.
32Ben Ami, p. 328-329.
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sitting on the windowsill. He would then report back to his departed
friends. He told them that for some unknown reason, their names
were never mentioned - not in Moscow, not at 10 Downing Street, not
at the White House, ‘When we were killed, we were changed from
Nobodies to Nobodies. Today, on our Jewish tomb, there is not the
star of David but an asterisk.’

‘ Uncle Abraham has gone to the

White House, is sitting on the windowsill two feet away from Mr.
Roosevelt. But he has left his notebook behind.’ Roosevelt did not like
the ad; neither did Secretary of State Cordell H ull”33
Hull not only disliked Hecht but tried to undermine Peter
Bergson. The F.B.I. reported that “this man has been in the hair of
Cordell Hull and they would like to have him inducted with the least
possible trouble.”34

An article which appeared in the Washington

Post on May 23,1944 was captioned, “Bergson Faces Inquiry by F.B.I.
as Alien Agent.” This article, written by Ann Cottrell, stated that the
F.B.I. was investigating the status of Bergson. The official reasons
given were the expiration of his temporary visitor’s visa on July 7,
1941, and his not registering with the Justice Department’s foreign
agents’ registration section. The article stated that the President of
the United Hatters, Cap and M illinery Workers of America, Max
Zaritsky, accused the American League for a Free Palestine of being
33Ibid, p. 327-328.
34F.B.I. Internal Security Memorandum from J. F. Buckley to D. M. Ladd, May
23,1944.
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an offshoot of Bergson’s Hebrew Committee for National Liberation.
Zaritsky forbade the use of his name on any documents issued by
the league.
Linking the league and the Liberation committee, Mr.
Zaritsky said members of the two groups are members of
the Palestinian Irgun, which he said has been “denounced as
Fascist by the Palestinian Labor Federation.35
The article reported that the open letter from Mr. Zaritsky had
been endorsed by Mr. W illiam Green, president of the American
Federation of Labor, (who also asked in a separate letter, addressed
to Representative Andrew L. Somers, that his name no longer be
used); R. J. Thomas, president of United Automobile Workers of the
Congress of Industrial Organizations; Samuel Wolchok, international
president of the United Retail, Wholesale and Department Store
Employees of America; James Maloney, president of the American
Glass and Bottle Blowers Association; and Leo E George, president of
the National Federation of Post Office Clerks.36
The article stirred up an internal discussion within the F.B.I.
itself. Interdepartmental memorandums suggest that the F.B.I. was
not conducting an investigation of Peter Bergson (H illel Kook) at that
time. An agent reported:
I called Mr.
(blacked out) of the Department to find out
about a newspaper article which appeared in the
36New York Herald Tribune. May 22,1944.
36The Washington Post. May 23,1944.
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Washington Post today to the effect that the Justice
Department was investigating Peter Bergson and the Hebrew
Committee o f National Liberation, and whether the
Department had requested that we conduct an investigation
inasmuch as our records did not show that such a request
was made._______ (blacked out) said they had not requested
us to conduct any investigation.37
This correspondence went on to explain the circumstances.
Bergson had been in contact with an agent of the F.B.I. and had kept
the bureau inform ed about his plans to organize the Hebrew
Committee o f National Liberation. The point of registration as an
alien group was discussed. The agent told Bergson
that it was one of those cases where he could not say it is
definitely out or he could not say it is definitely in, it is just
a question of in terp retatio n ._______ (blacked out) told
Bergson it was one of the cases in which he would not tell
him that he thinks they are exempt and at the same time he
would not insist that they were absolutely subject to the
Act. Bergson finally said from the standpoint of public
relations and general things just to prove they have a place
to show their records and show they are not hiding
anything, they would comply with the Statute in spite of the
difficulties and just show the Jewish people throughout the
world is their foreign principal.38
The correspondence also stated that while the F.B.I. had not
been specifically requested to investigate Bergson, the Justice
Department had asked the F.B.I. to “secure information from the
British as to the background of the organization (the H.C.N.L) because
37 F.B.I. Office Memorandum from D.M. Ladd to J.K. Mumford, May 23,1944.
38Ibid.
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the Department was positive that there is some tie with Palestine
and this group which they have not been able to find.”39
Other F.B.I. correspondence corroborated the fact that Bergson
was not being investigated for failure to register as a foreign agent.
It said, “. . . Bergson has not been investigated by the Bureau nor has
an investigation been requested by the Department relative to him.
Inform ation has been supplied to the Crim inal Division o f the
Department concerning the Committee for a Jewish Army of Stateless
and Palestinian Jews of which Bergson was the National Director.”40
The correspondence reviewed Bergson’s case. On November 6,
1942 Peter Bergson had sent a letter to Assistant Secretary of State,
A. A. Berle, Jr. In it he explained that he and his five colleagues, who
were visiting in the United States, were in danger of being drafted
for service in the U. S. Army. He said that he would willingly fight for
the United States except that he and his associates were responsible
for a much more important issue, that is, raising a Jewish Army of
two hundred thousand. Bergson appealed to Berle to consider the
value of this mission, stating, “But surely some way could be found
which would enable us to impress upon members of our local draft

39Ibid.
40 F.B.I. Office Memorandum from E. A. Tamm to D. M. Ladd, Subject* Hillel
Kook, alias Peter Bergson, May 23,1944.
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boards the character of our work in order to perm it them to
reconsider the matter of our classification in the light of the proper
facts.” Mr. Berle expressed his regrets that he could not be helpful in
the matter in a letter to Bergson dated November 21,1941.41
Following the Bermuda Conference incident the angry Senator
Lucas indicated to a State Department official, Mr. Alexander, that he
intended to call upon the director, J. Edgar Hoover, to suggest an
investigation of the Mr. Bergson’s draft status (i.e. if Bergson was
trying to avoid, or assist others in avoiding, the d raft), and to
determine the source of the funds for the full-page ads which the
Irgun delegation had purchased.42
Mr. Alexander then advised an F.B.I. agent that Bergson had
come to the United States in 1940 and that his status, as of May 23,
1944, was that his visitor’s visa was “overstayed.” He said that there
was a warrant outstanding for the deportation of Bergson, but that it
has not been served, “possibly because it might make a m artyr out of
Bergson. . . He also said that Bergson had requested diplomatic
immunity from the State Department, presumably to avoid the draft,
but the State Department had not considered it at all.”43
Bergson (Kook) asked the Board of Immigration Appeals to

41F.B.I. file on Peter Bergson, Memo, S.S. Alden to Mr. Ladd, May 12, 1943.
42Ibid.
43F.B.I. Office Memorandum from E.A. Tamm to D.M. Ladd, Subject: Hillel
Kook, May 23,1944, p. 3.
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rescind the warrant. He disclaimed the possibility that he could be
deported, stating that there was no transportation for civilians from
America to the Near East. He said that he had also applied to the
State Department for a permanent visa so that he could continue his
work in behalf of the Hebrew people.44
The F.B.I. did investigate the Committee for a Jewish Army.
They reported that
while there were allegations that there were Communists
in filtratin g the Committee, there were no concrete
indications of this. None of its officers were known
Communists. It was reported in A pril, 1943, that the
majority of the Jewish people in the United States were not
supporting it, although at that time its following was
increasing.45
The report said that while there had been no indications of
widespread activity since that time and that “British authorities had
taken no notice, thinking the group would die a natural death.”46
The reports of Communists in the Committee for a Jewish Army
were further discredited by the F.B.I. on March 16,1945 in a report
which discussed, in part, the reaction of the press to the Irgun
Delegation in America. The report stated that Bergson and his
activities had been publicly attacked in the press for more than a
44“Hebrew Leader Asks Board to Recall Warrant,” The Washington Post.
July 6,1944, p. 9.
45 F.B.I. Office Memorandum from E.A. Tamm to D.M. Ladd, Subject: Hillel
Kook, May 23,1944, p. 3.
48Ibid.
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year. The Communist Daily Worker had been most vociferous in its
attacks, while other news agencies stated that Bergson (Kook) was a
representative of the Irgun. It was claimed that he collected over one
m illion dollars from the American people, although he “became
vague,” according to one news article, when it was insisted that he
tell what use had been made of this money.47
On October 4, 1944. The Washington Post reported, “Bergson
Admits His Committee Has No Right to Collect Funds.” The article
reported a press conference in which Peter Bergson (Kook) charged
The Post of “deliberate misrepresentation and insinuation to present
him in the worst possible light.” He admitted, when questioned, that
the Hebrew Committee of National Liberation “is not American; has
no right to collect funds; is taking no action toward direct relief to
“Hebrews;” and does not, to their knowledge, represent either
Europeans or Palestinian “Hebrews.”48

A compatriot of Bergson

called The Washington Post the tool of “British imperialists and
defeatist Zionist leaders.”49 When asked who provided the capital for
the Hebrew National Liberation Fund, Inc., Bergson replied that part
of the funding was provided by night club impresario, Billy Rose.
Rose denied any connection with Bergson, saying, “Let him show one

47F.B.I. file on Peter Bergson, March 16, 1945, p. 2 o f summary statement
regarding file #!00-316012-8.
48The Washington Post. October 4,1944.
40Ibid.
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single check I ever signed. It is true that I did stage the pageant, “We
W ill Never Die,” both in New York and at Constitution Hall in
Washington for Ben Hecht, who wrote it. I did it because it was a
good show. That was my only connection with the pageant.” 50
Representative Sol Bloom (Democrat from New York) also
decried Bergson. He said, “No authorized Jewish agency approves of
the methods adopted by Bergson and his groups,”51 which Bloom said
were purely lobbying and high pressure.
Other inquiries were made concerning the right of the “Bergson
groups” to solicit or collect funds in the United States. Assistant
Attorney General, Herbert Wechsler, of the War Division wrote to
F.B.I. Director, J. Edgar Hoover asking if Bergson had a license from
the Treasury Department to collect funds for foreign relief, and if
they did not whether Bergson should be investigated for that
reason.52
Meanwhile, on October 15, 1944, President Roosevelt gave his
support to the Democratic Party plank on Palestine. However, he did
little to alleviate the plight of H itler’s Jewish victims in the
concentration camps.
The Jews of Europe may have been going unnoticed but those
60Ibid.
51Ibid.
“ Letter from Herbert Wechsler to J. Edgar Hoover, F.B.I. file # 100-310922,
October 18,1944.
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in Palestine were not. At the beginning of the 1944 Menachem Begin
led the Irgun there in a series of armed attacks on government and
police installations in order to exert pressure upon the government
to change its policy. This resulted in the deportation of 251 men to
Eritrea.
Relations between the British and the Jews furth er
deteriorated when the British minister of state in the Middle East,
Lord Moyne, was assassinated on November 6, 1944 by Lechi
(Lohamei Herut Israel, also known as the Stern Gang), the
underground group which had seceded from the Irgun in 1940. This
group, led, after the 1942 death of Stern, by Nathan Yalin Mor,
considered the action to be appropriate. The decision to liquidate
Moyne was defended by supporters of the underground. When Irgun
member, Yitshak Ben Ami, asked Nathan Yalin Mor if the
assassination of Moyne had been a positive act in the W ar of
Liberation, the answer was “Absolutely.” Mor felt that Moyne was
the personification of British imperialism in the Middle East. Moyne
had acted in opposition to the Jews throughout his career as Colonial
Secretary earlier in the war, as a member of the House of Lords and
as Resident Minister in Cairo. Moyne believed that the European Jews
were mixed with Slavic blood. Therefore only the Arabs were pure
Semites, having a historic rights in Palestine. Moyne was responsible
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for having the authorities in Turkey send the vessel, Sturma, back
to the Black Sea, where 770 passengers drowned. He also defended
the murder of Avraham Stem by the Palestine British police in
1942.53
Former Israeli Prime M inister, Yitshak Shamir, and Lechi
theoretician, Israel Eldad, supported and participated in the Moyne
assassination.
Lord Moyne was the highest British official in the Middle
East. And because we fought against the British in this area
we took him for a target. This was the main reason for the,
his assassination. Certainly we had known about his hostile
attitude towards Zionism, towards the idea of ingathering
the Jewish people here. He was against any Jewish aliyah,
any Jewish immigration. He didn’t believe that there exists
such a thing like a Jewish nation or a Jewish people, and
therefore we decided to make this operation.54
Abba Eban accused Shamir with sending the assassins of Moyne on a
suicide mission.S5
. . . in sending these people to kill Moyne those who sent
them, that includes Shamir of course, were quite consciously
murdering these two young Jews because there was no
possibility whatever that they could carry out that mission
and escape. Where could they escape to? So, in other words,
on the negative side it was a death sentence for these two
youngsters.. . “
93Ben Ami, p. 362.
64Interview w ith Yitshak Shamir by Joanna Saidel, October 25, 1993,
Knessett, Jerusalem.
55Telephone interview with Abba Eban from New York by Joanna Saidel,
September 6,1993.
“ Ibid.
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Shamir denied this charge.
It’s not a suicide mission. They wanted to escape but have
not succeeded. It was very risky of course. But there was a
plan how to, after killing, after the assassination, they had a
plan to escape!. . . They’d been like soldiers and they had all
the documents of soldier, British soldiers. And they could
reach the railway and by the railway come here. It was
possible! But it was bad luck because there was a policeman,
an Egyptian policemen in the area. . . when they killed Lord
Moyne. There was in the area a policeman on a motorcycle.
And they had bicycles to escape. He was faster. And he shot
them then. He shot. And Bet-Zouri was wounded, slightly,
but he was wounded. He couldn’t continue to run. And so in
such a way it happens. But the plan was, before, the plan
was to, to, to, for their escape. It was planned to get an
ambulance, an ambulance, a British ambulance, but it did
not succeed to bring this ambulance. . . they didn’t want to
wait longer. It had been determined to do it and then they
have been caught in that escape.57
A similar mission was carried out against Count Bernadotte four
years later.

He was appointed by the U.N. Security Council to

mediate in the Arab - Israeli conflict in 1948. On September 17,
1948 he was assassinated in Jerusalem. The Encyclopedia ludaica
states, “His assailants have not been identified, but are believed to
have been connected with Lohamei Herut Israel (Lechi).”58
Dr. Israel Eldad, scholar, writer and Zionist revolutionary was a
member of Lechi. When asked who was responsible for the Count
57Interview with Yitshak Shamir by Joanna Saidel, October 25, 1993,
Knessett, Jerusalem.
68Encyclopedia Tudaica. vol. 4, p. 670. Also see Middle East Tournal. 42, #2
(summer 1988), “A Haunting Legacy: The Assassination o f Count Bernadotte.”
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Bernadotte assassination he said, “Lechi. Me personally. . . I was
responsible only for the idea, not for the . . . Yitshak Shamir . . . was
responsible for the organizational (operations).”59
Abba Eban believes that the practices of the Irgun and Lechi,
particularly the murder o f Lord Moyne cost Israel early statehood.
He believes that partition would have resulted from a plan scheduled
for vote on December 21, 1944. British Foreign Office documents
confirm that a British plan for partition was set for proposal at that
time. It is questionable whether or not the plan would have been
accepted. According to Mr. Eban, the motives for this plan were proArab, but would nonetheless have served the Jewish cause.
According to Winston Churchill’s November 4,1944 memorandum to
Chaim Weizmann, Moyne had come over to the Zionist cause, albeit
for pro-Arab motives. The murder of Moyne put a strangle hold on
the partition plan. Churchill became despondent and alienated as a
result of the attack and did not pursue the plan with his former
vigor. It was dropped until 1947. Mr. Eban spoke about the murder.
The murder of Lord Moyne carried out in 1944 without any
knowledge by the people who carried it out of the general
context was a shattering tragedy because without it the
cabinet committee that Churchill had appointed was about to
reach a decision on the partition scheme. I myself in fact
being in the, in Cairo myself, got wind of this and conveyed
it to Sharett and to Weizmann. The decision was, in order to
abolish the White Paper, to put a plan of partition which
“ Interview w ith D r. Israel Eldad by Joanna Saidel, Jerusalem, November 3,
1993.
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was to be announced on December the twenty-first nineteen
hundred and forty four, and what happened was that Lord
Moyne, the Minister of State there had become, I would not
say converted to Zionism, that was not the case, but he had
become converted to the idea of partition with a Jewish
state as the only solution. He did this for Arab reasons. In
other words he said that unless the British were able to stop
immigration, which they were not able to do, then the only
way to save anything for the Arabs was by seeing that some
part of Palestine was reserved to them. So he reached what
I would call a Jewish state solution for anti-Jewish reasons,
namely that otherwise the Jews would take over the whole
of the country, and therefore partition was a sort of defense
of the Arab position. That was also the view that was put
forward then by Harold MacMichael, the High Commissioner
at that time. In other words, he was saying that the game is
up, as it were. There was no way of preventing the Zionist
thing from developing because the immigration pressure is
so strong therefore the question is how to protect the Arabs
to some extent. Therefore, there should be at least a part of
the country which was reserved, and that was one of the
reasons why Lord Moyne went over to support partition. In
November, 1944, Churchill invited Weizmann to Checkers
and told him triumphantly, We now . . . Moyne is now on
our Zionist side. You’ve got to go to Jerusalem and see what
happens. And Weizmann was going to Jerusalem. Then one
day about two days later Lord Moyne was assassinated and
Churchill went into a sulk which lasted for, oh I would think,
about four or five years,60 a refusal to deal with the
problem at all until the Potsdam Conference which was in
1945. Therefore, it’s no doubt that the murder of Moyne had
a negative effect.61
The opinion of Abba Eban has been hotly contested by his
political opponents. Yitshak Shamir said, “It’s nonsense. It’s nonsense.
80M r. Eban probably m eant four or five months.
81Telephone interview w ith Abba Eban from New York by Joanna Saidel,
September 6 ,1 9 9 3.
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In 44, '45 (laughs) the British, the British after all, have still been
here, very strong, and they didn’t think about leaving the country.”62
Menachem Begin’s advisor on Foreign affairs, author, journalist
and member of the Irgun command, Shmuel Katz, agrees with
Shamir. He said that Eban’s contentions were,
Absolutely untruth. Neither, neither the facts of the incident
itself nor the situation, nothing was going to be done until
after the war. In ' 44 the war was not over. That the murder
of Lord Moyne, which was completely justified, caused
Churchill to be very angry, that we know. And lots of other
people in England were very angry. But Mr. Abba Eban
should have explained to them why Lord Moyne was killed
instead of jumping at the idea that Lechi was to blame. I
never heard that Abba Eban ever explained to them that
Lord Moyne was the man who said, among other things,
when they talked of getting a million Jews out of Europe, he
said, What w ill we do with a million Jews? He was an antiSemite, Lord Moyne. And he had a hand in the White Paper,
in carrying out the White Paper policy. I don’t say that I
would have, if I had to decide, that I would decide that he
ought to be shot but once he was shot there were good
reasons for him being shot. And (it was) because we had
people like Abba Eban on the other side that we had so
much trouble, and our acts of resistance, which were
justified, which were much less than any other people would
have carried out, were undermined by people like Abba
Eban, not that he had very much authority in those days.63
Author David Wyman agrees with Shamir and Katz. He stated,
concerning the supposed British decision for partition, “the British
“ Interview w ith Yitshak Sham ir by Joanna Saidel, October 25, 1993, the
Knessett, Jerusalem.
” Interview w ith Shmuel Katz by Joanna Saidel, November 2, 1993, Tel Aviv.
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were not ready to move out Palestine.. . They were not ready to be
out until they were thrown o u t”64
While Lechi supported the Moyne assassination, the Zionist
Establishment, headed by David Ben Gurion, was outraged. It
initiated repressive measures known as the “Saison,” or (Hunting)
Season, on the Irgun and Lechi, going as far as to arrest some of them
and turn them over to the British thereby evoking extreme
controversy within Zionist ranks. The campaign was directed against
the Irgun rather than Lechi because the Irgun was a political threat
to Ben-Gurion. He knew that his Labor party would have to join with
Haganah in the battle for independence or the Irgun would assume
control. The only alternative, if Labor wished to keep control, was to
eliminate the Irgun entirely. On May 12, 1945 the Irgun issued a
warning:
WARNING!
1. The Government o f oppression should WITHOUT
ANY DELAY evacuate ch ild ren , women, c iv ilia n
persons and
o ffic ia ls
from a ll its o ffices,
buildings, dw elling places, etc., throughout the
country.
2. The c iv ilia n population, Hebrews, Arabs and
others are asked, fo r th e ir own sake, to abstain
from now u n til the w arning is re ca lle d , from
visiting or nearing Government offices etc.
YOU HAVE BEEN WARNED!65
84Interview w ith David Wyman by Joanna Saidel, August 20, 1993,
Cantebury, New Hampshire.
86Ben Ami, p. 352.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

140

The following month Teddy Kollek, who later became mayor of
Jerusalem, turned over a list of names of Irgun and Lechi men to the
British resulting in the arrest of many. An extract in the Palestine
Post. June 17th, 1945 said, “The Inspector General of the Police
wishes to express his appreciation to the Arab Customs Officer and to
the member of

the Jewish community who gave the information

which led to the finding of two batteries of mortars in Jerusalem on
June 12th and 13th.”66
Mr. Kollek was responsible for providing this information.
I am the “member o f the Jewish community” referred to by
the Inspector General of Police. I received the information
regarding these weapons in my capacity as liaison officer
between the Jewish Agency.. . and the Palestine authorities,
and I passed it on in the usual w ay...
TEDDY KOLLEK67
Mayor Kollek, whose contributions to the M unicipality of
Jerusalem are profuse and whose lifetime dedication to the State of
Israel is unquestioned, chose, during those tumultuous years, to
follow the laws of Palestine under the British. Although he favored a
Jewish state he preferred the more traditional diplomacy of the
Jewish Agency which opposed the radical action of the Irgun.
In the spring of 1945 invading Allied troops in Europe made a
“ Ben Am i, p. 352.
87Ib id .
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world-shaking discovery which confirmed the Jews worst beliefs and
fears. This was the discovery of the death camps. Although these
had been reported long before, the liberation of the camps drew
world attention to atrocities too horrendous to be believed. M ilitary
leaders, government officials, members of Congress, and journalists
were stunned despite their previous exposure to information about
the camps.68
M ilitary men were appalled and astonished at what they
saw. Hardened war correspondents found the horror “too
great for the human mind too believe.” General Eisenhower
called the “Barbarous treatm ent” inflicted on inmates
“almost unbelievable.” To dispel any doubts about the
accuracy of reporters’ accounts, Eisenhower requested that a
dozen congressmen and a delegation of American editors fly
to Germany to look at the camps. The legislators emerged
from Buchenwald “shocked almost beyond belief.” Editors,
expecting to find that correspondents had overstated the
situation, came away convinced that “exaggeration, in fact,
would be d ifficu lt”69
In July, the killing center at Majdanek was captured. American
reporters were permitted to inspect the camp, which was still intact.
They witnessed the crematoria, gas chambers, heaps of ashes, and
more.70 The New York Times reported the reaction of one American
whose comment reflected that of all who viewed Majdanek: “I am
now prepared to believe any story of German atrocities, no matter
48 Wyman, p. 323-324.
" Ibid, p. 325.
70Ibid, p. 324.
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how savage, cruel or depraved.” 71
The news, which had been suppressed for so long, captured the
headlines of newspapers across the countiy and around the world.
Newsreels and magazines were filled with monstrous photos of
unburied corpses, skeleton-like survivors, piles of glasses, human
hair and garments. The scope of destruction was beyond imagination;
the crimes against humanity beyond comprehension.
The reaction among viewers, and particularly among
mainstream

Zionists, was outrage. These reports confirmed the

repeated statements issued

by the Irgun Delegation

and the

Revisionists for at least three years prior to the 1945 disclosures.
As the war in Europe drew to a close, and these revelations
were forthcoming, the activities of the Irgun Delegation to the United
States began to focus with even greater determ ination on the
establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. Jews were greatly
disillusioned when the expected radical change in British policy
regarding large-scale immigration to Palestine did not materialize.
The displaced Jews still alive in Europe were interred in Displaced
Persons camps there. The Irgun Delegation in America tried to effect
a change in the condition of the DP’s and appealed to the President.
They also tried to get one of their long time leaders, Yitshaq Ben Ami,
back to the United States to renew his activities there.
71 New York Times. August 30 ,1 9 44 , p. 9.
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Having completed his duty fighting in Europe, Ben Ami had
been requested by the Irgun in New York to meet with Menachem
Begin to coordinate the work in America more closely with that of
the Irgun in Palestine. “We had to strengthen the bridge of
communications. . . between the homeland and the United States . . .
if the revolution was going to have a chance.” 72
In America, Truman continued to push for the repatriation of
100,000 displaced Jews. The writer, Jack London, chaired a meeting
of the American League for a Free Palestine held on June 20,1945 at
the City Center Auditorium in New York City. In a telegram to
President Truman he requested that the President act immediately
to implement the plan concerning the 100,000 and that the
government of the United States support fully the program of the
Hebrew Committee of National Liberation.73
Hillel Kook (Peter Bergson) also appealed to Truman on this
matter. In a four page letter to the President dated September 7,
1945, Kook reminded Truman that while the war in Europe had
been over for four months. “Some 200,000 Hebrews in Germany and
Austria still find themselves in the same position in which they were
prior to V-E day. . . the same notorious camps, the same bunks, the
same German hideous prison clothes, the same barbed wire and
72Ben Ami, p. 350.
73Note to David Niles concerning a telegram from Jack London to President
Trum an, June 2 4 ,1 9 4 5 , Trum an Papers, General File.
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armed sentries watching outside, only it is an American, British or
Russian soldier that stands guard now and this, if anything, makes it
even more painful.”74 Kook reminded the President that, while
“everywhere people are feverishly laboring for their rehabilitation
and reconstruction and are returning to life and liberty,” the Jews
again seemed to be forgotten. Kook also approached the Palestine
question, affirming that Palestine was not a British territory but had
been placed under the British mandate by international authority.
He contended that the United States, as leader among the United
Nations, bore direct responsibility for the Palestinian situation and
should intervene to put a stop to the heartless and despotic action of
the British Government which prevented Hebrews from returning to
their own national home. Kook told Truman that, when America was
actively participating in the supervision of elections in Greece and
Bulgaria and in the establishment of a new Roumanian government,
America should not hesitate to take an authoritative and dynamic
stand on the crucial problems in Palestine.75
Anger and frustration increased w ithin Revisionist and
mainstream Zionist ranks on September 18, 1945. That evening in

74 Letter to the President from Peter Bergson, September 7, 1945, Trum an
Library.
75Peter Bergson - representing the Hebrew Committee o f National
Liberation- to President Trum an, September 7, 1945, Papers o f H arry S.
Trum an, O fficial File.
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Jerusalem, a dispatch from Reuter’s news service reported the
rejection of Jewish demands for Palestine by the British. A British
cabinet sub-committee was appointed by Prime Minister Attlee to
draft the Labor Government’s policy with regard to Palestine. The
sub-committee recommended maintaining the British White Paper
and said that the Jewish demands for a state in Palestine and for free
immigration under Jewish control were unacceptable. Only 1500
Jewish immigrants were to be adm itted m onthly

and land

acquisition was to be restricted. A Palestine Legislative Council
should be established in which Jews could have representation as
compensation for restricted immigration. This Council would have
limited authority over internal affairs but “all questions concerning
foreign policy, security and defense should continue to be under the
control of the British Government.’’ 76
Representing the American Zionist Emergency Council, Rabbi
Abba Hillel Silver and Dr. Stephen Wise made urgent requests to see
the President.77 In a note in inter-departmental correspondence from
Hon. Charles G. Ross to the President’s Secretary, Matthew J. Connelly,
Ross stated his distaste for the Zionist activists and his respect for the
Jewish establishment in America. He writes, “I can only testify that

78JTA D ailv News Bulletin. The Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Vol. XII, No. 213,
September 19,1945.
77Letter of September 20, 1945, Silver to Trum an, Trum an Papers, O fficial
File.
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Dr. Silver’s is a high-class organization unlike the ‘renegade’ outfit
which appears to have put out a recent statement purporting to give
the President’s views.”78
That “renegade outfit” continued to seek the support and
assistance of the U. S. Government. It refused to cave into to
pressures to moderate its stance. In October, 1945, Yltshaq Ben Ami
met with Irgun leader, Menachem Begin.
My job was to help Begin and his associates understand the
political scene in Washington, London and the United
Nations, so we could best coordinate strategy between our
delegation in the United States and the Irgun in Palestine...
Most important was our agreement in principle that as the
time neared for the final stage of the uprising against the
Mandatory power, a provisional government would be
formed, one part underground in Palestine, the other in the
diaspora.” 79
It was also decided at meetings between Begin, Ben Ami and
Haim Landau (Begin’s chief of staff) that the Hebrew Committee for
National Liberation would need international recognition. The main
complaint of the central Irgun was that the Irgun Delegation was
not providing sufficient financial help to m aintain the m ilitary
revolution in Palestine.
The chances for weapons acquisitions, for training and for
large recruitments were there, if we in the United States
provided the means. No matter what we accomplished in the
United States, the center o f battle was in Palestine- and if
76Honorable Charles Ross to Secretary Connelly, The W hite House,
September 1 7 ,1 9 45 , Trum an Papers, O fficial File.
78Ben Am i, p. 355-256.
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our people lost the ability to fight with arms, no political
campaign would secure our nation’s freedom.. . It was true
that without the political front the m ilitary one would fail,
and we needed to achieve a synthesis, but we had to
remember that everything we did was to support the
m ilitary revolution.80
That revolution was different than any other revolution on
earth. Zionist theoretician and Lechi member, Israel Eldad, wrote his
own explanation of the underground’s perception of this revolution.
He stated that, unlike the major revolutions which have taken place
in the world to change economic, political or social structures,
“Zionism is a revolution and neither a philanthropic institution nor a
reform movement. It is concerned with the shift of an entire nation
from an exposed position to a place of refuge.”81

Eldad gives both

religious and secular motivation for the revolution, quoting the Bible“and among these nations ye shall find no rest” - and citing “the
endless repetition of historic events.” 82

In his analysis of the

motivations for the revolution Eldad recalls a comment made by the
founder of political Zionism; “Herzl once replied to one of the skeptics
who doubted his vision: An orange needs a table in order not to fall
to the ground; Zionism is like the globe - it is kept up by its own
motion. The existential need for a Jewish revolution is the only
80Ibid, p. 358.
81Israel Eldad, The Jewish Revolution. Shengold Publishers, N.Y., 1971,
p. 46.
“ Ib id .
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motive force required.” 83
Eldad detailed the revolution as it was interpreted by his
political and ideological faction - the FFI (i.e. Lechi). The FFI, or
Freedom Fighters of Israel, were an offshoot of the Irgun and the
Betar youth movement. It was founded by Avraham Stem, whom the
British murdered in 1942, and was the smallest, most radical and
daring of the underground Zionist movements .84

The New York

Times described the FFI in this way:
. . . the Fighters for the Freedom of Israel, or the Stern
Group, is even more fanatical and sinister than Irgun Zvi
Leumi. They plot individual political assassinations. They
were responsible for the unsuccessful attem pt on High
Commissioner Mac Michael’s life in Jerusalem in August
1944, and the murder of Lord Moyne in Cairo three months
later. Their leader is Nathan Friedman Yellin, a studious type
of man for whose capture a $4,000 reward is offered. Yellin,
mild-mannered and with an inconspicuous face behind goldrimmed glasses, is a form er school-teacher. He wields
tremendous influence over 200 to 300 followers, mostly of
Polish origin. They are expert marksmen, pledged to the
utmost self-sacrifice. They would shoot their way out of
any police ambush not hesitating to turn their last bullet on
themselves to escape arrest, if necessary.85
The Times article stated that the group had a vendetta against
the

British police whom they accuse of having unnecessarily shot

and killed Avraham Stem, their first leader.
MIbid, p. 50.
MIbid, p. 79.
85The New York Times. “Political Terrorist Groups Keep Palestine in
Turm oil,” July 28,1946,p. 4E.
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Stem was captured in February 1942, by a surprise police
swoop on his rooftop room in Tel Aviv. His followers later
said that he wore only shorts and an undershirt. His wrists
were handcuffed behind his back, they added, and he then
was pushed a few paces and shots were fired into his back.66
The police authorities never announced the circumstances of the
shooting except to say that he was killed while trying to escape.
The most distinctive feature of the FFI was its new political
conception which was first publicized in the trials conducted against
its members for acts against the British government. Members of
Lechi (FFI) refused to participate in the trials on the grounds that the
British courts had “no legal standing in the Land of Israel.” They
claimed that the British were a “foreign, imperialist occupying power,
and the British Mandate granted by the League of Nations. . . cannot
supersede the a -p rio ri title of the Jewish nation to this land..

The

FFI defendants declared in court that when their forefathers were
living in the Lands o f Israel, “with their kings and generals, their
poets and prophets, the ancestors of the British were still living in
the primeval forests of the savage British isles . . . We, the freedom
fighters of Israel, are the only ones entitled to bear arms, to fight for
our rights . . . This is the homeland of the Jewish people, this is where
it first became a productive and creative nation. It was banished
from here by force, and w ill therefore return by force. We are a
“ Ib id .
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Hebrew liberation movement.”
While the Irgun refrained from fighting against the British
during the war, they joined Lechi at the war’s conclusion and, under
the leadership of Menachem Begin, joined in m ilitary operations
against the Mandatory power in Palestine. They were supported in
the United States by the Irgun Delegation which continued its public
relations efforts to gain support for a Jewish state and to raise funds
for Irgun - Lechi related projects such as the purchase of the ship,
A ltalena. Members of the Irgun Delegation worked closely with the
Paris headquarters in this and other missions. Dr. Alex Raphaeli was
involved in the Paris operations.
Our object was to organize an army in Europe, transport it to
Palestine, and capture whatever territory we could hold. We
would then proclaim ourselves as the temporary Jewish
government of these areas and gain a right to be
represented in the international political forums on an equal
basis.87
Jabotinsky had approved of this idea in 1939 but the outbreak of the
war prevented its implementation.
My tasks were not too clearly defined, but I was generally
required to establish political contacts and find and
purchase weapons. . . Besides the tasks that had been
assigned to me I was put in charge of a so far non-existent
“Air Force.”88

8r Raphaeli, p. 154-155.
“ Ib id .
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Dr. Raphaeli recruited pilots who had served in the Allied
forces and was able to purchase arms from many places. A f t e r
Israel became a State, Dr. Raphaeli became Director of the Board of
Israel Aircraft Industries. This company “was the only foreign firm
listed in the top 100 companies on the Pentagon’s list of 500
contractors dealt with in fiscal 1993.”89
D r. Raphaeli was an asset to the State of Israel from pre
statehood days to the present. He worked for the Irgun in the early
years. After statehood Raphaeli became a great industrialist in Israel.
He began by founding the Jerusalem Pencil Company (Israel had
been importing most of its pencils from other countries). He later
started a factory to produce corrugated cartons. All citrus products
had previously been shipped in wooden crates. Raphaeli became the
main supplier of corrugated cartons in Israel, establishing plants also
in Turkey, Greece and Spain. He then developed Dura Plastics which
he part-owned. He had toolmaking and molding facilities. Dura was
renamed Vered, and later Dukal Graphite Industries. This was a
division of Jerusalem Pencils specializing in colored leads which it
sold to other pencil factories. Later, it began producing oil pastels and
wax crayons. Vered introduced plastic containers, like buckets, to
Israel. Raphaeli’s various products found markets world wide. He
shipped pencils to a company in Argentina owned by the Perons. He
SBThe Jerusalem Post July 2 ,1 9 9 4 , p. 4.
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had markets in Britain, France and Africa. His biggest success was in
Germany where his company had the largest share of the imported
pencil market in West Germany. Raphaeli became the president of
the Israeli Manufacturers Association. He was a partner in Rotoplas, a
rotational molding plant, the first of its kind in the Middle East. They
manufactured large containers for storing liquids and exporting fruit
juice.
After the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Raphaeli became Chairman of
the Board of Economic Welfare. This group dealt with the Arab
economic boycott. From 1978 to 1985, Raphaeli was director of the
boards of Zim Shipping Company; the Israel Aircraft Industries; and
the Jerusalem Economic Corporation. He was also chairman of the
board of the government owned Beth Shemesh Aviation Motors; and
Dagon silos in Haifa.
Besides being an asset to Israel, Raphaeli proved to be an asset
to the United States government during the war years in the field of
counter intelligence. His first task was to uncover a German spy
network. He was commended for this work. His further efforts were
equally as fruitful. He searched for and discovered Alfred Krupp,
who was a personal friend of Borman and who operated a worldwide
industrial - m ilitary complex for H itler, and Leo Schlessman,
governor of the Ruhr district, top Nazi official, and the recipient of
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the Nazi Goldabzeichen (golden Emblem), the highest Nazi award.90
Raphaeli’s interrogation o f Krupp resulted in other very important
arrests.
He worked with the Irgun Delegation to try to affect the politics
of the United States government. Despite their efforts, the Irgun
Delegation found itself still at odds with the Roosevelt administration.
Mainstream Jewish organizations did little better.
In October 1945, the American Zionist Emergency Council
submitted a memorandum to the State Department. This lengthy
material, was submitted to counter the effects of correspondence
which President Roosevelt had with King Ibn Saud earlier in the
year. On his way home from Yalta, President Roosevelt met with the
King on an American cruiser in the Suez Canal. Roosevelt expected
the Saudis to accept the American position on Palestine since Saudi
Arabia had been the only non-combatant to receive lend-lease aid
during the War. The President promised more aid in return for Saudi
support. The King however was vehemently opposed to Zionism,
suggesting, instead of a Jewish State in Palestine, that the Jews take
defeated German lands as their homes. The President, in the face of
this hostile response, agreed not to adopt an anti-Arab policy in

"Raphaeli, p. 127.
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Palestine.91 When Roosevelt died in early April, Truman was left
with the dilemma concerning the Saudis. “The temptation to become
more involved in the Arab world and to promote its alliance with the
West competed with the practical problem of handling the Jewish
refugees who had survived the Holocaust”92
In October, the American Zionist Emergency Council, having
over the prior few years been highly influenced by the activist work
of the Revisionists and the Irgun Delegation, reviewed the pro-Zionist
positions which had been taken by the U. S. Government, for the new
President, reminding him, and the State Department, o f the following.
On July 4,1945 a declaration was made by the Governors of 40 out
of 48 states favoring the establishment of Palestine as a Jewish
Commonwealth. The legislatures of 33 states, representing 85% of the
population of the United States also went on record in favor of the
Zionists. The prior summer, 1944, both major parties had endorsed
unrestricted Jewish im m igration to Palestine. The Democratic
platform had stated that they favored “such a policy as to result in
the establishm ent there o f a free and dem ocratic Jewish
Commonwealth.” The American Zionist Emergency Council claimed
that both Roosevelt and Truman were elected on that platform.

81Steven L. Spiegel, The Other A rab-Israeli Conflict: M aking Am erica’s
Middl.e_East Policy. from Trum an to, Reagan., p. 13.
82Ib id , p. 14.
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They said that Roosevelt and Truman were not the only
Presidents to favor a Jewish State in Palestine. In March 1919
President Wilson, who had directly affected the issuance o f the
Balfour Declaration stated that: “The Allied Nations, with the fullest
concurrence o f our Government and people, are agreed that in
Palestine shall be laid the foundation of a Jewish Commonwealth.”
This objective was supported by every American President since
then. The United States government’s support of the Jewish National
Home was recorded legislatively in two Acts o f Congress, namely, the
Joint Resolution (No. 73) unanimously adopted in 1922 by the 67th
Congress o f the United States; and the United States-British
Convention on Palestine, ratified by the Senate on February 20,
1925.93
This correspondence to the State Department also stated the
concern o f the Zionists that President Roosevelt had failed to assure
King Ibn Saud of Jewish intent to live in peace with the Arabs. Their
concern was also apparent concerning Arab rights to sovereignty in
Palestine.
. . . the Arabs have neither legal nor moral title to the
sovereignty over Palestine. W hile they conquered the
country over 1300 years ago, Arab rule ceased as early as
1071. Throughout the centuries the role of the Arabs in
83Memorandum submitted by the American Zionist Emergency Council to
the State Departm ent, October 2 3 ,1 9 45 , p. 1-2, Papers of H arry Truman, O fficial
File.
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Palestine has not been creative but destructive. In the
eroded, poverty-stricken and disease-ridden country which
w ithin the last few decades the Jewish people set out to
reclaim, it was difficult to recognize the land of milk and
honey described in the Bible.
The Emergency Council correspondence maintained that in the
twenty years between the two World Wars the Jews had done much
to repair the ravages of the previous 1300. “They have conquered
deserts and swamps, revived agriculture and industry and
established in Palestine a sturdy, self-reliant community.”
They accused the Pan-Arabist claim to Palestine of being “an
attempt to add yet another to the immense, but for the most part
thinly populated and undeveloped territories of the independent
Arab States,” stating,
this expansionist appetite has recently manifested itself also
in the demands put forward by the Arabs for Eritrea, the
Sudan and Cyrenaica. The great mass of the people in the
various Arab states are kept down in ignorance and
fanaticism, in d irt and wretchedness by a ruling class which
shows little or no interest in the improvement of their
miserable lo t94
The Council believed that Arab ethnic claims were distorted,
arguing that about 75% o f the Arabic-speaking people in Palestine
were recent immigrants or the descendants of persons who
emigrated to Palestine in comparatively recent times.
At no time was there a Palestine Arab State.

It was the

84Ibid, p. 4-5.
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Jewish people which produced in Palestine the civilization
and religious culture which, along with that o f Greece,
molded the civilization and the spiritual life o f the whole
Western w orld.95
The Zionists stated their objection to a number of other points.
These included the failure of the American Government to take
action concerning the White Paper of 1939, to keep the doors of
Palestine open to Jewish refugees during the War, to advise U.S.
representatives abroad o f U.S. determ ination to insure a Jewish
homeland in Palestine, and to utilize conditions created by the war to
advance the Zionist cause.
The Zionists also cited many pro-Arab positions which the U.S.
Government had taken. These included the United States recognition
of the independent governments of Syria and Lebanon soon after
their formation. Also, the U.S. encouraged the Arab States to declare
themselves to be against Germany toward the end of the war
“assuring them of places of honor among the United Nations,
irrespective of their war records.” The United States had not
withheld its support from the Arab League even though the League
declared its opposition to Jewish aspirations and proclaimed the
liquidation of the Jewish National Home as one of its major
objectives.96
85 Ib id .
" Ib id , p. 6
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A separate memo from the American Zionist Emergency
Council, called, “Some Facts on the Palestine Situation,” stressed the
support of organized labor and educators for a Jewish Homeland,
citing a petition by more than 2,000 university presidents and
professors favoring the establishment of a Jewish State.
The Council refuted the common arguments against the Jewish
National Home Policy. The first of these arguments claimed that
Palestine was too small and incapable of economically sustaining a
large population. In rebuttal the Zionists stressed the possibility of
large scale absorption of Jewish immigrants.
It was estimated by Dr. Walter Lowdermilk, Assistant Chief of
the U.S. Soil Conservation Department, and Mr. J. L Savage and Mr. J.
B. Hayes ( two American irrigation specialists), that at least a million
acres could be irrigated, as compared with less than 100,000 acres
under irrigation at that time. Dr. Lowdermilk also estimated that
with proper development Palestine could sustain an additional four
million inhabitants.97
The second argument against a Jewish Homeland was that
there were “too few Jews left” as a result of Nazi exterminations. The
Zionists rebutted this argument by quoting a July 14, 1945 article in
the London Economist, which was not pro-Zionist. This article stated
97“Some Facts on the Palestine Situation,” American Zionist Emergency
Council to the State Departm ent, September 1945, p. 4, Trum an Papers, O fficial
File.
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that observers of all types, returning from Germany, confirmed that
unexpected numbers of the Jews left in central Europe wanted to go
to Palestine.98
The third argument against the Jewish Homeland was the fear
of violent Arab opposition. The Council stated that the Arab countries
could not offer any real resistance to a clearly defined policy on the
part of the Great Powers since Arab dependence upon these Powers
was greater than ever before. Although the Arabs

successively

opposed each stage o f Palestine's developm ent they “have
consistently reconciled themselves to realities.. . Today they accept
as an accomplished fact the 600,000 Jews in Palestine. They w ill
likewise accept the Jewish State.”99
The fourth argument against Statehood was that Palestine was
promised to both the Jews and the Arabs. The rebuttal of this
argument by the Emergency Council took the form of documentation.
While the Balfour Declaration promised Palestine to the Jews, the
McMahon-Hussein Correspondence of 1915 presented a conflicting
promise to the Arabs. The Zionists explained that Mr. McMahon
made it very clear to King Hussein that that pledge excluded
Palestine and that this was understood by the King. They contend
that this was confirmed by Winston Churchill in 1922 and that
88Ib id , p. 5.
88Ib id , p. 7.
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further proof is evident “from the fact that at Versailles in 1919 Emir
Feisal in asking on behalf o f his father, King Hussein, for
independence for the Arab countries, expressly excluded Palestine.”
The Emir and Dr. Chaim Weizmann had signed an accord in which
“the Emir recognized the right of the Jews to immigrate into and to
develop Palestine provided Arab independence was achieved in the
Arab lands outside o f Palestine. That independence is today a
reality,” wrote the Zionists.100
The fifth argument against statehood was the growing
dependence of America on oil. The rebuttal to this argument was the
dependence of the Arabs on oil revenue. “It is altogether unrealistic,
however to believe that the Arab states w ill allow their opposition
to a Jewish Palestine to interfere with the flow of oil and thus with
the steady receipt of oil royalties which constitute a major part of
their revenue.”101

The Council argued that the United States was the only major
Power which was ready to exploit these oil resources and pay
royalties without attempting to interfere with the policies of the local
governments, making the U.S. the most desirable partner in the
development of their oil resources.102
100Ib id , p. 8.
101Ib id .
102Ib id .
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The sixth argument against Jewish statehood was the question,
W ill the Jewish State be a theocracy? To this the Zionists stresses
their belief in the separation of church and state. The Zionist
movement “does not, nor has it ever aimed to set up a theocratic
state in Palestine.” The term Jewish State did not refer to a religious
state but that the Jews would constitute the m ajority in a country
where each community would be autonomous in religious,
educational, cultural and social affairs and in which all citizens could
vote and hold office.103
The last argument against Jewish statehood was that the Jews
were divided against themselves. The Zionists believed that despite a
small but wealthy Jewish group which campaigned against a Jewish
State, the Jewish masses were wholeheartedly in favor of the Zionist
program.104
The Irgun Delegation in America agreed in principle with all of
the above arguments put forth by the American Zionist Emergency
Council. The Council however had a continuing vendetta against the
Hebrew Committee for National Liberation. The Council had claimed
in a 14 page document to the Justice Department on August 10,1944
that the HCNL planned to destroy the existing Zionist leadership and
replace it with their own kind. The Emergency Council claimed that
,03 Ibid, p. 9.
104Ib id .
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the HCNL represented no one except the Irgun in Palestine whose
activities were condemned by all “legitimate” Jewish agencies.
The F.B.I. file on H illel Kook (Peter Bergson) mentioned the
antagonism between the two Jewish factions. " . . . It is reported that
the American Zionist Emergency Council commented in a fashion
which had been referred to as typical of the statements made by the
more “solid” Jewish organizations: ‘Bergson’s action is an attempt to
perpetrate a colossal hoax on the Jewish people.’ The statement is
said to have continued, warning the public, the press and officials not
to be taken in by ‘the brazen fraud of a half dozen adventurers with
no standing, credentials or mandate, except from pistol-packing
Irgun.’”105
In November 1945, the Irgun’s Jewish Resistance Movement
attacked railroads throughout Palestine. Bevin repudiated the proZionist commitments of his party and dispatched an Anglo-American
Commission to Palestine to inquire into the Jewish refugee problem.
The revolt of the Jews against the British in Palestine began to
affect politics in the United States. There the Irgun had submitted a
memorandum to the American members o f the Anglo-American
Commission of Inquiry (AACI) which listed, for six single-spaced
pages, British crimes against the Jews. They maintained that it was

105F.B.I. Summary on Peter Bergson, December 15, 1944, from File # 6260950-42..
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useless to talk to the British since twenty-five years of talking had
done no good. Appealing to the British conscience, justice, and
humanitarianism was in vain and had led only to the massacre of
their fathers, mothers, sisters, brothers, children, rabbis and sages;
the British are to be those who deprive us of our homeland
and destroy our people . . . we are determined, in our
relations with them, to use no other words but “Fight!”106
Not only the Irgun delegation but mainstream Jews were finally
favoring the creation o f a Jewish state in Palestine and immediate
mass immigration for the displaced Jewish refugees of Europe.
The Palestine Solution was the title of a memorandum which
had been submitted to Truman during a meeting held on June 14,
1946 with the Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine (which
included Rabbi Abba H illel Silver, Rabbi Stephen Wise, Dr. Nahum
Goldstein, and Louis Iipsky). It was believed by them that in order
for the British to release the 100,000 there needed to be substantial
economic assistance from the United States and a clear statement of
responsibility by the United States.
The British desire the type of statement from the United
States which would enable them to convince the Arabs that
the United States forced the admission of the “100,000.” It is
believed, however, that the British w ill, if pressed, agree to
assume joint responsibility for such action.107

1M Ben Ami, p. 369.
107 Papers o f David Niles, June 1946, Trum an lib ra ry .
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It was also suggested that the United States propose a long
term solution to the problem. The Committee proposed partition (Le.
redrawing the boundaries of Palestine and Trans-Jordan), as well as
other solutions such as Dominion status, U.N. Trusteeship, or a
Canton State. It was suggested, in the section concerning

the

redefinition of Palestine's borders, that “the severance of Eastern
Palestine and its annexation by Trans-Jordan might be the basis for
gaining partial Arab support. It would also leave residual Palestine
with a Jewish majority.”108
By mid June the Jews in Palestine and the British were on a
collision course. Britain’s rejection of the request for permits for the
“100,000” outraged the Resistance. In retaliation, on June 17 they
blew up the bridges linking Palestine with the neighboring states.
The British Government prepared for

war in an effort called

Operation “Agatha” and gave the High Commissioner authority to
liquidate the ‘extreme elements’ now supposedly in control of the
Haganah and the Jewish Agency. The United States Government was
not to be informed, until the last moment, to prevent leaks to
American Jewish groups. All Jews of any political importance were
targeted in the operation of June 29, 1946 (“Black Saturday”) in
which one hundred thousand British soldiers and ten thousand police

108Ib id .
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participated.109
On July 2 1946, the White House issued a statement. It
protested “the arrest and detention of members of the Jewish Agency
and other prominent leaders of the Jewish Community in Palestine”
and said that it was “a cause of deep anxiety to this government.”
President Truman protested the fact that the action had been taken
“without my having been consulted or informed by the British
Government.” He stated that, since the Jewish Agency had been
recognized by international law and international agreements to
which the U. S. was a signatory, he was requesting an explanation
from the British Government. President Truman then recommended
the immediate admission of 100,000 Jewish refugees to Palestine and
reiterated American co-responsibility in finding a solution to the
Palestine question.110
Others also sought a solution to the Palestine problem. On
Monday, July 22, 1946 a small article appeared on the front page of
the Late City Edition of The New York Times bearing the title
“Gandhi Counsels Jews.”
In this article Mohandas Gandhi advised the Jews of Palestine
to abandon ‘naked force’ as a weapon against the British restriction
of immigration and to adopt instead the “matchless weapon of non-

110

Ben Ami, p. 376.
Papers of David Niles, Truman Library.
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violence”. 111
If the Irgun read this article it had little effect. The following
day the Late City Edition o f the Times front page read, “Jerusalem
Bomb Kills 41 in Attack on British Offices.” The article was
subtitled “Zionist Terror Raiders Accused o f Blast in King David
Hotel.”112 In this raid six stories of the historic hotel were destroyed
in an attempt to hit the British headquarters stationed in the hotel.
There were many injuries and deaths.113
Next to this article appeared a notation that the King David
Hotel was owned by Palestine Hotels, Ltd., a subsidiary o f the
Palestine Economic Corporation, 570 Lexington Avenue. The
Corporation had been organized twenty years earlier so that
“American Jews and others might give aid on a strictly business basis
to productive Palestinian enterprises and to further the economic
development of the Holy Land and the resettlement of an increasing
number of Jews there.”114 This non-political group was headed by
Robert Szold.
The following day tensions increased. It was reported from
Jaffa that Arab tensions in that port city were rising “because of the
Jerusalem bombing and the presence of the British cruiser Liverpool
The New York Tim es. July 22,1946, p. 1.
112 See Appendix H for the complete text of this article.
113 See The New York Times. July 23,1946, p. 1, 3.
114 The New York Times. “Bombed Hotel Property O f New York Corporation,”
July 23,1946, p. 3.
111
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off the harbor. The Liverpool was said to have been sent to Jaffa
because extremists were mining the harbor.”115
Tension rose in the Jewish quarter of Jerusalem, where
armed, British soldiers patrolled the streets. Shopkeepers
stood nervously in their doorways, ready to ring down iron
shutters at the slightest alarm. A telephone operator for the
Palestine Railways received an anonymous call that the
building was going to be blown up. Police reached the
building without result.116
As could be expected, the reaction to the bombing of the King
David Hotel was extremely negative. The New York Times editors
expressed their repulsion openly in the opinion section of the paper.
They claimed that the action was self-defeating and could not expect
to modify the position of the Mandatory Power, but would, rather,
stiffen British opinion. They felt that it would also deter the United
States government from pressing for further im m igration into
Palestine and would cause further divisions within that country. It
was believed that “in the long run, the victims of these tactics of
terrorism seem likely to include many of the harassed refugees
whose escape from Europe may be postponed still further.”117 While
supporting the admission of 100,000

refugees to Palestine the

editors condemned the actions of the underground. The Irgun
immediately took responsibility for the bombing of the King David.
11SThe New York Times. “Arab Tension Reported,” July 2 4 ,1 9 46
1,8 Ibid.
117

The New York Times. “Violence in Palestine,” July 23, 1946, p. 24.
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Irgun Z'vai Leumi, an extrem ist Zionist organization,
announced that it had been responsible for the bombing of
the British headquarters here in a communique’ issued
tonight in Tel Aviv but blamed the “British tyrants
themselves” for the loss of life.118
The Irgun claimed to have warned the King David’s switch
board operator of the impending disaster. This was explained in a
communique.
The tragedy which occurred in the civilian offices of the
occupying Government was not caused by Jewish soldiers
but by the British tyrants themselves, who disregarded that
warning and did not evacuate the building at the advice of
m ilitary experts who undertook to dism antle the
explosives.119.
No evidence was forthcoming to support this claim and the
Palestine Government vigorously denied any advance warning,
according to Reuter. In the United States and in Jerusalem the Jewish
Agency called upon the world Jewish community to condemn the
action. The Jewish press expressed their abhorrence of the incident,
calling on the Jewish community “to rise up against these abominable
outrages.” There was speculation that the formal action and full
cooperation in this respect was contingent upon the release of men
detained earlier by the B ritish.120
The bombing was denounced by President Truman who
118 The New York Times. “Zionist Terrorists Say They Set Bomb; Denounce
British,” July 24,1992, p. 1 .
,1BIb id.
120 Ibid.
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declared that such terrorism “might well” damage the cause of
Zionism. In his official statement the President commented on the
effects of the bombing and its relation to ongoing U.S. talks in London
to implement recommendations to allow 100,000 Jewish immigrants
to enter Palestine.
Such acts of terrorism w ill not advance, but on the contrary
might well retard, the efforts that are being made, and will
continue to be made, to bring about a peaceful solution of
this difficult problem.121
The Irgun Delegation in America remained loyal to the Irgun in
Palestine despite the political repercussions. They held to the claim
that “the heavy casualties were the end result of a series of tragic
missed signals.” The Irgun had at that time united with Lechi and
the Haganah in a United Resistance Movement. The plan to blow up
the hotel had been approved by the Haganah Command on July 1,
1946.122 It was personally approved by Ben Gurion.123

However,

following the unexpected loss of life and devastation, the Haganah
condemned the operation.124 The Irgun publicly took responsibility.
In America efforts had been made to try to reduce bloodshed.
The Irgun Delegation had set up the American League for a Free
Palestine which continued their publicity efforts to focus attention on
,21The New York Times. “Truman Condemns Palestine Blast; Sees Damage to
Peaceful Solution,” July 24,1946, p. 4.
122 Menachem Begin, The Revolt, p. 213.
123 Ben Ami, p. 377.
124 Begin, p. 224.
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the Palestine problem.
In July, 1946, when the URM (United Resistance Movement)
was entering its eighth month of operation, the destruction
of British m ilitary headquarters in the south wing of the
King David Hotel shook Jerusalem, and had wide spread
repercussions. The heavy casualties were the end result of a
series of tragic missed signals. Ironically, the President Of
our American League for a Free Palestine (ALFP), form er
Senator Guy M .Gillette, and the co-chairmen, Harry L.
Selden, had confirmed reservations for July 27th at the King
David. The activists who gathered around our cause in the
ALFP, had been ceaselessly searching for ways to avoid the
ever-increasing bloodshed. . .12S
There were particular reasons for deciding to bomb the King
David. Despite attempts by Senator Gillette and others to negotiate
with the British Government in favor of a Jewish state in Palestine,
the British had decided to launch Operation “Agatha” on June 29, at
1:45 A.M., the month prior to the bombing.
This Operation was an attempt to arrest “im portant” Jews in a
dragnet of British soldiers and police. To justify the arrests, the
British seized documents in the Jewish Agency building which they
later admitted did not sufficiently incriminate either the official
institution or the individual leadership. The Operation shook up the
Agency’s leadership, but it failed to destroy the Haganah, and hardly
touched the Irgun or Lechi. However, when “Agatha” was launched
on June 29, the immediate impulse in the United Resistance

129

Ben Ami, p. 374.
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Movement was for armed actions against the British administration;
and the go ahead was given, for the King David attack .126
The Irgun believed that damaging evidence had been found in
the British attack on the Jewish Agency and that this material was
being kept at the British headquarters. It was urgent that the
evidence be destroyed.
Unknown to the Irgun, it had been decided by Dr. Weizmann to
halt the armed struggle of the United Resistance Movement just as
the planned attack against the King David was proceeding. A note
was sent to Menachem Begin by Haganah leader Sneh on the 19th
and on the 22nd of July urging Begin to delay the operation.
The attack on the King David had the effect of focusing the
British public on the immediacy of the Palestine question. It also put
that question on the front pages of American newspapers. It marked
the end of the United Resistance Movement. In an interview in the
Parisian paper France Soir. David Ben Gurion declared that the Irgun
was “the enemy of the Jewish people.”127
The King David incident was a catalyst for the call for partition of
Palestine. Within three days of the blast the Anglo-American Cabinet
Committee recommended to the American and British Governments a
so-called federalist constitution for Palestine. This constitution was to
Ben Ami, p. 375-377.
127 Ben Ami, p. 380.
128
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vest “strong central powers in a British controlled central
government, leaving very little autonomy to the separate Arab and
Zionist provinces” and would make the admission of the 100,000
Jewish refugees to Palestine, which President Truman had urged ten
months prior, conditional upon the adoption of the federalization
program.128
The plan called for dividing Palestine into Zionist, Arab and
central-govemment districts. The central government would control
Jerusalem, Bethlehem and surrounding areas, and the Negev, south
of Beersheba. The Zionist district would include about 1500 square
miles (compared with the 2,600 recommended by the Peel report
proposing partition in 1936 and the 45,000 in the area constituting
Palestine when it was originally promised as a Jewish “national
home”). This area would include two thirds of the southern coastal
Plain of Sharon, except Jaffa, the Plain of Esdraelon, the Valley of Jezreel and eastern Galilee north of Beisan. The rest o f Palestine would
be Arab.129The British would retain substantial power.
The most striking aspect of the proposals is the degree of
power to be left in the hands of the central government. . .
Under the plan the British would control defense, foreign
relations, the police, prisons, the courts, railway and court
facilities in Haifa, the post office, the telephone and
telegraph systems, customs, excise taxes, civil aviation,
broadcasting and antiquities. They would also retain final
128
The New York Times. “Divided Palestine is Urged by Anglo-U.S. Cabinet
Body, Delaying Entry of 100,000”-July, 26,1948, p. 1.
128 Ibid.
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authority over immigration, but the provincial governments
would have the right of appeal to the United Nations’
Trusteeship Council130
The British position on the immigration question had been that
they could not agree to the absorption of 100,000 without the
agreement of the Arabs. The Anglo-American Cabinet Committee
deliberations caused an elaboration o f this position. “The British
have now said, in effect, that they cannot agree to adm it the new
refugees until the whole question of Palestine’s future has been
settled.”131 This immigration question had become the main point of
contention between the American and British governments.
Although the immigration plan had been delayed, details of
the plan had been agreed upon by the United States and Britain. The
United States would finance the movement of refugees to Palestine
and world Jewish organizations would take over the estimated
$280,000,000 cost of resettling them after their arrival.
The attitude of President Truman and the policy of the United
States Government was regarded as being pivotal to the solution of
the Palestine problem.
If President Truman rejects the new plan for a federated
Palestine that has been recommended to him by his Cabinet
delegation and that the British favor strongly it is not only
going to be a shock to British opinion but it is going to force
Ibid.
131 The New York Times. “Britain Tries Again on Palestine Solution,” July 28,
1992.
130
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a whole new reconsideration of the Palestine problem, with
that much more time lost. . .What they do urgently desire is
to get President Truman’s blessing to go ahead with the new
plan for a federated Palestine.132
Meanwhile a close friend of President Truman was at work in
Palestine for the Irgun delegation. Iowa’s Senator Guy Gillette
focused on

th eir

cause the prior year when he resigned

chairmanship of the Surplus Property Board and declined other
executive government appointments “to devote himself to the
solution of the Hebrew problem of Europe and Palestine.”133

In

August of 1945 Guy Gillette became full-time President of the Irgun
Delegation’s American League for a Free Palestine. Yitshaq Ben Ami
was its Executive Director. They worked with Ben Hecht, Louis
Bromfield, W ill Rogers, Jr., Paul O’Dwyer, W illiam Z iff and other
prominent Americans. In 1946 Guy Gillette campaigned to stop
Britain from establishing the independent state of Trans-Jordan on
three-quarters of the Mandate area. Gillette pointed out that “this
unilateral action by Britain contravened its obligation under the
Mandate and went against the policies set by the Anglo-American
Convention o f 1924.” When this attempt failed Gillette said on

132

The New York Times. “British lin k Fate of Palestine to US,” July 28, 1946,

p. 29.
133 Request from the White House to the White House News Photographers
Association to cover a press conference at the headquarters of the Hebrew
Committee for National liberation where Gillette would discuss his plans
concerning these matters, July 31, 1945, Truman Papers, Official File.
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national radio, “It appears, from the study of Great Britain’s record
on Palestine, that she supports the lofty ideals of democracy
provided they happen to coincide w ith the interests of the British
Empire.”134
In July 1946, Gillette went to Palestine in an attempt to modify
the course of British action, to meet with Begin to coordinate future
policies, and to establish a better relationship between the Irgun
Delegation in America and the Jewish Agency. His attempts “failed
on all fronts . . . he came back a converted revolutionary . . . From
then on his opening statement at public appearances was: ‘It is 1946
in America, but it is 1776 in Palestine.’”135
Attempts were also made within the ranks to strengthen the
Hebrew Committee for National Liberation’s political campaign, and
to tighten ties with the Irgun which had been strained because of the
decision by the Irgun Delegation not to send all their funds to the
front in Palestine, and because of Hillel Kook’s call for a democratic
(rather

than a Jewish) state in Palestine. On May 1, 1946 an

agreement had been signed with the Irgun High Command which
defined the Hebrew Nation as all Jews in the diaspora and in
Palestine who desired Eretz-Israel (the land of Israel) as their home
and wished to help in its liberation.
The HCNL is the political representative of the Irgun; the
1S4Ben Ami, p. 380-381.
Ibid, p. 381-382.
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links between the Irgun and its delegates abroad are
reestablished. The HCNL accepts the Irgun’s supreme
authority. The Irgun’s covert activities in the diaspora are
directed by the Irgun’s diaspora command. The Irgun
delegates are autonomous in their political work and shall
participate in formulating the Irgun’s m ilitary and political
policies.136
Begin hesitated to ratify the agreement, leading to considerable
friction, but the Irgun and American delegation continued to work
together throughout the summer o f 1946. The Morrison-Grady plan
(whereby Palestine would be split into four sections, two under
British rule, one under Jewish rule and one under Arab rule)
motivated Menachem Begin to write to the HCNL that summer. He
feared that the Jewish Agency might agree to the plan which would
result in internecine fighting in Palestine. “A civil war can break out
at any time within weeks or months,” wrote Begin.
I have no doubt that your campaign in the United States. . .
is one of the factors inhibiting the plotters. How long this
will restrain them is impossible to predict. . .We did not give
up our principles two years ago, after the Moyne incident,
when Golomb (head of the Haganah) threatened us with
annihilation. We did not stop our struggles then and we
won’t now.137
Begin planned to establish a Provisional Government only if “the
Agency people” agreed to the Morrison-Grady plan and “if there is no

’“ Ibid, p. 382-383.
137 Ibid.
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choice le ft” 138
At this time a rift was developing within mainstream world
Zionism. While Chaim Weizmann wished to settle for partition under
British rules, the Zionist movement in America, led by Abba Hillel
Silver, began turning toward the more m ilitant stand of the
Revisionists and the Irgun Delegation.
On August 5, 1946 the Executive of the Jewish Agency for
Palestine adopted a resolution rejecting the Morrison plan and
demanding the immediate grant of 100,000 certificates and the
transportation of the 100,000 to Palestine. They also demanded
immediate full autonomy in administrative appointments and in
national economics “to that area of Palestine to be designated to
become a Jewish State,” as well as the right to control immigration
there.139 This resolution was accompanied by a ten page paper titled
“Palestine: Trusteeship, Binational State, or Partition?” This report
compared the proposed types of government, analyzed the affects of
each upon the indigenous populations and made suggestions and
recommendations. Among these it was believed that Partition would
be the most acceptable solution as it would give “a full measure of
satisfaction to the political aspirations of both groups. Its drawback is
,3BIbid.
1M Resolution Adopted at Meeting of the Executive of the Jewish Agency for
Palestine in Paris, Monday, August 5, 1946, Papers of David Niles, Truman
L ib rary.
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that it can offer that satisfaction only in a lim ited area of the
country.” The Jewish State could work out its own destiny while the
Arabs would not feel “swamped” by the Jews as had been the feeling
reported by the Palestine Royal Commission. “It would also give the
politically conscious class among the Arabs of Palestine the ardently
desired opportunity to obtain political office and influence.” Trans
jordan and Iraq would probably favor the plan.
It may also be viewed with favor (by) Iraq, which would
obtain - through the friendly and allied state of Transjordan
- close access to the Mediterranean - an aim which has long
been a major objective of Iraqi policy.140
The report objected to the fact that “the Arabs are represented
in every branch of U. N. activity” while “it is clearly an untenable
condition that the Jewish people should have no voice and no direct
representation in affairs of the most vital concern to it.”141 The report
also suggested boundaries. “Both the Jewish State and Transjordan
would have access to the waters of the Jordan and could exploit them
for irrigation and the generation of electric power.”142The plan would
partition Jerusalem, placing it under the control of an international
trusteeship which would allow “the Jewish part of New Jerusalem” to
be part of the Jewish State and “the Arab part of New Jerusalem” to

“Palestine; Trusteeship, Binational State or Partition?” - page 7, August
5, 1946, Papers of David Niles, Truman Library.
141Ibid, p. 8.
142Ibid, p. 10.
140
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be part of the Arab State. It was suggested that Jaffa would be part
of the Arab State “though not contiguous with it” while the port of
Haifa would remain in Jewish hands. Haifa, however, would be
accessible to Transjordan through a free port area. There would also
be a naval area under British sovereignty.143
W hile members o f the Jewish Agency found Partition
acceptable the Irgun did not. Begin said, “We shall oppose it! We
shall never acquiesce in partitioning of our homeland!” The thing
they wanted to avoid at all costs was a civil war.
The efforts o f the Irgun Delegation and the Irgun High
Command to fight for a Jewish state in Palestine were inextricably
intertwined. Each bore the repercussions of the successes or failures
of the other. While the Irgun Delegation worked under the guise of
several organizations (e.g. the Hebrew Committee, the American
Friends for a Free Palestine, etc.) their true affiliation to the Irgun
became known. This knowledge caused fund raising problems due to
th eir alien status. Their organization and its leaders were
investigated by the F.B.I. The results of the investigations, however,
were not incriminating. During the war years some of their plans,
such as Dr. Raphaeli’s plan to establish an o ff shore radio station,
were foiled by the Roosevelt administration. Their political position
however remained unshakable as they continued to pressure the
143

Ibid, p. 9.
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government directly and in the public arena.
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CHAPTER 6

ROOSEVELT AND PALESTINE
For a long time he was a hero. No president had
appointed so many Jews to public office. No president
had surrounded himself with so many Jewish advisers.
No president had condemned anti-Semitism with such
eloquence and persistence. Jews were mostly liberals
in those faraway days, and a vast m ajority voted four
times for FDR.1
This dissertation has raised a question which is difficult to
answer. Why did President Roosevelt fail to help the Jews o f Europe
during World War II and why did he put o ff Jewish leaders in
America? There is no doubt that while the President supported the
Jews verbally he failed to take action that might have drastically
altered the outcome o f the war for the Jewish victims of the
Holocaust2 Some historians believe that the President was afraid of
appearing too friendly to the Jews during a period when antiSemitism was supposedly increasing.
The individual in whom the Jews placed their greatest tru st.
. . failed to seize the hour. Franklin D. Roosevelt had
information on the Holocaust long before . . . November 24,
1942, but, as with the War Crimes Commission, he allowed
the issue to come to a head before making a move of, in fact,
1 “Did FDR Betray the Jews? Or did he do more than anyone else to save
them?” James Schlesinger Jr., Newsweek. April 18, 1994, p. 14.
2 Abandonment of the Tews, by David Wyman, carefully documents these
events and the proposed various plans which Roosevelt might have enacted to
save the Jews of Europe.
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no immediate consequence. . . The chief executive turned
down Sikorski’s private appeal for large-scale bombing in
retaliation for German savagery.. . He also proved unwilling
to ask Congress about admitting thousands of Polish women
and children, currently released from Soviet camps, fearing
“anti-semitic agitation” upon the inclusion of many Jews.3
The Irgun Delegation to the United States and the New Zionist
Organization in America tried to influence the administration to help
the Jews of Europe and to take a stand against the British policy in
Palestine. They has little success. While the Irgun Delegation began to
attack the President through their ad campaign, the New Zionist
Organization responded differently. They turned to the Republican
party and tried to develop support there. This was a new approach.
The large m ajority of Jews in America were Democrats. Although
some disagreed with the policies of Roosevelt they did not want to
criticize the President during the war. The New Zionists’ decision to
reach out to the Republicans for help proved to be effective. They did
not, however, totally isolate themselves from the Democrats but tried
to make inroads to affect policy at the highest levels.
The Irgun Delegation organized the march of the rabbis,
formulated the campaign which exposed the Bermuda Conference as
a “mockery,” pressed for the creation of the War Refugee Board,
staged rallies and mass meetings. They were opposed by Roosevelt
each step of the way. These actions, as well as David Wyman’s
3

Penkower, The Tews Were Expendable, p. 95.
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documentation of Roosevelt’s behavior, are the basis for seriously
questioning the motivation of the President. Certain conclusions
have come to light.
The President was deeply involved in establishing ties with
the Saudi Arabian king, Ibn Saud. Washington’s contact with the
King were generally formulated for m ilitary and political benefits.
Regarding Palestine, Roosevelt initially wanted to get the Saudis to
speak face to face, or at least by royal representative, with Chaim
Weizmann. The President would not proceed to support a Jewish
State in Palestine without the support of the King because of
geopolitical concerns of the United States. These included the need
for Saudi oil concessions and plans for United States control of an air
base at Dharan.
Varying reactions have emerged from the proposal that
Roosevelt’s Saudi concerns were the main reason for his
abandonment of the Jews. Most responses have been hesitantly
questionable, some fully discounted the idea, others mulled over it
and considered it a possibility.
David Wyman commented about Roosevelt in the following
way.
He was very concerned not to get the Arabs upset. A part
of this was he kept saying that he didn’t want to see
massacre. He couldn’t put x - number of American divisions
over there to protect the Jews. So that this is why he was so
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hesitant, but there’s no doubt about it, he was playing both
sides against the middle. It was a very devious policy. He
didn’t know what to do. I think he was concerned about the
Jews, I think he favored a Jewish state, but not to the extent
of alienating the Arabs which is the only way your going to
have a Jewish state. And so he seemed without any concern.
He seemed just to lie . . . but at the same time he was
assuring Wise and Silver that it was just a matter of time. He
was also telling the Arab leaders that we won’t do anything
without Arab consent which means they aren’t going to do
anything. This came out, this correspondence whatever the
communication was between him and Arab leaders was
published in the press I think in late '4 5 . It made quite an
uproar because it showed what a false position he had
taken.4
The earliest communication between President Roosevelt and
King Ibn Saud is dated 1939. In this correspondence the question of
Jewish self rule in Palestine was confronted by the King. He advised
the President that such a decision would be against the sentiments of
the majority of residents of the area (Le. of the Arab population). The
Under Secretary of State, Welles, advised the President that because
this was “the first letter which we have had from an Arab Chief of
State” an appropriate response should be forthcoming. Welles,
therefore, drafted a reply to the King which he asked the President
to sign. In it the King was assured that no action would be taken
which departed from the position which had been maintained to that

4 Interview with David Wyman by Joanna Saidel, August 20, 1993,
Cantebury, New Hampshire.
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time.5
In 1940 Chaim Weizmann, President of the W orld Zionist
Organization, suggested to Mr. H. St. J. B. Philby, “the great Near
Eastern authority and friend of King Ibn Saud. . . some basis of
settlement which the King might be willing to support. Dr. Weizmann
said that he had remarked to Philby that the only thing the Jews had
to offer was money.” Weizmann stated that he was prepared to raise
“three to four million pounds as the price o f the King’s support of a
scheme whereby the Arabs of Palestine would be voluntarily
transferred to Trans-Jordan and Iraq.”6
The idea of transfer was one which Benzion Netanyahu and the
New Zionist Organization promoted throughout their campaign
against the British in Palestine. In 1938 M r. Netanyahu expressed
this idea in political literature. The idea of transfer was originated by
Israel Zangwill. Netanyahu believed that it should be arranged
politically and not by forced expulsion.7
With the war well underway by 1941, interest in Saudi Arabia
increased. That year King Ibn Saud approached the administration to
ask for financial assistance. This request was initially turned down
5 Under Secretary of State to the President, January 9,1939 and D raft letter
from President Roosevelt to King Ibn Saud, Foreign Relations of the United
States. 1939, vol. IV, p. 694-696.
6 Memorandum of Conversation by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern
Affairs (M urray), February 6 , 1940, Foreign Relations of the Unites States.
1940, Vol. m, p. 836-840.
7 Personal interview with Benzion Netanyahu, November 1993, Jerusalem .
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by the United States. The King preferred to ask the U.S. for a loan
than the British because he felt that the U.S. would not try to meddle
in Saudi Arabia’s internal affairs. When this request was turned
down he asked instead for a loan of road engineers and for a mission
o f agricultural and irrigation experts from the United States
Government. State Department officials advised that such an
arrangement would be beneficial to the United States. Agriculture
experts argued “that quite apart from the question of helping King
Ibn Saud, the information and experience which an agricultural
expert obtained in Saudi Arabia would be very valuable to the
Department of Agriculture.”8
The year, 1942, was important in determining the outcome of
the pressure campaign aimed at the President to assist the Jews of
Europe. Hitler’s plan was fully underway. Zionist groups in the United
States, particularly the Irgun Delegation and the New Zionist
Organization, were demanding action. However, im portant
negotiations were beginning in Saudi Arabia for American rights for
air transit over certain parts of Saudi Arabia.
The question remains whether President Roosevelt made
agreements with Ibn Saud to gain advantages in Saudi Arabia. The
Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Parker T. Hart, does not think this was

8 For a discussion on the proposal to assist Saudi Arabia see Foreign
Relations of the United States 1941, vol. HI, p. 624-659.
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the case. He believes that the friendship between the King and the
President was sincere and that no deals were made concerning the
Jews and Dharan air base.
No. No. No. I don’t, I don’t take stock in that one at all. I
don’t think that’s true. I don’t believe there was any deal of
that kind, in fact I don’t think there was any real deal
between them except that they were going to try to be
friends; that he made a pledge that, of his own accord, that
he would not undertake a policy which would be harmful to,
or that could be considered harmful to either side but he
particularly mentioned the Arabs, of course to Ibn Saud. He
said, I wouldn’t undertake a course of action without, that
might be harmful to you certainly, without consulting with
you before I do it. I’m paraphrasing what he said, but that is
basically what he said.9
The request by Ibn Saud for an agricultural mission was
approved, though not for purely friendly reasons. The War
Department had become interested in acquiring air rights from the
Saudis.
On learning of the War Department’s interest in establishing
one or more airfields in Saudi Arabia, this Department, to
ensure the most favorable possible reception of a request
for air facilities, took certain steps and made certain plans,
i.e. visit of Minister to present credentials and President’s
letter to King Ibn Saud, organization and dispatch of
Agricultural Mission, and opening of Legation at Jidda.. .10
The reasons for desiring these air bases were prim arily

* Telephone interview with U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Parker T. Hart,
by Joanna Saidel, October 4,1993.
10 The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Kirk), April 15,
1942, Foreign Relations of the United States. 1942, Vol. IV, p. 567-568.
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m ilitary. The War Department determined that if it was possible to
establish a route across Saudi Arabia it would be very beneficial.
Ferrying distance for short-range a irc ra ft between
Khartoum and Karachi w ill be m aterially reduced, also
Arabian route more secure than present one via Cairo.
Moreover areas near Jidda and Fort Duwadamie seem more
suitable with respect to terrain and communications than
further south.11
It was presumed that “there is probably no use in approaching
Ibn Saud on this matter unless an adequate offer is made to him of
financial or other economic assistance and unless the King is
convinced that in some way his country w ill be made secure from
Axis attack.” 12 It was decided that Lend -Lease aid (financial, not in
the form of war m aterial) would be the best way to persuade the
King to cooperate. Ambassador Hart confirmed the King’s need for
assistance.
We had a very strong proprietary feeling about getting that
oil flowing. We also had a very strong feeling that the King
absolutely had to have some income. He was absolutely flat
when I got there in 1944.13
The British also wanted air rights over Saudi Arabia.
Cooperating together the Americans and British were able to secure

Ibid, p. 568.
Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (K irk), July 7, 1942, Foreign
Relations of the United States. 1942, Vol. IV, p. 571.
13 Telephone interview with U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia , Parker T.
Hart, by Joanna Saidel, October 4,1993.
11

12
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air rights from the Saudi King. It was reported:
The King is willing to grant to the British, routes for non
stop flights from Khartoum to Bahrein passing north of
direct line from Birkeh to Bahrein and from Khartoum to
Basra passing north o f direct line from Dheba to Basra, and
he w ill not object if American planes utilize the facilities so
granted. He asked the matter to be treated with utmost
secrecy.14
Also in 1942 the problem of protecting U.S. oil fields in Saudi
Arabia was considerable. Suggestions were made to send American
servicemen, anti-aircraft batteries and troops, to defend oil
installations at Dharan.
American plans to help the Jews remained on hold into 1943.
President Roosevelt made an agreement with Ibn Saud that he would
take no action in Palestine without the full consultation of both Arabs
and Jews, thus continuing his policy of appeasement. Ambassador
Hart, believes that Roosevelt was sympathetic to the Arabs.
Franklin Roosevelt was, I think, concerned that the Arabs
would be totally neglected in the sweep of sympathy for the
Jews.1S
Ambassador Richard Murphy thinks that the Zionism was not
an important concern for Roosevelt.
Roosevelt and Zionism, frankly I don’t think he put that
much thought into it. It became much more of an issue in
14 The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary o f State, July 3 1 ,1 9 4 2 ,
Foreign Relations of the United States. 1942, Vol. IV, p. 574.
15 Telephone interview with U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Parker T. Hart
from Washington, D.C., by Joanna Saidel, October 4,1993.
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Truman’s time.16
The vigorous ad campaign promoted by Hillel Kook, Ben Hecht,
Samuel M erlin, Yitshak Ben Ami, Alex Raphaeli and others in the
United States may have been the most important single element in
forestalling an outright pro-Arab policy in the United States in the
early 1940’s. The effects of the campaign were that public awareness
was aroused to a degree which forced the White House in both the
Roosevelt and Truman administrations not to abandon the idea of a
Jewish State in Palestine despite suggestions to the contrary in 1943.
Some of these suggestions included the recommendation by
Colonel Harold Hoskins to ship up to a half million Jewish refugees to
Cyrenaica. In Part IV of a proposed post-war solution Hoskins made
specific suggestions concerning the Jews.
The existing population of one m illion Arabs and
one-half m illion Jews in Palestine is not to be moved and is
to form a bi-national state within a proposed Levant
Federation. This independent Levant Federation would be
formed by the reuniting of Lebanon, Syria, Palestine and
Trans-Jordan that, prior to their dismemberment after the
last war, had for years been one natural economic and
political unit. The Holy Places, including Jerusalem, Jaffa, and
Bethlehem, are to be an enclave under United Nations’
control. The cession of some specific territory other than
Palestine for a Jewish State is proposed - possibly northern
Cirenaica, which is now virtually uninhabited.
The Jewish refugee problem is met to the extent that,
under the proposed plan, the Jews could put another half
18 Telephone interview with Ambassador Richard Murphy
from the Council
on Foreign Relations, by Joanna Saidel, October 4 ,1 9 9 3.
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m illion in Palestine so as to reach parity with the Arabs and
up to a half million Jews in northern Cirenaica.17
Other suggestions for situating the displaced Jews in countries
other than Palestine included that of President Roosevelt as
mentioned in a memorandum by Harold Hoskins in September 1943.
Therein he writes that “the President mentioned the fact that he had
been receiving an increasing amount of information that indicated
that many European Jews after the war would not care to migrate to
Palestine but would prefer to return to their countries of origin in
Europe” based on assurances of security.18
Because of the magnitude of the massacre of Jews by the Nazis,
“the President felt that the number of Jews pressing to enter
Palestine after the war may be substantially less than was originally
anticipated.”19 Hoskins conveyed Roosevelt’s plan.
As to Jewish refugees who may wish to move out of Europe
the President said that he was still working on the
possibility of at least a certain number of them being settled
in the trans - Andean portions of Colombia in South America
. . . As to a solution to the Palestine problem, the President
stated that his own thinking leaned toward a wider use of
the idea of trusteeship for Palestine - of making Palestine a
real Holy Land for all three religions, with a Jew, a Christian,
17 Summary of lieutenant Colonel Harold B. Hoskins’ Report on the Near
East, April 20, 1943, Foreign Relations of the United States. (Palestine
Section), 1943, volume IV, p. 784-785.
18 Memorandum of Conversation, by Lieutenant Colonel Harold B. Hoskins,
Washington, September 27, 1943, Foreign Relations of the United States.
Palestine Section, 1943, volume IV, p. 812.
” Ibid.
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and a Moslem as the three trustees.. . 20
Roosevelt did not, however, act upon these ideas.
Meanwhile, Hillel Kook continued, with the Irgun delegation, to
formulate new tactics to draw attention to the plight of the Jews.
While failing to affect the President, this group, operating now under
the banner, “Emergence Conference to Save the Jews o f Europe,”
submitted their plans to Secretary of State Hull, Assistant Secretary
Long, Attorney General Biddle, Eleanor Roosevelt, and Secretary of
the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau. There the Irgun Delegation found
at least some help. Henry Morgenthau assured H illel Kook of his
continuing support.
I need not reiterate to you my interest in any intelligent
plan which offers any reasonable hope of success for saving
the Jewish population of Europe, which is rapidly being
annihilated. You may rest assured that I am already doing
everything in my power, consistent with my position in the
Government, to facilitate the rescue of these oppressed
people.21
President Roosevelt sent Colonel Hoskins to Saudi Arabia to
confront the King regarding the future of Palestine and to discuss the
possibility of a meeting between Ibn Saud and Chaim Weizmann.
The King vehemently opposed any negotiations with Weizmann or
the Jewish Agency.
Ibid, p. 812-813.
Letter from Henry Morgenthau, Jr. to Peter Bergson, September 3, 1943,
Morgenthau Diary, Franklin D. Roosevelt lib ra ry , Hyde Park , New York.
20
21
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Apparently President Roosevelt was concerned enough to send
substantial gifts with Hoskins for the King. In an outline of Hoskins’
report to the President on the visit to Saudi Arabia, Hoskins wrote, “I
also showed to the President photographs of the presentation of the
Jeep and of the Walkie-Talkie to the King, as well as photographs of
the irrigation project at el Kharj, 75 miles south of Riyadh.” 22
Despite the failure to arrange a meeting between Weizmann
and the King, Hoskins believed that his talks with Ibn Saud had been
successful diplomatically because of an intimacy which he was able
to develop with the King. “The fact that he could talk to me directly
in Arabic, often without anyone else present, allowed him, he said, to
be more frank than would otherwise have been the case since his
best interpreters are not Saudi Arabians by birth.”23
Hoskins claimed that, due to this intimacy, the King explained
“for the first time to anyone, the reason for his personal hatred of Dr.
Weizmann.” This was an attempt by the latter to bribe the King with
20 m illion pounds sterling which was supposedly guaranteed by
President Roosevelt through an interm ediary, St. John Philby.24
Hoskins claims that the President greeted this charge with “surprise
and irritation.”25
“ Ibid, p. 811-812.
23 Memorandum by Hoskins, Cairo, August 31,1943, Ibid, p. 808.
* Ibid, p. 809.
25 Ibid, p. 812.
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The King’s hatred for Weizmann and the Jews went far beyond
this point. His position and his religion were the determining factors.
King Ibn Saud is first a devout Moslem and only
secondarily an Arab. He is the head o f the Wahhabi
(fundam entalist) sect o f Islam. The Wahhabis regard
themselves not as a sect, but as the only true Moslems, while
non-Wahhabi Moslems are considered to have lost the
purity of their faith.
There is every reason to credit the sincerity of the
King’s beliefs. Leader of the Moslems (Wahhabis anyway),
guardian of the Holy Places of Mecca and Medina, and a
Moslem sovereign who is independent in fact as well as in
theory, he, with much justice, regards himself as the world’s
foremost Moslem, and assumes the defense of the rights of
the Moslem community. Hence, his preoccupation with
Jewish im m igration into Palestine, a problem in which
Moslem religious considerations are supported by Arab
nationalist sentiment.
Although the King is reasonable in his interpretation
of Moslem religious law, he is scrupulous in observance of
established principles. Any relaxation o f his steadfast
opposition to Zionist aims for Palestine (about the only
question on which the Moslem world shows unanim ity)
would violate his principles; it would cause him to lose the
respect which he now commands from his co-religionists; it
might threaten his influence with his intolerant Wahhabi
subjects; and it could even result in the overthrow of his
dynasty. The possibility that the King can be persuaded to
alter his position with regard to Palestine is, therefore, so
remote as to be negligible.26
Besides the Palestine problem, oil and Dharan continued to be
in the forefront of discussions between Saudi Arabia and the United
States. The U.S. proposed to establish a consulate at Dharan in August
MKing Ibn Saud - Summary, p. 3-4. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Crimea
Conference File, Map Room.
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1943.
It was pointed out that a Consulate in Dharan would be a
great convenience both to the California Arabian Standard
Oil Company and to individual Americans there, in the
issuance and validation of passports, notarial services,
services to shipping and seamen, documentation of
merchandise in normal times.. . 27
The Saudis were reluctant to comply with this request fearing
that “an American Consulate in Dharan would cause embarrassing
demands for consulates of other nations in Saudi Arabia.” It was also
believed that the same ends could be achieved in other ways.28
President Roosevelt continued to affirm his good faith to the
monarch. In correspondence he again reassured King Ibn Saud, his
“Great and Good Friend,” “. . . I am glad of this opportunity . . .to
reiterate my assurance that it is the view of the Government of the
United States that, in any case, no decision altering the basic situation
of Palestine should be reached without full consultation with both
Arabs and Jews.”29
The year, 1944, marked the beginning of proposals by the
United States for the construction of an airfield near Dharan. On July
29th the American Resident in Saudi Arabia presented the request.
As has already been explained to Your Excellency, the
United States m ilitary air forces are responsible for heavy
27The Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Secretary of State,
October 25,1943. Foreign Relations of the United States. 1943, voL IV, p. 835-836.
28Ibid, p. 838.
28President Roosevelt to King Ibn Saud, Foreign Relations of the United
States. 1943, vol. IV, p. 790.
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air traffic movements between points in North Africa and
India, and the responsible authorities believe that a direct
route between Cairo and a point near Dharan would
materially facilitate the movement of this traffic, and aid in
the prosecution of the war.30
The British opposed the American plan. They too had sent
officials to Dharan “for the purpose of finding a site for a Royal Air
Force landing field.”31
Most authentic confidential source confirms that
British told Saudi Government to refuse aerodrome to US
Army at Dharan. Royal Air Force Chief Cairo stated to same
source that A ir Ministry London would not concur in US
Army request for Dharan aerodrome.
In view of British survey for Dharan airfield this
appears to be an unfriendly act constituting (1) antiAmerican coercion of Saudi Government, (2) obstruction of
Allied war effort. Perhaps it is test of equal opportunities
for US and of British cooperation in Saudi Arabia.32
W ith the war in full swing, Dharan came to be considered a
national security concern. The United States A ir Corps had been
flying to the Far Eastern war theater via Iraq and Bahrein. The
airstrip at Bahrain was not considered suitable for heavy planes
because of its soft soil. Dharan, on the other hand, was desirable. Its
terrain was suitable and it would save each plane 220 miles of
travel.
30The American Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia (Moose) to the Saudi
Arabian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs (Yusuf Yassin), Foreign Relations
of the United States. 1944, vol. V, p. 661.
31Foreign Relations of the United States. 1944, vol. V, p. 663, note 13.
32The Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State, October 6, 1944,
Foreign Relations of the United States. 1944, vol. v., p. 663.
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American m ilitary authorities consider that the construction
of an airfield near Dharan at the earliest possible moment is
necessary for the prosecution of the war in the Pacific.33
The Army Air Forces stated that “the acquisition of a m ilitary airfield
at Dharan is considered to be a m ilitary necessity.”34 It was
considered essential for fueling the war in the Pacific.
It was intended . . . to save mileage or kilometerage on the
route that went from Cairo to Karachi and then hooked into
other carriers from there, to provision the Far Eastern
lines of combat because at that particular time we didn’t
have the . . . Pacific under our control. Later, when the
Pacific passed under American control the war against the
Japanese could be fought from the United States westward,
rather than from Cairo eastward, and India eastward.35
In a memorandum from the Secretary of State to President
Roosevelt, proposals for long range financial assistance to Saudi
Arabia were presented. These proposals were based on American
national interests and assumed that a strong and independent Saudi
Arabian Government in the Near East was essential to these interests.
It also argued that oil resources o f Saudi Arabia, “now in American
hands under a concession held by American nationals, should be
safeguarded and developed in order to supplement Western
Hemisphere oil reserves as a source of world supply,” and that “the
33Inform al Statement Prepared in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Nov.
9,1944, Foreign Relations of the United States. 1944, vol. v., p. 668.
34Memorandum by Colonel John W. Bowen of the War Department General
Staff, Foreign Relations o f the United States. 1944, vol. v., p. 669.
35Interview with U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Parker T. Hart, October 4,
1993.
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m ilitary authorities urgently desire certain facilities in Saudi Arabia
for the prosecution of the war, such as the right to construct m ilitary
airfields and flight privileges for m ilitary aircraft en route to the
Pacific war theater.”36
The Secretary of State urged the President to help implement
these matters by asking Congress to authorize aid to Saudi Arabia, by
asking the President of the Export-Import Bank to extend long term
loans for economic and social development in Saudi Arabia, and by
asking m ilitary authorities to give immediate attention to airfield
and related construction, with the dispatch of training missions and
equipment, and the construction of strategic roads and facilities.37
Irgun Delegation leader, Dr. Alex Raphaeli commented on the
importance of Dharan.
The interest of F.D.R and the American government in Saudi
was because Saudi controlled the oil fields. The biggest oil
fields. And because a great part of the world, including the
enemy of United States, Japan, (Japan was still in the war
when F.D.R. went to see Ibn Saud). . . was still in the war.
And Japan was getting its oil from Saudi Arabia. The idea.. .
from the American point of view, not the Jewish, was. . . to
protect America against enemies and to . . . make (it)
difficult for them to get supplies of oil from which the whole
war machine moved.38

38Memorandum from the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt,
December 22,1944, Foreign Relations of the United States. 1944. vol. v., p. 757.
37Ibid, p. 758.
33Telephone interview with Dr. Alex Raphaeli from Jerusalem, by Joanna
Saidel, June 15,1993.
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It wasn’t until the following year, 1945, that an agreement
was finally reached for the construction of an airfield at Dharan.
Early that year President met King Ibn Saud aboard the U.S.S.
Quincy on February 14,1945, at Great Bitter Lake, Egypt.
The President spoke to the King about the Jewish problem. The
King felt that the Jews should be returned to the lands from whence
they were driven, stating that the Arabs and the Jews could never
cooperate, neither in Palestine, nor in any other country and that the
Arabs would chose to die rather than yield their lands to the Jews.39
“The President replied that he wished to assure His Majesty that he
would do nothing to assist the Jews against the Arabs and would
make no move hostile to the Arab people.”40
Ambassador Richard Murphy does not believe that the
relationship between the King and the President was that important
to Roosevelt.
I don’t think that Ibn Saud figured, frankly, much at a ll.. .
as an individual on Roosevelt’s personal screen. . . No. No. I
mean he was old, very near to death, President, when he
met Ibn Saud.41
Historian W alter Laqueur agrees that one must be wary of the
relationship because of the President’s personal condition.
38Memorandum of Conversation Between the King of Saudi Arabia (Abdul
Aziz A1 Saud) and President Roosevelt, February 14, 1945, Foreign Relations of
the United States. 1945, vol. vm , p. 2.
40Ibid.
41 Interview with Ambassador Richard Murphy, October 4, 1993.
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Look. Don’t forget at this time Roosevelt was a very sick
man and, in ‘44 - ‘45, and he, half the time he didn’t know
what goes on. So one should be a little careful you know.42
The President did in fact feel a kinship with the King which
was especially strong, in part, because of their sim ilar physical
ailments. Concurrently, the King spoke of being the “twin” brother of
the President, in years, in responsibility as Chief of State, and in
physical disability.
The President said, “but you are fortunate to still have the
use of your legs to take you wherever you choose to go.” The
King replied, “It is you, Mr. President, who are fortunate. My
legs grow feebler every year; with your more reliable
wheel-chair you are assured that you w ill arrive.” The
President then said, “I have two of these chairs, which are
also twins. Would you accept one as a personal gift from
me?” The King said, “Gratefully. I shall use it daily and
always recall affectionately the giver, my great and good
friend.”43
The President also encouraged the King to take an interest in
agriculture and irrigation.
The President spoke of his great interest in farming, stating
that he himself was a farmer. He emphasized the need for
developing water resources, to increase land under
cultivation as well as to turn the wheels which do the
country’s work. He expressed special interest in irrigation,
tree planting and water power which he hoped would be
developed after the war in many countries, including the
Arab lands. Stating that he liked Arabs, he reminded His
Majesty that to increase land under cultivation would
decrease the desert and provide living for a larger
42Interview with Walter Laqueur, October 4, 1993.
43Foreign Relations of the United States. 1945. vol., viii., p. 7.
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population of Arabs. His Majesty thanked the President for
promoting agriculture so vigorously, but said that he himself
could not engage with any enthusiasm in the development
o f his country’s agriculture and public works if this
prosperity would be inherited by the Jews.44
The King did however grant to President Roosevelt the desired
rights to the Dharan base construction soon after this meeting. The
King’s agreement with the United States was made on the condition
that the field and fixed installations would pass to the Saudi
Government at the end of the war. The U.S. Forces would be allowed
to use the base for three years following the war. American
commercial airlines would receive most-favored-nation terms when
the field was eventually opened to civil aviation.45
The death of President Roosevelt ushered in a new hope for a
solution to the Palestine problem. President Truman was more
determined to support the Zionist cause than had been his
predecessor. He pushed for the entry of Jewish immigrants into
Palestine. This decision brought the response of confusion

and

disbelief from Ibn Saud, who was of the impression that Truman
would uphold Roosevelt’s Palestine policy. The King referred to the
agreement reached on board the U.S.S. Quincy,

the details of which

44Memorandum of Conversation Between Saudi Ibn Saud and President
Roosevelt aboard the S.S. Quincy, February 14, 1 9 4 5 . Fra n k lin D. Roosevelt
lib rary, Crimea Conference File, Map Room, p. 3 -4 .
45The Minister of Saudi Arabia to the Secretary of State, May 13,1945, Ibid,
p.894.
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were not released in totality.
What was said at that meeting is not completely known. Is it
possible that the President agreed, in return to rights to Dharan, not
to support a Jewish State in Palestine? This question was posed to a
number of people, including the former Israeli Prime Minister,
Yitshak Shamir who was also asked what he thought about the
possibility that President Roosevelt had been more concerned with
retaining oil concessions and the air base at Dharan than in saving
the Jews. His response was as follows.
Shamir: Maybe. It was not, it was not the only factor but it
was a part of his hostile attitude towards the Zionism. Could
well be understood, it was . . . handy to have an American
influence in the Middle East and he met once with Ibn Saud,
the king of Saudi. And well, of course, it’s possible. I can say
that most of the establishment officials of the United States
have been anti-Zionist. Not after Roosevelt’s death. This
changed, gradually this changed because Truman was
different.
Saidel: Yes. Roosevelt needed Dharan to fuel the Pacific, to
fuel the war in the Pacific, and the oil, so maybe that was a
national security concern to him, more than the Jews.
Shamir: I’m not sure because. . . Because there is, there was
nothing in contradiction between these both interests, the
Jewish interests and the American interests. There . . . has
not been any contradiction between them. But maybe
Roosevelt gave, of course there is no doubt of it, he gave
more importance to the American interests. Oil interests and
all that, but I know one thing. For the Jews, for the Jewish
people he had a dislike.
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Saidel: Do you know of any other reasons why?
Shamir: I don’t think so.
Saidel: Those were the only reasons that I could come up
with, Dharan and the oil.
Shamir: He didn’t have a positive reason for supporting the
Jewish state. And of course the Saudis, it may be that,
nobody knows what was the content of his conversations
with Ibn Saud. Nobody knows about it. But maybe that Ibn
Saud told him, Let the Jewish, let the Jewish problem aside.
Maybe. Maybe he talked with him and Roosevelt accepted it.
Maybe. Maybe.46
It appears that something of this sort took place between Roosevelt
and Ibn Saud for the King makes mention of an agreement between
himself and the President aboard the ship in a letter to Truman.
. . . we have been made aware lately, through the radio
broadcasts, of a speech attributed to Your Excellency that
you had searched through the papers of the late President,
our dear friend, President Roosevelt, and that you were not
successful in finding any confirmation of his talk with us
regarding the Palestine question. We did not previously
publish the subject discussed between us and the late
President regarding this m atter. However, in some
particular cases, we did inform various heads o f Arab
States, concerning the conversation which took place on
February 1 4,1 9 4 5 .. .47
This letter leaves room for speculation that President Roosevelt may
have made a secret agreement with the King regarding the Palestine
<sInterview w ith Yitshak Shamir by Joanna Saidel, October 25, 1993, The
Knessett, Jerusalem.
47The King o f Saudi Arabia (Abdul Aziz ibn Saud) to President Truman,
October 2, 1945, Foreign Relations of the United States. 1945, Vol. v m , p. 755.
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problem.
In July 1946 Truman informed the King that the United States
wished to implement the admission of 100,000 Jewish refugees to
Palestine,48 despite urging from the King to the contrary.49 A polite
verbal battle ensued, through correspondence, between the King
and President Truman because of this demand for the admission of
the 100,000 Jews to Palestine.
The Government and people of the United States have given
support to the concept of a Jewish National Home in
Palestine ever since the termination of the first World War.
. . It is only natural, therefore, that this Government should
favor at this time the entry into Palestine o f considerable
numbers of displaced Jews in Europe. . . It was my belief, to
which I still adhere, and which is widely shared by the
people of this country, that nothing would contribute more
effectively to the alleviation o f the plight of these Jewish
survivors than the authorization of the immediate entry of
at least 100,000 of them to Palestine.. .50
Prince Faisal, the son of Ibn Saud, was scheduled to see the
President on December 13, 1946. The State Department sent a
memorandum to the President advising him what to say to the
Prince at this meeting. It was suggested that the President indicate
his happiness over the continued harmonious relations between the
United States and Saudi Arabia, and the development of Saudi oil
48Letter from Truman to Ibn Saud, July 8, 1946, Official File, Truman Papers.
"Letter from Ibn Saud to Truman, May 24, 1946, Official File, Truman
Papers.
“ Letter from President Truman to King Ibn Saud, October 28, 1946, Official
File, Truman Papers.
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resources.

It was also suggested that the President affirm U.S.

interests to modernize Saudi Arabia by the construction of harbors,
roads, railroads, hospitals, and public utilities. Concerning Palestine,
the President was advised to say “that the Jewish National Home in
Palestine should be developed further”, and that he hoped and
believed that this could be done “with the agreement of the Arabs
and in a manner which w ill be satisfactory to all parties and which
w ill safeguard existing rights and privileges.. . 51
While President Roosevelt may have felt compelled to accept
the views of Ibn Saud regarding Palestine because of impending
national security concerns which occupied him during the war,
President Truman was not as restricted by these concerns. The war
was over and, although oil and the Dahran base continued to be very
important, he had more leeway to make his own decisions. Also
political concerns on the part of the Saudis required them to be more
pliable vis-'a-vis America. Principally, the King feared that the
British were behind Transjordanian King Abdullah’s plan for a
Greater Syria which might include Syria, Transjordan, Iraq, Lebanon
and part of Palestine. The King wanted assurance that the American
government would support him in the United Nations should the

51Memorandum from the Department of State to the President, December 13,
1946, President’s Secretary’s File, Truman Papers.
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events begin to materialize.52
On February 11 a ton secret message was received from
M inister Childs in Jidda, transm itting a message just
received from King Ibn Saud to the effect that the King had
obtained definite information that the British Government
was planning to have King Abdullah made ruler of Greater
Syria. King Ibn Saud asked that the United States
Government intervene in this matter im m ediately.. ,53
The Saudi Government

became more dependent on the

support and security provided by the United States as time passed.
The same holds true for the State of Israel These two enemy states
found common ground in their mutual benefactor, America. A dual
policy emerged in which the United States made guarantees to both
nations, and simultaneously attempted to maintain a balance of
power in the region. During the Truman administration, due to Saudi
fears of possible aggression from the Hashemite Kingdoms of Jordan
and Iraq, the United States was allowed to upgrade its facilities at
Dharan, which it still commanded, into a very important strategic
ferrying base which became a part of a policy of containment against
the Soviet Union, and a defense for Saudi Arabia.
Harry Truman, who very publicly gave moral support to the
creation o f Israel, secretly made agreements for the first
American m ilitary support to Saudi Arabia.
The strange path of U.S. policy in the Gulf had been
set. American now supported two countries who openly
opposed each other and followed often conflicting Mideast
“ Memorandum for the President from the Department of State, February
18, 1947, President’s Secretary’s Files, Truman Papers.
63Ibid, p. 1.
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positions.54
One may conclude therefore that the United States’ interest in
Saudi Arabia, particularly in U.S. oil concessions and the Dharan
base, could have been determining factors in the formation of
President Roosevelt’s, and later President Truman’s, policy toward
that country, and toward the Jewish and Palestine problems. For
President Roosevelt the need for oil and air strip rights was a
primary national security concern which overrode any consideration
he may have had for the Jews. He thought that, to save the Jews, the
United States needed to win the war through m ilitary power. Arthur
Schlesinger Jr. believes that “FDR, more than any other person,
deserves the credit for mobilizing the forces that destroyed Nazi
barbarism.”55 Revisionist Zionists contend that the President could
have done more to save the Jews while fighting the war in Europe.

“ The Secret Files: W ash in g to n . Israel a n d th e O n lf. WETA - TV Transcript
#106, A ir Date: February 17,1992, p. 10.
65Schlesinger, p. 14.
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CHAPTER 7
RESCUE AND PARTITION
The practical work of the Irgun Delegation involved the
financing and purchasing of vessels to transport fleeing Jewish
refugees, and later D.P.’s, from Europe to Palestine. These purchases
caused friction between Delegation members and the Irgun High
Command, particularly Menachem Begin, who believed that such
funds should be used at the m ilitary front rather than for the
purchase of vessels. This controversy led to the deterioration of
relations between the American and Palestinian branches of the
Irgun.
During these days the Palestine question was turned over to
the United Nations. It is possible that this was a deliberate move on
the part of the British, who did not expect partition to be accepted by
the international body. The Irgun Delegation and the Revisionists
opposed partition. During the fight for a Jewish state Revisionist
leader, Benzion Netanyahu, developed a relationship with State
Department official, Loy Henderson. While Henderson has been
portrayed as an opponent of Zionism, Netanyahu’s connection with
him reveals another side to this storv.
By the fall of 1946 it was clear to the Irgun Delegation that
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their activities in America needed to intensify. Ben Hecht again took
to his pen, writing play called A Flag is Born, which starred Marlon
Brando on Broadway and which was sponsored in part by Eleanor
Roosevelt. The play depicted the plight of the Jews of Europe, their
desire for a homeland and the barriers of the British. It ended with
Brando saying, “We promise to wrest our homeland out of British
claws . . . the English have put a fence around the Holy Land. But
there are three things they cannot keep out - the wind, the rain, and
a Jew.”1 The London Evening Standard called it “the most virulent
anti-British play ever staged in the United States.”2
The proceeds from Hecht’s play were used for two purposes.
Part went to finance the work of the Irgun in Palestine. The rest was
used to buy a ship, called the S’. S. A b ril,

for $38,000 at a

government auction of surplus vessels. While the Irgun Delegation to
the United States debated whether it was right to deprive the Irgun
in Palestine of some of the funds, they decided that if the Irgun was
not going to act to ship Jewish D.P.s to Palestine then the American
League for a Free Palestine would. They formed the “Tyre Shipping
Company” as a cover for the operation which was under FBI
surveillance from the start.
Meanwhile, on October 31, 1946 the Jewish underground took
1Ben Ami, p. 384.
2Ibid.
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its first action against the British outside of Palestine. The bombing of
the British Embassy in Rome made the point that the battle would
no longer be lim ited to Palestine but that the Jewish underground
would strike at British targets worldwide if necessary. This was
followed by other operations against British bases in Austria and
Germany where weapons and explosives were confiscated. The
decision to carry the fight to Europe, and to attack the British on all
fronts, was made and executed, for the most part by Lechi, with
operations often under the direction of Yaacov Eliav.3
In November, 1946, Irgun Delegation leader, Peter Bergson
(H illel Kook), requested a meeting with President Truman. In
correspondence from a Revisionist member, Fowler Harper, to the
White House, Fowler reiterates the Bergson request. This letter to Mr.
Charles Ross bears a hand written note beside Bergson’s name which
says, “Bad actor, steer clear.”4
Bergson was unable to see the President, who, his secretary
wrote, had been “so unusually busy” as “so many pressing problems
have arisen.”5 Bergson did not give up. On December 24th he sent the
President a case of Palestine wine in “the hope it might serve to
3For a detailed account of the underground activities of Yaacov Eliav see,
The Wanted.
4Letter from Fowler Harper to Charles Ross, November 9, 1946, Truman
Papers, Official File.
5Letter of the President’s secretary, Matthew J. Connolly to Fowler Harper,
Dec. 10, 1946, Truman Papers, Official File.
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assist the ushering in [of] the New Year.” Bergson said that having
been “constrained” to approach the President in the past concerning
the sordid aspects of Palestine it was now his pleasure to present the
President with a “bit of Palestine and it not soaked with trouble.” He
hoped that with pride and honor the Hebrew people would learn “of
the President of the United States toasting the New Year with wine
from the ancient hills of Judea.”6
Two days later, on December 26, 1946, there was an FBI raid
of an Irgun ship. The raid yielded, not the arms that they had
expected, but hundreds of lifebelts. The S. S. A b ril

then left

Brooklyn, New York for Marseilles.
In January 1947 British Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin, stated
his position on Palestine in a cabinet paper which he sent to Prime
Minister Attlee. It said, “Without the Middle East and its o il... .[I see]
no hope of being able to achieve the standard of living at which we
were aiming in Great Britain.”7 His plan was to have Palestine replace
Egypt as the headquarters for the Im perial Forces in the region.
Thereby, the communications, oil supplies and the strategic
geopositioning of the British would be maintained and protected.
On February 18th, the Palestine question was turned over to
the United Nations. Britain, it was speculated, wanted to give the
6 Notes from a letter from Peter Bergson to President Truman, December 24,
1946, Truman Papers, General File.
7 Ben Ami, p. 398.
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impression that it was tired of the situation and of the economic
burden that it entailed.
While supposedly giving up in despair, Bevin was actually
trying to precipitate events that would permit Britain to
create an Arab puppet state in Palestine. He guessed at the
scenario: The Arab and communist block would oppose a
partition resolution, while the United States stayed friendly
to all concerned. Thus, partition would fail, and under
British tutelage, the Arab m ajority of Palestine would be
given control of the country and eventually rule it.8
Under Bevin’s plan the Jews would be relegated

to small

“cantons” in a plan similar to the Morrison-Grady Plan, which Bevin
supported earlier. While Bevin publicly stated his support for the
protection of Arab rights, he privately stressed British and American
mutual geopolitical and economic reasons for backing the PanArabists. “Bevin blamed American domestic politics for his troubles
in Palestine.” 9
The Revisionists in America did not ease their pressure.
American mainstream Zionist, Abba H illel Silver, became more
m ilitant and demanding. In Britain, Weizmann vacillated and Ben
Gurion agreed “to what amounted to an historic abdication from
Zionism, and a retreat from his recent conversion to the goal of a
Jewish Commonwealth.”10

6Ibid.
9Ibid, p. 398-399.
10Ibid, p. 400.
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Although Loy Henderson has been perceived within Zionist
circles to be anti - Zionist,"

the New Zionist Organization leader,

Benzion Netanyahu, described an unknown side of the State
Department official. After two years of campaigning the New Zionist
Organization forced the mainstream Zionists to also take political
action. Netanyahu, sometime during 1945 - 1946, joined the Zionist
Organization. As a member he was forbidden to negotiate with
governments. He, therefore, decided to negotiate inform ally and
secretly. He had a connection, through a fellow associate named
Kolitz, to the wife of an Under Secretary of War under President
Wilson, a Mrs. Bolton, who was a very influential congresswoman.
Netanyahu and Kolitz asked her to arrange for a gathering with Loy
Henderson at her home. This was agreed upon and the dinner
meeting took place. At that affair Professor Netanyahu was able to
convince Henderson of the importance of the Zionist movement by
presenting it in a global scenario. He was highly impressed and
invited Netanyahu, who was a very eloquent and powerful speaker,
to come to the State Department and repeat the story to Henderson’s
associates. This was done.12
The intelligent and foresighted Revisionist spokesman had

11See The Arabists bv Robert D. Kaplan and Truman Palestine and the Press
by Bruce J. Evensen for more on this perception of Henderson.
12Personal interview with Benzion Netanyahu, November 7, 1993,
Jerusalem.
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envisioned a scenario which later proved to be true. Mr. Netanyahu
predicted that the Middle East, after the war ended, would become
an area of conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union.
He believed that the Arabs would not be able to stop the Soviet
advance and that the only true ally in the region would prove to be
the Jewish state.13
Netanyahu and Henderson met numerous times after this.
Their relationship opened many doors in the State Department, the
Army and the Navy for Mr. Netanyahu. The congresswoman, Mrs.
Bolton, was also able to open doors for him including arranging a
meeting for him and Kolitz with General Eisenhower.14
Eisenhower was so impressed by Netanyahu that he asked him
to speak directly to the General Wilson, head of the British Army,
who was due to visit America. Eisenhower called Netanyahu
personally to let him know the meeting had been scheduled.
However, the day before the meeting Netanyahu received a call from
Eisenhower’s office inform ing him that the Foreign Office had
ordered Wilson not to attend the meeting. Eisenhower was very
angry, believing that they were afraid to attend a meeting which
would weaken and expose them.ls
Eisenhower then called upon Netanyahu to present his ideas at
13 ibid.
14Ibid.
16Ibid.
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a meeting of the General Staff. This was very im portant to the
Revisionist cause. It may have been the first time in Zionist history
that Zionists had the opportunity to address a General Staff.
Netanyahu had penetrated veiy far and deep to be able to reach
Eisenhower and the inner circles of the administration.16
Loy Henderson also arranged for Netanyahu and Kolitz to meet
with the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, and later his replacement,
Mr. Lovett. Later he arranged for Netanyahu to meet Mr. Bohlen,
author of the Marshall Plan, and Arbor, the Under Secretary of
State.17
Mr. Netanyahu may have been responsible for changing the
view of the State Department. (When asked if in fact he did, Mr.
Netanyahu replied, “Absolutely.”) Rather than seeing Palestine as a
problem of the British, Jews and Arabs, Mr. Netanyahu was able to
convince the State Department that it had much farther reaching
importance. It was a global issue which needed to be dealt with at
the highest levels. It was extremely important to the geopolitical and
international political post war plans of America.18
The internal high level connections which Mr. Netanyahu
developed may have been one of the most important parts of the
history of the Zionist, and particularly the Revisionist, movement in
"Thief
17Ibid.
18Ibid.
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America. The results which he achieved working behind the scenes,
as well as his public campaign against the British, were extremely
important.
W hile Benzion Netanyahu worked behind the scenes, Hillel
Kook tried to affect the American government in his own way. He
cabled Truman from Paris to protest the British inaction concerning
the transfer of Jews from German camps to Palestine. He urged the
President to set up a commission which could carry out the policy. He
also encouraged Truman to tell the British Government that unless
they took action immediately the United States would no longer take
part in any further discussion on Palestine.19
At the time Bergson sent this telegram he was in Paris. That
city became the focal point for the activities of the HCNL. Kook
(Bergson), Eri Jabotinsky and others worked out of the Lutetia Hotel.
Yitshaq Ben Ami wrote that the Revisionists believed that France was
“the best choice for a future government in exile.” The overwhelming
view there “favored creating a Provisional Hebrew Government, with
or without the Jewish Agency. The HCNL believed that such a de
facto entity would put Britain on the political spot, elevating our
“terrorism” to “National resistance,” and our battle would be given
legitimacy in the eyes of the world.” 20
1BPapers of Harry S. Truman, General File, January 30, 1947.
20Ben Ami, p. 395.
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Apparently the Irgun Delegation leader had contacted
Menachem Begin regarding this idea.
I know that Kook was urging Begin to agree to a provisional
government. And the notion was they set a provisional
government abroad . . . And the notion was, of course, that
if Begin couldn’t get out of the country then Kook would be
the man to do it. Sure. And Begin would be here the head of
the fighting force, you see. Now, this is really amusing
because Begin was a political animal and I don’t think he
knew one end of a revolver to the other, from the other
(laughs).21
Irgun leader, Menachem Begin, however, rejected the plan by the
Irgun Delegation to the United States, particularly Kook (Bergson), to
set up a Provisional Government.
There w ill be the need for a government, and there w ill be
the time to form it, and possibly even a constellation of
events that w ill bring about declaring it - if the Agency
accepts a modified plan. Then events w ill bring together all
opposing factions and create the entity that w ill lead the
War for freedom and the integrity of the homeland . . . To
rush with such a decisive political step w ill be to destroy
that edifice before it is b u ilt22
France was the country of choice for Zionist underground
operations as the government there was quite sympathetic. Lechi
leader, Yaacov Eliav said, “we were given a free hand on condition
that our operations emanated not directly from France but from
neighboring countries, in order not to im plicate France in a

21 Interview with Shmuel Katz by Joanna Saidel, November 1993, Tel Aviv.
” Letter from Menachem Begin to Yitshaq Ben Ami, Ben Ami, p. 424.
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diplomatic conflict with England.”23
In Paris plans were made to consolidate Irgun activities
worldwide. Strategies were laid out for the formation of an aviation
school, for the acquisition of explosives, weapons and bases for
operations and supplies.
Kook and Ben Ami went to Paris. Perhaps they wanted to
oversee the activities of their ship, the S. S. A bril, which had arrived
in Marseilles. On February 28, 1947 it took 620 Jewish immigrants
aboard. It was renamed the S. S. Ben Hecht.

Sailing under the

Honduran flag, with its announced destination Bolivia, it made its
way toward Palestine. On March 8, 1947 it was intercepted by two
British destroyers. The passengers of the “illegal” ship were arrested
and brought to a detention camp on Cyprus.
The American League for a Free Palestine had manned the ship
with an American crew. They used this point to repudiate the British
actions, again launching an advertising campaign to arouse public
emotions.
Britain waives the rules! British jail American seamen in
Palestine. Who is breaking what law? These men fought
alongside the British in W. W. II. Still fighting for freedom,
they ran the Ben Hecht through the Royal Navy’s illegal
Palestine blockade. They were seized. Their crime: “Aiding
and abetting illegal immigration” - the British say. Did the
Ben Hecht crew violate the international pact of fifty-two
nations? Or did they effectively fu lfill President Truman’s
23Eliav, p. 239!
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repeated demand that Palestine’s gates be opened “at
once”?24
Having Irgun ships fly under foreign flags was another of the
methods used by the Irgun Delegation to the United States. They also
bought consulates.
There was the question when the war was over how to get
the people from the camps and train them m ilitarily how to
get the boats, etcetera. And this was the field (in) which I
was active too. It was a complicated m atter because we
had to go to various South American states and buy
consulates; you know this kind of a trick business, buying
consulates and issuing visas in order that the Jews from
Hungary, Poland, Rumania should be able to come to France
or Italy and take, from there, a boat - because France and
Italy would not permit them to enter on a transit visa unless
they had a final destination. So our job was to get to all those
ten of thousands o f Jews a final destination visa like for
instance Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala, San Salvador, what
have you. And then we had visas for which we had to
guarantee that the Jews would never come there based on
this visa. We were able to receive French or Italian transit
visas and from there take them on the boat. And so there
were things without end. There was not only airplanes there
were these things to o .25
In March, Congressmen Hugh D. Scott (Penn.) and John D.
Dingell (Mich.) protested the British arrests of Americans on the ship
operated by the Irgun Delegation. Amidst such agitation the British
released the crew and flew them back to New York. The American
League for a Free Palestine welcomed them home at a reception at
24Ben Ami, p. 407.
25Interview with Dr. Alex Raphaeli, by Joanna Saidel, June 1993.
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the Hotel Astor where Ben Hecht effectively stated the case of the
Irgun and the released Americans.
Today there are only two Jewish parties left in the field; the
terrorists and the terrified. You can dismiss the second party
as a political force... These lads are Americans. . . the same
sort of Americans who kept the lifeline to the British Isles
open . . . It was an American boat, bought with American
money. There is no Hebrew navy yet. There is no Hebrew
nation in Palestine yet. There are no victories yet - there is
only this: the air is clearing around a flag . . . victory is in us
- and there is light ahead.26
In Palestine the Irgun bombed the British officer’s club in
Jerusalem and, on March 21, Lechi set the oil refineries at Haifa on
fire.27 In May they attacked Acre prison, freeing 29 key Lechi and
Irgun men. Nine others died. Five were arrested. The British
government responded by hanging seven Irgun and Lechi men. The
Irgun reciprocated, hanging two British sergeants.28
In America Ben Hecht was recovering from surgery. From his
hospital bed he wrote “A Letter to the Terrorists of Palestine.”
My brave friends - you may not believe what I write . . .but
on my word as an old reporter, what I w rite is true. The
Jews of America are for you. You are their champion. . .
Every time you blow up a British arsenal, or wreck a British
jail, or send a British railroad train sky high, or rob a
British bank, or let go with your guns or bombs at the
British betrayers and invaders of your homeland, the Jews
of America make a little holiday in their hearts.29
28Ben Ami, p. 408.
27Hiav, p. 221, 222.
28Encyclopedia Judaica, vol. 9, p. 359.
29Ben Ami, p. 414.
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Hecht contrasted this p o rtrait of the Revisionists and Irgun
supporters with that of mainstream Zionists, whom he characterizes
as cowards.
U nfortunately, the heads o f nearly all the Jewish
organizations whom the American newspapers call “The
Jewish leaders” are against you. Every time you throw a
punch at the British betrayers of your homeland, nearly all
these Jews have a collective conniption fit. They rush in
waving white handkerchiefs and alibis. They didn’t do it not they! Respectable people don’t fight They gabble..."
Hecht closed by stating his opinion on the United Nations proceedings
concerning the fate of Palestine.
Right now, all the responsibility of the Jews is handsomely
engaged in cooing before the United Nations. The British put
the matter . . . up to the United Nations because they are
frightened of you . . . [they] figured the sound of gabble
before a world court would drown out the sound of Hebrew
guns in Palestine. It has not and it won’t ! 31
This letter was run as an ad in newspapers across the United
States, in Mexico, Canada, South America and France. “The British and
the Jewish Establishment were apoplectic. In the United Kingdom,
Hecht was blacklisted, while in Palestine, the Irgun distributed his
message to the population at large.” 32
The opinion of Ben Hecht was shared by other Irgun members.

30ibid, p. 414.
31Ibid, p. 415.
32 Ibid.
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Eliahu Lankin, commander of the Irgun in the Diaspora and
commander of the ship, Altalena, wrote, “. . . constant references to
the underground’s war w ith the British

had captured the

imagination of the American press.. .”33
As a commander of the Irgun in the Diaspora Lankin operated
out of Paris. He was financed “mainly from the Hebrew Committee
for National Liberation, which,” Lankin writes, “had developed a
comprehensive propaganda operation in the United States and had
raised substantial amounts of money for their work there.” 34
Menachem Begin was angry with the Irgun Delegation in
America which he believed were diverting funds from the revolt in
Palestine to less important aspects of the movement. To delegation
member, Ben Ami, he stressed, “I’m not a fatalist. Only one thing will
decide the fate of Eretz-Israel - the armed resistance. . . which needs
funds and which should have been forthcoming from you during the
past year, but have not.” 35
He was further outraged by the American independent action
concerning the purchasing of more ships and of the failure of Yitshaq
Ben Ami to deliver $100,000 which he had promised to raise for the
Irgun in Palestine. Begin bitterly attacked the activities of the Irgun
33Eliahu Lankin, To Win the Promised la n d : Storv of a Freedom Fighter, p.
303.
34Ibid, p. 212.
35Ben Ami, p. 425.
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Delegation.
Pm enraged to think that the Irgun delegates are not
coming across with all possible help. . . which we must have
to widen our battle. . .we lost repeated opportunities to
purchase weapons. . . actions were canceled because of the
lack of funds - and only because of that...
These miserable funds mean arms, safe havens for
our men, printing our message.. . $550,000 for two vessels!
With such an amount in our hands, we could organize ‘a
small revolution . . .’I must conclude with one simple
statement - everything, but everything for the front line!36
Begin was not the only Irgun member who was angry at the
Irgun Delegation to the United States. Others resented the fact that
the first ship to be purchased with their funds was named after Ben
Hecht rather than after Ze’ev Jabotinsky. Eliahu Lankin, who
commandeered the Altalena wrote
The Ben Hecht had been named in honor of the American
playwright who was a stalwart supporter of the Hebrew
Committee in America and the Jewish underground in Eretz
Israel. No doubt that he deserved to be honored in any
project connected with illegal immigration. But the Hebrew
Committee should have first acknowledged the debt of all
Zionists and Jews the world over to the memory of
Jabotinsky, who devoted his life to the struggle for the
establishment of the Jewish State and who, during the last
few years of his life, urged massive evacuation of the Jews
from East Europe.37
May 15, 1947 marked the formation of the United Nations
Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). The General Assembly
“ ibid.
37Lankin, p. 260-261.
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gave UNSCOP “the widest powers to ascertain and record facts, and to
investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of
Palestine.” On the day that UNSCOP diplomats arrived in Palestine
the British sentenced five members of the Jewish underground to
death. “The resentment and dismay of Jews in Palestine colored the
committee’s entire tour.”38
Ralph Bunche, an influential committee member, met with
Menachem Begin in his hideout near the Mediterranean. Bunche was
moved by the plight of the Jews and told Begin, “I can understand
you. I am also a member of a persecuted minority.” Bunche was an
African-American. “A wise Negro can never be an anti-Semite,” he
said.39
In July of 1947 another incident occurred which had a
profound effect on world public opinion and which bolstered the
image of the Irgun in America and worldwide. The famous ship
Exodus 1947, with 4,500 refugees aboard was forced, upon arrival at
the port of Haifa in Palestine, to return to its French port of
departure. When the refugees refused to disembark the British took
the boat to Hamburg where the people on board were forced to get
off and were returned to German soil.40

Hillel Kook immediately

38Peter Grose, Israel in the Mind of America, p. 234.
39Ibid, p. 235.
40Encyclopedia Judaica, vol. 9, p. 359.
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cabled the President concerning the Exodus. He urged the President
to take action against the British. Kook stated that he had been in
Germany on the day the ship left, full of survivors, including
hundreds of children. He wrote that the behavior of the British was
contemptible, and appealed again to the United States for
repatriation of the D.P.’s and cessation of direct negotiations with the
British government.41
On August 12th the American Jewish Labor Council contacted
the President regarding a story which appeared in the Cleveland
Plain Dealer eight days earlier. The story asserted that the minister
from Syria, Faiz el-Khouri, had stated that “President Truman told me
recently that he was tired of the Jews with their Zionism.” Was it
possible that the President would make such a statement? This was
the question posed in the letters from Leo Sack of the American
Zionist Emergency Council42
Charles Ross, secretary to the President, suggested that the
State Department should handle the situation which had offended the
Zionists. He wrote that “El-Khouri, after being quizzed by the
reporter, Bryan, says that President Truman had not used those exact
words he quoted. In other words, the President might have said that
41 Cable from Bergson to Truman dated July 23,1947, Truman Papers,
General File.
42Memorandum from Charles G. Ross, Secretary to the President, to David
Niles asking what should be done about the incident; Truman Papers, Official
File, August 18, 1947.
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he was tired of this Palestine problem and hoped it could have been
solved.. . The President should not get in any controversy with ElKhouri. He could deny it, of course, if it came up a t the Press
conference.”43
President Truman had perhaps, become increasingly irritated
by the pressure which the Jews put upon him. “According to the
diaries o f Henry Wallace, at a period of particular pressure he
exclaimed at a cabinet meeting in mid-1946, “If Jesus Christ couldn’t
satisfy them here on earth, how the hell am I supposed to?” He
added later, “I have no use for them and I don’t care what happens
to them.”44
The day after the release of the El-Khouri statement Abba
Hillel Silver contacted the President’s secretary, Matthew Connolly in
a cable in which Silver said, “. . . Would be most happy to hear from
you. I will be [at the] Commodore Hotel, New York City beginning
Thursday noon, Sailing Saturday morning, Best Wishes.. . ”
Below this telegram was handwritten, apparently by Connolly,
a big, double-underlined, word NO! 45 It appears that there was
continued hostility between Silver and Connolly, which was reflected
43Memorandum: David Niles to Charles Ross, August 19,1947, Truman
Papers, Official File.
44Steven L. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America’s
Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan, p. 20.
46Telegram from Silver to Connolly, August 13,1947, Truman Papers,
Official File.
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in their correspondence.46
Silver was now taking a more militant stand than Ben-Gurion.
An Irgun delegation member said, “Silver admitted to us that the
Irgun was having ‘a more successful psychological effect’ on the
British and world opinion than the Haganah.”47

Menachem Begin

also stated that Silver told him, “The Irgun will go down in history
as a factor without which the State of Israel would not have come
into being.”48
Hillel Kook cabled the President again on August 23,1947
when the British Government attempted to move 4400 Jews to
Hamburg. Kook charged that such action violated the spirit of the
Allied cause as well as the Potsdam Agreement.49
As the battle heated up over Palestinian Statehood President
Truman found himself in a whirlwind of controversy. While
espousing a global policy of “containment” he was also concerned
with regional implications, particularly oil concerns, as well as with
the actual situation in Palestine.
Those opposing Jewish Statehood were found particularly
48Abba H illel Silver to Matthew J. Connolly, Secretary to the President,
August, 15,1947, Truman Papers Official File.
47Ben Ami, p. 419.
48 Menachem Begin, The Revolt, p.316.
48 Cable from Bergson to Truman, August 23, 1947, Truman Papers, Official
File.
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within the State Department. They feared that American relations
with the Arabs and with the Moslem world would be irreparably
damaged. They believed that such alienation was not affordable since
Europe depended upon Arab oil which was essential to the Marshall
Plan. American oil companies in the Near East would be hurt. The
State Department also urged Truman to resist his desire to help the
Jews because of the need for U.S. military access to the area and,
particularly, to the base at Dharan in Saudi Arabia. It was feared by
Truman’s Defense Secretary, James Forrestal, that an energy crises
would result and create the need for four cylinder motor cars in
America. It was also feared by the State Department that the
Palestine problem would become a permanent irrita n t in
international politics, to which the United States would continually
have to contribute both financially and m ilitarily.

It was also

believed by the opponents of Statehood that a Jewish State was
contradictory to American ideals of concerning self determination as
well as being in contradiction to the United Nations charter. It was
felt that increased tensions between Jews and Gentiles would result
in the United States. Further concerns emphasized the possibility of
growing extremism in the Arab world and even Arab alliance with
the Soviet Union.50
Pro-Zionists argued that partition was the fairest solution. Both
50 Spiegel, p. 26.
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the Arabs and the Jews would have a state, while the holy sites in
Jerusalem would be protected by international law. The Jewish
refugee problem would be solved as well.sl
Truman hoped that the United Nations would be able to resolve
the problem without his personal involvement. He waited for the
UNSCOP report before finally endorsing the plan for partition. When
he eventually decided to sign on the State Department was not
happy. Representatives of their department stated that
Probably no American President has ever disregarded
expert advise so thoroughly and with such relish. In acting
to establish and later to support the Jewish State in
Palestine, Truman ignored the objections of his Secretary of
Defense, James Forrestal, and three of his Secretaries of
State: James Byrnes, General George Marshall, and Dean
Acheson.52
The Irgun Delegation and the New Zionist Organization were
firm ly opposed to partition. In October, 1947, the Irgun’s
mouthpiece, “The Voice of Fighting Zion,” warned that if the U.N.
decided to partition Palestine it would not provide an international
force to implement the action, that the British would evacuate the
area but retain a blockade by sea, leaving the Jews defenseless and
unable to receive reinforcements or arms. On November 16, 1947,
“The Voice” broadcasted another warning to Jews in Palestine. It
61ibid.
“ Richard H. Curtis, A C hanping Tmagp; A m p rira n Perceptions of the ArabIsraeli Dispute, p. 26.
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warned the public of harboring three false illusions. First, that the
partition would be implemented by peaceful means; second, that if
war broke out in Eretz Israel, the United Nations representatives in
Jerusalem would restore peace; and, third, that if the United Nations
representatives failed in their mission the Security Council would
intervene to stop the war.53
It is essential that the people be called upon to prepare
themselves for war and not for repose . . .The creation of
even this ghetto inside our Homeland will be carried out
amid flames.. and rivers of blood.54
On Saturday, November 27 the United Nations voted thirtythree to thirteen in favor of partitioning Palestine into two states, an
Arab State and a Jewish State. The State Department immediately
called for a U.S. embargo on weapons to the Middle East. On
November 30,1947, the “Voice of Fighting Zion” said, “The partition
of the Homeland is illegal. . .Jerusalem was and will be forever our
capital. . . In the war that is surely coming . . . all the Jewish forces
will be united.” 55
During the next two weeks members of the Zionist movement
congratulated President Truman and thanked him for “the great
support” which he had given to the cause. Abba Hillel Silver wrote,

53Ben Ami, p. 429.
54Ibid.
55Ibid.
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“You have won a place of distinction in Jewish history.”56
Steven Wise congratulated David Niles. “. . . Did you happen to
see my telegram — one of thousands—that went to the “Boss”? It
is his achievement and vou helped. With love and gratitude, Yours,
Stephen.”57
While mainstream Zionists were congratulating the President,
Hillel Kook (Bergson) was pressing him to take certain steps to
prevent imminent tragedy regarding the Palestine situation.58 With
the outbreak of fighting in Palestine, the State Department remained
Britain’s steadfast supporter. The U.S. Consulate General in Jerusalem
issued a warning to all American citizens that taking part in the
fighting would cause them to lose their United States passports.59
Even mainstream Zionists were outraged by this measure. On
January 24, 1948

Dr. Israel Goldstein, acting chairman of the

American Zionist Emergency Council, sent a cable to the President in
which he wrote, “Distressed and shocked by report of State
Department instructions to the American Consul-General in
Jerusalem to withdraw passports and threatening to withdraw the
citizenship of Americans volunteering to help in the defense of the
Jewish community against Arab attacks undertaken in defiance of
58Cable from Abba Hillel Silver to Harry Truman, December 1,1947, Papers
of Harry Truman, General File.
57Wise to Niles, December 5, 1947, Papers of David Niles, Truman Library.
68Bergson to Truman, December 5,1947, Truman Papers, Official File.
59Ben Ami, p. 430.
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United Nations decision. It is incomprehensible that our government
which took a leading part in bringing about the United Nations
decision should now contemplate punitive measures against those
who uphold the policy of the United Nations and of the United States.
Such action by the State Department would be contrary to the best
American traditions. .

60 Dr. Goldstein requested the President to

intervene and rescind the State Department actions.
The State Department also ordered the Treasury to conduct
another investigation of Jewish activities to see if funds were being
raised in the United States to “smuggle Jewish emigrants unlawfully
into Palestine.” 61 The Hebrew Committee for National Liberation had
in fact purchased another ship to smuggle Jewish refugees into
Palestine. The 4500 ton U.S. Navy landing craft, classified as an LST,
was designed for amphibious invasions to land tanks and men. It
was decided to name the ship after Ze’ev Jabotinsky. It was given
Jabotinsky’s pen name from his days in journalism, the Altalena .
Members of the Hebrew Committee in the United States formed the
Three Star Line shipping company as a cover for the Altalena. Funds
were lacking however, and the Committee was unable to sail her to
Europe. In the meantime the ship was used as a tramp freighter,

80Dr. Israel Goldstein to President Truman, Truman Papers, General File,
January 24,1948
81Ben Ami, p. 430.
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flying the P anam an ian flag.62 It hauled potatoes from New Brunswick
to Virginia, then went from Virginia to Florida to haul lumber. During
the winter of 1947-1948 the Altalena visited ports in Cuba, Italy,
France and Casablanca before returning to the United States. Hillel
Kook wanted to put the ship at the disposal of the Jewish Agency
(Haganah) so that it could be used to transport 6000 refugees to
Palestine and be anchored at Tel Aviv by the time of the British
withdrawal from Palestine on February 1, 1948. Ben Ami would not
agree with this plan. However, by February control of the Altalena
was transferred to the Irgun while U.S. Revisionists remained
responsible for the financial details. In March 1948, Eliahu Lankin
assumed command and organized a 5000 man fighting force to bring
arms to Palestine.
That month Kook petitioned President Truman to arm the Jews
so that American forces would not have to be sent to Palestine to
quell the fighting. The Irgun Delegation leader requested “100 small
airplanes, 250 armored cars and light tanks, 120 small and medium
pieces of anti-aircraft and field artillery, 10,000 light and heavy
machine guns, 20,000 rifles, 2,000 jeeps, trucks and other transport,
3 corvettes or similar coastal naval craft and ammunition for the
above arms.”63 Kook offered to pay for the material on a cash - and 62Lankin, p. 260-263.
63Summary of a letter from Bergson to the President, March 27, 1948,
Truman Papers, General File
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carry basis.
The Irgun’s Altalena was loaded with arms on the French coast,
with the complicity of the French government. It was going to carry
one of the largest arms shipments ever to be shipped to Palestine.
Supposedly, an agreement had been reached between the Irgun and
Ben Gurion’s Haganah in which eighty per cent of the weapons would
be delivered to the Haganah and twenty per cent retained by the
Irgun. However, when the ship arrived on the coast of Palestine it
was blown up by the Haganah.
Altalena was also an operation organized by this group of
Hillel Kook in France. And especially by a man who worked
with this group by the name of Ariel, Shmuel A rie l.. . Ariel
had excellent relations with the French government. And by
his connections with the French A rm y,. . . especially with
the French Foreign Minister, George Bideau.. . he concluded
on behalf of the Irgun, a treaty with the French government
for cooperation, cooperation with the aim of supporting the
establishment of a Jewish state in Israel. And the first
operation in this direction was the organization of this ship,
A lta le n a . It was a ship, a rescue ship, with some few
thousands of Jewish refugees, young refugees, who have
been interested to come to Israel and serve in the Israeli
army in this war with the Arabs. And the French army
decided to give it a pretty large quantity of arms. This was
Altalena.64
When asked if there was a deal made between the Irgun and
Ben Gurion form er Israeli Prime Minister, Shamir, replied

84Interview with Yitshak Shamir by Joanna Saidel, October 25, 1993, the
Knessett, Jerusalem.
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ambiguously.
Yes. Yes. But the initiative was of this group. Ariel, Hillel Kook, all
these people. But Begin, here in Israel, informed the government
that we will bring such a ship to Tel Aviv in the next few weeks
or months and.. . they made a bargain about giving. . . a part of
the arms, for Jerusalem. . . because Jerusalem was not yet a part
of the State of Israel. According to the United Nations decisions
Jerusalem was designed to be an international city. And
therefore the Irgun proposed to the Israeli government, it was
the provisional government at this time, to give the greater part
of arms to the army, to the existing army, Zahal, as we call it.
And the part of it, twenty per cent or so, for Jerusalem. The
government agreed or not agreed? It’s not clear yet. It’s not
clear. Because there have been talks with, not with Ben Gurion
himself, the talks have been with various emissaries of Ben
Gurion, that was Galali, and there were others. And before the
ship arrived here, on the beach of Netanyah, Ben Gurion changed
his mind and asked the Irgun to give up to the army, to give to
the army, all the arms! The ship with all the arms, with all the
contents of the ship! And well, the people (who) have been with
Begin have not agreed and therefore came this confrontation.
That’s i t . . . Well, it was a tragedy. It was a tragedy. It could be
avoided.65
Former Irgun commander and, later, foreign affairs advisor to
Menachem Begin, Shmuel Katz, stated that not only did Ben Gurion
know all about the agreement but that he attacked the ship
specifically to get rid of Menachem Begin.
Oh! No question. He knew all about it . . . Look. I have
written in my book, Davs of Fire. . . I wrote deliberately
that the Altalena was blown up not because we had so many
ships, we could do with one ship less, but because Mr. Ben
Gurion wanted to kill Begin who was on the ship. And so I
expected to be sued or to be tried for libel. . . There were
66Ibid.
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some secret meetings in which I was attacked but nobody
came forth to say this is libel, this is slander. And the fact is
that I explained why I thought so .. . It wasn’t such a great
ship. It was the best thing we had. It was offered to the
government, it wasn’t to say that we were going to use it
further. The idea was to bring i t . . . this was part of the
original agreement with them .. . Once it was taken off (the
eighty percent), the ship would be presented to the
government. . . I have no doubt about it, as I said I wrote
about it. There was nobody else on board. The, all of the
people except for a handful, and they were killed by the
way, I think sixteen boys were killed on that ship, had been
taken o ff.. . Nobody knows whether we got all the arms off
at Kfar Vitkin, because that is where we brought the arms.
Why did Altalena come to Kfar Vitkin? It wasn’t an Irgun
center. We wanted to bring the boat to Tel Aviv and get a
whole lot of Irgun people to help unload it. But the agree
ment with the Haganah said, No. Kfar Vitkin, which was a
center of the Labor party.66
Shmuel Katz was in Paris when the Altalena was on its way to
Palestine. He was in charge of monitoring the progress of the vessel.
I’d remained responsible for the Altalena on its way to
Palestine but we lost all contact because our radio didn’t
w ork. . . I was supposed to . . . remain in Paris and be the
contact man with the Altalena. But our radio transmitter
didn’t work . . . (laughs) So we didn’t have contact with
anybody!67
While the Irgun considered the loss of the Altalena

to be a

tragedy some Labor leaders were quite pleased. Abba Eban believes
that the action taken by Ben Gurion consolidated power.
The international effects were certainly beneficial because
the fight then was Israel had already been established as a
” Interview with Shmuel Katz by Joanna Saidel, Nov. 1993, Tel Aviv.
87Ibid.
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state but the problem of recognition was very sticky. And
one of the arguments against was that there was no proof
that the provisional government of Israel, as we then called
it, really had authority, or full authority, and Ben Gurion ‘s
action was really related to the need to secure a minimal
degree of recognition with which to live in the international
context. You cannot live as, simply as a state with no
international connections, and he asserted really the
sovereignty of Israel. And it was one of his most dramatic,
one of his most courageous, but also one of his most, I would
say, poignious actions and after that the provisional
government of Israel became respected as the government
of Israel because you can’t be a government unless you have
a monopoly of violence. Once you have two armies in a
country then that means that neither of them can be a
government. It becomes a Lebanon with militias like now.
And his logic was that unless you have the army under a
single jurisdiction you couldn’t honestly say that you were a
state. Now, he even applied that unto his own camp because
he also went on and he liquidated the separate Palmach. In
other words his obsession with a unified Israel defense force
took him into combat both the left and the right. To the right
against what he called the Porishim, the seceders, and to the
left to the Palmach.68
Mr. Katz vehemently disagrees with Abba Eban’s analysis.
Ben Gurion’s authority in the State was not consolidated
because the Altalena was blown up. He was a Prime Minister
after all and nobody was attacking his authority. What Abba
Eban may have been hinting at is his acceptance of the idea
that we had . . . that the Altalena was an act of rebellion
against the provisional government which was nonsense! We
had an agreement with them. No. You see Abba Eban is a
pathological liar. He always was. And if you were to bring
Mr. Abba Eban here I would tell him, maybe he doesn’t
know. He’s a liar. He’s dishonest and he’s a terrific blower to
88Telephone interview with Abba Eban by Joanna Saidei, September 1993,
from New York.
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his own trumpet.69
Menachem Begin survived the Altalena

and was, heroically,

one of the last people off the ship before it blew up. He refused to
leave until his men had gone first. The commander of the vessel,
Eliahu Lankin, described the incident. He said that amidst the
unabating storm of bullets and mortar fire Begin refused to leave the
wounded whom he had been tending on board. When Lankin
commanded him to disembark, saying, “I am the commander of this
ship and I demand that you go ashore at once,” Begin replied, “Eliahu
. . .What’s come over you? Very well, I’ll get off as soon as we attend
to the wounded. Now calm down.”70
The decision of the Irgun Delegation to purchase vessels with
money raised in the United States had caused animosity between
them and the Irgun High Command in Palestine. Menachem Begin
remained angry that such astronomical amounts were being spent
for a few vessels, still believing that he could finance a small
revolution with such a sum. Begin was also disturbed by plans of the
Irgun Delegation to set up a provisional government in the diaspora.
This appeared to be a challenge to his authority. Ironically, Begin
ended up on one of the Irgun Delegation ships, the Altalena, and
according to his personal advisor, became the primary target of Ben
SBInterview with Shmuel Katz by Joanna Saidel, November 1993, Tel Aviv.
70Lankin, p. 340.
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Gurion in the Haganah action to blow up the ship at Kfar Vitkin.
While the Irgun Delegation focused on rescue, they were also
highly involved in action to stop partition and to promote statehood.
The Revisionist Zionists, particularly Benzion Netanyahu, were also
relentless in this pursuit. Mr. Netanyahu was able to penetrate the
highest offices of the land by his convincing scenario which took the
Palestine problem out of the regional arena and placed it on the
world agenda. This was extremely important to the change in
thinking of certain State Department officials, particularly Loy
Henderson. By pursuing this approach Netanyahu was able to
address General Eisenhower, and thereby gain access to other sources
which became available to him.
The steadfast work of a few individuals, the Revisionist,
Netanyahu, and the Irgun Delegation leaders, Kook, Raphaeli, Ben
Ami, Eliezer and Merlin, and those who supported these leaders,
made remarkable progress in bringing the Jewish plight to the
attention of the nation. Their contributions positively affected the
final decision on statehood.
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CHAPTER 8

REUBEN HECHT: THE EUROPEAN CONTACT

The archives of Dr. Reuben Hecht (1909-1993) are important to
the study of Revisionist Zionism in America because they show,
clearly, the place which that group held in the overall scheme of
Jewish efforts to save victims of the Holocaust Hecht’s papers point
to a major lacuna in the historiography of attempts made to rescue
Jews from the Holocaust. The scholarly literature on the subject has
been dominated by a tendency to emphasize the rescue efforts
undertaken by the “establishment” Jewish and Zionist groups, such as
the Jewish Agency, the Institute for Illegal Immigration, and the
American Joint Distribution Committee, and not those of their rivals,
the “dissident” organizations.1
Reuben Hecht (not to be confused with Ben Hecht) was the
European representative of the Irgun Delegation to the United States
headed by Hillel Kook (Peter Bergson). Hecht was instrumental in
organizing, with Dr. W illi Perl, the Sakarya

refugee ship which

brought more than 2,000 refugees to Palestine in 1940.
In 1944 Hecht came in contact with the American Consul
General, Samuel Edison Woods, who introduced Hecht to Jitschak and
’ Introduction, Archives of the Holocaust . Hecht Arrhive-Universitv of
Haifa, p. ix.
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Recha Stembuch. The Stembuch’s acted as the European executive of
the Emergency Rescue Committee (Vaad ha-Hatzalah) which was an
offshoot of the Union of Orthodox Rabbis of the United States and
Canada (the Agudah). Reuben Hecht became the only Zionist, nonOrthodox member of the Sternbuch group. He worked intimately
with them to effect rescue missions, acquire intelligence and
establish contacts in Europe. This work had far reaching results,
actually affecting the perceptions of Heinrich Himmler, Reichsfuhrer
SS2.
A remarkable aspect of the activist Zionists was their ability,
because of their intense convictions, to produce results with an
exceptionally small number of individuals. What Ben Hecht was able
to do in America through his ad campaign, Reuben Hecht
complimented in Europe through his total dedication to the Zionist
cause. He forsook his family fortune and business, enduring the
wrath of his father (who later stated that Reuben had been correct),
in order to further his convictions.
Hecht was born in Antwerp in 1909, the elder of two sons of
the prosperous Jacob Hecht, founder of the second largest shipping
company on the Rhine. Before the War (c. 1933-1934) Hecht worked
in Paris as a volunteer in the office of the Revisionist World
2The Kastner war tria l revealed that Hecht and the Sternbuch group
believed that Himmler would agree to a deal to trade Jews for easier post-war
treatment of Himmler.
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Executive, under Jabotinsky. There Hecht proposed a World
Organization of State Academicians, “which means of students and
faculty members, and so on, all people who are in the academic life,
who are on the political line to create a State.”3 As an emblem for
this group Hecht proposed the Yellow Badge, which Herzl had
designated as “our highest order.” Jabotinsky approved of the
emblem, wore it, and named it “Yavneh VeTodefet” Hecht explained
the meaning, “Yavneh is then spirit. Yodefet was the last fortress of
Bar Kochba (leader of the Jewish revolt against Rome, 132-135 C.E.).
.. The last fortress. That means a combination of the Yeshiva at that
time, of the intellectual Jewish spirit, and of the forces of defense.” 4
In the late 1930’s Hecht had played a direct role in the
propaganda efforts of the Irgun Delegation.
I was mainly involved in public relations, which means to
make political propaganda and diplomacy. I was involved to
help the ideas of our illegal radio station, I proposed such
things, they were afterwards made, different kinds of
putting the idea of the Irgun and of Jabotinsky’s movement
and the Hebrew Committee as a Jewish national revival for a
State clearly to the non-Jewish and also to the Jewish
masses.s
Later, during the War years, Dr. Hecht came in contact with
Samuel Edison Woods, “the most successful U.S. intelligence gatherer
3Interview of Dr. Reuben Hecht by Prof. Penkover , January 7, 1982, Haifa,
Israel, Archives of the Holocaust . Hecht Archive-Universitv of Haifa. Dor. 7, p .
449.
4Ibid, p. 449-450.
5Ibid, p. 468-469.
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of World War II,” and developed a close personal relationship with
him.6 Woods was the American Consul General, based in Berlin from
1937 to 1941 and in Zurich from 1941 to 1945. There he and Hecht
collaborated to rescue Allied airmen and to coordinate efforts to
rescue Jews. The primary advantage o f this relationship for the
Revisionist Zionists in America was that it provided direct contact
between the Revisionists and the White House. The general method
of communication had been to transmit information through the
official intelligence center in Bern. This office was headed by Allen
Dulles who opposed the Zionists. Samuel Woods had a brother in the
cabinet of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Woods was able to directly transmit
reports to Roosevelt by a special code which the President personally
enciphered. These transmissions included reports on the expulsion of
Jews from Switzerland, on the conditions of Jews in concentration
camps, and suggestions for the rescue of Jews from Hungary and
Bulgaria.
Hecht’s work with the Stembuchs resulted in the recruitment
of the former federal president of Switzerland, Jean-Marie Musy, to
the Zionist cause. This “Swiss Catholic reactionary antisemite” and
personal acquaintance of Himmler convinced him, toward the end of
the war, to release Jews, against the command of Hitler. Himmler
was led to believe that by doing so a favorable press campaign would
8Ibid, p. xi.
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be generated in his favor.
The fact that Reuben Hecht provided sensitive information to
the American government is attested to by the American Consul
General in a letter to J. Klahr Huddle, Esquire, Counselor of the
American Legation in Bern. Therein, Woods asks for confidentiality
concerning Hecht’s transmissions. Woods writes, “he (Hecht) has
given me interesting information on Hungary and Yugoslavia.. . Dr.
Hecht mentioned that it was forbidden by law for a Swiss citizen to
furnish representatives of a foreign country with information such as
that given in his report and that he would be grateful if his identity
as author of the report not be revealed to Swiss officials.. .”7
That particular information dealt with the expulsion and
extermination of Jews from Switzerland. Hecht urged the United
States, in correspondence of August 8,1944, to uphold its support for
a Jewish National Home, writing
Is it not enough, that already on May 15, 1944, 260 railway
cars crammed full of Jewish children of 2-8 years of age left
Hungary for the extermination camps of Auschwitz? . . . The
M andatory Power at present demonstrates to the
persecutors that the Jews have no home, no right to live.. .
The Jewish people place their confidence in the Government
of the United States which can bring them help.
While pleading with the U.S. for help, Hecht worked through

7 “Confidential” correspondence from American Consul General Woods to
Mr. Huddle, March 13, 1944, Hecht Archive. Doc. 12.
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Muesy, for the release of Jews from the camps. When questioned
about Muesy’s motivation for helping the Zionists Hecht stated,

Muesy’s activity was entirely political, the intention was to
explain to those German circles, who already understood
that the War was lost, that the persecutions of the Jews
created a terrible impression abroad, and to tell this
Himmler to his face. In addition, to make it clear to him that
the catastrophic impression would be a bit less catastrophic
if at least now the remaining 600,000-800,000 Jews would
be released, who, according to the famous order of Himmler
were to be destroyed as well. These figures are produced by
the Germans.8
In exchange for the release the United States was to provide
surety in the form of cash held in escrow and a promise that in
exchange for not destroying the camps, as Hitler commanded,
Himmler would be guaranteed by the American army “that the camp
guards in the Wehrmacht uniform would receive treatment like the
Wehrmacht soldiers, and be regarded as war prisoners and not be
shot on the spot, but be put before a military court.”9 Hecht affirmed
that this plan was approved by Roswell D. McClelland, special
assistant to the American Minister at the American Legation, who
said that Eisenhower had also approved of the plan. According to this
plan 1200 to 1800 Jews were to be released every week. The first
8Stenographic protocol of the Interrogation of Reuben Hecht at the
Kastner trial, April 6, 1954, Hecht Archive. Doc. 18.
9 Ibid.
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train, transporting 1200 Jews, actually arrived in Kreuzningen on
February 9, 1945. Due to sabotage of the plan no additional trains
arrived after that.
The money promised to Himmler, 5 million francs, was
acquired from the Joint Distribution Committee and the Rescue
Committee in America. Hecht also received money from the Irgun
Delegation.10 The money, however, was not the major temptation
offered to Himmler. The Zionists believed that he would be more
interested in political advantage. Hecht was questioned on this point
by advocate Tamir at the Kastner war trial in 1954.
Q. You wanted to mislead Himmler?
A. It is difficult to answer the question.
Q. Did you tell Himmler the truth? Answer my question: Did
you wish to mislead him or on the contrary, awake in him illusions
and hopes.
A. We certainly had no intention to do Himmler any favor at
all.
Q, I did not ask you whether you wanted to do Himmler a
favor, why do you evade answering every single question?
A. It is difficult to reply to those questions yes or no.
Q, It is definitely possible to answer yes or no. Answer the
question.
A. We wanted to exploit the political situation in order to
explain to Himmler that by releasing the Jews he was approaching
10Ibid, p. 17.
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more his political intentions.
Q. What were his political intentions which he could have
approached more?
A. He wanted to get in touch with the West, and for that he
needed some point of connection. And proof for this is that the
negotiations with the Jews served him in this.
Q. To approach the West, that means to divide between the
Allies, between Russia and the West, is it not so?
A. In our opinion no, but in Himmler’s opinion, yes.
Q. So you mislead him at least on this point?
A. Yes. We knew from the Americans that this was out of the
question, but they agreed that we should give him this answer.
Q. Did you think that you can deceive Himmler?
A. Yes.
Q. And this without expertness in the international political
situation?
A. On the basis of the talks with Woods it was possible to
assume this. He explained to us that if it is necessary to pay
compliments to the devil in order to save Jews, it is allowed to do so.
We shall do the reckoning with him later on.
Q. Instead of encouraging with the Nazis a hope of money, you
wanted to awake a hope of political advantage?
A. Yes, because in this manner we wanted to solve the entire
problem, whereas with money we would have convinced that there
would be every time additional expulsions in order to make
additional extortions.
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Q. And based on what did you believe that those Nazis, those
criminals, after they murdered 6 million Jews- would fall into your
trap?
A. Because part of the Nazi criminals were in a great panic and
were convinced that the War was lost.
Q. Among them was Himmler?
A. Himmler, if I can believe Muesy, understood that the war
was lost.
When Hecht was asked, during the same trial, what he believed
contributed to bring the most pressure on the United States to help
the Jews he credited the Revisionists and Irgun Delegation, saying, “I
think that the great pressure was carried out by the large
advertising campaign in the press and the mass meetings of the
“Hebrew Committee.”
In 1982 Professor Monty Penkover interviewed Dr. Reuben
Hecht at his office in Haifa. There Hecht reiterated the importance of
Sam Woods in the relationship between the Revisionist Zionists in
America and the American Administration.
Dr. Hecht: Sam Edison Woods. You know who he is?
Prof. Penkover: Well, I know the whole story.
Dr. Hecht: Officially he was only Consul-General, but in reality
he was much more.
Prof. Penkover: Of course, American Intelligence. . . He was a
counter against Dulles.”
11Interview of Prof. Penkover with Dr. Reuben Hecht, Hecht Archive. Doc.
7, p. 383-384.
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Hecht explained how and why he avoided Dulles.
Dr. Hecht: He gave a lot of information which he received from
me directly to America, not through the channels of Dulles . . . Dulles
was I wouldn’t say an antisemite, I don’t know, but according to
Woods, Dulles was not interested in the Jewish problem in Europe,
because he thought that this is a nuisance for the Allied war effort.12
In other sections of the interview Hecht mentions the three primary
American government officials with whom he was concerned.
Dr. Hecht: . . . Now, there were three Americans: McClelland,
Dulles, who was an enemy, and Woods who was the strongest, I could
even say, practically the only helping force.13
Hecht also discussed the attitude of General Eisenhower with
Professor Penkover.
Dr. Hecht: . . And one day we (Hecht and Recha Sternbuch)
discussed, at length . . . that to bombard the railway crosspoints and
the stations before Auschwitz and the crematoria, could save
hundreds of thousands of Jews. Because till they would repair it
especially if several times bombarded, we also brought, through
McClelland, these recommendations to Eisenhower who was the Chief
Commander of the Allies, our request to make bombardments against
this and to make bombardment of the gas-ovens, of the crematoria.
Because if a few hundred people would have been killed it is nothing
against thousands who were murdered every day. But McClelland
was not helpful and the answer of Eisenhower was: We are not
fighting a Jewish war, this is not in the way of the war effort, and we
do not want that the Germans to think we are fighting the war for
the Jews. And Eisenhower was not in favor at all, and McClelland was
a bureaucrat, and the Americans put it down!14
12Ibid, p. 385, 387

13Ibid, p. 387.
"Ibid, p. 426.
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When questioned about whom Hecht worked with in Europe he said,
“I directly was responsible for the Irgun.”15 The American Consul
General, Samuel Edison Woods, was aware of Hecht’s affiliation and
was himself a fervent Zionist as a result of Hecht’s indoctrination.
Hecht said of Woods, “He was more Zionist than all the Jews in
Switzerland together.” 16 Hecht admired and trusted Woods, crediting
him with stopping the British blockade of Palestine after Irgun
intelligence informed him of the British plan.
Dr. Hecht: Woods believed everything, and he was a very clear
Realpolitiker. And what I gave him was forwarded immediately,
dispatched to Washington.
Prof. Penkover: Washington, meaning the Secretary of State?
Dr. Hecht: The Secretary of State and maybe also the White
House, because later on a thing happened where he directly
telephoned after the War to the White House, and he, Woods,
achieved to avoid the British blockade of Palestine against arms and
immigration ships.17
Professor Penkover asked Hecht why the the very religious
Aguda joined with the New Zionist Organization.18 Hecht believed
that the only possible explanation was that “the Aguda really wanted
to save the lives of Jews,” religious or not.
The Revisionist Zionists were also successful in getting
15Ibid, p. 395.
16Ibid, p. 429.
17Ibid, p. 405; See p. 406 for details of how this was accomplished.
10Ibid, p. 415 (there seem to be some interchangeable terminology between
the NZO and the Irgun Delegation in this interview which is left unexplained).
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intelligence concerning the planned Nazi invasion of England.19 Woods
again dispatched the information to America. Hecht helped Woods in
other ways. The Revisionist,20

through him,

helped to bring

American pilots and captains of the Air Force, who were interned in
Switzerland, to freedom,21 and to prepare suggestions for psycho
logical warfare against the Germans. 22 Woods nominated Reuben
Hecht for the American Medal of Freedom.
Could it be possible that the long delayed charges against Hillel
Kook in the United States (i.e. regarding his alien status) and the
casual attitude toward him by the F.B.I. (their reluctance to
investigate his activities and status) were, in reality, because he was
seen as an asset to the American war effort? Certainly his European
connections, Reuben Hecht and Samuel Edison Woods, were providing
useful intelligence to the American government.
As of March 16, 1945 the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, J. Edgar Hoover, acknowledged that “no active
investigation has been conducted by this bureau concerning Peter
Bergson (Hillel Kook) up to this time.” 2< Two years later still no
action had been taken despite various efforts to do so. An official
19Ibid, p. 421.
20Hecht mentions both the New Zionist Organization and the Kook group in
the interview and does not distinguish between them.
21 Ibid, p. 423.
22Ibid, p. 424.
23Secret F.B.I. document from Hoover to Frank J. Wilson, Chief, Secret
Service Division, Treasury Dept..
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U.S. Government internal security memorandum attests to this fact;
“It is to be observed that recent information received by the Bureau
reflects that the Board of Immigration Appeals has taken no action
with respect to the deportation proceedings against Bergson and the
Department has advised that no action is contemplated.”*''

A Top

Secret F.B.I. document, dated March 5, 1952 further clarifies the
status of Bergson. It states, “In March 1947, records of the State
Department reveal that Bergson was in New York City attached to the
United Nations working on Palestine matters.”25 By August of 1953
Bergson was still residing in the United States and operating a
business which he formed in 1950, Middle East Industries, “for the
purpose of interesting American industrialists in the development of
an industrial Israel and the development of substantial and
profitable commerce between the United States, Israel and the
Middle East.” 26 This memorandum confirmed that “with regard to
any connection he may have with the Israeli Government, Bergson
advised that in 1948 he had been a member of the Knessett
(Parliment) in Israel as a member of the Freedom Party.” 27 This
memorandum was followed chronologically by an undated letter to
the Director of the F.B.I. which read,
24F.B.I. Office Memorandum from D.M. Ladd to Mr. Strickland, March 13,
1947.
25Top Secret F.B.I. Document, March 5, 1952, SAC, New York; Director, FBI.
26Memorandum to the Director, FBI from SAC, New York, August 24, 1953.
27Ibid.
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Bergson expressed a desire to cooperate with the Bureau in
any way possible and was most cordial during the
interview. In as much as this interview with Bergson failed
to disclose any activity on his past which would constitute a
possible violation of the Registration Act of 1938, as
amended, and since active investigation to date has been
negative in this regard, this case be considered closed, UACB.
Kook’s fund raising work in America had been essential to the
rescue work of Reuben Hecht and William Perl. Kook’s group partially
funded the SS. Sakarya, the S.S. Pencho, and other rescue missions.'8
Kook and Hecht worked hand in hand.
The position of Reuben Hecht proved to be convenient for the
Irgun Delegation in America in other ways. The Hebrew Committee
for National Liberation needed, for their political work, money in
France and other places. Reuben Hecht was essential to the move
ment of these funds. As he explained in the Penkover interview, one
day Reuben Hecht was invited by the Ambassador of Santo Domingo
to a dinner party. Uneager to attend, he was encouraged to do so by
the American Consul General, Woods.
So I came there, and there was a big dinner- table with
candle light and everything, and then the Ambassador
introduced me and then they drank champagne on (to) the
new Honorary Consul in Basel. And I also raised my glass in
honour of the new Honorary Consul in Basel. And I looked
round, and I didn’t find him. At the end, I understood, I
even have a letter of Trujillo. . . It was very funny. I had no
idea. Hillel Kook forgot to advise me that he arranged for me
to be Consul in order to be able to bring gold from
28Perl, The Four Front War, p.228. 263, 333.
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Switzerland to Paris, and to have a free travel possibility.
But I didn’t know.29
Hecht told Penkover that this appointment was helpful for the
Irgun Delegation in America also in the workings of their illegal
transport ships, such as the Ben Hecht. Hecht’s Swiss passport
became invaluable for his IZL (Irgun) - organized “illegal immigra
tion” of Jews to Palestine.
He opened an office in Zurich and exploited his shipping
contacts to smuggle Jews, including 2,400 of them in 1940
on the S.S. Sakaria. Once in Romania he won the support of
the German ambassador, who attempted to stop a ship with
“illegals” from sailing.30
Reuben Hecht’s position as Consul was, however, challenged by a
certain Consul-General, Mr. Mueller.
Dr. Hecht: . . . And then it occurred to me that a certain
Goyish businessman in Basel was the Consul-General. Mr.
Mueller. And he complained to the Swiss authorities that
now a second Consul is there. And that was very interesting.
And then I insisted, and he insisted, and thereafter - 1 have
the photocopies - the Swiss Secret Political Police which
officially does not exist (If you would have asked in
Switzerland you would have thought it doesn’t exist.) made
a detailed report about me. That I am a very dangerous
political agent of the so-called Revisionist terrorist group
Irgun; who once with force fought the British. And that it is
dangerous to give me this Consulate because I will use it not
in the interest of Swiss neutrality. And so on. I have the
document. And then, of course, I didn’t receive it, and
probably I am the only man in the world, in the civilized
29Penkover interview with Reuben Hecht, Hecht Archive, p. 437.
30 Obituary of Reuben Hecht, The Terusalem Post Inter
national Edition. April 24, 1993, p. 4.
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world, who receives an Honorary Consulate, but not the
Exequatur of his government.31
When asked, in 1982, what the major contribution of the Irgun
and people like H illel Kook made, and what deserved historical
emphasis, Hecht replied, “I think that the battle of the Irgun; not I
think, Churchill said it, that the Irgun was one of the reasons that the
British left Palestine.” Hecht also states his belief in the importance
and effectiveness of “the propaganda of the Hebrew Committee in
America.”32
This information about the Irgun Delegation to America’s links
in Europe, Reuben Hecht and Samuel Edison Woods, is essential in
understanding the far reaching connections and the importance of
that group. They were not the ineffectual renegades described and
feared by mainstream Jews in the 1940’s, but rather were one of the
most important, if not the most im portant, Jewish groups, when
judged in retrospect. They were responsible for some of the most
effective rescue work, and for the some of the most effective public
campaigning to draw attention to the plight of the Jews of Europe
and to the lack of governmental initiative to save those Jews. Their
European connections, particularly Woods and Hecht, provided vital
information which confirmed the rumored atrocities committed by
31 Ibid, p. 438-439.
32 Penkover interview, p. 467-468.
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the Nazis and thereby attempted to condemn the Roosevelt and
Truman administrations for their inability to affect the condition of
those Jews.
There was im portant collaboration between the American
Revisionists and Agudat Orthodox Jews of the United States. This was
accomplished w ith the fu ll knowledge o f the United States
government and shows quite clearly the division between Zionist and
non-Zionist representatives in the government. While Dulles and
most State Dept, officials were anti-Zionist, the American Consul
General was, in Hecht’s words, “more Zionist than all the Jews in
Switzerland together.”
The Hecht Archive also suggests that the idea of bombing the
railways and crematorium at Auschwitz, as mentioned in

David

Wyman’s book, Abandonment of the Tews, originated with Hecht and
the Sternbuch group. The plan was proposed to McClelland and
recommended to Eisenhower but put down by both.
The joint work of Reuben Hecht and the Irgun Delegation in
rescuing Jews even affected the former Prime Minister of Israel,
Yitshak Shamir. When asked if he knew Hecht he replied,
Reuben Hecht. Yes!. . . Yes! H e . . . had very good contacts.
And ties with this group in America and he cooperated with
them in Europe. He was active in Europe, in Switzerland.. .
He was friends with Hillel Kook, a very good friend of him
since they had been together maybe in Paris, in France,
these years. And, you know . . . there have been some
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contacts between me and this group when I was in Djibouti,
French colony, where I got the status of a refugee, a political
refugee from the government of France because I escaped
from a camp of prisoners in Africa where I was imprisoned
by the British. Deported from Israel, from Palestine, to
Eritrea. And this group helped me to get the . . . right of
asylum, of the political refugee and as such refugee I was
brought to France, I came to France, by the provision of the
French government; and from France I went to Israel a few
days after the establishing of the State of Israel. And this
group, especially their bureau, their office in Paris, they
helped me a lot in getting these facilities and the support of
the French government. . . Yes. Yes. And they helped a lot.
They helped the Jewish underground.. ,33
Shmuel Katz, Irgun leader who later became a renowned
author and journalist, was also fam iliar with the work of Reuben
Hecht. He offered additional information about the reasons for
Samuel Edison Woods’ access to the White House. When asked if he
knew Reuben Hecht, Mr. Katz responded as follows.
Katz: I was very fam iliar with him. Sure. I knew him for fifty
years.
Saidel: Did you know the American Consul General named
Samuel Edison Woods?
Katz: I didn’t know him but he worked with Hecht. Now, do you
know his story?
Saidel: I’ve read the Hecht archive. Samuel Edison Woods was
supposedly an intelligence agent supporting the Zionist
movement, I believe.
Katz: Well, I don’t know about his supporting the Zionist
movement. Maybe he did, but Hecht worked with him. First
o f all, during the War, when American airmen, after
bombing targets in Germany, sometimes had to land in
Switzerland and one of Woods’ jobs, he was the consul in
33 Telephone interview w ith Yitshak Shamir from Tel Aviv, by Joanna
Saidel, June 2,1993.
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Zurich at the tim e, was to try and get them out of
Switzerland and back to America and Hecht helped him in
this. Subsequently, my indirect contact with Wood was
much later, was in 1 9 . . . end of 4 7 or 48 when we
had decided, you know after the Partition decision at the
United Nations the British continued harassing our
immigrants, the so called illegal immigrants. And in the
Irgun we decided that we would warn the British that if
they continued harassing our boats we would sink their
boats. We didn’t have much chance of sinking many boats
but we had a couple of plans. One, and this was something
that I was supposed to be supervising, not that I’m a great
boat sinker but (laughs) I was supposed to deal with
the subject. We had one plan for Shanghai and we had one
plan for South, Portsmouth or South Hampton, I don’t know
which. But at any rate we decided that we would warn the
British and because they knew that our warnings were
usually serious, that we didn’t make warnings in vain
because they’d found out in Palestine than when the Irgun
warned them of something that it was carried out. And so
we decided to send a message, first of all to the British, to
warn them. And so I discussed this with Hecht and
Hecht gave Wood the warning to pass on to the British. Wood
passed it on to Washington because Wood had, Wood
although he was only supposed to be a consul, he had direct
access to the White House. And, I may think for a moment
and remember why he had access. And so a few days later
we had a reply. Hecht gave the reply that he had from
Wood, that Wood had had from Washington that this
warning had been passed on to the British and the British
had notified the Americans that they were stopping the
harassment. Now, Woods’ status with the White House came
because he had established, when he was a consul in
Munich, before he came to Zurich he was a consul in Munich,
and he made contact with one of the German opponents of
the Nazis. To get information from him they used. . . to go to
the cinema and get seats next to each other and this man
would pass on the information to him there and he would
pass it on to the States . . . he was giving them some very
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important information, including, if I’m not mistaken, the
information about the impending invasion of Russia! '4
The connection therefore, between the Irgun Delegation to the
United States and their representative in Switzerland, Reuben Hecht,
proved to be important, not only for the Zionist cause and for the
Irgun, but for the American war effort. This contact provided
important information to the United States government, helped in
the rescue of American airmen, saved a train load of 1200 Jews, and
provided a direct contact between the Jewish underground and the
White House.

34 Telephone interview with Shmuel Katz from Tel Aviv, by Joanna Saidel,
June 10, 1993.
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CHAPTER 9
BEGIN VISITS THE U.S.

In October 1948 the Irgun Delegation attempted to promote the
leader of the Irgun High Command, Menachem Begin, in a new light.
Instead of freedom fighter it was desirable to portray him as
statesman, scholar and friend of the United States. This was done to
gain support for Mr. Begin in the election for Prime Minister in
Israel. Controversy developed over a plan

for him to visit the

United States. W hile the Irgun Delegation

formed a reception

committee for a dinner in Begin’s honor planned for November in
New York, a storm of protest broke out among those who considered
him a terrorist. This led to a controversy within the United States
government whether to allow him into the Unites States or not.
Begin had the support of important American figures who were
affiliated with the Irgun Delegation, such as Louis Bromfield who
called Menachem Begin “one o f the great and almost legendary
figures of our time.” Bromfield credited Begin with great successes.
As Commander- in- Chief of the Irgun Zvai Leumi he led
one of the most glorious and successful resistance
movements in history. A little defenseless community, a
people who, in the course of almost two thousand years of
dispersion, had lost the art of m ilitary defense was
transformed under his leadership into a fighting and heroic
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nation.1
Bromfield noted that Begin had been responsible for giving Jews
back their dignity and self-respect and the respect of the civilized
world. Bromfield told David Niles that the Irgun was responsible for
the collapse of the British regime in Palestine.2
Bromfield tried to persuade M r. Niles that support for Begin
was politically the right choice for America.
Today, Mr. Begin heads a strong political movement in Israel
dedicated to western concepts o f democracy - Tenuat
Hecherut (Freedom Movement) - and thus is the logical and
natural candidate for Prime Minister in the coming elections
in Palestine. He combines in his personality not only the
qualities of a m ilitary commander and a political leader, but
also of a scholar, a lawyer and a speaker of great repute.3
Bromfield stressed the importance o f “establishing a mutual
understanding and friendship between the United States and the
strategically vital State of Israel” and by asking Niles to add his name
to the list of Americans who would welcome Mr. Begin to the United
States the following m onth.4
In secret State Department correspondence from Under
Secretary Lovett to Clark C lifford fo r President Truman the
controversy over admission of Menachem Begin to the United States
1Letter of Louis Bromfield to David Niles, October 1948, Niles Papers, Truman
L ib rary.
2Ibid.
3 Ibid.
‘ Ibid.
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was discussed. In this confidential file, dated November 12, 1948,
Lovett presented Clifford with the pros and cons of granting U. S.
visitors visas to Begin and five associates. Lovett wrote that since
Begin was
formerly head of the terrorist Irgun Zwai Leumi and now
chief of the Hebrew Freedom Movement . . . The Visa
Division, Legal Adviser and the Division of Security agree
that Begin and associates are mandatorily excluded from
admission into the United States under Act of 1918 which
lists specific restriction to admission. We have had this point
carefully checked and the aforementioned experts agree
that the Irgun Zwai Leumi group clearly falls under the
provision of this law on several counts.5
Lovett advised Clifford that under the 9 th Proviso of this Act,
however, the law could be waived by the Commissioner of
Immigration, with the consent of the Attorney General, if it was “in
the national interest” to do so. “The Department is under considerable
pressure to recommend to the Attorney General that Mr. Begin and
his associates be permitted to enter this country under the 9th
Proviso clause,” wrote the Under Secretary. This was also the opinion
of the United States representative in Tel Aviv, Mr. McDonald. In a
telegram to the State Department, he urged the immediate approval
of Begin’s visa application. He believed that, while Begin’s presence
in the United States might offend Jewish organizations, refusal of the
5Secret State Department correspondence from Under Secretary Lovett to
Clark Clifford, November 12, 1948, Truman Library, White House Central FilesConfidential.
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visa application might embarrassingly involve the United States in
Israeli politics.6
A national reception committee to welcome Begin had already
been put in place. This committee included many well known
American figures including nine governors, eleven Congressmen,
including five Senators (Green, Awakener, Capper, Magnuson, and
Thomas), many judges, educators, mayors, clergymen, and other
notable persons.
Louis Bromfield issued invitations to a dinner which was to be
held on November 23 rd at the W aldorf-Astoria in honor o f
Menachem Begin. Under Secretary Lovett mentioned this information
to Clifford before stating the pros and cons concerning Begin’s
admission.
Two main points were presented which favored Begin’s
admission. First, “Mr. Begin is the head of the strongest opposition
party in Israel which is also rightist and anti-communist. It is
possible that this party may become the controlling one in Israel in
which case if we did not grant visa we would be excluding the future
Prime Minister of Israel.” 7 Second, many prominent people were
urging admission, as well as the American League for a Free
Palestine which was the main supporter of the Irgun in the United
"Ibid
7Ibid
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States.
Five points were presented in opposition to Begin’s admission.
The first of these was the fact that the Irgun was responsible for the
bombing of the King David Hotel. One hundred mostly British
government officials were killed in the attack. The Irgun had also
taken responsibility for an incident that occurred on July 30, 1947
in which two British Army sergeants were hanged. It was thought,
therefore, that there would be a public outcry in Great Britain if
Begin were admitted to the States.
The second point against adm itting Begin, similarly, was the
uneasiness of the British Embassy regarding admission. This fear,
Lovett suggested, could be discounted, as the F. B. I. could be alerted
in advance.
The third point was that some Americans, including important
Zionist groups would feel bitter about the admission. The risk of
alienating such groups needed to be considered.
Also, the admission would increase the strain on U. S. - Arab
relations. This could be expected because the Irgun called for the
inclusion of Transjordan, as well as all o f Palestine, w ithin the
borders of Israel.
Finally, allowing Begin to enter the United States could serve as
an “unfortunate precedent in future visa cases involving terrorist
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organizations such as the Stern Gang.” 8
On November 29, 1948 correspondence appeared in the
Letters to the Editor of The New York Times regarding the visit of
Menachem Begin to the United States. This piece reminded the
editor, whose name had appeared on the list of reception committee
members planning the welcoming dinner for Begin at the WaldorfAstoria, of the terrorist background of the Irgun leader. It recounted
what the signers of the letter considered to be the most negative
aspects of the controversial leader. It expressed the complaints and
urged withdrawal of support for Begin. It posed a number of
questions to the editor. The questions confronted the editor with the
most infamous acts of the Irgun including the bombing of the King
David Hotel, the kidnapping and garroting of two British sergeants
and booby trapping their bodies, the alleged massacre of 250
inhabitants of the village of Deir Yassin, and charged that the Irgun
Delegation, masquerading under the front of “democracy,” was a
totalitarian group, “as reactionary as the

fanatical Muslim

Brotherhood” which used the funds it acquired in America to buy
arms from Soviet Russia. The letter was signed by Rev. Dr. Henry
Sloane Coffin, former president of Union Theological Seminary and
former moderator of the Presbyterian Church in the United States,
Father John La Farge of New York, well known Catholic editor, and
“Ibid
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Rabbi Morris Lazaron of Baltimore, member of the Central Conference
of American Rabbis, and a director of the American Association for
the United Nations
The events which took place in the village of Deir Yassin cast
the most ignominious light upon the workings of the Irgun in
Palestine of possibly any action taken by them. On April 11, 1948
The New York Times headlines read, “Jews Attack Village of Deir
Yassin. Massacre of civilians reported.”
Yitshak Ben Ami, Irgun member and activist in America for the
Kook group, claimed that the American press portrayed an incorrect
image of the events in the Arab village. He claimed that the village
had been, since the late 1800’s, a hotbed of Arab extremism and was
far from the “peaceful little village” described in the Times. Ben Ami
also claimed that the Irgun had the support of other Zionist groups,
specifically the Haganah, but that they denounced the incident in
the heat which followed. Ben Ami had been faced with “attempted
forays into our homes from Deir Yassin” when he was in charge of
defending Givet Shaul, a Jerusalem suburb, as early as 1936.
We dug out our “illegal” weapons every night and waited,
while the Jewish supplementary police repulsed the
infiltrators again and again. Months later, we had a defense
position in nearby Motza commanded by Hillel Kook, and he
often asked my help to transport men to their night duties
in Motza. Driving back and forth to Motza from Jerusalem, I
spent many hours lying in roadside ditches after ambushes
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out of Deir Yassin.9
Ben Ami asserted that, together with the Arab village of Lifta, the
“civilian population” of Deir Yassin “tried to choke off traffic to and
from Jewish Jerusalem whenever trouble was brewing.” 10
Ben Ami stated that the incident was far more involved than
described in the Times. Supposedly, in the beginning of April, Iraqi,
Jordanian and some European troops had stationed themselves in
Arab villages near Jerusalem.
The night of April 2nd, Deir Yassin opened intense fire on
the Jewish suburbs of Beit Hakerem and Bait Vegan. The
firing lasted all night. For the next several nights running,
Haganah and Irgun troops reconnoitered Deir Yassin; by the
seventh of A pril, the Irgun and Lehi commanders had
decided to attack and occupy the village. This would
discourage further night attacks, help secure the highway to
Tel-Aviv and consolidate Hebrew control of the western area
of Jerusalem.11
The attackers, lacking the necessary weapons, advanced under
instruction not to fire unless necessary, not to pillage or destroy
property but only to secure the village. The attack was
. . . preceded by an armored car atop which a loudspeaker
began repeating warnings in Arabic to the inhabitants: ‘The
forces of the Irgun and Lehi are attacking you. Run toward
Ein Karem or seek shelter below the village. We come to
chase the foreign forces in your villages.’ The element of
surprise had been sacrificed in an attempt to save civilian
9Ben Ami, p. 440.
10Ibid
11Ibid.
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lives.12
This was followed by a vicious, bloody battle.
Begin’s visit to the United States had come before the
hemorrhaging within the underground body, which resulted from
this incident, could be stopped. The Jewish establishment opposed
Begin’s visit and the aims of his political movement. Their objections
focused on the Deir Yassin issue. On December 4, 1848 their letter
was published in a section to the editor of The New York Times.13 11
was signed by such prominent individuals as Albert Einstein and
Hannah Arendt.

This general condemnation of Irgun activities

specifically focussed on Deir Yassin.
On April 9 (The New York Times), terrorist bands attacked this
peaceful village, which was not a m ilitary objective in the
fighting, killed most of its inhabitants - 240 men, women and
children - and kept a few of them alive to parade as captives
through the streets of Jerusalem. Most of the Jewish community
was horrified at the deed, and the Jewish Agency sent a telegram
of apology to King Abdullah of Trans -Jordan. But the terrorists,
far from being ashamed of their act, were proud of this
massacre, publicized it, widely, and invited all the foreign
correspondents present in the country to view the heaped
corpses and the general havoc at Deir Yassin.
One of signers of this protest, Hannah Arendt, was a mover
and shaker among American Jewish intellectuals. In March 1942 she
had worked with a contemporary, Joseph Maier, to form a group
12Ibid, p. 441.
13For complete text of this letter see Appendix M.
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called Die Jungjudische Gruppe (“the Young Jewish Group”). This
group, like Kook’s, called for the creation of a Jewish Army. However,
“while the group members considered themselves Zionists, they were
very critical of Zionism.” 14 Arendt attacked the Irgun Delegation in
her publication, Aufbau. in which, on March 6, 1942, she “called the
Revisionists ‘Jewish Fascists’ and asserted that their effort to raise a
Jewish Army was only a part of their larger effort to gain control of
the Zionist organization for their own ends.”ls
Arendt favored “the establishment of Palestine as part of a
postwar British Commonwealth rather than as an autonomous
state.”16 She rejected Revisionist calls for relocating Arab populations,
which she considered would require “fascist organization.” 17 By 1944
however, when the atrocities of Europe were fully verified, Arendt
said, “The only difference between the Revisionists and the General
Zionists today lies in their attitude toward England, and this is not a
fundamental political issue.”18

By 1948 Arendt supported Count

Bernadotte’s proposal for a U.N. trusteeship. It was during this period
when she opposed Irgun Delegation efforts to bring Menachem Begin
to America to gain support for his Herut political party.

14Elizabeth Young-Bruehl, H a n n a h Arendt: For Love of the World, p. 178.
15 Ibid.
16Ibid, p. 180.
17Ibid, p. 183.
18Ibid, p. 224.
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The attack on Deir Yassin evoked deep emotional feelings on
both sides. In his memoirs, Menachem Begin indicated that there was
more behind the attack on Deir Yassin than the defense of the
Jerusalem road, and that the portrayal of the incident in the press
was distorted. Begin explained that the village was located at a
strategic position.
D ir Yassin, lying some two thousand feet above sea-level,
was an im portant lin k in the chain o f Arab positions
enclosing Jerusalem from the West. Through D ir Yassin Arab
forces from Ein Kerem and Bethlehem crossed to the Kastel
front, whence they attacked Jewish convoys along the only
road from Jerusalem to the coast
Begin refuted the charge that Deir Yassin was not a m ilitary
objective. He stated that, to the contrary, it was a vital security
interest in the War of Independence. The plan, agreed upon by the
Haganah, called for the creation of an airstrip in that location.
After the capture of D ir Yassin . . . the Haganah
commander in Jerusalem announced that its capture was of
no m ilitary value and was, indeed, contrary to the general
plan for the defense o f Jerusalem. We had, to our regret, to
refute M r. Shaltiel w ith the aid o f a letter from - Mr.
Shaltiel. Raanan, the Irgun commander in Jerusalem, radioed
to us the following letter he had received from the Haganah
Regional Commander:
‘I learn that you plan an attack on D ir Yassin. I wish
to point out that the capture of D ir Yassin and holding it is
one stage in our general plan. I have no objection to your
carrying out the operation provided you are able to hold the
village. If you are unable to do so I warn you against
blowing up the village which w ill result in its inhabitants
abandoning it and its ruin and deserted houses being
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occupied by foreign forces. This situation w ill increase our
difficulties in the general struggle. A second conquest o f the
place w ill involve us in heavy sacrifices. Furthermore, if
foreign forces enter the place this w ill upset the plan . . . ’
When we published this letter we ended with those
three points after the word ‘plan.’ The national interest
required that we should not reveal what that plan was.
Today those three points are superfluous. It can be revealed
that in their place in the original letter there came the
highly significant words: ‘for establishing an airfield.’ That
airfield was established at Dir Yassin and, for a time, served
as the only means of communicating between besieged
Jerusalem and the coast19
Menachem Begin stated that the village had been warned, as
Ben Ami described. Many inhabitants had fled and been unharmed.
Once the battle began there were heavy casualties on both sides.
Begin contends that the results of the battle were exaggerated by the
enemy.
To counteract the loss of Dir Yassin, a village of strategic
importance, Arab headquarters at Ramallah broadcast a
crude atrocity story, alleging a massacre by Irgun troops of
women and children in the village. Certain Jewish officials,
fearing the Irgun as political rivals, seized upon this Arab
greuel propaganda to smear the Irgun. An eminent Rabbi
was induced to reprimand the Irgun before he had time to
sift the truth. Out of evil, however, good came. This Arab
propaganda spread a legend of terror amongst Arabs and
Arab troops, who were seized with panic at the mention of
Irgun soldiers. The legend was worth half a dozen battalions
to the forces of Israel. The “Dir Yassin Massacre” lie is still
propagated by Jew-haters all over the world.20

18Begin, p. 162-163.
80Ibid, p. 164, note.
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W hatever the tru th of the m atter, one thing is certain, the
descriptions of the incident in the world press destroyed any
remaining credibility the Irgun might have had.
Menachem Begin was allowed into the United States despite the
outcry against him. On November 30, 1948 The New York World
Telegram commented on an announcement which was made at the
dinner for Begin at the Waldorf-Astoria. It chronicled the dissolution
of the American League for a Free Palestine, the

group which

Yitshak Ben Ami had directed from 1946 to 1948.
Announcement of the American League, which has been
bitterly opposed by leading Zionist groups and condemned
by the British government, came last night. Ben Hecht, cochairman, told 1200 guests at a dinner in the WaldorfAstoria Hotel, at which Mr. Begin was guest of honor, that
the league’s job was done, adding its story “ends at least as
nicely as a Jewish story can end... Against the calumny of
its own people, against the pitiless skulduggeries of British
propaganda and against thousand-to-one power of the
British army, Irgun fought for the right of Jews to strike
back at their destroyers and oppressors.”
The year, 1948, marked the end of the separatist action by the
Irgun. The effect of that action upon the foundation of the Jewish
State is controversial. While some detested the actions o f this
underground group others considered it the essential ingredient in
the Jewish national liberation movement.
The visit of Irgun High Command leader, Menachem Begin, to
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the United States came as a fitting close to the activities of the Irgun
Delegation in America. They had worked for almost a decade to gain
public support for the creation of a Jewish Army, for the rescue of
Jewish Holocaust victims, and for the creation of a Jewish State in
Palestine. Although their efforts had, at times, been in direct
confrontation with Begin, the aims of both branches of the Irgun had
remained basically the same. W ith the dissolution of the Irgun
Delegation a new united effort was birthing in which the focus of
activity was Israel. There the Irgun was transformed into the a
legitimate political party, Herut, which became the heart of the right
wing political faction and eventually was voted into power. As party
leader, Menachem Begin became the Prime M inister of Israel.
Today’s Likud party was created as a direct result of Begin’s work in
the Irgun. It is now led by Benjamin Netanyahu, the son of the
Revisionist’s New Zionist Organization leader, Benzion.
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CHAPTER 10

A QUESTION OF TERMINOLOGY
The term “Revisionist” has, in the course of this investigation,
been highly controversial. Persons interviewed were perhaps most
emotional, of all topics discussed, over this term and over whom it
was applied to. While the term “Revisionist” had been used by
numerous literary sources to describe the Irgun Delegation to the
United States this definition is questionable. The term itself seems to
be ambiguous. Both the application and the denial of this term, as it
applied to the Irgun Delegation to the United States, can be defended
under varying circumstances. Certainly both the Irgun and the New
Zionist Organization derived from the Revisionist movement created
by Jabotinsky. However, after the initial break with the World Zionist
Organization, these “Revisionist” groups separated, one forming a
political party, the other a m ilitary arm.
There has also been considerable controversy and error in
separating the work of the Irgun Delegation to the United States from
the New Zionist Organization o f America. The names of these groups
have been used interchangeably and incorrectly in source books,
encyclopedias, and even intelligence files.
David Wyman is one of the few writers who has correctly
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stated that the Irgun Delegation was “not associated with the New
Zionist Organization of America, which was the Revisionist Zionist
body in the United States.”1 The Hebrew Committee and its affiliate
organizations were, in fact, secretly members of the Irgun, which was
the Jewish armed underground in Palestine. Mr. Wyman stated that
“while these men constituted a tiny, American - based wing of the
Irgun, they did not conduct underground activities in the United
States. During the war, they were almost completely isolated from
the Irgun in Palestine.”2 That is, they did not conduct aggressively
m ilitant activities on American soil. They did, however, operate
covert activities such as purchasing arms, undertaking rescue
missions, buying visas and consulates.
The dilemma of differentiation appears in a letter from Wallace
Murray, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, to
the Acting Secretary of State regarding the assassination of Lord
Moyne.
. . . the Stern Gang . . . is one of the two principal secret,
illegal Jewish m ilitary organizations in Palestine, the other
being the Irgun Z’vai Leum i. . . Both of these groups are
made up o f fanatical young Jews who are completely
unscrupulous . . .These groups are offshoots of the extreme
right-wing of the Zionist movement, the Revisionists or New
Zionists.. . 3
’ Wyman, p. 85.
2Wyman, p. 85.
3Memorandum from Wallace Murray to the Assistant Secretary of State,
Washington, Nov. 8, 1944- Foreign Relations of the United States- 1944. vol.5. p.
634-635.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

276
While Murray was able to identify the various groups, he was
unable to differentiate the distinctions between them.
. . . It is difficult to say today wherein the difference
between the two groups he, and, in fact, we have reason to
believe that they are no longer distinct organizations, but
rather are two parts o f one secret terrorist organization
which seeks the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine
through the overthrow by violent means of the present
administration there.4
While members of the Kook group attest to being delegates of
the Irgun they deny being Revisionists. Although they were closely
tied to the Irgun, they deviated from the Irgun and became,
somewhat, an organization unto themselves. Lechi leader, former
Israeli Prime Minister Yitshak Shamir, said, “You cannot say that this
was a Revisionist movement. It was a very special movement, I
would say, that was created by Hillel Kook and his friends.”5

The

confusion over terminology is apparent even here, as Mr. Shamir
explains. Although he denies, in the previous statement, that they
are Revisionists, he states that they are affiliated with the Revisionist
movement.
There have been others, they have been sent to the United
States by the Irgun. And the Irgun was, we can say, a
certain affiliation o f the Revisionist movement. They have
been sent to America, H ille l Kook and his friends as
delegates of shlihim, that you call in Hebrew, it means
4. Ibid.
6Telephone interview with Yitshak Shamir from Tel Aviv, by Joanna Saidel,
June 2,1993.
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envoys, by the Irgun. And in this framework of the Irgun,
Hillel Kook and his friends have founded the group that was
very active in the public world, in the media.”6
Dr. Alex Raphaeli, a member of the Irgun delegation to the
United States reiterated this view.
Although we considered Jabotinsky our leader and mentor
and consulted him as well as other party leaders, we drew a
distinction between the party’s view and our own m ilitary
activities. The public image of the IZL was that it was the
m ilitary arm of the Revisionist movement, but the truth is
that we followed our own independent ways and even came
into sharp conflict with Jabotinsky when we failed to accept
his suggestions.7
Further questions regarding who were Revisionists, and who
were not, arose from other sources. When asked whether or not
Kook’s group were Revisionists or, rather, a movement unto
themselves, author and Foreign Affairs advisor to Menachem Begin,
Shmuel Katz stated,
Well, I suppose they became a movement unto themselves,
but when we talk of Revisionism, after all you might say
that Shamir’s group was also not Revisionist in that sense.
Shamir belonged to Lechi and . . . Lechi’s leader, Stern, was
in conflict with Jabotinsky. So I don’t know. I wouldn’t say
that they were not Revisionists. They were also . . . an
offshoot, at least, of Revisionism, very definitely^ After all.. .
their principle was that there should be a Jewish State in
Palestine. Their principle was to save Jews. Their principle
was to bring Jews here. At that time what more could

8Ibid.
7Dr. Alexe Raphaeli, Dream and Action, p. 65-66.
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anybody, would anybody need in order to be a Revisionist?8
Irgun Delegation member, Dr. Alexe Raphaeli, thinks that the
issue of terminology is important and very sensitive. He flatly stated,
“We did not consider ourselves Revisionists. Now, that’s a very
sensitive question.” 9

He had long conversations with Jabotinsky

over the issue of control. Jabotinsky often urged the Delegation to
work with his political organization.
And there was the answer, and this was the cardinal answer
which we in the Irgun felt all these years . . . We felt that
Jabotinsky was our spiritual head. He was our logical head.
He was.. . Field Marshall of whatever modest forces we had,
but we did not consider the m ilitary work a political work.
We did not want to accept any party or political
consideration, right or left.10
Dr. Raphaeli explained that his group felt, as young people, that they
should fight for their independence and protect Jews.
We were very, very small but we were very, very active;
and you don’t need so many people if you have certain
courage and you have certain possibilities and some ideas to
do things. And the Irgun did very, very big things. These
things they did from (a) m ilitary point of view . . . not
because we belong to this or other party.11
Jabotinsky was not happy with this approach and continued to
•Telephone interview with Shmuel Katz from Tel Aviv, by Joanna Saidel,
June 10,1993.
8Telephone interview with Dr. Alexe Raphaeli from Jerusalem, by Joanna
Saidel, June 15,1993.
10Ib id .
11Ib id .
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try to influence Raphaeli in frequent meetings between them in
Paris. While Raphaeli completely understood the thinking of the
Revisionist party (having been a party member and founder of the
Betar movement in the thirties) he, and the rest of the Irgun
Delegation, felt that the m ilitary work should be separate from the
political work.
This was the big discussion and the Revisionists took
offense, were very, very aggressive and instead (of
participating and helping) they were very critical and felt
that we were breaking up the movement, etcetera, but we
thought that we were doing m ilitary work and not political
work. 12
Dr. Raphaeli stated that, besides the m ilitary differences,
there were some jealousies and rivalries between the Irgun
Delegation leader, H illel Kook, and the New Zionist Organization
leader, Benzion Netanyahu. Raphaeli thought highly of Netanyahu
despite their differences.
He was very much admired by me in any case. And with
Benzion we worked, he even worked in our office for a little
while. But he was a Revisionist, and his mentality, he’s a
very gifted man, a professor, but we didn’t feel that he has
m ilitary s p irit.. ,13
Why then was Netanyahu so antagonistic toward the Kook
group? Raphaeli explains.
Listen. Listen. There are many, many jealousies. Compared
12 Ibid.
13Ib id .
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with us he was a bit older. He was a professor. We were just
youngsters relatively. I mean I was at that time Doctor. I
got my doctor(ate) in Heidelberg. But most of the other
colleagues were a bit younger than I and didn’t have any
education. He considered himself im portant... intellectually,
maybe that’s right, much more important than Hillel or any
of the other colleagues.. . 14
When asked if Hillel Kook would consider himself a Revisionist
Raphaeli replied, “if he w ill hear that you called (his group)
Revisionists he w ill explode! (Laughs.) He will explode but he is, he is
exactly, as Netanyahu, emotionally involved. I’m not emotionally
involved . . . We are not Revisionists. We were not Revisionists.”15
Dr. Raphaeli agrees that there is a lot of confusion over
terminology, and in understanding the differences between these
Zionist groups.
Ninety percent of the population in Palestine and abroad,
Jews involved in Zionism, considered the Irgun a part of the
Revisionist party. . . But this is not the inside truth. This is
not the inside truth . . . we’re politically not Revisionists. We
are a m ilitary group acting according to principle (to)
liberate the country against the British, protect the Jews
wherever they needed physical protection and . . . bring . . .
them to Palestine. Period. That’s all.16
Dr. Raphaeli believed that “Revisionists were very good, very
loyal, very nice people but this was not their approach. We. . .
wanted to put the Jewish problem on the agenda of the world, of the
14Ibid.
15Ibid.
18Ibid.
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international agenda.”17
The Revisionist New Zionist Organization also aimed at putting
the Jewish problem, particularly the British problem, on the agenda,
as well as, in the early years, campaigning for a Jewish Army. Their
methods included mass campaigning, nationwide advertising,
presentation of their views in publications, such as Zionews. and
infiltration into the Congress, Army, Navy, and the administration.
Hillel Kook spoke about the Irgun and the Revisionist party. He
stated that the Irgun operated independently from the party.
I knew the Revisionist hierarchy because we had to be in
touch with them. They were the only party who supported
us on an organized basis. This doesn’t contradict what I said
to you. We were independent. You can receive support from
somebody and not be controlled by them. Begin, when he
came out of the underground and formed the Herut Party,
did not want to include the Revisionists. He did not want to
meet the delegation of the Revisionist leadership.18
Despite the fact that the Revisionists and the Irgun worked
separately it should be remembered that their mutual leader,
Jabotinsky, personally called both the New Zionist Organization
leader, Benzion Netanyahu,19 and the Irgun Delegation leader, Hillel
Kook, to campaign for support in America. Kook testified to the fact
that Jabotinsky had personally requested his assistance.
17Ib id .
18Interview of Hillel Kook by M. Kaufman, Oct. 27, 1981, Institute of
Contemporary Jewry, Oral History Division, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, p.6.
10Jabotinsky’s request for Netanyahu to come to the States is documented in
chapter two, “Revisionist Zionism Comes to America.”

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

282
In ‘39 the war broke out. Jabotinsky decided to go to London
. . . I wanted to go back to Palestine. Jabotinsky told me not
to go. He said. . .The only place to do something is among the
great American Jewry.. . 20
Kook came to the United States shortly before Jabotinsky died
in 1940. Kook agreed with Netanyahu’s assessment that Jabotinsky
was a broken man because he had failed to mobilize American Jewry.
However, Kook did not mention the successes that Netanyahu and the
NZO had achieved with Jabotinsky during the campaign that spring
and summer. To the contrary, Kook contends that Jabotinsky “took
over a delegation of about five members o f what they call the
presidency o f the NZO with him . . . to move to the United States
and mobilize American Jewry. And they failed miserably.”21
Kook claims that there was some joint activity between the two
groups to raise funds; “It was the only sort of joint activity that was
organized by the Irgun and the Revisionists. It was an open
delegation . . . It was headed by Colonel John Henry Patterson . . .
and Robert Briscoe.”22
For various reasons the two organizations drifted apart. The
Irgun delegation was criticized for establishing an open organization
when it was supposed to be working strictly underground.
There was a big fight going on between these guys and the
Revisionists. They said, “You have no right to have an
“Kook interview w ith Kaufman, Ibid, p. 13.
21 Ibid, p. 14.
22Ibid.
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organization. You are Irgun people. Irgun is an underground
(organization). You cannot be a open organization. It was the
first time that the Irgun was in control of an open
organization.23
While Benzion Netanyahu stated that he joined the Kook group
briefly after Jabotinsky’s death, Hillel Kook stated the same thing in
reverse.
In New York, under the shock of his death and the shock of
the war, and the very desperate situation all around, and
being cut o ff from the Irgun, we as a group agreed that I
should become a member of the ‘nesiut’ (executive) of the
Revisionist Party. So, when I say that I was never a
Revisionist it is not true. I was a Revisionist and I was a
member of the ‘nisiut’ sometime between September and
November of 1940. After about three or four meetings I saw
that we had no common language whatsoever.24
Benzion Netanyahu agreed that he had found little common language
with the Irgun delegation when he was a member of the Committee
for a Jewish Army.25
Another point of misunderstanding was the relationship
between the Irgun in Palestine and the Irgun Delegation. While
Menachem Begin was angry that the Delegation wasn’t sending funds
to the Irgun, Kook felt that the Irgun was non-operative since it had
decided not to attack the British during the war.
To the best of my recollection I don’t think we sent a single
penny to the Irgun here between the time I arrived there,
“ Ibid, p. 17.
“ Ibid, p. 20.
25Conversation with Benzion Netanyahu, November 1993.
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which was July 1940, and until we sent Ben-Eliezer (1 9 4 6 )..
. As far as we were concerned the Irgun existed only in
name. What did the Irgun do? We were the only Irgun that
was doing something.26
Confusion over terminology is evident in many sources. The
majority of sources writing on the subject have used the terms Irgun
and Revisionists interchangeably and therefore incorrectly. This
analysis was even apparent in intelligence circles. For example, in a
1943 report from the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) such an error
is made. Here the New Zionist Organization is confused with the Irgun
Delegation to the United States.
. . . the New Zionist Organization has. . . been vociferous out
of all proportion to its actual strength. Its activities in this
country are being directed by a delegation of Palestinians,
headed by Peter Bergson and including Eri Jabotinsky, son
of Vladimir, and Alexander H adani.. . The Committee for a
Jewish Army . . . the Emergency Committee to Save the
Jewish People of Europe, the American Resettlement
Committee for Uprooted Jewry, and a newest venture, the
American Legion for a Free Palestine . . .a ll of these
groups, through interlocking leadership, are Revisionist
sponsored and are connected w ith the New Zionist
Organization.. ,27
It was not well known in those days that the Kook group was directly
affiliated with the Irgun in Palestine, since it promoted itself as an
American organization which was not specifically Jewish.
29Kook interview with Kaufman, p. 28.
27CIA file, Office of Strategic Services, Foreign Nationality Branch, report
No. 160, November 20, 1943, “Aftermath of the American Jewish Conference,”
p.8-9.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

285
There is some am biguity here. The Irgun Delegation
organizations did in fact operate to rally a diverse following. This
non-sectarian appeal made it appear to be different from Jewish
mainstream groups because it brought the problems and the
campaigns out of a strictly Jewish milieu and integrated them into
American society.
We were not a Jewish organization. The Committee for a
Jewish Arm y was an American organization. The first
chairman was Pierre Van Passen the writer, who was not a
Jew. He was a Zionist but not a Jew. He was very active.28
The Committee for a Jewish Army was only one of the Irgun
Delegations organizations which sought non-sectarianism.
. . . this little committee that we had called American
Friends o f Jewish Palestine which, by the way, was non
sectarian. It was not a Jewish organization, it was an
American organization whose chairman was a non-Jew by
design, not by accident. Not that we thought there was
anything wrong with Jews organizing it, but already in ' 39
we instinctively didn’t see ourselves as a body functioning
within the American Jewish community on a Jewish basis.
The decision was that this had to be an effort to mobilize
the sympathy not only of the American Jews but also of the
American people for our Zionist aspirations.29
Such sympathy was, by these efforts, forthcoming from a
variety of groups, not only in America but in distant regions of the
world. The Irgun Delegation was able to secure the support of “Bible

“ Kook interviewed by Kaufman, p. 36.
28Kook interview with Kaufman, p. 20.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

286
people,” Ideological sympathizers, and supporters o f national
liberation movements like the Irish.
There were people o f Irish descent who hated the British
and who liked the idea of another nation wanting to free
itself. We were a national liberation movement. We were the
first unequivocal form ulation of a national liberation
movement that followed after war.30
Various other groups also supported Kook’s movement.
Actually we collaborated with, we organized, we helped the
Indians because we had more support. Later on, when we
had quite a bit of support, we helped the Koreans. Syngman
Rhee was on our payroll We used to pay him $50 a m onth..
. The Indians (Ghandi’s) we helped a great d eal.. . We also
had the support of the American Indians. . . The main
supporter in the House of Representatives was Congressman
W ill Rogers, who was part Indian, son of the famous W ill
Rogers.31
This outreach to all ethnic peoples of varying religions helped
to alleviate interracial tensions in a tim e when the general
assumption was that antisemitism dominated the American scene.
During the 1940’s, the general feeling of Americans turned to
sympathy for the Jewish plight.
There was tremendous sympathy in America for Zionism in
those days. There was some antisemitism in America but I
would say the vast m ajority of the American people, if you
could reach them, would sympathize. We had the Bible
people, who were very strong, from the Bible belt in the
Middle West. From there we mostly got our Senators and
Congressmen, and we could hold on to them because they
30Ibid, p. 22.
31Ib id.
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didn’t yield.32
The effort by the Irgun Delegation to present itself as an
American, rather than a strictly Jewish, organization was paralleled
by the efforts of the New Zionist Organization of America. Rather
than trying to appear to be an American organization, they presented
the Jewish and Palestine problems in a global scenario. This effort
was one of the most successful aspects of their campaign. While
administration officials and congressmen were, at first, hesitant to
support the Jewish cause, the executive director of the NZO, Benzion
Netanyahu, a brilliant and eloquent speaker, was able to present the
situation as having far reaching global effects which could alter the
post war world. The basis of his thesis was that only a democratic
Jewish State in Palestine would be strong and determined enough to
stave off the coming surge of Soviet influence which Netanyahu was
sure would sweep the region after the war ended. The force with
which Professor Netanyahu conveyed this assumption resulted in
changing the Palestine problem from a regional problem to a global
concern.
While both the Irgun Delegation and the N.Z.O. appealed to
Americans on a non-sectarian basis, both were intensely committed
to Palestine. It eventually became known that Kook’s organizations

“ Ibid, p. 21.
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represented the Irgun in America. The O.S.S. recognized this
relationship in a 1944 report.
Relationship between the Hebrew Committee of National
Liberation and the Irgun in Palestine has not been admitted,
but there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to justify the
charges that have been made.33
The Office of Strategic Services also acknowledged the
differences between the Revisionist Party and the Irgun in 1944.
However, they were s till unsure whether or not the two
organizations were working together secretly while maintaining that
they were divided for tactical purposes.
Their report stated that although there were indications of
connections between the Hebrew Committee of National Liberation
and the Irgun in Palestine, the Committee denied that it was a
Revisionist organization. The Zionist Revisionist Party had recently
disassociated itself publicly from the activities of the Bergson
committee.

The views put forth by the Hebrew Committee of

National Liberation represented a departure from certain aspects of
the Revisionist program, particularly their view that Transjordan
should be considered an inseparable part of a Jewish state in
Palestine. While this was the opinion reported in the O.S.S. file,
Transjordan was really not a major issue at the time. The main issue
33CIA file, Office of Strategic Services, Foreign Nationality Branch, report
No. 191, June 6 ,1 9 4 4 , “The Hebrew Committee of National Liberation and Its
Background,” p. 5.
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was the policy toward the British.34The report further remarked that
their m ilitant and nationalistic attitude, particularly with
respect to the Arabs, has often led them to be called “Jewish
Fascists” and their m ilitary organization, the Irgun Z’vai
Leumi, has committed acts of violence in Palestine.
According to some observers the avowed organizational and
ideological separation between the Revisionists and this
Committee of National Liberation is designed prim arily for
tactical purposes, although there may be personality
differences involved.35
The supposition that the New Zionist Organization was working
secretly with the Hebrew Committee proved to be unfounded; and
the characterization of the Revisionists as Fascists was an extreme
inaccuracy. The label, Fascists, had been attached to the Revisionists
by leftist opponents.36 By June 1944 the OSS was better able to
differentiate between the New Zionist Organization leadership and
that of the Irgun Delegation.
In the United States an American branch of the Revisionist
Party was formed in 1926. It has always been a small group
with approxim ately 500 members. Present president is
Colonel Morris Mendelsohn, Executive director and editor of
the organization’s bimonthly English - language magazine,
Zionews. is B. Netanyahu.37 Like its parent in Palestine, this
American branch of the New Zionist Organization has in the
past refused to cooperate w ith the general Zionist
organizations . . . Recently, since the program o f the
American Zionists now places its greatest emphasis on the
34Conversation with Benzion Netanyahu, January 23, 1995, from New York.
35CIA file, Office of Strategic Services, Foreign Nationality Branch, report
No. 191, June 6 ,1 9 4 4 , “The Hebrew Committee of National Liberation and Its
Background,”Ibid, p. 6-7.
30Conversation with Benzion Netanyahu, January 23, 1995, from New York.
37Netanyahu was actually head of political activity.
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establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine and closely
approximates that of the Revisionists. The NZO has at times
sought to collaborate.38
Perhaps the major point of contention and division between the
New Zionist Organization and the Irgun Delegation to the United
States resulted over a point of ideology. While the two groups did not
work together they did not attack one another until a policy of Hillel
Kook was published which distinguished between “Jews*' and
“Hebrews.” While Kook held this view, it was not accepted by all
members of the Irgun delegation. Dr. Alex Raphaeli and Yitshak Ben
Ami opposed the id ea.39 This distinction was pointed out in an F.B.I.
report in 1945. It reported Kook’s demand for a democratic Hebrew
nation in Palestine.
The Bergson group makes a distinction between Hebrews
and Jews. By Hebrews it means those who wish to be
Hebrews by nationality, as a part of a renascent nation in
Palestine, rather than Hebrews by religion. Jews are
properly so called only when referring to their religion, they
assert.40
By Kook’s definition Jews living in Europe as of 1945, together
with the Jews of Palestine, constituted the Hebrew nation, and owed
allegiance only to that nation. Palestine was the Hebrew nation by

38Ibid, p. 7.
39 Telephone conversation with Dr. Raphaeli from Jerusalem, by Joanna
Saidel, February 1994.
40FBI Confidential Internal Security Report, “Hebrew Committee of
National Liberation,” January 1, 1945, p. 5-6.
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God’s will. Palestine was to be “a free state in which the Arabs (who
outnumber the Jews in Palestine 3 to 1) and other non-Hebrew
residents w ill share full equality and privileges of citizenship.” This
ideology distinguished between American Jews and all other Jews.
“American Jews are American o f Hebrew descent. They are an
integral part of the American nation.”41
The O.S.S. likewise reported on Kook’s plan for a democratic
state in Palestine, reiterating that the terminology used by the
Hebrew Committee of National Liberation presented a differentiation
between European and Palestinian Jews wishing to live in Palestine
and “Jews living in other countries who therefore do not belong to
the Hebrew nation. The Committee’s ideology divorces the concept of
“Jew” and “Hebrew,” arguing that the former is a term pertaining to
religion, the latter to nationality.” 42 The O.S.S. report compared this
ideology to that of the anti-Zionist American Council for Judaism,
which maintained that the basis of unity among Jews had to be
religion and that Jews should consider themselves nationals of the
countries in which they resided. The American Council for Judaism
differed, however, in its opposition to the establishment of a Jewish
state in Palestine.43
41 Ibid.
42 CIA file, Office of Strategic Services, Foreign Nationality Branch, report
No. 191, June 6 ,1 9 4 4 , “The Hebrew Committee o f National Liberation and Its
Background,” p. 5.
43 Ibid.
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The Zionists maintain that. . . it has never been intended
that Jews should owe political allegiance to any country
other than to the land of which they are citizens. The
relation of the American Jew to the Jewish National Home,
according to the Zionists, w ill not differ from that of any
other American toward the land of his ancestors.44
This policy was opposed by Kook’s foes (and some of his
friends) because of its ominous implications for Jews of Europe who
wished to remain in their countries of origin, and for American and
other Jews who wanted equal rights o f return to a Jewish National
Home.
Bergson’s foes say this distinction has grave implications,
because it infers that the Jews of Europe have no claim to
citizenship in the countries where they live. Although the
Zionists fight for the right o f such Jews as wish to go to
Palestine to do so, it also believes in and w ill fight for the
right of fu ll and equal citizenship for Jews in any country
where they may liv e .. . Furthermore, they point out that if
anyone, Jew or non-Jew, wishes to contribute to the
establishment of a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine he has
full opportunity to do so.. . 45
This issue became the focus of a full fledged attack on the
Irgun Delegation by New Zionist Organization leader, Benzion
Netanyahu. In the July 1944 issue of his newspaper, Zionews. he
wrote an article titled, “The Fiasco of the Hebrew Committee.” In this
article Netanyahu contended that the Irgun Delegation to the United
States had no mandate or authority to represent the Jewish people.
44 Ibid.
45 FBI Confidential file No. 100-61870, New York, 1945, p. 5-6.
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They may be able, energetic, and determined. The very fact,
however, that a few individuals, relatively unknown in
Jewish life, without any authority or mandate from the
people, could come and declare themselves the masters of
the Hebrew nation, testifies to a mania of grandeur or to
some sort of messianic complex that they must have
developed during the period of unlimited control which they
exerted over the Committees of their creation46
Benzion Netanyahu claimed that Kook’s call for a democratic
state was based on a “fundamentally false, historically groundless
differentiation between Hebrews and Jews.” Where, he asked, does
one draw the line between Hebrew and Jew? He believed that certain
conclusions may be derived from the assumptions of Kook’s Hebrew
nation policy.
Either we agree that Palestine is not yet a Jewish State, and
in consequence no Jews owe allegiance to it, and hence there
is no Hebrew Nation; or we agree that Palestine is already
the Jewish State, and then even the Jews who were born in
Palestine, but are citizens of other countries, must be
excluded from the Hebrew Nation. On the other hand, “Arabs
and other non-Hebrew residents of the land” - to whom the
Hebrew Committee promises “full equality and privileges of
citizenship and government” - must be considered members
of the Hebrew nation, and I cannot understand why they are
called “Arabs and non-Hebrews.”47
Netanyahu believed that the contentions of Hillel Kook were
self contradictory and inconsistent. Such a policy accepted the theory
of assimilationists which stated that while their religion is Jewish,
48Zionews. Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem, July 1944, p. 12.
47Ibid, p. 13.
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their nationality is that of the country in which they live.
I believe, however, that what constituted the main reason
for this endorsement of assimilationism by the Hebrew
Committee people, came not out of audacity but cowardice,
not out of stupidity but “super-smartness.” In short - it was
out of opportunism.4®
Netanyahu stated that just as the Committee was opportunistic
with regard to the assimilationists, so it is with regard to the British
policy in Palestine. He particularly pointed to the Hebrew Committee
policy which stated “that the Hebrew Nation postpones the
settlement of the political and boundary problems of Palestine until
after victory. Until that time we shall cooperate with and assist Great
Britain as the Mandatory for Palestine.”49 Netanyahu believed that
the Hebrew Committee disregarded the possibility that the political
fate of Palestine could be decided before the war was over, as most
political problems would be.50
An anti-Zionist body, like the American Jewish Committee,
found it necessary to demand, in the midst of the war, that
Britain relinquish the mandate - the same demand that had
been raised by the New Zionist Organization of America. But
the members of the Hebrew Committee would not dare do
such a thing. They would not embarrass the mandatory
power. They would not fight the White Paper or the Land
restrictions, or the other instruments of British policy which
are employed for the liquidation of Zionism. They w ill
“cooperate with and assist Great Britain as the mandatory
48Ibid, p. 14.
48Ibid, p. 15-16.
50Ibid.
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for Palestine.”51
The New Zionist leader believed that recognition of the Jewish
people in the United Nations was imperative for effecting a solution
to the “Jewish problem.” He said, “We, the New Zionists, have raised
this demand long before the Committee decided to “adopt” it.” This
policy was adopted because the New Zionists believed that such a
solution would benefit the world, not only the Jews of Europe. They
based it on legal and political facts concerning the recognition of
Jewish national minorities, and on the granting o f Palestine to the
whole Jewish people. They vehemently contested the assertion that
the Hebrew nation differed from the Jewish nation. They maintained
that the League of Nations had granted national m inority rights “to
Jews, and not to Hebrews; and the Mandate speaks of the Jewish,
and not the Hebrew people.”
As far as we are concerned, the names Hebrews and Jews
are synonymous terms. Both are dear to us and we are
proud of both. But if a differentiation between the two is
attempted, such as that of the Hebrew Committee, which can
only strengthen the position of assimilationism, then we
shall adhere more adamantly to the name Jews - a name
denoting the greatness, the heroism and the suffering of our
nation, a name which accompanied us through the darkest
corridors of history, a name which our enemies have tried so
hard to besmirch, and which as Herzl said, we must turn into
a symbol of honor in our future Jewish State.52

61Ibid, p. 16.
52Ibid.
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These arguments represent the fundamental differences
between the New Zionist Organization of America and the Irgun
Delegation to the United States. There remains however one other
question which has been raised by a former Irgun leader, Shmuel
Katz. He, with some ambiguity, questioned whether or not the Kook
group was actually sent to the United States by the Irgun at all.
I myself have never found any evidence that they were
actually sent there, but according to letters that Raziel, who
was, in 1940, the head of the Irgun, wrote to Kook, and
these have been published now, and he said, What on earth
are you doing, we sent you to get money. So that I take as
evidence that he was sent there.53
Mr. Katz explained that Hillel Kook had been in London until
June 1940 and he was in a committee representing the Irgun in
which Katz was a member. Katz was suspicious of Kook’s intentions.
I wasn’t sure, but I suspected that he was not representing
the Irgun. I knew something about the Irgun, I’d been
attached to the Irgun before the war. and I thought he was
just putting it on. I don’t, I still don’t know.S4
Katz speculated that perhaps Kook was originally asked by Raziel to
go to America and that he went from Poland to England instead. He
went on to America in June.
My impression is that he had no real business in London,
but that his intention was to get to America in the first
place and Raziel’s letter rather confirms that. What was he
doing in America if he wasn’t collecting money? So I, there’s
53Interview with Shmuel Katz by Joanna Saidel, November 1993, Tel Aviv.
MIbid.
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no evidence. You see if you talk to these people, they don’t
admit anything so you can’t get to the bottom of it ... how is
it that they started an organization there before Jabotinsky
came which had nothing to do with the Irgun? And he
didn’t worked for the Irgun. The Irgun had no benefit from
it at that time.55
Irgun Delegation member, Dr. Alex Raphaeli has rebutted Mr.
Katz’s contentions that there were no documents to support the belief
that the Irgun High Command sent the Kook group to America as
their emissaries. Raphaeli feels that Mr. Katz’s charges are a bit
naive. Raphaeli claimed that, in 1939, when the Irgun delegation
came to the United States, the Irgun was an underground
organization which didn’t write such documents. He said that if a
command were given it would be in code and that not many open
letters of the type that Mr. Katz required would ever have been
written, as the British were hunting them everywhere. Dr. Raphaeli
explained that while he admired Mr. Katz’s intellectual abilities (Mr..
Katz recently produced a monumental biography of Ze’ev Jabotinsky)
he felt that Mr. Katz was incorrect in stating that Kook’s group may
not have been sent by the Irgun. Dr. Raphaeli believes that Shmuel
Katz’s controversy with the Irgun delegation is the result of Mr.
Katz’s Revisionist leanings. Raphaeli stated that Katz believed the
Irgun should be under the control of the party and resented and
objected to their independence. These objections, Raphaeli argues,
65Interview with Shmuel Katz by Joanna Saidel, November 1993, Tel Aviv.
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have led to Katz’s frequent questions, “Where are the documents?”
and “Who sent you?” Raphaeli believes that Katz was a political
animal, not a m ilitary man.
In further defense of his position, Dr. Raphaeli spoke with two
members of the Irgun High Command, Aharon Heichmann, Vicechairman of the Irgun Veterans, and Mr. Benjamin Zeroni, Irgun
commander who also participated in Lechi activities.56 Dr. Raphaeli
told them of Mr. Katz’s charges. Raphaeli was told by them that they
would testily to the fact that the Irgun did indeed send a delegation
(i.e. Kook’s group) to America and that they would provide a joint
declaration to such effect to this writer.57
These documents were forthcoming and confirmed that the
Irgun had indeed sent the delegation to the United States. M r.
Heichman and Mr. Zeroni wrote the following.
We would like to take reference to you letter dated
November 29, 1993 to Dr. Alex Raphaeli regarding the
question whether the Irgun Delegation, which was active in
the USA from August 1939 until the end of WWII was
indeed dispatched by the command of the IZL and whether
there are any documents confirming this decision.
The implication would be that otherwise the delegation also
called the “Committee,” the “Bergson Group,” was a self
appointed body not representing the Jewish underground.
As two surviving members of the High Command of the
“ Zeroni’s activities in Lechi are recounted in Eliav’s book, Thp Wanted.
57Conversation with Dr. Raphaeli from Jerusalem, by Joanna Saidel,,
December 12,1993.
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Irgun of that period, we gladly confirm to you that our
fighters headed by Mr. Hillel Kook, including Sam Merlin, Y.
Ben Ami, A. Ben -Eliezer, and Alex Raphaeli (Nahshon,
Hadani) indeed were appointed by the Irgun to be sent to
the USA from the different bases of their work in Europe in
order to conduct activities leading to the establishment of a
Jewish Army, on the way to the creation of a Jewish State, to
do the rescue work, saving as many as possible Jewish
people from the terror of the Germans and bringing them to
Israel.
Though during the World War II the contact between the
USA and Palestine was very difficult, the delegation carried
out, to the best of their ability, with a lot of initiative and
courage this assignment
Irgun was an underground organization under the law of
conspiracy especially in view of the British efforts to arrest
and destroy our organization.
Obviously, there was neither protocols nor w ritten
instructions, only in special cases contacting members
abroad were coded messages used.
Every member o f the Irgun who was supposed to be
informed knew exactly about the decision o f the High
Command and who the members of the delegation were.
When the delegation started setting up the national
committee for action in America public leaders, especially in
the Jewish community, knew exactly the status o f this
delegation.
Mr. Jabotinsky, the President of NZO, while in the last
months of his life, often addressed the delegation in writing
and the title addressed was always “The delegation o f the
IZL”
These letters have been published and appear in the
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published archives of the IZL in 1990, Volume 1, #53-#54,
p. 111-114.
There is a possibility that some persons involved in political
work, for reasons of their own, might try to delegitimize the
delegation, however, the publication of the work of the
delegation is in numerous books covering recent Jewish
history, research work at the universities, have this point
absolutely clear in the spirit of the decision o f the High
Command
We wish you success in your important work,

Very sincerely yours,
Aharon Heichman (and) Benjamin Zeroni58

W hile both the New Zionist Organization and the Irgun
Delegation stemmed from Jabotinsky’s Revisionist movement and,
therefore, had Revisionist origins, the path of these two groups
separated. The New Zionist Organization retained the political
characteristics of the Revisionist Party. The Irgun Delegation
deviated from Jabotinsky’s leadership, though continuing to respect
and consult with him, and became an independent m ilitary organ
which cut its ties to the Party altogether. The antagonism which
existed between the New Zionist Organization and the Irgun
Delegation was never totally resolved. The Irgun Delegation’s
decision to act independently, as a m ilitary rather than political
68Letter written to Joanna M. Saidel from M r. Zeroni and M r. Heichmann.
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entity, and, particularly, to establish a democratic, rather than a
Jewish, state in Palestine, were the determining factors in Benzion
Netanyahu’s decision to launch an all out attack on the

Irgun

Delegation. The term “Revisionist” and its application remain highly
controversial within these groups to this day. It should stand that,
while originating from the same Revisionist source, the members of
the more m ilitant Irgun Delegation to the United States were not
Revisionists (i.e. were not participants in the Revisionist political
party), in contrast to the members of the New Zionist Organization of
America.
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CONCLUSIONS

The Irgun Delegation to the United States and the New Zionist
Organization of America had both failures and successes in their
efforts to influence American public opinion. Despite their tireless
work, they failed to change the circumstances which affected the
Jews of Europe.1 Nevertheless, the Irgun Delegation succeeded in
procuring ships and arms for some rescue missions, providing
intelligence to the United States government through their contact in
Europe, Reuben Hecht, appealing to the public as non-sectarian
(rather than as a uniquely Jewish organization), creating the
foundations of the Jewish lobby in America, increasing awareness
by stirring and challenging the American public, and possibly
forestalling an outright pro-Arab foreign policy.
The New Zionist Organization was particularly effective in
publicly confronting and challenging the anti-Zionist British policy in
Palestine, in exposing the intentions of the British, and in changing
the perception of the Palestine problem w ithin American
government circles from a regional problem to a global concern.
The achievements of the N.Z.O. and the Irgun Delegation were
primarily educational and political. They affected not only the Jewish
community in the United States but the entire nation, broadening the
1Raphaeli, p. 112.
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understanding of the plight of European Jewry and revealing the
results of the silence and isolation which surrounded it.
The bitter truth was that the Allies, after great sacrifices, won
the war against Nazi Germany, whereas for the Jewish people the
doors of Palestine remained closed, the Jews were isolated, and
millions perished.2
The Kook and Netanyahu groups can be credited with creating
a successful campaign for public support in the United States. Their
contributions have been consistently overlooked in American Zionist
historiography which generally credits the mainstream Zionist
organizations with any successes achieved in the States. It is now
evident however, that the work of the Irgun Delegation and the N.Z.O.
was actually the precursor of effective mainstream Zionist activity in
America in the 1940’s. Support for this analysis can be found in the
writings of David Wyman, Monty Penkower, Walter Laqueur, Joseph
Schectmann, and in the Hecht Archive. W alter Laqueur wrote that
the Irgun Delegation, particularly Bergson and Ben Hecht, “organized
a public relations campaign. . . which all but overshadowed the
activities of the official Zionist movement.”3
archive state that

Editors of the Hecht

“scholarly literature on the subject has been

dominated by a tendency to emphasize the rescue efforts undertaken
by the “establishment” Jewish and Zionist groups... and not those of

2ibid.
3Laqueur, p. 551.
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their rivals, the “dissident organizations.”4 David Wyman praised the
Irgun Delegation for their outstanding accomplishments.
As for Jewish groups in this country, the group that was
most effective, I don’t think there is any question about it if
you look at it objectively, was the Bergson group. Which is
not to say that other Jewish groups weren’t active in trying
to publicize and to build political pressure and to get action
taken... But, among the groups involved in that, it seems to
me that the group that was most effective and the group
that was most finely focussed on the issue was the Bergson
group.s
For their time, both the Irgun Delegation and the New Zionist
Organization operated in a highly innovative manner. Launching a
nation wide advertisement campaign was considered new and
daring.
It was a new dimension. It revolutionized American Jewry.
The criticism was: “How dare you write about Jewish things
so big?” And we said, “Because they are big issues!” Who
says the Jews are a small issue, or the Jews are a small
people? We are not pygmies. We are people. It was an
innovation also in American terms, by the way. No American
organization had ever run a fu ll page ad asking for money.
Today now this is everybody’s style. Everybody runs ads.6
Another extremely important success for the Irgun Delegation
and for the New Zionist Organization was the fact that these groups
laid the foundations for the creation of the Jewish lobby in America.

4 Hecht Archive, p. ix.
5 Interview with David Wyman by Joanna Saidel, Canterbury, New
Hampshire, August 20,1993.
“Kook interview with Kaufman, p. 36.
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This accomplishment had long term benefits to Israel which exist to
this day. The congressional support garnered by these groups was
the start of this activity to lobby Washington. H illel Kook said, “We
had close to 200 Congressmen and close to 40 Senators out of a total
of 96. It is a lot of power. We were the real originators of the socalled “Jewish Lobby,” the pro-Israel lobby. And that kept us alive.7
There was a great deal of congressional support for both groups, as
well as high level adm inistrative support, for the New Zionist
Organization.8
When asked whether the Irgun Delegation founded the Jewish
lobby in America, the former Prime M inister o f Israel, Yitshak
Shamir, stated that the Irgun Delegation was extremely important to
the creation of the Jewish lobby in America. He stated that, during
and after the war, emissaries of the Zionist movement and Jewish
world organizations, such as Weizmann and Abba Eban, came to
America and to the United Nations and contributed to the creation of
the Jewish lobby, but that the Irgun Delegation pioneered the idea.9
. . . they (Weizmann, Eban, etc.) have started also a kind of
7Ibid, p. 72.
‘ This question represents a major point of controversy between the Irgun
Delegation and the New Zionist Organization. Both groups claim that they had
the m ajority of Senatorial and Congressional support and that the other group
had little or no such support. It appears, in fact, that at one time or another
each group had relatively strong support. As time passed some of the initial
support gained by the Irgun was lost to the Revisionists simply by mistakes
like the premature Bermuda Conference ad.
8Interview with Yitzak Shamir by Joanna Saidel, the Knessett, Jerusalem,
O ctoer 25,1993.
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Jewish lobby, but I think that Hillel was the pioneer of this
idea. The pioneer, the first to create a Jewish lobby. . . he
convinced some congressmen for the first time. Some not
Jewish congressmen, to help him, to support h im .. . this, I
think, it was an achievement of the group of Hillel Kook.10
One of the most remarkable successes of both the Irgun
Delegation and the New Zionist Organization was how much they
were able to achieve with an almost insignificant number of
organization members. The activist role of both the Irgun Delegation
and the N.Z.O. forced mainstream Zionist agencies, which had isolated
themselves, to reexamine their position, and, eventually, to end their
silence.

By 1943 the New Zionist Organization and the Irgun

Delegation shamed the m ajority of American Jews into action.
“Bergson and his followers remained an annoying, but perhaps
healthy, stimulant for American Zionist leaders..
Irgun delegation member, Dr. Alex Raphaeli, stated, “At the
very least, it would be fair to say that we helped to place the Jewish
problem on the American agenda, thereby making it a matter of
international concern.”12 This seems to be a very modest selfassessment.
While the war was going on, the Irgun Delegation focussed on
the issue of rescue rather than focussing, as some Zionist groups had,
10Ibid.
11Aaron Berman, Nazism: The Tews and American Zionism. Ch. 5, “The
American Zionist Lobby 1943-1945,” p. 131.
12Raphaeli, Dream and Action, p. 97.
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prim arily upon the issue of statehood. The lobbying efforts of the
Irgun Delegation in this area were

effective in drawing public

attention to the atrocities being committed in Europe.
The Bergson group did, for the most part, move their
focuses away from the statehood issue, which they also had
been working on until we learn about mass annihilation in
late 1942. They transferred most of their energies to rescue
and, given the lim ited size and the lim ited resources they
had, they achieved, I think, quite a good deal both in terms
o f publicizing the issue . . . which was a big problem
because the press didn’t do it, and then also in terms of
lobbying and getting support in Washington . . . 13
These rescue efforts during the war also accomplished positive
results in Europe. There Reuben Hecht helped to relay intelligence
to the White House through the American Council General and
Zionist sympathizer, Samuel Edison Woods, to free captured U.S.
airmen, to effect actual rescue missions, and to inform the United
States government about Axis war plans.
The Irgun Delegation applied enough public and political
pressure, particularly after the failed Bermuda Conference, to
demand the creation of the War Refugee Board. The Irgun Delegation
was one of the main forces that brought the War Refugee Board into
existence.
This has been questioned by some historians and I would
have to say they’re coming at it from a bias point of view ...
the conflict between the Bergson group back then and the
"Interview with David Wyman by Joanna Saidel, August 20, 1993,
Cantebury, New Hampshire.
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main Zionist groups, the Stephen Wise group and the Chaim
Weizmann mainline Zionists, that conflict continues on to
this day in certain Jewish circles.14
Hillel Kook commented about the creation of the War Refugee Board
by saying, “The War Refugee Board was our biggest achievement and
also our biggest failure. Hitler wasn’t killing refugees.”15
Menachem Begin commended the work of H illel Kook. Begin
stated, “His ingenuity in keeping a fierce light of publicity upon the
Irgun’s struggle was an im portant factor in the success of the
revolt”16
The tragedy of the activities of the Irgun Delegation and the
New Zionist Organization is that American mainstream Zionism
feared, resented, and, in fact, were jealous of the independent
activities of these fiercely independent groups. Had they been able to
work together in a concentrated lobbying effort, their power would
have been increased dramatically. A united Jewish effort could have
drastically altered the outcome of the fate of millions of Jews.
It is my opinion.. . that if the American Jewish leadership,
especially the Zionist leadership. . .would not have hindered
our activities, let alone joined with us or let us join with
them - which we offered and nearly achieved - then
probably as many as half the Jews of Europe would have
been saved by governmental action.. .17
14ib id.
16Kaufman interview with Hillel Kook, October 27, 1981, p. 49.
18Begin. The Revolt, p. 63. note.
17Kook interview with Kaufman, October 27, 1981, p. 48-49.
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Perhaps the greatest achievement of the Irgun Delegation to
the United States and of the New Zionist Organization of America was
not the outright success of individual campaigns to raise a Jewish
Army, to rescue the Jews of Europe, to establish a democratic Hebrew
nation in Palestine, to combat the Mandate through anti-British
propaganda, lobbying and boycotting. None of these missions was
completely successful. Rather the greatest contribution which these
organizations made was their constant struggle to place these issues
on the American public agenda and, ultim ately, onto the global
agenda.
Our public relations campaign was very successful, and our
movement included . . . a cross-section of America. It was
not a Jewish movement. In fact, the Jews were a minority
and people from all sections and all walks of life were
represented.. .18
This resulted in a far greater success than could have been
achieved by pursuing individual targets, that is, the establishment of
the only democracy in the region, the State of Israel. Had the N.Z.O.
and Irgun Delegation not been so aggressive, statehood might have
failed to come about. Palestine may have remained in British hands
or become an Arab entity. A combination of events which includes
the outbreak of the war, the extermination of a huge segment of the
Jewish population of Europe, and the outcry which ensued from the
18Raphaeli, p. 112.
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publicity efforts of the Irgun Delegation to the United States and the
New Zionist Organization of America, culminated in the long sought
dream, a Jewish National Home.
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APPENDIX A

PARTIAL LIST OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST, EXPULSIONS AND
MURDER OF, THE JEWS -720 B.C. to 1969 AD.

720 B.C. Sargon makes Samaria an Assyrian province - Mass
deportation of Israelites
586 B.C. Destruction of Jerusalem - Mass deportation to Babylon
411 B.C. Destruction of the temple of the Jewish community at
Elephantine
348 B.C. Artaxerxes III deports a number of Jews to Hyrcania
167 B.C. Antiochus IV outlaws the practice of Judaism and profanes
66 B.C. Massacre of the Jews at Alexandria
70 C.E. Destruction of Qumran community; Seige o f Jerusalem,
destruction of temple; Fall of Masada
325 C.E Christian Church formulates its policy toward the Jews: the
Jews must continue to exist for the sake of Christianity in
seclusion and humiliatian
339 C.E. Constantius II prohibits marriage between Jews and
Christians and possession of Christian slaves by Jews
438 C.E. Thoedosius II Novellae against the Jews and heretics
455 C.E Jews of Babylonia forbidden to keep the Sabbath
470 C.E. Persecutions by Babylonian authorities
525 C.E. End of Jewish kingdom in southern Arabia
612 C.E. Severe legal measures against the Jews o f Spain
628 C.E. Dagobert I expels Jews from Frankish Kingdom
632 C.E. Heraclius decrees forced baptism
633 C.E. Severe legal measures against the Jews o f Spain
638 C.E. Jerusalem conquered by the Arabs
638 C.E. Severe legal measures against the Jews o f Spain
694-711 C.E Jewish religion outlawed in Spain
1012 C.E Expulsion from Mainz
1078 C.E. Jerusalem conquered by Seljuks
1096 -1099 C.E First Crusade
1096 C.E Crusaders massacre Jews of Rhineland
1099 C.EJerusalem conquered by crusaders
1144 C.E. Blood Libel at Norwich, England
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1147-1149 C.E Second Crusade
1171 C.E Destruction of the Blois community, France
1182- 1198 C.E Expulsion of Jews from France
1187 C.E Jerusalem captured by Saladin
1190 C.E. Anti-Jewish riots in England; massacre at York
1195-1196 C.E Anti-Jewish excesses at Speyer and Boppard
(Germany/Austria)
1215 C.E. Fourth Lateran Council, Italy, introduces the Jewish Badge
1222 C.E Council of Oxford, England, introduces discriminatory
measures against Jews
1235 C.E. Blood Libel at Fulda (Germany/Austria)
1236 C.E. Persecutions against Jews in W. France
1242 C.E. Burning of Talmud at Paris
1244 C.E. Jerusalem captured by the Khwarizims
1249 C.E. Innocent IV issues bull against blood libel, Italy
1255 C.E. Blood Libel at Lincoln, England
1263-1264 C.E. Jews of London sacked
1275 C.E. Statu turn dejudaismo, England
1285 C.E. Destruction of Jewish community of Munich, Germany
1288 C.E. Jews burned at Troyes, France
1290 C.E. Expulsion of Jews from England
1298-1299 C.E. Rindfleich persecutions (Germany/Austria)
1306 -1315 C.E. Expulsion of Jews from France
1322-1359 C.E. Expulsion of Jews from the Kingdom of France
1348 C.E. Black Death Massacres, Spain
1348-1349 C.E. Black Death Massacres, France
1348-1350 C.E. Black Death Massacres, Germany & Austria
1356 C.E. Charles IV grants the Electors the privilege of taxing the
Jews
1389 C.E. Massacre of Jewish community at Prague
1391 C.E. Massacres and conversions, Spain
1399 C.E. Blood libel at Poznan (Poland-Lithuania)
1415 C.E Benedict XIII (Italy) orders censorship of Talmud
1420 C.E Expulsion of Jews from Lyons
1424 C.E Expulsion of Jews from Cologne
1427 C.E. Papal edict prohibits transportation of Jews to Eretz Israel
in ships of Venice and Ancona
1435 C.E. Massacre and conversion of Jews of Majorca
1439 C.E. Expulsion of Jews from Augsburg
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1452-1453 C.E John of Capistrano incited persecutions and
expulsions of Jews from Germany & Austria
1454 C.E. Privileges revoked; riots against Jews in Cracow
1473 C.E. Expulsion of Jews from Mainz
1473 C.E. Marranos of Valladolid and Cordoba massacred
1474 C.E. Marranos of Segovia massacred
1475 C.E. Blood libel of Trent
1480 C.E. Inquisition established in Spain
1483 C.E. Expulsion of Jews from Warsaw
1492 C.E. Expulsion of Jews from Sicily
1492 C.E Expulsion of Jews from Castile and Aragon
1495-1503 C.E. Expulsion of Jews from Lithuania
1496-1497 C.E Expulsion of Jews from Portugal; mass forced
conversion
1499 C.E. Expulsion of Jews from Nurenberg
1506 C.E. Massacre of Marranos in Lisbon
1510 C.E. Expulsion of Jews from Brandenburg
1516 C.E. Eretz Israel conquered by the Turks
1519 C.E. Expulsion of Jews from Regensburg
1531 C.E. Inquisition established in Portugal
1541 C.E Expulsion of Jews from Naples
1541 C.E. Expulsion of Jews from Prague and crown cities
1544 C.E. Luther attacks the Jews
1550 C.E Expulsion of Jews from Genoa
1551 C.E. Expulsion of Jews from Bavaria
1553 C.E. Burning of Talmud, Italy
1554 C.E. Censorship of Hebrew books introduced in Italy
1555 C.E. Paul IV orders that Jews be confined to ghettos
1556 C.E. Burning of Marranos in Ancona, Italy
1567 C.E Expulsion of Jews from the Republic of Genoa
1569 C.E Expulsion of Jews from the Papal States
1584 C.E. Gregory XIII orders compulsory sermons to Jews
1593 C.E Expulsion of Jews from Papal States
1597 C.E Expulsion of Jews from Milan
1614 C.E Fettmilch’s attack upon the Jews of Frankfort
1615 C.E. Expulsion of Jews from Worms
1624 C.E Ghetto established at Ferrara, Italy
1648-1649 C.E. Chmielnicki massacres (Poland-Lithuania)
1649 C.E. Expulsion of Jews from Hamburg

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

314
1655-1656 C.E. Massacres during wars of Poland against Sweden and
Russia
1670 C.E. Blood libel in Metz, France
1670 C.E Expulsion of Jews from Vienna
1687 C.E Jews of Paznan attacked (Poland-Lithuania)
1712 C.E Jews of Sandomierz expelled after blood libel
1734-1736 C.E. Attacks by the Haidamacks (Poland-Lithuania)
1745-1748 C.E Expulsion of Jews from Prague
1750 C.E. Severe legislation against the Jews in Prussia
1775 C.E. Anti-Jewish edict of Pius VI, Italy
1793 C.E Attack on the ghetto in Rome
1819 C.E “ Hep! Hep!” riots
1824 C.E. Expulsion of Jews from the villages of Russia
1826-1835 C.E Velizh blood libel
1839 C.E. Entire community of Meshed (Persia) forced to convert to
Islam
1840 C.E Damascus blood libel; restoration of Turkish rule in Eretz Q_
Israel
1847 C.E. Anti-Jewish riots in Prussia
1848 C.E. Anti -Jewish riots in Austria-Hungary
1871-1872 C.E. Attacls on Jews of Rumania
1879 C.E Kutais blood libel
1881-1882 C.E. Pogroms sweep southern Russia; beginning of mass
emigration of Jews
1882 C.E. Tiszaeszlar blood libel
1885 CE Expulsion of Russian refugees
1891 C.E. Expulsion of Jews from Moscow
1891 C.E Xanten blood libel
1894 C.E. Dreyfus trial
1895 C.E Anti-semitic league organized in Rumania
1900 C.E Konitz blood libel, Germany
1903 C.E. Pogrom in Kishinev (Russia-Poland)
1905 C.E. Pogroms; mass emigration (Russia-Poland)
1906 C.E Pogroms in Russia
1909-1910 C.E. Polish boycott against Jews
1910 C.E. Expulsion of Jews from Kiev
1917 C.E. The British capture Jerusalem
1919 C.E. Pogroms in Hungary
1919 C.E. Pogroms in Ukraine and Poland
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1919 C.E. Abolishment of community organization and
Jewish institutions in Russia
1924 C.E Economic restrictions on Jews in Poland; attempt to settle
Jews in Crimea
1929 C.E. Massacres in Hebron and Safed (Arab riots in Jerusalem)
1933 C.E anti-Jewish economic boycott in Germany
1935 C.E. Nuremberg Laws deprived all German Jews (i.e. anyone
who was one-quarter Jewish blood or more) of rights of
citizenship or intermarriage
1936 C.E Pogrom in Przytyk (Poland)
1937 C.E Discrimination against Jews in Polish universities
1937 C.E. Anti-Semitic legislation in Rumania
1938 C.E. Anti-Jewish economic legislation in Hungary
1938 C.E. Pogroms in Vienna; anti-Jewish legislation; Deportations
from Austria begin
1938 C.E Kristallnacht; economic ruin of German Jews
1938 C.E. Racial legislation in Italy
1938 C.E Many Hungarian Jews lose citizenship
1939 C.E. Pogroms in Poland (after Nazi invasion)
1939 C.E. Anti-Jewish laws in the Protectorate (Czechoslovakia)
1940 C.E Formation of ghettos in Poland
1940 C.E. Discrimination laws of the Vichy regime
1940-1945 C.E. A total of 139,000 Jewish victims from the
Netherlands, Belgium. Italy, Scandinavia, Switzerland
1941 C.E. Pogroms against Jews in Kaunas and Lvov, massacres by
Einsatzgruppen in occupied Russia; expulsions of Jews from the
Reich to Poland; first death camp established in Poland at
Chelmno
1941 C.E Pogrom in Jassy (Rumania)
1941 C.E. Anti-Jewish laws in Slovakia
1941 C.E. Jewish emigration from Germany prohibited
1941 C.E Opening of concentration camp at Drancy ( France)
1941-1944 C.E 83,000 Jews of France deported from and murdered
1942 C.E. Massacres in occupied Russia continue, death camps at
Auschwitz, Maidanek and Treblinka begin to function at full
capacity; transports from the ghettos to death camps
1942-1944 C.E. Mass transports of Jews to Auswitz from Belgium and
Holland
1943 C.E. Transports from all over Europe bring Jews to death camps
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in Poland; Warsaw ghetto revolt; Annihilation of most of the
ghettos of Poland and Russia
1943-1944 C.E 7,500 Italian Jews murdered
1944 C.E. Extermination of Hungarian Jews began
1944-1945 C.E A total of 557,000 Jewish victims from Rumania,
Hungary, Greece, and Yugoslavia
1945 C.E A total of 125,000 Jews of Germany murdered
1945 C.E A total of 342,000 Jewish of Austria and Czechoslovakia
murdered
1945 C.E A total of 4,565,000 Jews of Poland murdered
1946 C.E Pogroms at Kielce and other places of mass emigration
1948 C.E Jewish culture in U.S.S.R. repressed and intellectuals shot
1956 C.E. Jews of Egypt expelled
1969 C.E. Jews executed in Iraq
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APPENDIX B

The following is the complete text from the Congressional Record of
Senator Mead’s speech favoring the creation of a Jewish Army.

Congressional Record
Proceedings and debates of the 77th Congress, Second Session

A Jewish Armv
Extension of Remarks of
HON. JAMES E. MURRAY
of Montana
In the Senate of the United States
Wednesday, May 6, 1942 (Legislative day April 30, 1942)

Mr. Murray. M r. President, I ask unanimous consent to have
printed in the Appendix o f the Record a very able address delivered
by the distinguished Senator from New York [Mr. Mead] at a dinner
given in New York at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel on May 3, 1942,
discussing the proposal for the creation of a Jewish Army.
There being no objection, the address was ordered to be
printed in the Record, follows:
Pierre Van Paassen belongs to that small group of men to
whom America and world democracy w ill forever be indebted. For
Mr. Van Paassen is one of the most distinguished members of that
fellowship of journalists who have been trying to arouse us to what
has been happening in the world. W ith sustained eloquence,
crusading fervor, desperate urgency, he has been hammering away
at us, “that it was later than any of us thought.” If we have finally
awakened, Mr. Van Paassen has played an im portant role in that
awakening.
But Van Paassen has done much more than to provide us with
mere recital o f events. He has helped us to understand the real
meaning of those events. He recognized long ago that the vast
struggle in which we of the United Nations are now engaged, is much
more than a battle for spoils. It is more than a clash of empires. Its
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roots lie deeper than the megalomania of a Hitler, a Mussolini, or a
Japanese war clique. This war, Van Paassen has been telling us for
years, is a total war. It is a total war not simply because it covers the
earth and the seas and the heavens; it is a total war because it is a
death struggle between civilizations; between diametrically opposed
conceptions of life, between those who would preserve for all the
opportunity to go forward to greater freedom and greater progress,
and those who would impose a system of slavery on all mankind.
And because it is that kind of total war, the faiths and the hopes and
the ideals of men, are weapons no less important than the arms they
wield. We need total mobilization of all our spiritual and moral
weapons.
It has taken us a long time to develop that conception of total
war. Indeed, the fact that we must meet as late as May 1942 to
demand the formation of a Jewish army is distressing proof that we
have not even yet fully understood that conception. If we did, there
would today be in the Middle East, in Palestine, around Suez, a
Jewish army fighting proudly and equally with all other peoples in
the cause of liberty and freedom.
We have passed through several stages in our thinking about
the war. There was a period that w ill go down in history as the
Munich period, when we thought we could safeguard democracy by
bargaining with its enemies, by making a deal with tyranny.
September 3, 1939, shattered that illusion. On that day the lesson
was written in letters of blood for all to see; in a world that had been
shrunk to a fraction of its former size by the achievements of science,
democracy and Naziism could not live side by side.
But even after that date we persisted in illusions. There were
many of us in this country who thought we could defeat the forces of
darkness by helping our friends with materials, by providing them
with arms with which to smash the common foe. That, indeed, saved
democracy from defeat But it could not give us victory. The Japanese
shattered that illusion for us. On December 7, 1941, we finally
learned that we could not save ourselves from slavery merely by
building the arms for others to use. We, ourselves, had to take up
those arms. We, ourselves, had to man the planes and the ships and
the tanks we were building. We had to take our place in the fighting
ranks of humanity, shoulder to shoulder with all the brave and
gallant peoples who had been facing the fury of the Axis attack
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But even at this late hour, our conception of total war is still
inadequate. We are still far from complete mobilization of our
material resources. We are even further from total mobilization of
our moral strength. And by that, I mean simply this: There are
throughout the world, in the ranks of the United Nations, on the side
of democracy - yes: and among the conquered peoples of Europegreat reservoirs of strength which we are failing to use. There are
sources of manpower and materials we are not enlisting in our battle
for freedom. There are powerful ideals and values and aspirations,
which we are failing fully to utilize. And those faiths and ideals, as I
have already suggested, are no less important to us in this war of
“faiths and ideals” than the weapons our factories are producing.
For years we made the mistake of trying to compromise with
our sworn enemies. We are paying in blood, sweat and tears for that
mistake. Today we are committing another grave error. We are
failing to use to the full, the energies and loyalties and abilities of all
our friends.
For years, we made the mistake of trying to compromise with
our democratic ideals. Today we are repeating that mistake. We are
not fully mobilizing our moral resources. We are failing to make
imaginative and aggressive use of the dynamic power of freedom
and equality. We are failing to give to the peoples of the world a
ringing and inspiring affirmation, not merely of the things we are
fighting against but of the things we are fighting for.
The need for, the very existence of your committee for an army
of stateless and Palestinian Jews - a cause to which I am proud to
give my fullest support - is eloquent proof of our failure to
understand the meaning of total war. I am no m ilitary strategist. I
have no access to the plans of the Axis general staffs. I don’t pretend
to understand H itler’s intuitions. But I do know a few plain and
simple facts. Hitler is on the edge of the Caucasus attempting a drive
to the east. The Japanese are in Burma driving west. Rommel is in
Libya heading for Suez. That to me means clearly one thing: That the
Axis forces are making a gigantic attempt to converge on the Middle
East; that Hitler wants to grasp with his mailed fist that has crushed
so many brave peoples the treacherous hand of the Japanese,
dripping with the blood of the heroes of Baatan and Singapore, and
Java. And I know one other thing: Suez is virtually the last bastion
we command between Malta and Australia. Its loss would be a
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catastrophe.
Iraq and Iran are among the last remaining sources of oil - the
most vital of all commodities in this war of machines. That oil is no
less vital for our victory than it would be for Axis fortunes. My
business is not prophesy, at least not prophesying the result of
m ilitary campaigns. But you don’t have to be a prophet to realize that
the next major theatre of conflict is bound to be the Near and Middle
East.
Again let me repeat, I am no m ilitary strategist. But it is
absolutely obvious that if we were really lighting a total war, we
should be mobilizing every single person in that area, every bit of
material that is available there. We should be attempting to inspire
democracy’s friends in the Near East w ith the unflinching
determ ination, w ith the unbreakable resolve, to throw back the
assault the Axis is preparing to unleash.
Are we doing that? Are we really applying to the Near East the
lessons we learned in Singapore, in Crete, in Hong Kong? The
existence of your committee for a Jewish Army is the reply to that
question. And it is a negative reply.
For the plain facts are that at this vary moment there stands in
the Near East, 75 miles from Suez, the modem Jewish community of
Palestine. A half million strong. A community pulsating with creative
energy; possessed of an amazing degree o f special skills and abilities;
passionately dedicated to the cause of democracy and freedom;
aware to a man that its alternatives are the victory of world
democracy or death; desperately anxious to fight back against the
oppressor who began his ruthless attack on civilization by attacking
the Jewish people. Already, Jewish Palestine has made a magnificent
contribution to the cause of the United Nations. It has given of itself,
of its men and materials far beyond its numbers and size. The
heroism of those Jews who fought and died so bravely in Crete, in
Greece, in Libya, on the Mediterranean, w ill ennoble the annals not
only of Jewish history, but the pages of world history.
But there are still many tens of thousands of able-bodied Jews
in Palestine who clamour for the opportunity to fight in this common
battle for civilization. There are tens of thousands of stateless Jews
throughout the world who have been given no place in the ranks of
the United Nations. Joined together in the ranks of a Jewish army,
these people would constitute a m ilitary force that would
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immeasurably strengthen the position of the United Nations in the
Near East. Fighting under the inspiration of their own symbols, they
would be raised to a pitch of enthusiasm that would make them a
fighting force second to none. Granting the Jews of Palestine equality
among the United Nations in this struggle, would inspire oppressed
people everywhere. We would be offering living proof of our
determination to restore the freedom of which they have been so
cruelly robbed.
I do not want to attempt any analysis of the reasons why we
have failed to organize the Jews of Palestine into a Jewish army.
Surely we should have realized by this time that in total war nothing
less than total mobilization of all our men and materials and energies
everywhere w ill suffice to give us victory. Surely we should
recognize that to discriminate against the Jews, living in their
national homeland, by refusing them the status and dignity we have
granted to all other free peoples, is to set aside the sacred principles
for which we are fighting.
Our refusal, I fear very much, is a hangover of an earlier period
in our thinking and politics. It is a hangover of the attempt to win
doubtful friends and to influence wavering people. Today, we can
have no patience with such efforts. Less appeasement and more
vision, less fear and more courage- these are the urgent needs of the
moment. And there, in Palestine, is one vital instance where we can
demonstrate such statesmanship and vision and courage.
If, we of the United Nations were to say tonight: “Jews of
Palestine. You, who know so well the meaning o f persecution and
slavery, and who therefore so profoundly appreciate the meaning of
freedom and human dignity. You who are so desperately anxious to
join in crushing the common enemy of all mankind. We want you to
join with us in that struggle. We want you to join, not as you already
so magnificently have done, as an anonymous entity, as a people
whose name the communiques dare not mention. We want you with
us as a full partner in battle and, therefore, as a fu ll partner in
freedom. And we want you to unfurl in the society of nations, the
Jewish banner, that inspiring symbol which through your glorious
work in Palestine, you have made synonymous with courage, with
heroism, with unbreakable resolve. We w ill use every man you can
muster. We want every resource you can command. We need every
atom of energy you possess.”
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My friends, if we were to say that to the Jews of Palestine
tonight, do you think Adolf Hitler would be very happy? I hardly
think so-and for a very simple reason. Such a declaration would
mean that we of the United Nations are finally determined never
again to repeat the tragedy of “too little and too late.” It would mean
that we are acting in time to safeguard one of the most valuable
bastions in our possession by mobilizing every available man, every
available resource for its defense. It would mean that we have
finally learned that to win this war, we must mobilize democracy’s
friends everywhere. It would mean that we have determined to use
to the fullest the tremendous dynamic of the democratic ideal. It
would mean that we have begun to implement our promises to the
oppressed and conquered peoples of the world by granting dignity
and equality to all people who are fighting with us in freedom’s
battle.
That a Jewish army w ill be organized in the Near East, I have
little doubt. I know that m ilitary necessity, elementary justice, and
simple common sense w ill ultim ately triumph. But w ill we act in
time?
That, in Palestine no less than elsewhere, w ill determine
whether we are doomed to years of devastating and costly conflict or
whether we shall go forward, speedily, resolutely, efficiently, to that
certain victory on which the future of civilization depends.
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APPENDIX C
Extension of Remarks
of

Hon. James M. Mead
of New York
In the Senate of the United States
Thursday, May 7, 1942
Mr. Mead. M r. President, I ask unanimous consent to have inserted
in the Appendix of the Record a notable address delivered by my
distinguished colleague, the junior Senator from Montana [Mr.
Murray], at the testimonial dinner for Pierre Van Paassen, sponsored
by the Committee for an Army of Palestinian and Stateless Jews, on
Sunday evening, May 3, 1942, at the W aldorf - Astoria Hotel, New
York City.
There being no objection, the address was ordered to be
printed in the Record, as follows:
Mr. Toastmaster, our honored and distinguished guest, Pierre
Van, Paassen of the Committee for an Army of Palestinian and
Stateless Jews, ladies and gentlemen, I am happy to be here tonight
and to have the privilege of taking part in this program. Like all true
Americans, I am proud of the fact that I live in a country which
possesses the highest measure of freedom and liberty in the world a country where it is possible for men and women of all races or
creeds to freely assemble, as we do here tonight, and express
ourselves openly and fearlessly on any subject relating to human
liberty and justice.
Today, the eyes and thoughts of all humanity are focused on
that cruel and deadly struggle now taking place on the battlefields of
Europe and other far- flung areas of the world - a struggle which will
determine the future of civilization and of freedom for centuries to
come. In this great sanguinary battle which w ill decide the shape of
things for the future there must be no irremediable mistakes; there
must be no failure to mobilize to the fullest degree all the ideological
foes of Hitler’s totalitarian philosophy, wherever they may be found.
All the vital forces of the world, wherever they exist, opposed to the
pagan doctrines of Hitler, must be mobilized in this fight for human
liberty and justice.
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When I first heard through the press of the activities of your
committee for a Jewish army, I was frankly skeptical of the proposal.
To me it seemed improper to suggest an armed force made up of
members of a particular race or religion. It did not appear to me to
be in harmony with American principles of common citizenship in
this free country of ours-a country where our Jewish fellow citizens
have always carried their full share of responsibility as Americans,
and where they are today carrying out in the fullest measure their
share of the war burden. It had seemed to me at first that there
should not be any talk of any special Jewish army. But since I have
come to study and understand the plan, I can see that a Jewish army
composed solely and entirely of Palestinian and stateless Jews can be
made a most effective force for the defeat of Hitler’s campaign in the
Middle East. It is, of course, not contemplated that this army is to be
organized in this country. It w ill mobilize a substantial force of free
men, not now organized, in an area where they are needed, men
whose intense feelings have been aroused and who w ill constitute a
fighting force to reckon with our enemies.
In this plan I see no intention whatsoever of differentiating,
directly or indirectly, between Americans of Jewish and other stocks
in their proper participation in the war effort. The plan is to organize
those fighting men of Palestine who are now unorganized and who
can, under this proposal, be made a very effective factor in the
defeat of Hitler. With this understanding of the proposal, I have no
hesitation in saying that I am an enthusiastic advocate of such an
army.
The United Nations cannot afford to overlook the offer of a
middle eastern Jewish army. They cannot ignore a proposal designed
to strengthen physically and morally the democratic forces of the
world by the creation of a new army of a couple hundred thousand
fighting men who have been uncompromising foes of H itler ever
since his ascension to power.
It is easy to see that on purely moral and Christian grounds an
indisputable case can be established for the formation of an army
made up of Palestinian and stateless Jews. We all know that
followers of the Christian faith for years before the outbreak of the
war have stood aghast at the barbarous persecution of Jews by the
Nazi regime in Germany. Yet, because o f the principles o f
international law and diplomatic relations between countries, they
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were unable to do much about i t But now we are engaged in a lifeand-death struggle for the preservation of democracy and of
Christianity itself, and to insure victory we must mobilize every
available force in the world.
These stateless Jews feel bound by the dictates of honor and
the preservation of their ideals, to offer themselves in this struggle,
It seems clear to me that we in this country should do everything in
our power to remove any technical obstacles to the accomplishment
of their purpose and the vindication of their honor. This is the least
we can do to atone for the years of inaction and idleness during
which we permitted Hitler to expand his m ilitary power and cany on
his inhuman efforts to annihilate both Jewry and Christendom in
Germany and mass his forces for a supreme attack against world
civilization.
On moral grounds the case for a Jewish army, as I see it, is a
case so logical and unanswerable that there can be no basis for
questioning it. I w ill not undertake to pursue this point further.
But wholly aside from a moral basis for the establishment of a
Jewish army, as proposed by your committee, there is a selfish
reason for such a plan. That selfish reason is that the United Nations
needs a Jewish army in the Middle East as part and parcel of a total
pattern of world strategy essential to destroy H itler. It is not
necessary to be a m ilitary expert to realize that the Jewish army
which is here proposed would be a very substantial reinforcement to
the armies opposing H itler in the Middle East In that theatre of the
war there is an absolute need for all the possible manpower that can
be mustered to block the advance of the Nazi forces.
In connection with this m atter I am thinking always of the
main fact that this war must be won and Hitler must be destroyed. It
requires only common sense to understand that the m ilitary
situation today is such that if we are to win, we must put into the
field armed forces in the greatest possible number and at the most
strategic points. Right where this army w ill be assembled is one of
the most strategic areas of the war. If, therefore, there is such
manpower available-manpower that can be depended upon to fight
to the last breath of life rather than surrender - why should there be
the slightest hesitation to make use of it? This is especially obvious
since these armed forces you are proposing to organize are located
substantially right in the area involved, and w ill, therefore, not
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require the use of our extremely lim ited shipping facilities for
transportation.
Thus, for selfish reasons alone, we in this country should have
undertaken to encourage this idea of a Jewish army if it had not
already been proposed.
As the eleventh hour of this desperate global conflict
approaches, no time remains for futile discussion. This proposal is a
practical one. The Jewish army is not a theory; it is not a vague idea;
it is a fact which can be realized if our ally, Great Britain, wills it so. I
feel certain that the British people and their m ilitary leaders desire
this army, and that their recognized political leaders, Churchill and
Cripps, w ill surely approve it.
We in this country find it difficult to understand why there
should be any hesitation by the British Government in giving
wholehearted approval to the plan of a Jewish army. If it were a
m atter to be decided by the American people, I know what the
decision would be. A plan which proposes that tens of thousands of
intrepid young Jews of Palestine and the Middle East should be given
an opportunity to oppose Hitler’s bloody march toward India and the
subjugation of the world would be instantly accepted. If there were
a matter to be decided here, this proposed Jewish army would be
mobilized without a moment’s delay.
My friends, it is my belief that the establishment of this Jewish
army, if carried out, w ill prove to be of great value - yes, a very vital
step in the conduct of our total war against the Axis Powers. I wish
your committee Godspeed in your efforts, and I give you my full
assurance of unqualified support.
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APPENDIX D
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
The Tewish Armv
Extension of Remarks
of
Hon. James A Shanley
of Connecticut
In the House of Representatives
Tuesday, May 12,1942
Mr. Shanley. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the
Record, I include the address of Alfred A. Strelsin, chairman of the
executive board, Committee for a Jewish army, delivered at the
Waldorf - Astoria on May 3,1942.
It gives a vivid story o f the movement which all o f us who are
fighting the Axis ought to know. It speaks for itself:
Honored guests, ladies, and gentlemen, this dinner is a
testim onial to Pierre Van Paassen, well-known author, war
correspondent and lecturer: A great humanitarian, a fighter for
freedoms and the dignity of man. To Pierre Van Paassen, the
chairman for the committee for an army of stateless and Palestinian
Jews.
This committee is composed of hundreds of leading American
men and women of all walk of life, including Congressmen, Senators,
and men of high places in the Army and the Navy, who, with their
now millions of followers, are urging England to permit the creation
of an army of stateless and Palestinian Jews to fight under allied
command.
You might ask “why should we in America be concerned with
an army in the Near East?” The answer is very simple. The Near East
means one of the largest and richest oil areas in the world - Iraq and
Iran. The Near East means the pathway to the world’s greatest pincer
movement - the Near East means the back door to Russia - and the
gateway to the Suez Canal; the life line for supplies that keep all our
Allies fighting. The Near East means Palestine, the land of religions
and the cradle o f civilization; the land that now has become one of
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the most strategic center points of the war because of its proximity to
the Suez Canal - only 75 miles away - the Palestine that Jewish
people, w ith superhuman zeal, sweat, and blood, have in one
generation, transformed from an empty desert into a land rich with
fine farms, golden orange groves and swiftly growing modern cities.
These Palestinian Jews, who have conquered the soil, the rocks,
and all the natural obstacles, who know the terrain and understand
guerrilla warfare, together with their stateless and disinherited
brethren scattered through the Near East, 200,000 strong, are
offering themselves to be organized into an army to protect the Suez
Canal. O rdinarily, 200,000 men would not appear to be very
important, but today there are only 350,000 Allied soldiers in the
entire Near East, an area larger than the United States; and because
of the difficulty of transportation, an additional 200,000 men on the
scene may be the deciding factor in the most significant battle of the
world’s greatest struggle. Only today copies arrived in this country
of the London Daily M irror that contain a statement of General
Wavell to the effect that the reason they lost the Far East was due to
their use of practically untrained soldiers as they dared not further
deplete their already inadequate forces of the Near and Middle East
by the transfer of a few much - needed divisions from there.
The now stateless Jews were the first to feel the persecutions
and sadistic oppression of the brutal Nazis. It is these men who have
seen their homes destroyed, their families murdered, their women
mutilated, who want to fight these fiendish Huns; men who would
fight with a fanaticism that only the experience o f such horrors
makes possible, and who, knowing their fate if captured, would fight
to the death. These people constitute the only manpower available on
the spot and with thousands of them army trained, having escaped
from the defeated armies of Czechoslovakia, Greece, Yugoslavia, and
other unhappy nations, become the men of the hour. W ith a
background, the results of which may decide this war, America must
be and is concerned. With our Allies calling upon us for men and
materials for the Near East, some 12,000 miles away, and with a
recognized shortage of transports and convoys, it becomes important
to America that all existing manpower in any section of the world,
who are imbued with the spirit of democracy and world freedom,
should be utilized.
Yes, we plead with England to permit the creation of this army
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so that they, too, may fight for the universal cause of democracy and
for the extermination o f the verminous Nazi - Fascist menace, in
concert with all other people who are fighting for the emancipation of
the world. One doesn’t have to be devout to feel that there is some
sort o f religious destiny in the fact that these 200,000 stateless and
Palestinian Jews are now available to prevent Hirohito from shaking
bloody hands with Hitler. Perhaps the moral law of retribution is
about to come into its own.
This dinner marks the closing o f the first chapter of our
campaign, known as the formative stage. The second chapter w ill be
devoted to making this army idea a reality. Through the use of the
press, the radio, and the speakers’ platforms, we hope to impress
Great Britain with the American public desire to give concrete
expression to Churchill’s recent statement that this is not a war for
territorial controls, nor subordination of people, but for the freedom
of the world, the dignity o f man, and equality of all races, colors, and
creeds - which utterances were so deservedly lauded by the well known commentator, Upton Close, last Sunday.
We know that the thinking Americans w ill help us find the
financial means with which to do this, and we fervently hope that
before long we shall have another dinner - that one to be held in
celebration of the accomplished fact
And now, I have the privilege of introducing the next speaker
of the evening, one of the most distinguished citizens of the State of
New York, with a defense record that marks him one of America’s
leading statesmen, whose constant fighting for humanity has
indelibly inscribed him in our heart - the Honorable James M. Mead,
United States Senator from the great State of New York.
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APPENDIX E

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
On the Jewish Army
Extension of Remarks of
Hon. Andrew L. Somers of New York
In the House of Representatives
Thursday, May 7, 1942
Mr. Somers of New York. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend
my remarks in the Record, I include an address delivered by Peter
Bergson, national director of the Committee for a Jewish Army, at a
dinner given at the Waldorf - Astoria Hotel on May 3,1942:
The President of the United States, in his striving for
truth and righteousness, is looking for a name to baptize this war.
The need and difficulty in naming the present war stems from the
fact that the question, “When did this war start?” remains
unanswered.
Pierre Van Paassen, like any prophet and fighter for
justice, does not recognize strictly official data and chronology. Before
September 1939 there were bloody rehearsals on many theatres of
war on the globe - in China, Abyssinia, Spain, and Palestine. Van
Paassen watched and understood the meaning of these rehearsals.
Through his books, articles, and lectures, he became a herald and
prophet of the fight against fascism and Naziism.
We Palestinian Jews have had the arduous task of
meeting the spearhead of the fascist and Nazi tyrants in the Middle
East long before 1939. We took up weapons in our hands in order to
fight a sub - war, provoked and led by Axis agitators and officers and
Arab-Nazis like the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem. For three years there
raged in Palestine a ruthless campaign which murdered not only
Jewish men, women, and children but also British officials and
soldiers. We were forced to meet the enemy with rifles and bombs.
We who met these Axis vanguards on the hills of Judea and Galilee,
in the slums of Jerusalem and Haifa, on the roads of Tel Aviv and
Yafa; we who were forced to answer with force the Nazi provocations
against the Jews and the British from 1936; we representatives of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

331
this Palestinian youth are here in fu ll dress at a banquet and
conference begging the right to continue this fight against Naziism
and fascism we started long ago-now, when the whole of humanity is
struggling for survival.
This was the era of the Chamberlains and Daladiers, of
Munich and Berchesgaden. Appeasement was at its height not only in
London and Paris, but also in Cairo and Jerusalem. And then the time
came when the world began to awake and recognize its mortal
enemies - a world war was on and millions of people died for
blunders of their misguided leaders. The weakened democracies are
straining every ounce of energy to stem the tide, and yet, the people
standing the brunt of the enemy’s attack for years before, single and empty-handed, without friends or support from the big free
world around them, are still denied equal opportunity to fulfill their
duty in the crusade for the destruction of the now common foe.
And yet the Jews of Palestine today are submitted to the
shameful status o f “Schutz-Juden” - protected Jews. Use your
imagination, free Americans, and try to understand what 100,000
sturdy Palestinian Jews feel, when submitted to forced passivity have their parents, wives, and children and their country defended
by Americans, Englishmen, Poles, Czechs, and Frenchmen - protected
Jews, second-grade citizens of God’s earth.
So, my colleagues and I came here with a message, a message
to a great people , who have been destined to save the world. “Give
the Jews of Palestine and those disinherited Jews of the world guns,
airplanes, and tanks. Give them a flag-create a Jewish army.”
Nothing can express more concisely the differences between
the evil of Nazidom and the justice of the United Nations, than the
Jewish army on our side of the front.
One of the greatest battles o f history was won with the
command “England expects every man to do his duty.” Every man did
his duty, and England became the mightiest sea power in the world. I
know of no more concise a form to express the message we brought
to this country than those historic words of Nelson. We Said, “We
want to do our duty.” Two hundred thousand men want to fu lfill
their duty in the world that was plunged into a frightful, chaotic, and
bloody mess, just because so many people failed to fulfill their duties.
It is only because this same world has not freed itself of an unjust
and futile discrim ination that these 200,000 jews are being
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prevented from fulfilling their duty for their people and dignity and
human civilization.
In these United States, the land of human liberties and genius,
the reception to our cause was as complete as we had dared hope.
First, came a symbol of America’s greatness, a giant of letters, a
brave soldier, and a prophet of his generation - Pierre Van Paassen,
Dutch by birth, Canadian on the field of battle, and yet, so completely
and cherished an American.
W ith prophetic clarity he foresaw the trend of future
developments. “The Axis’ march around the oceans, the conquest by
land of Malaya and Singapore, and the pending climatic battle of the
Middle East. Then came other great Americans, admirals, generals,
statesmen, presidents of universities, and thousands of everyday
stout-hearted Americans, who gave us their blessings and support. If
I were to return today to my country, and speak to our men there
who are eagerly awaiting the call to arms, it would be a message of
great cheer and hope that I could bring them from the Committee for
a Jewish army, and the many thousands of its active supporters and
millions of followers.
Of course our task is not achieved yet, and the Jewish army
has not as yet raised its banner on the field of battle. But no task of
great historic magnitude, has ever been easily achieved. We have,
however, succeeded in putting the Jewish army question on the map,
together with the other problems the United Nations will have to face
and solve before victory is achieved.
Bringing you here tonight the feelings and sentiments of
100,000 brave and fearless Palestinian Jews, I would like to assure
you, Pierre Van Paassen, and all of your colleagues in the fight for a
Jewish army, that the army’s formation is a foregone conclusion. No
power on earth can now prevent the formation of a Jewish army, as
no power on earth succeeded to defeat the army of the Yugoslav
Chetniks. But it is up to the democratic powers to determine whether
the Jewish army w ill be a strong, well-equipped and trained army,
comprising at least 200,000 Jews, who are Hitler’s arch enemies and
who have no other or better way to fight him, or that this be a
guerrilla army that w ill do its best behind the lines of the Axis
hordes.
The youth of Palestine will fight with determination of people
who know that: “Dying on one’s feet is better than living on one’s
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knees.” We w ill fight because out there has grown a generation that
has again learned something that Jews have long forgotten, and that
is to kill. For generations we have learned to die a m ultitude of
deaths, the fighting Jews of Palestine have learned to kill a ruthless
enemy.
Assuring and pledging the readiness of his gallant people to
fight to the last, a great leader has appealed to these United States
for tools to do the job. America answered the call - 333tools were
given. As a small man o f a great and ancient people, I appeal to these
United States, and to the same Mr. Churchill to give us the tools, and
we will do our job.
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APPENDIX F

Committee for a Jewish Army List
(Membership list as it appears on their official stationery)

Hon. Chairmen
Dr. Samuel Harden Church
Col. John Henry Patterson D. S. 0.

Pierre Van Paassen-Chairman
Louis Fitch, K.C.-Vice Chairman
Alfred A. Strelsin-Chairman-Executive Board and Trustee
Meir Grossman- Vice Chairman-Executive Board
Peter Bergson-National Director
Gabriel A. Wechsler-S’e creta/y

Committee
Very Rev. H.P. Almon Abbott-Bishop o f Lexington, Ky.
Hallet Abend-Foreign Correspondent
Rabbi Aaron Ashinsky, Pittsburg Pa.
Repr. William B. Barry (N.Y.)
Dr. Carl Beck-Surgeon , Chicago
Y. Ben Ami, Palestine
Repr. George H. Bender, (Ohio)
A. Ben-Eliezer, Palestine
Rabbi Bernard Bergman, New York, N.Y.
Rabbi Joshua Bloch, New Hyde Park, N. Y.
Rabbi Philip D. Bookstaber, Harrisburg, Pa.
Rabbi Jacob Bosniak, Brooklyn, N.Y.
Repr. Fred Bradley, (Mich.)
Repr. Michael J. Bradley (Pa.)
Joseph Brainin-Publicist
Rabbi William G. Braude, Providence, R.I.
Hon. Miller M. Brister, Chairman, New York City Fusion Party
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Louis Bromfield-Au thor
Senator Prentiss M. Brown (Mich.)
Rev. Duncan H. Browne, St. James Church, Chicago
Repr. Charles A. Buckley (N. Y.)
Struthers Burt-A uthor
Bishop James Cannon, Jr., Richmond, Va.
Eddie Cantor- Actor
Repr. Louis J. Capozzoli, (N.Y.)
Rabbi D.A. Jessurun Cardozo, New York, N. Y.
Dr. O. C. Carmichael, Chancellor, Vanderbilt University
Russell Gordon Carter-Author
Carrie Chapman Catt, Civic Leader
Dr. Emmanuel Chapman, Fordham University
Rabbi Jechiel M. Charlop, Bronx, N.J.
Rabbi B. L Chayet, Roxbury, Mass.
Dr. Rufus E. Clement-Pres., Atlanta University
Rabbi Rudolph I. Coffee, San Francisco, Cal.
Rabbi Armond E. Cohen, Cleveland, Ohio
Rabbi Herman M. Cohen, St. Paul, Minn.
George Hamilton Combs, Jr.-Radio Commentator
Jerome Count, Attorney, N. Y.
Thomas T. Craven - Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy (Retired)
Assemblyman Robert J. Crews, Brooklyn, N.Y.
Repr. Thomas H. Cullen, (N.Y.)
Prof. Elliott C. Cutler, Harvard University
Repr. Thomas D’Alesandro, Jr. (Md.)
Morecai Danzis-Joumalist
Prof. Taraknath Das, College of the City of N. Y.
Senator James J. Davis, (Pa.)
G. B. Dealey-Chairman, Dallas Morning News
Dr. Clarence R. Decker-Pres., University of Kansas City
Repr. Charles S. Dewey, (111.)
Repr. Samuel Dickstein, (N. Y.)
Repr. John D. Dingell, (Mich.)
Melvyn Douglas-Acfor
Repr. Le Roy D. Downs, (Conn.)
Dr. Stephen Duggan-Dir., Inst, of International Educ.
Repr. Herman P. Eberharter (Pa.)
Rabbi Nachman H. Ebin, Brooklyn, N.Y.
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Oscar W. Ehrhom-ftes., Nat Fed. of Church Clubsof U. S.
(Episcopalian)
Rabbi Hebert Fedder, Laurelton, L I.
Rabbi Louis Feinberg, Cincinnati, Ohio
Repr. Ivor D. Fenton, (Pa.)
Lion Feuchtwanger-Author
B. P. Fineman-Mofcron picture Producer
Rabbi Jesse J. Finkle, Newport News, Va.
Prof. H. H. Fisher-Stanford University
Repr. James M. Fitzpatrick, (N.Y.)
Rt. Rev. Msgr. E. J. Flanagan, Boys Town, Nebraska
Repr. Thomas F. Ford, (Calif.)
Bruno Trarik-Author
Waldo Frank-A uthor
Rabbi Benjamin Friedman, Syracuse, N.Y.
K. Bertram Friedman-Attorney, New York
Repr. Fred C. Gartner, (Pa.)
Dr. Christian Gauss-Dean, PrincetonUniversity
Oscar Gavrilovitch-Royal Yugoslav Consul
Otto Gavrilovitch- Yugoslav Statesman
Repr. Bertrand W. Gearhart (Calif.)
Rabbi David L Genuth, Cleveland, Ohio
Manfred George-Editor, Aufbau
Senator Guy M. Gillette (Iowa)
Rabbi Roland B. Gittelsohn, Lynbrook, L.I.
Rabbi Isaac Goldfarb. Brooklyn, N.Y.
Rabbi David A. Goldstein, Omaha, Nebraska
Rabbi Abraham V. Goodman, Davenport, Iowa
Dr. H.L Gordon, Past National Commander, World War Vetrans
American Palestine Jewish Legion
Repr. George Grant, (Ala.)
William Green-Pres. American Federation of Labor
Rabbi Wm. P. Greensfeld-Waterbury, Conn.
Hon. Dwight Griswold-Govemor of Nebraska
Mrs. John Gunther-Author and Lecturer
Rev. Ernest Graham Guthrie, Chicago Congregation Union
Dr. Alexander B. Hadani, Palestine
Morris W. Haft-/ndustrialist
Rabbi Naftali H. Halpem, Newark, N.J.
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Rabbi Israel Harburg, Lynn, Mass.
Sir Cedric Hardwicke-Actor
Repr. Vincent Harrington (Iowa)
Dr. Franklin S. Harris-Pres., Brigham Young University
Hon. George J. Harter-Mayor of Akron, Ohio
Rabbi Gustav N. Hausmann, New York, N. Y.
Mark Hawley-Radio Commentator
Miriam Hayman, Palestine
Ira A. Hayes, Brigadier General, U. S. Army (Retired)
Ben Hecht-Aufhor
Captain Jeremiah Helpem-Director, Jewish Marine League
Burnet Hershey-Padio Commentator
Dr. Ernest 0. Holland, Pres., State College of Washington
Dr. J Shelton Horsley, St Elizabeth’s Hospital, Va.
Bronislaw Huberman- V iolinist
Hon. Robert A. Hurley- Governor of Connecticut
Harry P. Huse, Vice-Admiral, U. S. Navy (Retired)
Wallace Irwin-A uthor
Eri Jabotinsky, Palestine
Hon.Howard W. Jackson, Mayor of Baltimore, Md.
Hon. R. M. Jefferies, Governor of South Carolina
Rt. Rev. Thomas Jenkins-Bishop o f Nevada
Rev. Albert S. Johnson, Memphis, Tenn.
Senator Edwin C. Johnson, (Colo.)
Dr. A. S. Kagan, New York, N. Y.
Rabbi Charles Kahane, Brooklyn, N.Y.
Prof. Eric Kahler
Rabbi Jacob H. Kaplan, Miami, Fla.
Rabbi M. A. Kaplan, Brooklyn, N. Y.
Rabbi Dr. Jacob Katz, Bronx, N. Y.
Samuel L. Katz, New York, N.Y.
Rabbi Reuben Kaufman, Paterson, N.J.
Rabbi C. Hillel Kauvar, Denver, Colo.
Rabbi Julius Kerman, Lorain, Ohio
Hans Kindler-Conductor, Natl. Synphony Orchestra
Repr. Arthur G. Klein, (N. Y.)
Rabbi Isaac Klein, Springfield, Mass.
Dr. R. B. Kleinsmid- President, University of S. Calif.
Rabbi Nathan Kollin, Richmond, Va.
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Repr. Charles Kramer, (Calif.)
Rabbi Bernard Lander-Civil Engineer, U. S. Navy
Dr. Emil Lengyl-Aufhor
Prof. Max Lemer, Williams College
Kenneth Leslie-Editor, Protestant Digest
Theodore Levin-Attorney, Chicago
Rabbi Dr. George Lieberman, Wheeling, W. Virginia
Haim Lieberman-Journalist
Harry W. Lielnors-JExec. Secretary, Baltic American Society
Prof. Julius E. Lips
Clarence C. Uttle-Director, Jackson Memorial Laboratory
Rt. Rev. Harry S, Longley, D.D .-Bishop o f Iowa
Ludwig hore-Columnist
Prof. Willem J. Luyten, University of Minnesota
Repr. Walter A. Lynch, (N.Y.)
Repr. Lucien Maciora, (Conn.)
Rabbi Mairim Magnes, Brooklyn, N.Y.
Rabbi Jacob R. Marcus, Cincinnati, Ohio
Morris Margulies, Past National Secretary of the Zionist Organization
of America
Rabbi Dr. Bernard D. Marton, Brooklyn, N.Y.
Alfred J. McCosker, Pres., Mutual Broadcasting System
Hon. John McDonough, Mayor of St. Paul, Minnesota
Edward P. McGlachlin, Jr.-Major General, U. S. Army (Retired)
Repr. Raymond S. McKeough (111.)
Prof. Nelson P. Mead, College of the City of New York
Eric Mendelsohn-Archifecf
Col. Morris J. Mendelsohn-President, New Zionist Organization of
America. Past National Commander Jewish War Veterans
Rabbi S. Felix Mendelsohn, Chicago, 111.
Rabbi J . 0. Mereminsky, Mt. Vernon, N.Y.
Samuel A. M erlin-Journalist
Rabbi Max Meyer, Flushing, N.Y.
Karin Michaelis-Author
Hon. E.D. M illikin, Mayor of Seattle, Washington
Moishe Nadir-A uthor
Dr. Reuben S. Nathan-Journalist
B. 'Netanyahu-Author
Alfred Neumann- W riter
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Prof. Reinhold Niebuhr-Union Theological Seminary
Hon. Herbert R. O’Conner, Governor of Maryland
Rabbi Ahron Opher, New York, N.Y.
Prof. H. A. Overstreet-Educator and A uthor
Prof. Constantine Panunzio, University of California
Angeio Patrl-Educator and A uthor
Repr. Nat Patton, (Texas)
Brock Pemberton-Producer
Dr. Svetislav S. Petrovitch-Yogoslav Statesman
Dr. D.B. Phemister, University of Chicago
Harold M. Phillips-Atroraey, New York
Rabbi Herman Pollack, Bloomington, Ind.
Channing Pollock-Author
Michael Potter-A ttorney, New York
Rabbi Baruch E. Rabinowitz, Baltimor, Md.
Joseph Raffaeli, Palestine
Rabbi Max Raisin, Patterson, N.J.
A. Philip Randolph, International President, Brotherhood of Sleeping
Car Porters
Victor Ratner-Advertising Executive
Prof. O.LReid-Educator
Curt Bless-Foreign Correspondent and A uthor
Rabbi N. H. Riff, Camden, N.J.
Col. Raymond Robins-Social Economist
Rabbi Moses Rokeach, Brooklyn, N. Y.
Rabbi Morris M. Rose, Brooklyn, N. Y.
Samuel Rosen-Journalist
Rabbi Abraham I. Rosenberg, Baltimore, Md.
Rabbi Samuel Rosenblatt, Baltimore, Md.
Rabbi Rudolph Rosenthal, Cleveland, Ohio
Rabbi Jacob Philip Rudin, Great Neck, L I., N.Y.
Repr. Adolph J. Sabath (111.), Dean, House of Representatives
Dr. Abram Leon Sachar-A&tional Director, B’nai B’rith Hillel
Foundation
Prof. Curt Sachs, New York University
Repr. Leon Sacks, (Pa.)
Rabbi Maxwell L. Sacks, Brooklyn, N. Y.
Rabbi Abraham S. Samuels, Bronx, N.Y.
Rabbi Edward T. Sandrow, Cedarhurst, L. I., N. Y.
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Israel Schapiro, Library of Congress
Rabbi Abraham Scheinberg, Brooklyn, N. Y.
William Jay Schieffelin-Civic Leader
Arnold Schoenberg-Composer
Rabbi Henry A. Schorr, Bronx, N.Y.
Leopold Schwartzchield-Journalist
Milton Shapiro-Attorney, Chicago
Dr. David Shecket-Military Engineer
Dr. Irving Shendell, New York, N. Y.
Repr. John Edward Sheridan, (Pa.)
Herman Shumlin-Prod ucer
Rabbi Julius Silberfeld, Newark, N. J.
Hans Simons, New School of Social Research
Rabbi M . K. Skinder, New York, N. Y.
Senator William H. Smathers, (N. J.)
Reps. Andrew L Somers, (N. Y.)
Rabbi Samuel D. Soskin, Ft. Worth, Texas
Marcus M. Sperber, K. C., Montreal, Canada
Willard G. Stanton, New York, N. Y.
Harry Stsnrr-Attorney, New York
Dr. Alfred E Steams, Massachusetts
Rabbi HarryJ. Stem-Montreal, Canada
Prof. Kurt G. Stem, Yale University
William Stern-Pres., Dakota National Bank
Rt. Rev. W. Bertrand Stevens-Bishop o f Los Angeles, Calif.
Rex Stout-A uthor
Arthur Szyk-A rtis t
Dr. Horace D. Taft, Connecticut
Irving T aitel-Industrialist
Senator Elbert D. Thomas, (Utah)
Lowell Thomas-Radio Commentator
Repr. Harve Tibbott, (Pa.)
Prof. Paul Tillich, Union Theological Seminary
Senator Millard E Tydings (Md.)
Clifton M. Utley-Director, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations
Z. H. Wachsman-Jouraaiisr
Hon. Murray D. Van Wagoner, Governor of Michigan
Maurice Walk-A ttorney, Chicago
Repr. Samuel A. Weiss, (Pa.)
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M. R. Werner-Author
William Allen White-Editor, Emporia Gazette
Dr. Henry N. Wieman, University of Chicago
Ray Lyman Wilbur-President, Stanford University
Alexander W ilf, W ilf Bros., Phila.
Dr. Maurice William, New York, N. Y.
Dr. Joseph B. Wollfe, Wollfe Clinic, Phila. Lieutenant Commander, U.S.
Naval Reserve
Mary E Wooley-Educator
Rabbi Samuel Yalow, Syracuse, N. Y.
H. E. Yamell-Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy (Retired)
Rabbi Ephraim E. Yolles, Philadelphia, Pa.
Leon Zimmerman-/ndustrialist
William Zorach-Sculptor
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APPENDIX G

List of names attached to the ad “The Bermuda Conference was a
Mockery”
Major Gen. Charles J. Bailey
Rear-Admiral Charles S. Butler
Rear-Admiral Richard E. Byrd
Major-Gen. Fox Conner
Mafor Gen. William Crozler
Major-Gen. Robert C. Davis
Rear-Admiral Ralph Davison
Major-Gen. George B. Duncan
Major-Gen. Charles S. Farnsworth
Brig.-Gen. Robert C.FoyBrig.-Gen. Ira A. Haynes
Admiral A. J. Hepburn
Major-Gen. Roy A. Hoffman
Major-Gen. C.E. Kilboume
Rear-Admiral C. P. Kindleberger
Rear-Admiral H. E. Lackey
Gen. Edward W. Lewis
Brig,-Gen. Marshall Magruder
Major-Gen. Edw. M. McLachlin, jr.
Brig.-Gen. George W. Melver
Brig.-Gen. James J. Meade
Admiral 0. G. Murfin
Brig.-Gen. J. Watt Page
Brig.-Gen. John F. Preston
Major-Gen. Charles R. Reynolds
Vice-Admiral S. M. Robinson
Rear-Admiral George H. Rock
Major Homer A. Stebbins
Admiral Joseph Strauss
Brig.-Gen. George Vidmer
Vice-Admiral R. R. Waesche
Rear-Admiral Harry Ervin Yarnell
Sen. John H. Bankhead (Ala.)
Sen. Warren Barbour (N. J.)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

343
Sen. Theodore G. Bilbo (Miss.)
Sen. Arthur Capper (Kansas)
Sen. Albert B. Chandler (Ky.)
Sen. James J. Davis (Pa.)
Sen. Sheridan Downey (Cal.)
Sen. Guy M. Gillette (la.)
Sen. Carter Glass (Va.)
Sen. Joseph F. Guffey (Pa.)
Sen. Edwin C. Johnson (Colo.)
Sen. Harley M. Kilgore (W. Va.)
Sen. William Langer (N. Dak.)
Sen. Francis Maloney (Conn.)
Sen. Burnet R. Maybank (S.C.)
Sen. Kenneth McKellar (Tenn.)
Sen. EH. Moore (Okla.)
Sen. James E. Murray (Mont.)
Sen. Claude Pepper (Florida)
Sen. George L Radcliffe
Sen. Robert A. Taft (Ohio)
Sen. Elbert D. Thomas (Utah)
Sen. Charles W. Tobey (N. H.)
Sen. Harry S. Truman (Mo.)
Sen. James M. Tunnell (Del.)
Sen. Millard E. Tydings (Md.)
Sen. Charles L McNary (Ore.)
Sen. James M. Mead (N. Y.)
Sen. Frederick Van Nuys (Ind.)
Sen. Robert F. Wagner (N. Y.)
Sen. David I. Walsh (Mass.)
Sen. Kenneth S. Wherry (Nebr.)
Sen. Alexander Wiley (Wis.)
Hon. Claude G. Bowers
U.S. Ambassador to Chile
Hon. Joseph F. Davies
Former Ambassador to Russia
Hon. Prentiss M. Brown
Adm inistrator, OPA
Hon. Marriner S. Eccles
Chairman, Federal Reserve Bank
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Hon. Leon Henderson
Hon. Herbert Hoover
Hon. Wm. M. Leiserson
Nat. Labor Relations Board
Hon. Dave H. Morris
Former U. S. Ambassador to Belgium
Hon. Donald Nelson
Chairman War Production Board
Hon. Robert R. Nathan
Chief o f Planning Division, W. P. B.
Hon. Charles Poletti
Sp. Asst, to Sec. o f War
Hon. Hariod D. Smith
Director, Bureau o f Budget
Hon. Homer M. Adkins
Governor o f Arkansas
Hon. Robert O. Blood
Governor o f N.H.
Hon. Dwight Griswold
Governor o f Nebraska
Hon. Herbert B. Maw
Governor o f Utah
Hon. Howard McGrath
Governor o f Rhode Island
Hon. Robert R. O’Conner
Governor o f Maryland
Hon. Henry F. Schricker
Governor o f Indiana
Hon. Harold E. Stassen
Governor o f Minnesota
William Green
Pres. Amer. Fed. o f Labor
Phillip Murray
President, Congress o f Industrial Organizations
Sidney Hillman
Gen. Pres. Amalgomated Clothing Workers o f America
Louis Adamic
Ben Hecht
Victor M. Ratner
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Arturo Toscanini
William Allen White
And 3,381 other distinguished American leaders from a ll walks o f
life and
from a ll sections o f the co u n try.
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APPENDIX H

“Jerusalem Bomb Kills 41 in Attack on British Offices.”
“Zionist Terror Raiders Accused of Blast in King David Hotel.”
The New York Times. July 23,1946, p. 1.
Jerusalem, July 22 - An entire six story corner and basement at the
southwestern wing of the King David Hotel were destroyed and at
least forty - one British, Jewish and Arab Government officials were
killed and fifty-three were injured soon after midday when
terrorists , believed to belong to either Irgun Z’vai Leumi or the Stern
Gang, blew up a large part of the offices of the chief secretary o f the
Palestine Government.
Prominent Britons, including British Jews, are among the
casualties. The dead include eight unidentified bodies, according to
the latest semi-official figures, and fifty-two missing persons are
buried under a huge pile of debris. They include twelve senior
British civil servants and four senior Palestinian civil servants.
I was on the scene, outside the fashionable hotel - a Jerusalem
landmark overlooking the Old City - just after the heavy explosions
shattered the southwestern corner. Rescue operations had already
been begun by British troops and police sweating under the hot July
sun. They were bringing out bodies on stretchers, leaving a trail of
blood over the rubble.
People standing outside or just entering or leaving the building
were among the casualties. Postmaster General Gerald Donald
Kennedy was killed outside the southern wing. The Superintendent
of Police, Kenneth Page Hadingham, was badly injured. Richard
Mower, correspondent of The New York Post, suffered a leg fracture.
The corner was destroyed by a heavy charge o f gelignite
planted in the basement by four or five armed gunmen. The six
floors included a well known basement cafe called La Regence and
consisted of thirty or thirty-five rooms, mostly occupied by the chief
secretary’s offices. British Army headquarters has the entire top
floor of the hotel and only a small section is situated at the
southwestern corner. This explains the com paratively small
casualties among the British military.
The first detonation occurred at about 12:10 P.M. when a small
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smoke bomb exploded near a parked automobile on Julian’s Way
about fifty yards south o f the hotel. It was intended to hold up all
cars. Then came several shots from automatic guns.
The second explosion came almost imm ediately as a man
dressed in Arab clothing alighted from a blue limousine and threw a
small grenade along a lane on the northern end o f the hotel. A
m ilitary sentry fired at him and the man threw away a submachine
gun and limped to the car, which sped off toward the Jaffa Gate - one
of the main gates of the walled Old City. The car was found
abandoned later at the foot of the Tower of David, not far from the
district police headquarters.
Five minutes later came a third, shattering explosion. It was
preceded by a mysterious telephone warning to the hotel’s
switchboard operator by a woman caller who said: “Tell everyone to
leave the hotel. It is going to blow up in a few minutes.”
A few minutes before the third detonation a truck drove down
the sunken driveway at the northern end of the hotel and four or
five men jumped out at the service entrance to the kitchen. They
assembled all the hotel staff-cooks, waiters and kitchen boys - below
the stairs at gunpoint as one man laid several m ilk cans full of
explosives with fuses, wires and detonators. Then the men dashed off
and the hotel staff fought to get out at all the exits.
An eyewitness, Maj. Eric M errill, army public-relations officer
who was in the building opposite the hotel, told me: “First there was
a great explosion. Then the southwestern corner of the hotel seemed
to bulge. It collapsed with a great roar and a huge column of browngray smoke billowed up.”
A number of Government officials, typists and women clerks
who had been standing at their office windows peered out to seek
the causes of the first two explosions were trapped and hurtled out
as the third went off. E.W. Keys, assistant secretary, was hurled clear
across the road into the wall of the W.M.C.A. gymnasium. He was
killed.
Men and women staggered from the hotel, dazed from shock,
their faces covered with white dust and many streaked with blood
from head wounds. Others unable to walk were being helped.
Government employees, British m ilitary men, messenger boys and
hotel guests came out in a long stream. A passing bus was blown off
course and every passenger was injured.
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The Deputy High Commissioner, Sir John Valentine Shaw, was
sitting in his office at the southeastern corner of the hotel when the
explosion occurred. He was uninjured, Immediately he assumed
charge of the rescue work, directing troops, police officers and
plainclothes men. A few minutes later the inspector general of the
police, Col. W. N. Gray, and other high-military officers joined him.
Executives o f the Jewish Agency and the National Council of
Palestine Jews issued a statement expressing horror “at the dastardly
crime perpetrated by the gang of desperadoes.” After expressing
sympathy to the victims’ families, the statement added: “Jews in
Palestine are called upon to rise up against these abominable
outrages.” This may herald active efforts by responsible Jewish
institutions to combat and liquidate reckless terrorist groups.
A detachment of Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders arrived
with picks, shovels, acetylene blow-torches, portable cranes and
first-aid kits exactly fifteen minutes after the explosion. They began
clearing the wreckage. At one crevice beneath a twenty-foot pile of
wreckage, there was moaning. One man was brought out, followed by
two others.
Police worked unceasingly to seek the culprits. I heard orders
crackling and snapping over the short-wave police radio. Commands
were issued and patrol trucks and armored cars dashed to the scene.
Anti-terrorist sirens wailed and halted all traffic. Police cars with
loudspeakers went around announcing complete curfew in the whole
municipal area o f Jerusalem from 12:45 P.M. until further notice.
The curfew was later restricted to the central Jewish area only and
this w ill be removed at 5 A.M. tomorrow.
One report said that an automobile abandoned near the Jaffa
Gate had two sticks of gelignite, one revolver and one Arab cloak
inside. But the small group of gunmen who held up the hotel staff
and planted the explosives in the basement got clear away. A taxi
containing a quantity of arms believed used by some of the escaping
terrorists was found abandoned on Jaffa Road.
Army headquarters declared that the men who entered the
hotel basement unloaded several milk cans and trundled them along
the corridor to the far end, directly below the secretariat and outside
the restaurant. A British Signal Corps officer, hearing the noise, came
out to investigate and was shot in the stomach twice and severely
wounded by a man dressed as an Arab.
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The Palestine radio reported that bodies o f five Britons and
twenty-three Palestinians had so far been taken from the wreckage
of the hotel. Four are still below the wreckage. Hospital reports,
however, said that thirty-one bodies had been brought in by 7 P.M.
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APPENDIX I
NATIONAL REVIVAL PRINCIPLES
(Ideological Principles of Lechi)
1. THE NATION
The Jewish people is a covenanted people, originator of
monotheism, formulator of the prophetic teachings, standardbearer of human culture, guardian of a glorious patrimony. The
Jewish people is schooled in self sacrifice and suffering; its
vision, survivability and faith in redemption are indestructible.
2. THE HOMELAND
The homeland is the Land of Israel w ithin the borders
delineated in the Bible. (To your descendants I shall give this
land, from the River of Egypt to the great Euphrates River.
Genesis 15:18). This is the land of the living where the entire
nation shall live in safety.
3. THE NATION AND ITS LAND
Israel conquered the land with the sword. There it became a
nation and only there it will be reborn. Hence Israel alone has a
right to that land. This is an absolute right. It has never
expired and never will.
4. THE GOALS
1. Redemption of the land.
2. Establishment of sovereignty.
3. Revival of the nation. There is no sovereignty of the land,
and there is no national revival without sovereignty.
These are the tasks of the organization during the period of war
and conquest:
5. EDUCATION
Educate the nation to love freedom and zealously guard Israel’s
eternal patrimony. Inculcate the idea that the nation is master
to its own fate. Revive the doctrine that “The sword and the
book came bound together from heaven” (Midrash Vayikra
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Rabba 35:8).
6. UNITY
The unification of the entire nation around the banner of the
Hebrew freedom movement. The use of the genius, status and
resources of individuals and the channeling of the energy,
devotion and revolutionary fervor of the masses for the war of
liberation.
7. PACTS
Make pacts with all those who are wiling to help the struggle of
the organization and provide direct support
8. FORCE
Consolidate and increase the fighting force in the homeland and
in the diaspora, in the underground and in the barracks, to
become the Hebrew army of liberation with its flag, arms and
commanders.
9. WAR
Constant war against those who stand in the way of fulfilling
the goals.
10. CONQUEST
The conquest of the homeland from foreign rule and its eternal
possession.
These are the tasks of the movement during the period of
sovereignty and redemption.
11. SOVEREIGNTY
Renewal of Hebrew sovereignty over the redeemed land.
12. RULE OF JUSTICE
The establishment of a social order in the spirit of Jewish
morality and prophetic justice. Under such an order no one will
go hungry or unemployed. All w ill live in harmony, mutual
respect and friendship as an example to the world.
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13. REVIVING THE WILDERNESS
Build the ruins and revive the wilderness for mass immigration
and population increase.
14. ALIENS
Solve the problem of alien population by exchange of
population.
15. INGATHERING OF EXILES
Total ingathering of the exiles to their sovereign state.
16. POWER
The Hebrew nation shall become a first-rate m ilitary, political,
cultural and economical entity in the Middle East and around
the Mediterranean Sea.
17. REVIVAL
The revival of the Hebrew language as a language spoken by
the entire nation, the revival of the historical and spiritual
might of Israel. The purification of the national character in the
fire of revival.
18. THE TEMPLE
The building of the Third Temple as a symbol of the new era of
total redemption.1

1Yaacov Eliav. Wanted. ( New York: Shengold Publishers, Inc. , 1984), p.
136-138.
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APPENDIX J

lis t of Voyages1

Name of
ship
1. Kosta

Date

Approx. No.
of Immigrants

3-37

16

Embarkation and
Debarkation Points

Organizer

Remarks

(Vienna) Athens-

Revisionists

Sailboat with auxiliary
motor. Wading ashore.

Beach near Haifa

No landing organization yet.
2. Artemisia 1 8-37

68

(Vienna) Athens
Tantura Beach

Revisionists

3. Artemisia il 12-37

120

(Vienna) KorinthosTantura

Revisionists

A. Artemisia III 6-38

386

(Vienna) Inlet near
Athens-Tantura

Revisionists

First time aid of landing
organization. Artemisia net
tonnage: 115

5. Draga 1

9-38

246

Susak-Tantura

Revisionists

Mordechai Katz’s group
plus those who had es
caped to Fiume and Susak
landed on Yom Kippur.
Draga net tonnage: 277

6. Draga II

11-38

544

(Vienna) GalatzNetanyah

Revisionists

Draga II and Ely carried the
survivors of Amoldstein
transport plus additional
immigrants

7. Ely

11-38

620

(Vienna) GalatzNetanyah)

8. Gepo 1

12-5-38

734

(Vienna) TulceaNetanyah

9. Katina

1-18-39

775

(Vienna) Balchik-

Revisionists

Revisionists

Ely took Draga II
passengers aboard
prior to landing pro
cedures.

Smooth sailing and
easy blockade break
ing. Arrived, landed,
December 18.

This chart is from The Four Front War: From the Holocaust to Hie riOiiilScu Laii.il,
by W illiam R. Perl, Crown publishers, Inc., New York, 1979, pp. 367-371.
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N. of Netanyah

Revisionists

10. Gepoll

2-20-39

750

(Vienna) BalchikN. of Netanyah

Revisionists

Gepo II sinks in Mediter
ranean. Katina rescues
all on board and lands
them near Netanyah.

11. Astir

3-6-39

720

(Danzig) Vfeima-AI
Jura, Palestine

Revisionists

Transferred to & de
barked by S.S. Marsis

te.A trato l

3-9-39

386

Bari-Palestine

Mossad

13. Sandu

approx.
3-15-39

269

Private
Constanta
Captured off Palestine
coast on 3-23

14. Assimi

3-20-39

260

Constanta-Palestine

Members of
Captured by the British
Mizrachi & Ha (4-1). Turned back. ReNoar Ha Zioni. turned Palestine and
Ship “ adoptlanded June 7.
ed’ by Haganah.

15. Aghios
Nicolaos

Late March 39 750

Constanta-Palestine

Private (Mr.
Flesch)

Fired at by British patrol.
One passenger killed.
Immigrants landed any
way on 4-39.

16 .A tratoil

Late March 39 400

Susak-Palestine

Mossad

Immigrants first embark
ed on S.S. Colorado:
then transferred.

17. Aghia
Zioni

Late March 39 600

Marseille, Fiumenear Rehoboth
(Palestine)

Revisionists

420+ evaded arrest,
173 arrested “near Isdud," of whom 44 es
caped after arrest.
(Landed 4-22-39).

Ship captured by British
Left Palestine 3-26. Ar
rived Constanta with all
aboard 4-2-39.

18. Panagai
Late March 39
Conasteriu

80

Korynth-Palestine

Revisionists

Jews from Austria &
Germany who were
stranded in Greece
after having escaped
individually to Athens.

19. Aghios
4-20-39
Nikolaos II

600

Burgos-Palestine
(Haifa)

Private (Mr.
Flesch)

Passengers transship
ped to S.S. Nichola.
Landed by Nichola
5-19. Arrested & later
released: 308.

20. Atrato III

400

Susak-Palestine

Mossad

Passengers first em
barked on SS Colorado.

4-39

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

355
Then transferred to Atrato. Short voyage,
last, successful landing.
21. Lieset

5-17-39

906

Tulcea-Palestine

MaccabiRevisionists

Captured by British 6-2;
Master of Liesel: 9 mo.
prison; crew acquitted;
passengers released in
Palestine 6-4.

22. Atrato IV

5-20-39

430

Constanta-Palestine

Mossad

Captured 5-28-39 by
H.M.S. Sutton. Passen
gers released in Pales
tine after short detain
ment.

23. Colorado 1 5-19-39

266

Constanta-Palestine

Mossad

Was observed by British
intelligence passing Is
tanbul 5-22, yet suc
ceeded; landing un
detected.

24. Unnamed
sailboat

Late May ‘39

26

Vtigoslavia-Palestine

Private

Landed 6-7, near Akko

25. Beriitsa
Maria

5-27-39

350

Burgos-Palestine

Revisionists
(Confino)

Landed 6-8.

26. Frossoula

5-29-39

658

CzechoslovakiaSulina-Palestine

Private

Long Odyssey. Epi
demic on board. Ship
fumigated in Beyrouth.
From there stranded
passengers taken aboard & landed by
Tiger Hill.

27. Aghios
6-39
Nikolaos III

693

Vama-Palestine

Private

Landed 7-3-39 by trans
fer to landing ship
Nicola.

28. Rim

801

Constanta-Rhodes.
See remarks.

Revisionists

Ship caught fire July 4
off Rhodes. All aboard
saved. Passengers
taken aboard & landed
by Aghios Nikolaos IV
near Netanyah, 8-20-39

29. Las Perlas Late June

370

Palestine

Private

30. Dora

500

Holland-Palestine

Mossad

6-26-39

7-39

Mainly German Jews
who had escaped to
Holland and were evac
uated before German

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

356
invasion of Holland.
800

(Poland)
Galatz-Tel Aviv

Revisionists

Ran straight through
the blockade, up the
beach of Tel Aviv.
Beached there
(8-23-39).

32. Colorado II 7-14-39

266

VamaConstantaPalestine

Mossad

Captured on July 28.

33. Rudnichar 8-1-39

305

Vama-Palestine

Revisionists

Passengers landed
8-10

34 Aghios8-8-39
Nikolaos IV

809

Constanta-RhodesPalestine (Near
Netanyah)

Revisionists
Agudat
Israel

After loading immigrants
at Constanta, ship pick
up the shipwrecked
from Rim in Rhodes.
Landed all 796 by land
ing ships Tassos and
Rosetta.

35. Tiger Hill

Mid-August
39

1,417

Constanta-BeyrouthTel Aviv

Mossad

Included in the 1,417
when landxing were
passengers of the
Frossoula (see Frossoula No. 26). While
breaking the blockade,
the Tiger Hill was, on
9-1-39, fired at and two
of the immigrants were
killed* Repeated the
Parita feat. Beached
in Tel Aviv.

36. Krotova

8-20-39

650

Fiume-Palestine

Revisionists

Relatively smooth sail
ing.

37. Syros

8-22-39

593

Fiume-Palestine

Revisionists

Last transport sailing
from Italy before out
break of war.

31. Parita

7-8-39

T h ey were the first persons to be killed by British bullets after the outbreak of World War II.

38. Noemi
Julia

8-29-39

1,136

ConstantaPalestine

Revisionists

September 1 9 ,‘39 ship
sailed openly into Haifa
and demanded admis
sion for those on board.
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With war on, in wake of
furor over British killing
of Tiger Hill refugees,
British hesitant to shoot
at Noemi Julia.
368

Vama-ConstantaBurgos-Palestine
(near Herzliya)

Revisionists

All aboard landed by
landing boat S.V.
Bapha and 4 small
wooden-boats 9-19-39.

40. Rudnichar 10-27-39
III

457

Sulina-Palestine
(Sydne Ali, near
Tel Aviv)

Revisionists

Passengers transship
ped for landing to
schooner Kooperator
and small boats.

41. Hilda

12-9-39

729

Balchik-SulinaPalestine (Haifa)

Mossad

Ship captured 1-24-40
by Royal Navy. Brought
to Haifa. Passengers
first detained, then re
leased.

42. Delpa

12-24-39

224

Constanta-VfemaPalestine

Revisionists

A youth transport, al
most all from Betarim
from Hungary, Poland,
Rumania, Bulgaria.

43. Sakarya

2-1-40

2,175

Sulina-Palestine
(Haifa)

Revisionists

Captured by H.M.S.
Fiona and escorted to
Haifa 2-13-40. Largest
ship, largest load, fast
est trip of all. Ship seiz
ed but later released to
owners due to legal
quirk. Passengers to
detention camps. Re
leased 8-12. Eri Jabotinsky, the Sakarya's C.O.,
brought to Akko fortress
& imprisoned there until
death of his father,
Ze’ev Jabotinsky,
8-6-40.

44. Pentscho

9-21-40

514

Sulina-Mytilene
(Greek island,
Stampalia, Rhodes)

Revisionists

Ship faltered near Kamili
Island (actually unin
habited rock). After al
most perishing of hun
ger, picked up by Italian
warship and taken to
Rhodes, then Italy. In
terned but miraculously

39. Rudnichar 8-30-39
I
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survived the war and re
turned to Palestine.
45. Libertad

5-40

390

Burgos-Palestine
(Zikhron Ya’acov)

Revisionists

Bulgarians, mostly, with
some Yugoslavs, Ruma
nians.

46. Atlantic

10-7-40

1,771

Tulcea-SulinaCyprus-Haifa

Mossad

47. Pacific

10-11-40

1,000

Sulina-Haifa

Mossad

48. Milo

10-19-40

880

Tulcea-Haifa

Mossad

Those arriving in Pales
tine on the Pacific plus
80 from Atlantic were
transferred by the Brit
ish to their S.S. Patna.
The Patria blew up and
rapidly sank in Haifa Har
bor. 254 perished in this
catastrophe. 1,584 sur
vivors, most from Atlan
tic and Milo, were de
ported to fever-stricken
island Mauritius. Survi
vors of this climate and
epidemics received per
mission to enter Pales
tine five years later.

49. Salvador

12-40

(327)

Burgos-lstanbul
sinks in Sea of
Marmara

Private

50.Struma

12-11-41

(767)

Constanta-lstanbul
Turks towed the
unseaworthy ship
out into the Black Sea
on 2-23-42 where she
sank 2-24.

51. Darien II

2-19-41

878

Constanta-VamaPalestine

Mossad

Ship sailed from Con
stanta with 380. In Varna
370 more boarded. In
Instabul 128 survivors
of Salvador boarded.

52. Vitorul

9-42

120

Constanta

Private

The 60 ton unsea

204 die as Salvador
sank. Survivors reached
Istanbul. From there on
3-19-41 the D alian ,
another refugee ship,
picked them up and
landed them in Pales
tine.
One sole survivor. All
others drowned.
Militant Irgun Zvai Leumi
declared this sinking to
have been “murder"
and initiated violent
action against the colo
nial power.

worthy ship is not
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known to have arrived.
53. Euxenia

4-42

12

Sulina-Casne
(Turkey)

Private

Sailboat with auxiliary
motor. Foundered in
Aegean Sea. All 12
saved; land in Turkey.

54. Milka 1

3-44

410

Constanta-lstanbul.
Continued by land
to Palestine.

MossadRevisionist
cooperation

Due to new policy,
those who on their own
craft reached neutral
Turkey could from there
legally enter Palestine
by land.

55. Maritsa II

4-44

244

Constanta-lstanbulPalestine

Mossad and
Revisionist
cooperation

See remarks re; travel
from Turkey, above.

56. Maritsa II

5-44

266

n

«i

•c

57. Milka II

5-44

433

W

II

u

«

58. Morina

7-44

308

a

u

K

u

59. Maritsa III

7-44

318

m

a

U

u

60. Bulbul

8-44

410

Constanta-lstanbulPalestine

u

61 . Salah-ADin

8-44

547

Constanta

u

62. Mefkurie

8-44

(350)

Constanta
(torpedoed)

u

See remarks re: travel
from Turkey, above.

Ship torpedoed, survi
vors machine-gunned
in water. 345 perished.

Total number of those tabulated who reached Palestine*

* Tabulation of Aliya Bet shipping constitutes a most intricate task, as reports about ships, dates, number
of passsengers vary widely. When in doubt we accept the lower figure. Besides, contemporary news
reports and intelligence dispatches mention more names of ships carrying ‘ illegal" refugees than are
tabulated above. Careful scrutiny reveals, however, that a good number of these communications erred.
The blockade breaking ships often had their names changed. Thus a dispatch might name a ship as
loading refugees in some port. Another ship with refugees crammed on board, flying a different flag and
showing a different name might be reported passing the Bosporus. Again another ship was related as
hiding in one of the numerous inlets of a Greek island. Still another ship was written up as unloading
visaless immigrants in Palestine. Yet it was always one and the same vessel.
On the other hand, as the Jew hunt in Europe increased in intensity, a growing number of individually
organized small vessels, mainly sailboats, set out for the only possible point of escape. Those who made it
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to Palestine had landing organizations waiting for them. Their arrival was not recorded and they mixed as
fast as they could with the population there. The total number of visaless Jews reaching the country
during the Nazi reign therefore exceeds the number tabulated above.
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APPENDIX K

List of twelve points made by David Wyman regarding President
Roosevelt's treatment of the Holocaust.
1. The War Refugee Board should have been set up in 1942. It
should have been better funded and received broader powers.
2.The U.S. government should have made bolder efforts to
press the Germans to release Jews.
3. Constant pressure and threat of punishment could have been
applied to Axis satellites to release their Jews.
4. Neutral countries should have been pressured to absorb
Jews, to by-pass immigration procedures, and to erect reception
camps near borders. The U.S. could have funded, encouraged and
supplied absorption, food distribution, etc
5. In the United States im m igration quotas were almost
untouched. Had the U.S. made a concerted effort to take in displaced
Jews other countries might have followed suit. However, in 1942,
when Wendell Wilkie urged British leaders to admit Jews “the British
high commissioner replied that since the United States was not
taking Jews in even up to the quota limits, Americans were hardly in
a position to criticize.”
6. The excuse that shipping was needed to transfer Jews and
that such shipping would interfere w ith the war effort was
unfounded. In fact, some ships returning from Europe actually
needed ballast. Jewish refugees could easily have acted as weight in
these ships’ holds.
7. A campaign (through radio, leaflet dropping, underground
communication, falsifying documentation, bribing lower level
officials) to stim ulate and assist escapes would have greatly
increased the number of Jews able to escape.
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8. Larger sums of money could have been sent to Europe to
facilitate escapes, hide Jews, supply food and essentials, strengthen
the Jewish underground and gain non-Jewish assistance.
9. Much more effort should have gone into sending food and
medical supplies.
10. The U.S. government could have applied additional pressure
on neutral governments, on the Vatican, and on the International Red
Cross to push them to take earlier and greater action.
11. The U.S. could have taken m ilitary action. The A ir Force
could have bombed the Auschwitz killing installations and some
deportation railroads.
12. “Much more publicity about the extermination of the Jews
should have been disseminated through Europe. Allied radio could
have beamed the information for weeks at a time, on all possible
wavelengths, as the Germans did regarding the alleged Russian
massacre of Polish officers at the Katyn forest. This might have
influenced three groups: the Christian populations, the Nazis, and the
Jews. Western leaders and, especially, the Pope could have appealed
to Christians not to cooperate in any way with the anti-Jewish
programs, and to hide and to aid Jews whenever possible.”1

1David Wyman, p. 331-334.
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Appendix L
To 5,000,000 Jews in the Nazi Death-Trap Bermuda Was a
“Cruel Mockery”
“When W ill The United Nations Establish An Agency To Deal With
The Problem of Hitler’s Extermination of a Whole People?”
Somehow, through invisible, underground channels, one
ray of shining hope might have penetrated the ghettos of Europe. A
rumor might have spread and grown into a whisper among the
agonized Jews of Hitler’s hell. A whisper telling of deliverance from
torture, death, starvation and agony in slaughter-houses. This ray of
hope and this whisper were expressed in one word: Bermuda !
The rumor told of representatives of the United States and
Great Britain, the leading champions of the United Nations, the
protagonists of the Four Freedoms, assembling to save the hunted
and tortured Jews o f Europe. On the deliberations of this small
convention on an Island in the Atlantic were focused all the hopes of
the doomed Jews o f Europe: those, too, of the free well-meaning
people the world over. Men and women of good w ill everywhere at
last believed that the United Nations had decided to do something
about the unprecedented disaster of a people put to death.
Wretched, doomed victims of Hitler’s tyranny ! Poor men and
women of good faith the world over! You have cherished an illusion.
Your hopes have been in vain. Bermuda was not the dawn of a new
era, of an era of humanity and compassion, of translating pity into
deed. Bermuda was a mockery, and a cruel jest.
THIS is not our definition. It is the definition of the London Sunday
“Observer”- one of the most influential and important newspapers in
Great Britain.
Not only were ways and means to save the remaining four
million Jews in Europe not devised, but their problem was not even
touched upon, put on the agenda, or discussed. More than that-the
name “Jews” was banished from the vocabulary of this convention, as
PM’s foreign editor, Alexander Uhl, reports: “It was regraded as
almost improper to mention even the word “Jew.”
But not only the attention of the victims of Nazi atrocities and
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of their friends the world over was concentrated on the meeting at
Bermuda: Hitler, too, was concerned with the United Nations’ reply to
this challenge to the exterm ination o f the Jewish population in
Europe. Alas! To him Bermuda was again convincing proof that the
United Nations were neither ready nor willing to answer his threat
with action. They were continuing to give him “carte blanche” in his
extermination process, exactly as in the pre-war days they permitted
him to deal with Jews in Germany, with Austria and Czechoslovakia,
thus paving the way for aggression, invasion, and war.
Can it be possible that the United Nations do not understand
that should H itler succeed in exterminating the Jews as a people,
they by their silence w ill pave the way to the extermination of the
Czechoslovak, Polish, Greek or even the French people?
Now we are witnessing a variety of attempts to justify the
Bermuda failure, to wrap it in secret formulae, such as “no dealing
with Hitler,” or “not to interfere with the prosecution of the war,” or
“not to undertake anything which would prolong the war,” etc. All
this is just throwing sand into the eyes o f public opinion. All this has
nothing to do with the real facts and the harrowing truth.
The facts, plain and sim ple, are the following: (a) This is a
specific problem of Jewish disaster. H itler did not (as yet) decree the
extermination of all the
peoples o f Europe, he decreed the
extermination of the Jewish people in Europe and this process of
extermination is unabated and steady. Two m illion or more have
been put to death already! (b) Five m illion Jews in Europe still live.
The government of Roumania, Hungry and Bulgaria, all satellites of
Germany, are willing to release their Jews any tim e the United
Nations are willing to take part in the deliverance. By doing do, they
hope to find grace and pardon in the eyes of the United Nations
whom they consider as the inevitable victors in this world struggle,
(c) The United Nations have taken no advantage of these offers. They
have not done so for one reason: the British government has
prevented them, fearing that public opinion w ill demand that these
refugees be admitted into Palestine - a practical place of salvation
only a few days away from the Axis countries by short water route,
train or even bus, where the new Hebrew Nation awaits them with
open arms.
The Jewish Problem Is Not a Refugee Problem
W ith the Bermuda Conference a thing of the past, not having
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even discussed the problem of the extermination o f the Jewish
people in Europe, now, more than ever, it is clear that we are dealing
not only with a refugee problem , but w ith the Jewish problem
of Europe. These two problems should not be confused. They are
entirely distinct. Democracy cannot connive with the slaughter of
millions of innocent civilian people - the Jews in Europe. There are
ways and means to stop H itler’s wholesale murder and to evacuate
those who can be evacuated. But no one has been assigned to
deal with this tremendous problem. What is necessaiy is that
the machinery for action be created. The United Nations, which have
uttered so many words o f pity must now do something if these
words of pity are to be more than empty lies. They must create a
United Nations Agency composed of m ilitary and diplomatic experts,
which should have full authority to define and effectuate a realistic
and stem policy of action, to save the remaining millions of Jewish
people. This Agency o r Commission w ill deal, not with
refugees outside H itler’s reach, but with the Jewish people
under his yoke today.
A Program o f Action ( . . . Not Pity !)
There are two broad areas in which this Agency can begin to
operate without delay or procrastination.
1. Immediate utilization of all existing possibilities of transfer
of Jews from H itler - dominated countries to Palestine or to any
temporary refuge and the initiation of all further possibilities in this
program.
2. The immediate creation of a Jewish army o f stateless and
Palestinian Jews, including “suicide” Commando squads, and Air
Squadrons for retaliatory bombing, which w ill raid deep into
Germany, thus participating as an entity in the war and bringing
their message of hope to Hitler’s victims.

Join the Crusade for Democracy
The crime of Europe calls for the mobilization of every shred of
righteousness and spiritual power left in the world. On the field
o f battle soldiers die. On the field o f massacre civilization
dies. The thunder of civilization against the swamp-like antics of the
German government is alone capable of stopping the German crime
against life. Such a thunder unleashed by our own representatives
and by all the nations that serve the cause of God would strike terror
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into the souls of the German people.
Therefore we dedicate ourselves to this fight and we call upon
every American to join hands with us in this crusade for humanity
and decency.
Every citizen is part of the collective conscience of America;
this conscience has never been found wanting. Demand action from
your government against the German massacre of the Jews.
C O M M ITTEE FOR
PALESTINIAN JEWS1

A

JEWISH

ARMY

OF

STATELESS

1The New York Times. Tuesday, May 4,1943, p. 17.
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APPENDIX M

TEXT OF NEW YORK TIMES LETTER, DEC. 4,1948
TO THE EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES:

Among the most disturbing political phenomena of our time is
the emergence in the newly created state o f Israel of the “Freedom
Party” (Tenuat Haherut), a political party closely akin in its
organization, methods, political philosophy and social appeal to the
Nazi and Fascist parties. It was formed out of the membership and
following of the form er Irgun Zvai Leumi, a terrorist, right-wing,
chauvinist organization in Palestine.
The current visit of Menachem Begin, leader of this party, to
the United States is obviously calculated to give the impression of
American support for his party in the coming Israeli elections, and to
cement political ties w ith conservative Zionist elements in the
United States. Several Americans of national repute have lent their
names to welcome his visit It is Inconceivable that those who oppose
fascism throughout the world, if correctly informed as to Mr. Begin’s
political record and perspectives, could add their names and support
to the movement he represents.
Before irreparable damage is done by way of financial
contributions, public manifestations in Begin’s behalf, and the
creation in Palestine o f the Impression that a large segment of
America supports Fascist elements in Israel, the American public
must be informed as to the record and objectives o f Mr. Begin and
his movement.
The public avowals of Begin’s party are no guide whatever to
its actual character. Today they speak of freedom, democracy and
anti-imperialism, whereas until recently they openly preached the
doctrine of the Fascist state. It is in its actions that the terrorist
party betrays its real character; from its past actions we judge what
it may be expected to do in the future.
A shocking example was their behavior in the Arab village of
Deir Yassin. This village, off the main roads and surrounded by
Jewish lands, had taken no part in the war, and had even fought
off the Arab bands who wanted to use the village as their base. On
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April 9 (The New York Times), terrorist bands attacked this peaceful
village, which was not a m ilitary objective in the fighting, killed
most of its inhabitants - 240 men, women and children - and kept a
few of them alive to parade as captives through the streets of
Jerusalem. Most of the Jewish community was horrified at the deed,
and the Jewish Agency sent a telegram of apology to King Abdullah
of Trans -Jordan.
But the terrorists, far from being ashamed of their act, were
proud of this massacre, publicized it, widely, and invited all the
foreign correspondents present in the country to view the heaped
corpses and the general havoc at Deir Yassin.
The Deir Yassin incident exemplifies the character and actions
of the Freedom Party. W ithin the Jewish community they have
preached an admixture of ultra-nationalism, religious mysticism, and
racial superiority. Like other Fascist parties they have been used to
break strikes, and have themselves pressed for the destruction of
free trade unions. In their stead they have proposed corporate
unions on the Italian Fascist model. During the last years of sporadic
anti-British violence, the IZL and Stern groups inaugurated a reign
of terror in the Palestine Jewish community. Teachers were beaten
up for speaking against them. By gangster methods, beatings,
window-smashing, and wide-spread robberies, the terrorists
intimidated the population and exacted heavy tribute.
The people of the Freedom Party have had no part in the
constructive achievements in Palestine. They have reclaimed no
land, built no settlements, and only detracted from the Jewish
defense activity. Their much publicized immigration endeavors
were minute, and devoted mainly to bringing in Fascist compatriots.
The discrepancies between the bold claims now being made by
Begin and his party, and their record o f past performance in
Palestine bear the im print of no ordinary political party. This is the
unmistakable stamp of a Fascist party for whom terrorism (against
Jews, Arabs, and British alike) and misrepresentation are means, and
a “Leader State” is the goal.
In the light of the foregoing considerations, it is imperative that
the truth about Mr. Begin and his movement be made known in this
country. It is all the more tragic that the top leadership of American
Zionism has refused to campaign against Begin’s efforts, or even to
expose to its own constituents the dangers to Israel from support to
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Begin.
The undersigned therefore take this means o f publicly
presenting a few salient facts concerning Begin and his party; and of
urging all concerned not to support this latest manifestation of
fascism.
Isidore Abramowitz, Hannah Arendt, Abraham
Brick, Rabbi Jesurun Cardozo, Albert Einstein,
Herman Eisen, M. D., Hayim Fineman, M. Galleri,
D., H. H. Harris, Zelig S. Harris, Sidney Hook, Fred
Kabush, BruriaKaufman, Irma L. Lindheim,
Nachman Majsel, Seymour Malman, Myer D.
Mendelson, M. D., Harry M. Orlinsky, Samuel Pitlick,
Fritz Rohrlich, Louis P. Rocker, Ruth Sager, Itzak
Sankowsky, L J. Schoenberg, Samuel Shuman,
M. Unger, Irm a Wolpe, Stepan Wolfe.
New York, Dec. 2 ,19481

11bid, p. 588-590.
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GLOSSARY
(Note: The purpose of this glossary is to briefly supply a definition as
it relates to the dissertation. It is not meant to completely define a
term or list the achievements of any group or individual)

ALIYAH (Hebrew, ascent) the coming of the Jews to settle in Eretz
Israel. This term does not only denote immigration, but expresses the
essence o f Zionism, the return of the Jew to his homeland. The First
Aliyah (1882-1903) brought 25,000; the Second Aliyah (1904-1914)
brought approximately 40,000 Eastern European Jews; the Third
Aliyah brought about 35,000; the Fourth Aliyah (1924-1928)
brought 67,000; the Fifth Aliyah (1929-1939) brought some 250,000
Jews, most of which were refugees from Nazi Europe.
ALTALENA - Pseudonym of Vladim ir Jabotinsky for his column in
the Russian newspaper, Odessa News, during the early 1900’s.
ALTALENA - Ship purchased by the Irgun which sailed from France
with fighting forces, ammunition and weapons for Israel but was
destroyed by the Haganah before it was unloaded.

AMERICAN LEAGUE FOR A FREE PALESTINE - Established in 1944 to
support a Jewish national independence movement in Palestine to
defeat the British Mandatory Government there; directed by Yltshak
Ben Ami from 1946 to 1948; co-chaired by Senator Guy Gillette and
American author Ben Hecht. The organization was closely affiliated
w ith the Hebrew Committee o f National Liberation. Jewish
establishment organizations opposed these groups. In 1946 the
League produced the Broadway play, “A Flag is Born.” The proceeds
benefited the Irgun. The League was dissolved in November 1948.
ARLOSOROFF, Chaim - Labor leader whose assassination was
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ARLOSOROFF, Chaim - Labor leader whose assassination was
allegedly blamed on the Revisionists in order to discredit their
growing movement
BALFOUR DECLARATION - on November 2, 1917, Lord Balfour, in
correspondence to Lord Rothschild, promised British support for a
Jewish State in Palestine.
BERGSON, Peter - alias for Hillel Kook while working for the Irgun in
the United States.
BETAR - Acronym for B’rith Trumpeldor; Zionist youth organization
founded by Vladim ir Jabotinsky in 1924, dedicated to the formation
of a Jewish State in Palestine, and affiliated w ith the Zionist
Revisionist Movement
BRITISH MANDATE FOR PALESTINE - One o f four Mandates
established by the League of Nations after World War I; Iraq and
Palestine came under British Mandatory Power, Lebanon and Syria
under French Mandatory Power. The Mandate for Palestine stated
that the M andatory would be responsible for securing the
establishment of a Jewish National Home there.
COMMITTEE FOR A JEWISH ARMY - organized in 1941 by the Irgun
Delegation to the United, the Committee aimed to create a Jewish
Army based in Palestine to fight under Allied Command. It was
opposed by the Jewish establishment but succeeded in heightening
public awareness of the plight of the Jews in Europe. It ceased to
function in 1944 after the creation of the Jewish Brigade and was
succeeded by the American League for a Free Palestine.
Diaspora - the Jewish communities dispersed outside Eretz Israel.
Die Tat- daily newspaper of the Irgun (1938-1939), published in
Yiddish in Warsaw, Poland.
EBAN, Abba - Israeli representative to the United Nations. Supporter
of the Labor party, opponent of the underground movements (Irgun
and Lechi).
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ELDAD, Dr. Israel - chief theoretician for the underground movement,
Lechi.
ERETZ ISRAEL - Land of Israel.
HADANI - Alias for Dr. Alex Raphaeli while working for the Irgun
Delegation to the United States.
HAGANAH- Underground self-defense m ilitia of Jews in Palestine
created in 1920 by Jabotinsky for the defense of Jewish settlements
against Arab attacks. In 1931 arguments over the effectiveness of
the organization led to the split which resulted in the formation of
the Irgun Z’vai Leumi.
HEBREW COMMITTEE FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION - founded in 1944
by the Irgun Delegation to the United States under the leadership of
Hillel Kook. The group sought to establish a Jewish state in Eretz
Israel.
HECHT, Ben - author, journalist, important contributor to the ad
campaign o f the Irgun Delegation to the United States, writing
scathingly critical ads opposing the U.S. policy toward the Jews of
Europe during the Holocaust
HECHT, Reuben - European contact for the Irgun who assisted in the
American war effort by helping to free American airmen and by
gathering intelligence.
HERUT - Irgun underground newspaper (1942-1948), later the
political party of Menachem Begin.
HERZL, Theodore - The father of political Zionism; author, journalist
IRGUN Z’VAI LEUMI (IRGUN - IZL) - underground Jewish m ilitary
organization founded in Palestine in 1931 and headed by Ze’ev
Jabotinsky from 1937 until he died in 1940; later headed by
Menachem Begin. From 1931 to 1939 the Irgun protected Jews from
Arab attacks, and retaliated. The British White Paper, issued in May
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1939, initiated a new stage of Irgun activities which included attacks
and sabotage against the British. The Irgun ceased activities against
the British during World War II to join the Allies in the fight against
Germany. Under the leadership o f Menachem Begin the Irgun
resumed its anti-British efforts in 1944. In 1948 the Irgun was
incorporated into the Israel Defense Forces.
JABOTINSKY, Vladim ir (Ze’ev) - founder of the Revisionist Party;
leader and founder of the New Zionist Organization and head of the
Irgun.
JEWISH BRIGADE - a World War II British m ilitary unit which fought
under a Jewish flag.
JEWISH LEGION - a World War I British m ilitary unit which fought
under a Jewish flag.
KATZ, Shmuel - Foreign Affairs advisor to Prime Minister Menachem
Begin, member of Irgun High Command, Knessett member, author,
writer for the lerusalem Post.
KOOK, Hillel - (Peter Bergson) leader of the Irgun Delegation to the
United States (also called the Bergson Group), nephew of the chief
Rabbi of Jerusalem.
LECHI - (Lohamei Herut Israel, Hebrew for Freedom Fighters of
Israel), also known as the Stern Gang, the Jewish underground in
Palestine which fought the British from 1940 - 1948, organized and
led by Avraham Stern. This group split from the Irgun following the
Irgun’s decision to refrain from fighting the British during World
War II. Lechi also differed from the Irgun in its method of attack,
Lechi choosing personal assassinations of British officials rather than
m ilitary targets.
MERLIN, Shmuel - one of the original group of five delegates sent to
America by the Irgun.
NETANYAHU, Benzion - leader of the Revisionist Zionist movement
in America, Executive Director o f the New Zionist Organization,
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Professor, author, editor of Zionews.
NEW ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA - the Revisionist political
party in America, headed by Ben Zion Netanyahu.
PALMACH - The striking units o f the Haganah; dominated by
socialists
RAPHAELI, Dr. Alexe - one of the original group of five delegates sent
to America by the Irgun. Founder of Jerusalem Pencils, Director of
Israel Aircraft Industries, Jerusalem Economic Corp., Zim Israel
Navigation Company, Ltd., Dagon Ltd., Haifa.
REVISIONIST PARTY - See Union of Zionist Revisionists.
“SEASON”- (“The Hunting Season”) A campaign (Nov. 1944 - Oct.
1945) organized by Haganah, under Ben-Gurion’s leadership, to
inform on, kidnap and interrogate Irgun and Lechi members in an
attempt to stop them from attacking the British. Most of those
captured were turned over to the British and were imprisoned in
Palestine or exiled to prisons in Africa.
SHAMIR, Yltshak- Former Prime Minister of Israel; leader of Lechi
following the assassination of Avraham Stem.
UNION OF ZIONIST REVISIONISTS - Zionist political movement
founded by by Vladim ir Jabotinsky in 1925 with the goal o f
establishing a Jewish State in Palestine on both sides of the Jordan.
In 1935 the Revisionists left the World Zionist Organization and
established the New Zionist Organization.
UNITED RESISTANCE MOVEMENT (UMR) - coordinated anti-British
m ilitary actions of the Haganah, Irgun and Lechi which lasted from
November 1945 to August 1946.
WHITE PAPER OF 1939 - official British rejection of the partition
plan; a proposal for a Palestinian state having an Arab m ajority.
Under the plan Jewish immigration and rights to purchase land
would terminate within five years.
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WYMAN, David - author of The Abandonment of the lews, which
criticized the actions of the United States government during the
Holocaust with regard to the lack of effort to save the Jews of Europe.
ZIONISM - the political movement which called for the return of the
Jewish people to Eretz Israel.
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